[*1]
People v Crawford (Glenroy)
2004 NY Slip Op 51558(U)
Decided on December 9, 2004
Appellate Term, Second Department
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.


Decided on December 9, 2004
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

APPELLATE TERM: 9th and 10th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

PRESENT: McCABE, P.J., RUDOLPH and ANGIOLILLO, JJ.
2003-1737 OR CR

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Respondent,

against

GLENROY A. CRAWFORD, Appellant.


Appeal by defendant from a judgment of the Justice Court, Town of Tuxedo, Orange County (J. Vingiello, J.), rendered December 4, 2003, convicting him, after a nonjury trial, of speeding, in violation of section 1180 (d) of the Vehicle and Traffic Law, and imposing sentence.


Judgment of conviction unanimously affirmed.

Defendant was convicted, after a nonjury trial, of having violated section 1180 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law, specifically of traveling at a speed of 60 miles per hour, where the posted speed limit was 35 miles per hour. He contends that the officer's testimony regarding his visual estimate of the speed of defendant's vehicle, was insufficient to sustain his conviction as it was not corroborated by any mechanical device for gauging speed.

It is well settled that the opinion evidence of a police officer, uncorroborated by mechanical devices, may, in a proper case, be sufficient to sustain a speeding conviction. The officer must demonstrate some experience in observing the rate of speed of moving objects, and some consideration must be given to the variance between the estimated speed of the vehicle and the established speed limit (see People v Olsen, 22 NY2d 230 [1968]). Here, the officer testified as to his expertise in visually assessing the speed of vehicles, and was therefore properly qualified to give opinion evidence on the subject. Moreover, the variance of 25 miles per hour between the officer's visual observation of 60 miles per hour and the posted speed limit of 35 [*2]miles per hour, was great enough to establish that defendant was speeding (People v Olsen, 22 NY2d 230, supra; see also Matter of Martin v Adduci, 138 AD2d 599 [1988]).

Although the officer's version of the events differed from the defendant's version, resolution of conflicting testimony, and the weight to be accorded to such testimony are primarily questions to be determined by the trier of fact which saw and heard the
witnesses (see People v Gaimari, 176 NY 84, 94 [1903]). Such determinations are entitled to great weight on appeal and should not be disturbed unless clearly unsupported by the record (People v Garafolo, 44 AD2d 86 [1974]).
Decision Date: December 09, 2004