Kahona Beach LLC v Santa Ana Rest. Corp. |
2010 NY Slip Op 51787(U) [29 Misc 3d 1210(A)] |
Decided on August 26, 2010 |
Supreme Court, New York County |
Kenney, J. |
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports. |
Kahona Beach LLC and
Yamilee Bongo, Plaintiffs,
against Santa Ana Restaurant Corp., 344 Bowery Retail LLC, and Robert Lombardi, Defendants. |
In this case, plaintiffs, the owner and the resident of a condominium
apartment in Manhattan, seek damages and permanent injunctive relief based on their allegations
that defendants have created a private nuisance by playing music too loudly. Plaintiffs move for
summary judgment on liability, and also for permanent injunctive relief, and request that the case
be set down for inquest or trial as to damages. Defendant 344 Bowery Retail LLC (Bowery), the
landlord of defendant Santa Anna Restaurant Corp. (Sala), cross-moves for an order to compel
disclosure and to preclude plaintiffs from offering certain evidence at trial.
Assuming, arguendo, the truth of the Sala Defendants' assertion that the building developer
failed to properly insulate the condominium, they have not demonstrated how this would permit
Sala to violate the Noise Code or to avoid responsibility for nuisance. The Noise Code is
intended to promote the peace of mind and health of New Yorkers. That the City never sleeps
does not change that Sala must comply with the law.
E N T E R:
__________________________
J.S.C.
Plaintiffs complain that employees of their downstairs neighbor, Sala, which has
been operating as a restaurant and lounge since 1999, have been playing excessively loud music
into the night thereby greatly disrupting and interfering with plaintiff Yamilee Bongo's sleep,
health and her ability to enjoy her home. Sala is located on two floors of commercial space
directly below plaintiffs' apartment. Plaintiffs assert causes of action for private nuisance and, in
their first cause of action, seek permanent injunctive relief. In their second cause of action,
plaintiffs seek damages.
[*2]
As to the injunctive relief sought, in the
complaint plaintiffs demand that defendants be enjoined from operating a nightclub from 10:00
As background, by order filed June 12, 2009, Justice Walter B. Tolub granted
plaintiffs' request to preliminarily enjoin defendants from playing music above the sound levels
described in the Noise Code, and directed a hearing in early August on the matter. On August 4,
2009, a hearing was held at which Justice Tolub instructed defendants to propose a plan to ensure
that the Noise Code requirements were met. On November 9, 2009, the parties appeared before
Justice Tolub concerning the preliminary injunction motion and a contempt motion made by
plaintiffs. After an evidentiary hearing, Justice Tolub denied plaintiffs' application to enjoin
defendants from operating Sala in the late evening and early morning hours and, finding only a
minor violation of the injunction, denied plaintiffs' contempt motion.
Defendant Bowery, Sala's landlord, appeared in November 2009, after stipulating
with plaintiffs to vacate a default judgment that had been granted on August 28, 2009, but did not
participate in the November 9, 2009 proceeding before Justice Tolub. On March 16, 2010,
Bowery was granted leave to amend its pleading to interpose a cross claim against Sala for
contribution, contractual and common-law indemnification and for failure to procure insurance.
"The proponent of a motion for summary judgment must demonstrate that there are
no material issues of fact in dispute, and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law" (Dallas-Stephenson v Waisman, 39
AD3d 303, 306 [1st Dept 2007]). Upon proffer of evidence establishing a prima facie case
by the movant, "the party opposing a motion for summary judgment bears the burden of
produc[ing] evidentiary proof in admissible form sufficient to require a trial of material questions
of fact'" (People v Grasso, 50 AD3d
535, 545 [1st Dept 2008], quoting Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557,
562 [1980]). "[A]ll of the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the opponent of
the motion" (id. at 544; Negri v Stop & Shop, Inc., 65 NY2d 625 [1985]). "If
there is any doubt as to the existence of a triable issue, the motion should be denied" (F.
Garofalo Elec. Co. v New York Univ., 300 AD2d 186, 188 [1st Dept 2002]).
In support of her motion, plaintiff Bongo submits an affidavit in which she avers that
she purchased her apartment, through Kahona Beach, LLC, from the building's sponsor in 2007
and, due to her extensive travel throughout 2008, did not then spend much time in the apartment,
but thereafter moved in. Bongo avers that when she bought the apartment, she was unaware that
Sala hosted private parties and operated as a nightclub on weekends, but soon learned that Sala
employees regularly play loud music with a strong bass line audible in her apartment. Bongo
chronicles her inability to fall asleep, nighttime awakenings, experiences with sound emanating
from Sala and calls to Sala about noise from June 2009 through March 2010. Bongo avers that
the level of the bass frequencies severely degrades her quality of life, and that in addition to
hearing sound, she can feel vibrations from the music in her apartment. Bongo claims that the
music disturbs her studies and has led to exhaustion, extreme stress, and physical harm and that
as a result, she spends as much time away from her apartment as possible and has listed it for
sale. Bongo feels that the noise problems [*3]must be disclosed to
a purchaser, and that she therefore will be unable to obtain the apartment's true value from a
buyer.
It is undisputed that Bongo provided access to Sala and defendant Lombardi, Sala's
principal (together, the Sala Defendants), to enter her apartment on August 13, 2009 so that the
Sala Defendants could prepare a proposal to ameliorate noise, as was directed by Justice Tolub.
Bongo states that she does not know what, if any, work was done at Sala, but contends that
nothing was done to change Sala's sound system and that no requests were made for access to her
apartment to perform acoustical testing. Bongo contends that her expert's proposed solutions,
such as installing adequate soundproofing and sound limiters on the sound equipment, have been
ignored, but remarks that the instances of unbearable music have diminished since November
2009, and that the Noise Code violations are more infrequent now.
Plaintiffs submit a letter, dated February 27, 2009, written by her counsel and
addressed to the Sala Defendants and Bowery. The letter addresses Bongo's complaints to Sala of
"loud music blaring" and "Sala's insistence on piping loud music into [plaintiffs'] apartment from
opening until closing at 4
Plaintiffs also submit the affidavits and testimony of expert Alan Fierstein, who
opines that he measured the sound levels at Bongo's apartment from April 28, 2009 through May
5, 2009, on May 9, 2009, and again from October 14, 2009 through November 2, 2009. Mr.
Fierstein's opinion is addressed in some detail below.
In addition, plaintiffs provide the affidavit of Bongo's house guest, Mr. Carl Restivo,
who avers that on July 8, 2009, Sala was playing loud music from 6:45 to 8:30
In opposition to plaintiffs' motion, the Sala Defendants argue that plaintiffs' real
dispute is with the developer, which failed to install adequate installation. In addition, Lombardi
avers that defendants responded to every one of Bongo's calls, and always turned down the music
even if it was dinnertime background music that could barely be heard by Sala diners. Lombardi
further avers that the Sala Defendants have never been given a violation for noise, and that they
provided a noise amelioration plan when directed by the court, but that plaintiffs were not
satisfied with the plan. Lombardi states that the Sala Defendants agreed to cooperate with
plaintiffs' expert, who made various recommendations that they were able to follow, and that
subsequent testing showed that Sala was within legal noise limits. Lombardi also notes that
plaintiffs chose to purchase a unit in an up-and-coming neighborhood in "the city that never
sleeps," and that Sala has been continuously operating in the same place for a long time, has not
changed its operations and generates no unusual noise (Lombardi Op. Aff., ¶ 16 [internal
quotation marks omitted]). Lombardi avers that any decrease in value in the plaintiffs' apartment
is attributable to the economic downturn, and that it was upon the death of Bongo's father that
she asked for consideration concerning noise levels.
To establish a private nuisance there must be an
intentional and unreasonable interference by a defendant with a plaintiff's right to use and enjoy
the premises he or she occupies (Ward v
City of New York, 15 AD3d 392, 393 [2d Dept 2005]; Weinberg v Lombardi,
217 AD2d 579 [2d Dept 1995]). The elements of the cause of action are " (1) an interference
substantial in nature, (2) intentional in origin, (3) unreasonable in character, (4) with a person's
property right to use and enjoy land, (5) caused by another's conduct in acting or failure to act'"
(JP Morgan Chase Bank v
Whitmore, 41 AD3d 433, 434 [2d Dept 2007]), quoting Copart Indus. v
Consolidated Edison Co. of NY, 41 NY2d 564, 570 [1977]). "[E]xcept for the issue of
whether the plaintiff has the requisite property interest, each of the other elements is a question
for the jury, unless the evidence is undisputed" (Weinberg, 217 AD2d at 579; but
seeMcCarty v Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 189 NY 40, 47 [1907])["What is
reasonable is sometimes a question of law and at others a question of fact. When it depends upon
an inference from peculiar, numerous or complicated circumstances it is usually a question of
fact"]). Residents are not required to seek medical care or move in order to demonstrate injury
(see State ve Fermenta ASC Corp, 166 Misc 2d 524, 533 [Sup Ct, Suffolk County1995],
affd in part 238 AD2d 400 [2d Dept 1997]), but must establish substantial annoyance or
discomfort to the ordinary reasonable person, and more than mere discomfort or minor
inconvenience (Dugway, Ltd. v Fizzinoglia, 166 AD2d 836 [3d Dept 1990]).
Quoting the website of the New York City Department of Environmental Protection
(DEP), the court in People v Bender (14 Misc 3d 1223[A], 2007 NY Slip. Op 50145[u]
[Crim Ct, NY County 2007]) wrote: "The [DEP] lists noise complaints as the number one quality
of life issue for city residents and touts that the [Noise Code], effective July 1, 2007, establishes a
flexible, yet enforceable noise code that responds to the need for peace and quiet while
maintaining New York's reputation as the City that never sleeps [internal quotation marks and
citation omitted]." Certainly, the interference with a person's sleep, and the right to the quiet
enjoyment of one's residential premises is a matter of great importance. However, plaintiffs seek
a permanent injunction, and such relief "is a drastic remedy which may be granted only where the
plaintiff demonstrates that it will suffer irreparable harm absent the injunction" (Icy Splash Food & Beverage, Inc., v
Henckel, 14 AD3d 595, 596 [2nd Dept 2005]; see e.g. Matter of 35 New York City Police Officers v City of New
York, 34 AD3d 392, 394 [1st Dept 2006]).
Defendants argue that plaintiffs have not alleged facts which, if believed, would
show the defendants' unreasonable and substantial interference with plaintiffs' use and enjoyment
of the apartment, or their injuries therefrom. Defendants maintain that the preliminary injunction
proceedings have not resolved any issue, other than that on a few occasions the music from Sala
exceeded the Noise Code limits, and that no finding was ever made that, under the
circumstances, Sala's music is playing at an unreasonable level. The Sala Defendants point to
Justice Tolub's findings on the contempt motion that plaintiffs had only one example of an
elevated noise level reading during a specific period. They also claim that they lowered the
volume of the music every time Bongo complained, whether or not it was loud, and point out that
they have received no noise violation citations, and that plaintiffs have taken no steps to mitigate
their alleged injury.
The Sala Defendants also contend that plaintiffs' expert did not find that music from
Sala was blaring into plaintiffs' apartment, but only that there were bass vibrations, and assert
that the cause of Bongo's stress, exhaustion and anxiety was the loss of both of her parents in a
short period of time after she purchased the apartment. The Sala Defendants argue that their
continuous lawful operation [*5]of their business must be
weighed against Bongo's alleged discomfort, with the court weighing the reasonableness of the
noise alleged to be a nuisance in light of all of the circumstances. Finally, the Sala Defendants
contend that it is critical to them to discover the extent of Bowery's awareness that soundproofing
materials were removed during the renovation of the building to condominium units, which, they
maintain, is a liability issue.
In reply, Bongo avers that the death of her stepmother and her father did not occur
until later in 2009, but that her dispute with defendants started in Fall 2008. Bongo further avers
that she is not hyper-sensitive to sound, but has learned that she is sensitive to bass music blaring
into her apartment, causing the floor and walls to vibrate and her furniture to shake.[FN1]
As is generally the case in nuisance suits (Weinberg, 217 AD2d at 579;
see Lawrence Wolf, Inc. v Kissing Bridge Corp., 288 AD2d 935, 936 [4th Dept
2001]; Futerfas v Shultis, 209 AD2d 761, 763 [3d Dept 1994]), this case presents issues
of fact for trial. The primary dispute here concerns the reasonableness of the noise that has
emanated from Sala.
Despite what appears to be the Sala Defendants' contention otherwise, plaintiffs have
no obligation to tolerate any violation of the Noise Code. Indeed, it is the Sala Defendants that
are required to operate their business within the confines of the law. In a noise nuisance case,
however, while sound level is certainly a significant factor, the unreasonableness of an alleged
interference with a property owner's rights also requires the evaluation and weighing of multiple
other factors, including the duration of the allegedly offending sound, the times at which it is
made, whether the condition is recurring, and if so, with what frequency (see Futerfas v
Shultis, 209 AD2d at 763). Clearly sounds that are reasonable midday, may not be so after
midnight (see Matter of Twin Elm Management Corp. v Banks, 181 Misc 96 [Mun Ct,
Borough of Queens, 2d Dist 1943] [12 hours of piano practice found not to be a nuisance where
there was no showing that the piano playing was exceptionally loud or performed at unreasonable
hours]), and 10 minutes of disturbance on rare occasions is not the same as 10 minutes of
disturbance hourly. In addition, the character of the neighborhood must also be considered, as
what is acceptable in an industrial area may not be acceptable in a residential area. Whether or
not a plaintiff came to the nuisance is also a factor, but of less significance than the level,
duration and frequency of occurrences of sound (cf. McCarty, 189 NY at 50), and
of little, if any, significance concerning a violation of the law (see Graceland Corp. v
Consolidated Laundries Corp., 7 AD2d 89, 93 [1st Dept 1958], affd 6 NY2d 900
[1959]).
Plaintiffs have demonstrated what Bongo deems to be disturbances on the order of
approximately three times a month for seven of the 10 months from June 2009 through
mid-March 2010. While Bongo avers that her expert demonstrated to her what noise levels
would exceed the Noise Code limits, for many of her affidavit entries concerning occasions of
noise she does not adequately quantify the level (see e.g. Bongo Mov. Aff., ¶¶
22 [June 25, 2009 incident], 27 [July 5, [*6]2009 incident]; 29
[August 3, 2009 incident]). Bongo describes the volume of the sound in the apartment as
exceeding Noise Code limits on five occasions in the June 2009 through March 2010 period, but
does not state the basis for her knowledge of this assertion, or specify how long the noise
exceeded the Noise Code limits on these occasions. Bongo also does not make clear that the
Noise Code was violated during instances when she describes the music as loud or disturbing.
Plaintiffs also submit the July 24, 2009 testimony of Sala's manager that he was
listening to music when there was no one in Sala, and that upon Bongo's complaint he went to
plaintiffs' apartment to hear the sound, but heard no music (Pl. Exh. 5, at 46). Sala's manager also
testified that the restaurant had been playing the music at "an unbelievably low degree, so I've
turned the music from ambient background restaurant music to almost nonexistent," but that
despite this, he has personally received five to 10 complaints from Bongo since May 2009
(id., at 56-57). The report of plaintiffs' expert, Fierstein, reflects that for a week
commencing April 28, 2009, Bongo recorded music that she felt was loud enough to wake her or
prevent her from sleeping and that on Saturday, May 9, 2009, Fierstein performed a noise test
himself. Fierstein's report contains two graphs, with the first demonstrating a six-minute period
of music at varying volumes, on May 2, 2009, a Saturday night, from 11:45 p.m. to 11:51 p.m.,
during which time the noise exceeded the Noise Code limits. The second graph demonstrates a
three minute period, on May 1, 2009, a Friday night, from 11:09-11:12 p.m., where the sound
level in plaintiffs' apartment exceeded the Noise Code level. Presumably these readings were the
highest readings. Fierstein avers that he heard and recorded the same type of noise in the
apartment and opined that there were "[d]ozens of incidents of disturbing music during the week"
(Pl. Exh. 8 [May 12, 2009 letter], at 3), and that the apartment is unreasonably loud, but also
states that the sound violated the Noise Code "when the music is playing at the levels I
measured" (id., at 6). It is not clear whether plaintiffs' expert is opining that the level of
sound generated by Sala exceeded the Noise Code on multiple occasions, or only for the three-
and six-minute periods illustrated or measured in the graphs on Friday and Saturday night.
Plaintiffs also submit a second report from Fierstein addressing the 19-day period
from October 14, 2009 through November 2, 2009, in which Fierstein made similar assertions
(Pl. Exh 15 [November 2, 2009 letter], at 2). The record reveals, however, that at the November
9, 2009 proceeding, Fierstein testified, regarding one of the graphs in his report, that within the
two and a half minutes of sound illustrated therein, there were approximately 10 seconds in
which the noise level exceeded the Noise Code, followed by a remaining period in which the
music was not audible for the remaining time except for a couple of spots. Fierstein also testified
that out of Bongo's hours of recordings over the 19-day period, the sound only exceeded the
Noise Code on October 25, 2009 (Pl. Exh. 16, at 38). Thus, Justice Tolub determined that there
had been only a minor violation of the injunction, and insufficient evidence to hold defendants in
contempt (Pl. Exh. 16, at 51). In any event, other than the Noise Code violations discussed, the
record, without further explanation, does not lend itself to meaningful assessment of the duration
and frequency of Noise Code violations.
Consequently, plaintiffs' own submissions demonstrate that there are fact issues,
from which inferences must be drawn, as to the level, frequency, duration and other factors
concerning the noise. In addition, plaintiffs seek injunctive relief of a far greater magnitude than
merely the curtailment of bass frequencies, despite that their expert did not opine that there has
been a violation of the Noise [*7]Code other than the specific
section that concerns bass frequencies.[FN2] In fact, plaintiffs seek an order enjoining Sala
from playing music at all from 9
Plaintiffs also point to Justice Tolub's discussion, during previous proceedings
concerning the preliminary injunction, about plaintiffs' status as third-party beneficiaries to a
lease between Sala and its landlord, Bowery. As plaintiffs plead only a nuisance claim, and not a
contract claim, whether or not they are third-party beneficiaries to the Sala lease with Bowery
will not be addressed here. In addition, while both plaintiffs and defendants point to Justice
Tolub's comments during the prior preliminary injunction proceeding, "a preliminary injunction
is a provisional remedy and a decision concerning a preliminary injunction does not become the
law of the case, nor would it constitute an adjudication on the merits so as to preclude
reconsideration of that issue at a trial on the merits [internal quotation marks and citation
omitted]" (Icy Splash Food & Beverage, Inc., 14 AD3d at 596).
Plaintiffs also cite to cases in which courts have commented negatively about those
who, concerning a nuisance, callously disregard the rights of others (see e.g. Hohenberg v 77
W. 55th St. Assoc., 90 AD2d 750 [1st Dept 1982] [defendant did nothing to ameliorate noise
condition in building]), and argue that defendants have ignored Bongo's pleas and taken no steps
to ameliorate the noise problem. Plaintiffs' submissions, however, reveal that, on November 9,
2009, Lombardi testified that since the August 4, 2009 hearing, some repairs had been made to a
ceiling in Sala, and that all of the speakers in the restaurant were lowered from Sala's ceiling (Pl.
Exh. 16, at 44). Lombardi further testified that he has attempted to measure the sound in the
restaurant and has marked the volume levels on the sound system and allegedly provided
instructions to staff in order to remediate the problem, and that he hired someone to monitor the
music level when customers submit their own music (id., at 44-49).[FN3] As previously noted, on summary
judgment, evidence must be viewed in favor of the non-moving party. In addition, the testimony
of Sala's manger and Lombardi that Sala turned down the sound when Bongo complained
conflicts with Bongo's averments that her calls were ignored or met with rude responses and, on
summary judgment, a court "may not evaluate the parties' credibility to decide whose version of
the facts is true" (Gurfein Bros., Inc. v Hanover Insurance Co., 248 AD2d 227, 229 [1st
Dept 1998]), but is essentially obligated to accept the opposing party's version of the facts (see e.g. Shands v Escalona, 44 AD3d
524, 524 [1st Dept 2007]).
While the Sala Defendants' submissions by no means satisfactorily demonstrate the
abatement of any sound problem, issues of fact preclude summary judgment and the granting of a
permanent injunction of the magnitude sought by plaintiffs. If the repairs Lombardi discussed
have [*8]been made, there is a fact issue as to where things stand
now. While this would not preclude plaintiffs' recovery for damages (see Hochenberg, 90
AD2d 750, supra [discussing damages]).
As there are fact questions concerning plaintiffs' nuisance claim, plaintiffs' motion
for summary judgment as against Bowery, based on their contention that Bowery had notice of
Sala's acts, is denied, without prejudice to renew at trial.
Bowery's motion to preclude, based on plaintiffs' failure to comply with Bowery's
discovery demands is also denied. With its contention that it made a single, apparently
unreturned, phone call to plaintiffs' counsel concerning discovery, Bowery does not demonstrate
plaintiffs' bad faith or willfulness under the circumstances here. Thus, there is no basis for the
harsh remedy of preclusion. Bowery has demonstrated a basis to compel plaintiffs to comply with
its demands, and plaintiffs are ordered to do so, as discussed below.
Bowery's motion to compel is granted to the extent that, within 45 days of service on
plaintiffs by Bowery of this decision and order with notice of entry, plaintiffs are to comply with
the following discovery and other demands made by Bowery: (1) the demand for a bill of
particulars;[FN4] (2) the
demand for collateral source information; (3) the notice to produce; (4) the notice for discovery
of statement of party; (5) the notice for discovery and inspection of expert witness information;
(6) the demand for witness disclosure; and (7) the demand for insurance information, all of which
are dated January 29, 2010. The parties are also directed to appear for a court conference, as
directed below, to address discovery, including, if necessary, a deposition schedule. Bowery's
motion is otherwise denied, without prejudice to renewal upon proper papers, as the record does
not demonstrate a basis for Bowery's demands for authorizations for plaintiffs' social security
disability authorization, income tax, employment, union and workers' compensation records or
for "Ad Damnum Information" (see Havens v Tucker, 136 AD2d 814, 815 [3d Dept
1988]).
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED that plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment is denied; and it
is further
ORDERED that defendant 344 Bowery Retail LLC's motion to preclude is
denied; and it is further
ORDERED that defendant 344 Bowery Retail LLC's motion to compel is
granted to the extent that, within 45 days of service on plaintiffs by Bowery of this decision and
order with notice of entry, plaintiffs shall comply with Bowery's (1) demand for a bill of
particulars; (2) demand for [*9]collateral source information; (3)
notice to produce; (4) notice for discovery of statement of party; (5) notice for discovery and
inspection of expert witness information; (6) demand for witness disclosure; and (7) demand for
insurance information, all of which are dated January 29, 2010; and it is further
ORDERED that a preliminary conference will be held on October 21,
2010, at 9:30 AM, in Part 8.
Dated: August 26, 2010
Footnote 1:Plaintiffs state, in their reply
memorandum of law and elsewhere, that the Sala Defendants played music that exceeded the
Noise Code by 400%, but this assertion does not accurately reflect plaintiffs' expert's discussion
regarding the sound level, in which he stated that a sound of 66 decibels is more than four times
as loud to the human ear as the Noise Code's 45 decibel limit.
Footnote 2:Plaintiffs' seek to enjoin the Sala
defendants from playing music or allowing music to be played at a level in excess of certain
limits established in the Noise Code, but, on this record, plaintiffs have demonstrated the
violation of only one section ([a] [2]) of the Noise Code and not the other sections ([a] [1] and
[a] [3]) upon which plaintiffs model their broad request for permanent injunctive relief.
Footnote 3:The dates when the remedial
efforts were undertaken are not clear on the record.
Footnote 4:Bowery's demand for a bill of
particulars appears geared toward a negligence action, and plaintiffs are ordered to comply by
responding to the demand as appropriate, considering the nature of this action. Plaintiffs'
contention that Bowery is not entitled to discovery because it was not in the action from its
commencement ignores that plaintiffs stipulation agreeing to vacate the default.