1	COURT OF APPEALS
2	STATE OF NEW YORK
3	
4	PEOPLE,
5	Respondent,
6	-against-
7	No. 225 CALVIN MAYS,
8	Appellant.
9	
10	20 Eagle Street Albany, New York 12207
11	November 13, 2012
12	Before:
13	CHIEF JUDGE JONATHAN LIPPMAN ASSOCIATE JUDGE CARMEN BEAUCHAMP CIPARICK
14	ASSOCIATE JUDGE VICTORIA A. GRAFFEO ASSOCIATE JUDGE SUSAN PHILLIPS READ
15	ASSOCIATE JUDGE ROBERT S. SMITH ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE F. PIGOTT, JR.
16	Appearances:
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24	David Rutt
25	Official Court Transcriber

1 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: People v. Calvin 2 Mays, number 225. 3 Counselor, do you want any rebuttal time? 4 MR. ECKERT: Two minutes, Your Honor. 5 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Two minutes. Sure. Go ahead. 6 7 MR. ECKERT: Thank you, Your Honor. The 8 trial court erred by allowing the prosecutor to 9 determine that the request to expand the jury note 10 would be granted and to conduct follow-up, and these 11 errors tainted the trial, not individual counts. 12 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Why isn't it 13 ministerial as your adversary contends? MR. ECKERT: A ministerial act is something 14 15 that involves no judgment, no choice; it's simply you 16 do what's clearly required. For instance, when a 17 deputy goes to tell the jury stop deliberating, you simply say the words "stop deliberating". There's no 18 19 2.0 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What was the 21 practical effect in this case of having the prosecutor do the video, the - - - where to stop, 22 23 where to start? In practical terms, what is it that 2.4 was prejudicial about that?

MR. ECKERT: Well, I submit that prejudice

1	doesn't need to be shown, but the practical impact -
2	
3	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But tell us in
4	MR. ECKERT: Yeah.
5	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: common sense
6	why is this a bad thing?
7	MR. ECKERT: Because the trial prosecutor
8	took over the role of the judge in doing several
9	things. First
10	JUDGE CIPARICK: But there was no
11	objection, was there? There was no objection by
12	defense counselor. No one objected to the prosecutor
13	showing the video. No one apparently objected to the
14	exchange between the jurors and the prosecutor,
15	correct?
16	MR. ECKERT: Correct. Either this was mode
17	of proceeding or I lose. So
18	JUDGE GRAFFEO: Well, maybe what do
19	you do if the judge doesn't know how to use that kind
20	of electronic equipment?
21	MR. ECKERT: There's no fundamental problem
22	with having somebody else run the machine, but the
23	prosecutor made choices in terms of running the
24	machine that went beyond

JUDGE SMITH: You're saying it should have

1 been some video technician, not the prosecutor? 2 MR. ECKERT: Or the prosecutor could, as 3 in, I think, a Second Department case, show the 4 jurors where the start button and stop button are and 5 the jury can do what they want or some independent 6 person. 7 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What's the impact on 8 the jury of the prosecutor running it? 9 MR. ECKERT: Well, the impact - - - first 10 of all, going step by step through what the 11 prosecutor did, the judge gets a note that just says 12 "Fastrac video", meaning, I think, play the video. 13 The prosecutor, not the judge, decided to grant the 14 jury request that was granted - - - that was made on 15 the fly to stop the video. And I think that's a 16 choice - - - that's a nonministerial act by itself. 17 JUDGE SMITH: You're really saying that 18 that request, stop the video, should be treated as 19 though it was a jury note? 20 MR. ECKERT: I think that should be treated 21 as though it's a change to the - - - like as in 22 DeRosario, that it's a change on the fly. 23 JUDGE SMITH: So when a juror says could 2.4 you stop the video, the judge has to say, okay, hold

everything, I need a conference with counsel?

MR. ECKERT: First of all, if the judge had 1 2 made that mistake, that would require an objection, 3 but I think the prosecutor making the - - - to the 4 extent that I'm making an O'Rama error there that 5 require an objection, but I think the judge has to be the one to decide whether or not that request should 6 7 be granted. JUDGE CIPARICK: So this judge wasn't 8 9 monitoring - - - obviously, he was not monitoring what was going on here, right? He didn't say one 10 11 word. He didn't say to the DA, let me ask the 12 question, or he didn't - - -13 MR. ECKERT: Correct. I mean, the judge 14 just let the prosecutor - - -15 JUDGE CIPARICK: Just let him keep going. 16 MR. ECKERT: - - - take over. 17 JUDGE GRAFFEO: Although the judge was 18 present here. 19 MR. ECKERT: Yes. 20 JUDGE GRAFFEO: Because that's one thing in 21 Torres and Ahmed, we didn't have a judge present. 22 It's a court employee, it's the court officer, it's 23 the law clerk, but the judge - - -2.4 MR. ECKERT: Correct.

JUDGE GRAFFEO: - - - wasn't present.

1 Here, the - - - I take it the judge was still sitting 2 on the bench here and aware of what was happening. 3 So it's a bit different from our previous cases. 4 MR. ECKERT: It's different, but the 5 question is who is making the judgment, who is making 6 the - - -7 JUDGE SMITH: The judge even interjected. 8 I mean, the judge speaks a couple of times, says can 9 everybody see, things like that. 10 MR. ECKERT: At the very beginning, yes, a 11 couple of the questions that the judge - - -JUDGE SMITH: I mean, isn't - - - can't you 12 13 read this transcript as the judge was supervising the 14 courtroom and allowing the prosecutor to do the 15 ministerial function of showing the video? 16 MR. ECKERT: But the prosecutor didn't 17 perform - - - the judge - - - if the prosecutor had 18 hit the play button, that's ministerial. If the 19 jurors had then said, can you stop it there, and the 20 judge said, okay, why don't you stop it there - - -21 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: If the colloquy had 22 been with the judge, it's okay, right? 23 If the colloquy arguably - - -MR. ECKERT: 24 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: The judge said stop 25 it here, Judge, what should I do here, that would be

1 okay, right? 2 MR. ECKERT: That - - - there might 3 arguably be an O'Rama error that requires 4 preservation at that point. So arguably there's 5 still an error, but it requires preservation because 6 the judge is sort of taking information or taking 7 changes from the jury on the fly. JUDGE PIGOTT: How did your client do with 8 9 the jury on this issue? 10 MR. ECKERT: Pardon me? 11 JUDGE PIGOTT: How did your client do with the jury on this issue? 12 13 MR. ECKERT: With regard to this - - - with regard to the facts in this video, he was acquitted 14 15 of all counts. 16 JUDGE READ: Yeah. That's the kind of 17 error you'd like to see all the time, isn't it? 18 MR. ECKERT: Well, no, and that's why I 19 think what's important about Ahmed is - - - this 20 Court's decision in Ahmed is that when the judge 21 turns over a judicial function, and I submit that 22 reinterpreting or allowing the jury to change their 23 note is a judicial function - - -

JUDGE PIGOTT: But that happens.

not unusual when they want a readback, for example.

That's

2.4

They say, we want all the testimony of so-and-so, and then there's a colloquy when the - - - and the judge says, are you sure you want all of it, and they say, well, we mean just the direct. And then, of course, a good defense lawyer says, Judge, if you're going to read the direct, you got to read the cross, and then that happens. That could have happened here. The defense lawyer could have said, wait a minute, you're stopping and starting it, even though they want to see this part, Judge, I want them to see the other part. And then you would have had an objection.

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MR. ECKERT: Correct. And that's, I think, important because if the judge had committed the O'Rama error, that requires an objection.

JUDGE PIGOTT: No, no. I'm saying - - they're saying what happened here, and then you stand
up - - I know you weren't there, but the defense
lawyer stands up and says, Judge, they're asking the
DA here to do this, I think that we ought to help
them out a little bit more and give them what
happened just before that. It's not the judge doing
anything; it's just making - - fixing this.

MR. ECKERT: True. But I submit that what goes on, when the juror makes a written request and then has supplemental changes as in DeRosario,

1	supplemental changes to that request and the judge
2	grants or doesn't grant that, there's a potential
3	O'Rama error because there's no additional defense
4	input, and the defendant has to object. But I think
5	what's important here is the O'Rama error is
6	committed by the prosecutor; that's not something you
7	see every day.
8	JUDGE CIPARICK: But that happens all the
9	time. The jurors say, we heard enough, we heard
10	enough. They ask for everything, but then they come
11	to the part
12	MR. ECKERT: Exactly.
13	JUDGE CIPARICK: that they want to
14	hear
15	MR. ECKERT: Right.
16	JUDGE CIPARICK: and then they
17	somehow communicate to the court and to everybody and
18	to the court reporter, we've heard enough.
19	MR. ECKERT: Correct.
20	JUDGE CIPARICK: And it ends right there.
21	So that's an O'Rama error?
22	MR. ECKERT: And to the extent that there's
23	an error though, that requires an objection. To the
24	extent that there's a problem with the court taking

supplemental comments from the jury that changes to

note and not going through the O'Rama process, to the extent that there's an error there, absolutely that requires an objection by defense counsel.

2.4

JUDGE SMITH: Well, why does it become mode of proceedings when it's the prosecutor, not the judge?

MR. ECKERT: Because the prosecutor shouldn't be doing it at all. That's the Ahmed error. I think the purpose of the O'Rama error - - -

JUDGE GRAFFEO: This isn't the first case though where - - - I mean, there are some Appellate Division cases where prosecutors ran the tape and it was approved.

MR. ECKERT: Well, it was approved because the prosecutor hit start and stop or showed them where the start and stop button was. It wasn't the prosecutor - - - first of all, the prosecutor didn't reinterpret the note from the jury to say, now we're going to start and stop the tape. But I think the reason that it's important with regard to all - - - the trial and not regarding individual counts is that Ahmed says that when a judge allows a nonjudicial person to take over judicial function, that violates the right to trial by jury.

JUDGE SMITH: If I understand you, you

1 could make exactly this argument if it were a law 2 secretary or some video technician had been running 3 the videotape. MR. ECKERT: If the video technician had 4 5 carried out a judicial function, yes. If the judge was directing - - -6 JUDGE SMITH: It supposes you have exactly 7 8 the same transcript except it's not the prosecutor 9 standing there; it's a video technician. That's 10 still mode of proceedings error? 11 MR. ECKERT: I think so because you've 12 still got the - - -13 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Is it - - -MR. ECKERT: It's less of an error; it's 14 15 less - -16 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Wait. Is your 17 argument really that the jury gets a different 18 relationship with the prosecutor by his doing it or 19 is your argument that because - - - in answer to 2.0 Judge Smith's question that really that has nothing 21 to do with it. I mean, that I understand as there 22 can be subtle things that work on a jury, but doesn't it - - - but does it - - - if you have a neutral 23 2.4 who's doing the machine, you think it's still the

same error, there's no difference - - -

1	MR. ECKERT: Well
2	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: on your theory
3	of this argument?
4	MR. ECKERT: If the neutral is
5	reinterpreting the jury note by allowing them to
6	change Fastrac video to saying
7	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Well, that's O'Rama,
8	right?
9	MR. ECKERT: telling them where to
10	stop.
11	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: That's O'Rama?
12	MR. ECKERT: I think that's Ahmed.
13	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: That's Ahmed?
14	MR. ECKERT: That's Ahmed because a
15	nonjudge is deciding that that request will be
16	granted.
17	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So it doesn't matter
18	who takes over the courtroom; anyone taking over part
19	of the judge's role is no good?
20	MR. ECKERT: Correct. I mean, there was a
21	neutral party; it was a neutral party in Ahmed.
22	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Let's hear from your
23	adversary, and then you'll come back with rebuttal.
24	JUDGE CIPARICK: So what about the
25	distinction between an advocate and a neutral party?

MR. O'BRIEN: Well, I mean, I guess - - 
JUDGE CIPARICK: He says it doesn't make a

difference.

MR. O'BRIEN: I think what we're talking

about, pausing a video player, it probably doesn't

2.4

JUDGE SMITH: If there had been an objection, if the defendant had stood up and said,

Judge, I object to the defense - - - to the prosecutor getting up there and bonding with the jury by chatting back and forth with them, would that have been a good objection?

make a difference. But if I take the defendant's - -

MR. O'BRIEN: I mean, I think probably if the defendant actually objects to that and he - - -  $\!\!\!$ 

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So then - - - but if that would be a good objection, why isn't this a mode of proceedings error that you really don't need to object to if it's prejudicial, if it goes to the heart of the function of the judge and there is a relationship that builds, assume that this went a little further than what - - and it's hard to draw these lines, suppose there was a real colloquy about, well, what do you think about that particular part of the tape and he engages in more of a back and forth

1 with the jury, that would have been mode of 2 proceedings, right? 3 MR. O'BRIEN: Well, I still - - -CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Or not? 4 5 MR. O'BRIEN: No, I still think with O'Rama under Kadarko and Ramirez, which I think was not 6 7 cited in the briefs - - -8 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But what about Ahmed? 9 What about Ahmed? 10 MR. O'BRIEN: Okay. Ahmed is different but 11 with - - -12 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yeah, but I'm asking 13 you - - -14 MR. O'BRIEN: Okay. 15 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - about Ahmed. 16 Why is that not a mode of proceedings error? Say it 17 was a little bit more extreme than this and we - - -18 and I think you'd agree it's hard to draw a line as 19 to what they said and didn't say, why isn't that mode 20 of proceedings that if you and I engage in some kind 21 of a dialogue where I kind of - - - the possibility 22 that I'm going to bond with you, why isn't that a 23 mode of proceedings error? 2.4 MR. O'BRIEN: Okay. Well, I mean, I - - -25 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Judge shouldn't allow

1 that, right, when it's his role, when it's his role. 2 MR. O'BRIEN: Yeah, if it's his role. Now, 3 the bonding thing, I think, is maybe a separate 4 point, but with respect to - - -5 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yeah. 6 MR. O'BRIEN: - - - with respect to Ahmed, 7 I mean, Ahmed has to do with the judge delegating the 8 substantive instruction on the law to somebody else. 9 But here - - -10 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yeah, but the point 11 is theoretically, and I'm not saying in practical 12 terms, but theoretically if you're taking the role of 13 the judge and you're performing the judge's function 14 back and forth with the jury, can't - - - wouldn't 15 you think that that - - - that if that's what 16 happens, and we'll see how it applies to this 17 particular case, that that's a mode of proceedings 18 error? MR. O'BRIEN: I think that's not what 19 20 happened here. I think that - - -21 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But if it did, that would be a mode - - -22 23 MR. O'BRIEN: I think it would be a mode of 2.4 proceedings error if the prosecutor were giving 25 substantive instructions, absolutely. I think that's

1 2 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, so your quibble 3 - - - or not quibble - - - your argument is this - -- what he did was ministerial and that it shouldn't 4 5 have arose to that level, but how do we know which it is, ministerial or substantive? Or do you think this 6 7 is just obviously ministerial? MR. O'BRIEN: Well, I think this is 8 9 obviously ministerial, but I also think that - - - I 10 mean - - -11 JUDGE CIPARICK: But what about his asking, 12 do you want to see the next one? I mean - - -13 MR. O'BRIEN: Well, and I think that - - -14 JUDGE CIPARICK: - - - do you want me to 15 play it again, do you want me - - -16 MR. O'BRIEN: I think as was pointed out -17 18 JUDGE CIPARICK: Getting close. 19 MR. O'BRIEN: - - - in our brief, that 20 question seems to be directed at the judge from the 21 prosecutor. And if you read - - - I mean, the judge 22 is very involved in this also. Really, I mean, the 23 one thing where I can sort of see the prosecutor

maybe doing something sort of out of bounds is with

the pause, when the juror asked to pause it. Okay.

2.4

1	I mean, there the prosecutor is sort of doing
2	something other than just press play.
3	But I think it's the same thing as if you
4	had a readback and the court reporter is doing a
5	readback, and one of the jurors says, wait a second,
6	I didn't hear that, could you read that back to me.
7	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But the court
8	reporter is different than the prosecutor, isn't it?
9	JUDGE CIPARICK: Neutral, works for the
10	court.
11	MR. O'BRIEN: Right, right. So if there
12	were actually a delegation
13	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Isn't this in some
14	ways a stronger case than Ahmed because
15	MR. O'BRIEN: No.
16	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: you're not
17	dealing with a neutral; you're dealing with
18	MR. O'BRIEN: No
19	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: an advocate.
20	MR. O'BRIEN: because Ahmed deals
21	with the court delegating authority. The court
22	didn't delegate the court delegated
23	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But delegating
24	MR. O'BRIEN: the playing of the
25	video.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But delegating

authority to a neutral is not as significant. It

still may be enough under Ahmed but delegating it to

one of the sides, the prosecutor, that's quite more

serious, isn't it?

2.4

MR. O'BRIEN: Right, but that's - - - I guess my point is that the business of pausing the video is not something the court delegated to the prosecutor. The prosecutor answers that question, but the court doesn't say, well, I'm going to defer to the prosecutor, let the prosecute - - - that would be delegating. Delegating is an active thing.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What did the judge do other than at the very beginning that indicated active involvement?

MR. O'BRIEN: Well, the court - - - well, first of all, I mean, I think, if, in fact, this was just played and that was it, the court wouldn't have had to do anything basically. And so, I mean, what it does is, because there are two clips, there's this - - and because there's the glare from the lighting and turn off the light, so it's involved with those little things, but basically playing back a video doesn't require the court to do much of anything.

Now, the prosecutor inserts herself. That

may - - - maybe that's misconduct.

2.4

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What about the defense during all of this? What about the defense? Are they entitled to play a role if the prosecutor is playing a role?

MR. O'BRIEN: Again, if the defense objected to the fact that the prosecutor was playing this video - - -

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: If they don't say anything, forget about what the - - -

MR. O'BRIEN: No, I do think there are also practical issues here, I mean, noted in the record that the prosecutor says before the read - - - or before the playing back of the video, I've got the officer out in the hallway in case I can't get this to work. These surveillance videos are usually - - - they're proprietary software, they have their own special software player. It's not as simple as instruct the jurors how to press play on the VCR, and there may be problems with it, and the prosecutor was aware of that and, therefore, had the police officer there.

 $\label{eq:continuous} \mbox{ If I can make a point about the prejudice} \\ \mbox{though, as well ---}$ 

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Go ahead. Sure.

1 MR. O'BRIEN: - - - because counsel seems 2 to equate mode of proceedings with automatic 3 reversal, and for lots and lots of mode of 4 proceedings errors, maybe the vast majority of mode 5 of proceedings errors, the nature of the error is going to be such that if it's committed it's going to 6 7 result in a reversal, but that's - - -JUDGE CIPARICK: So here it's harmless 8 9 because of the acquittal? 10 MR. O'BRIEN: Absolutely, absolutely. And 11 there's no argument of spillover effect. I don't think there could be. 12 13 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Well, if there were 14 no other charges, we all agree, but what's the effect 15 that he was convicted on the other charges? 16 MR. O'BRIEN: The fact that he was 17 convicted of the other charges? CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yeah. 18 19 MR. O'BRIEN: I think shows that this 2.0 couldn't have prejudiced him. I mean, typically the 21 prejudice works the other way. It's the propensity sort of argument. It's - - - they convicted me on 22 23 both of these, and you should reverse both of them 2.4

because that playing of the video on the other one

which convinced them that I was the burglar in that

one spills over into this one. Here, they looked at this video - - - this is an ID case - - - they looked at this video and said, we don't know it's him. How does that - - - how can that possibly spill over onto the other case? It doesn't - - -

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CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: You didn't think it's tainted by - - -

MR. O'BRIEN: I don't think it works logically the way that a spillover argument can typically work.

And with respect to DeRosario and changes on the fly, this is not a substantive change in the request. Play the video, that's all that - - - all that happens is the video is played. Pausing it at one point is not substantively changing the request. And I think it's important to remember again with the nature of the this video, these are surveillance videos. They're recorded at high speed, multiple cameras, and they have to be slowed down, and that was - - that's indicated in the record that they had to slow this down to something like normal speed. If you just put this in and play it, you see a hundred frames a second or something.

So you have this video which is already playing at a sort of odd speed, but they want us to

see the video. That's all they request; that's all that happens here. It's paused at one point because it's going by quick.

2.4

JUDGE CIPARICK: They wanted to see it at one point where the defendant was together with somebody else supposedly. They wanted to see that particular image.

MR. O'BRIEN: Right, right. And that's part of - - in the video. It's like you were saying about a readback. They may ask for the readback testimony of an entire witness and what they're looking for is one little thing in it. I don't think that change - - -

JUDGE CIPARICK: They communicated that to the district attorney, not to the judge, not to the - - it's - - -

MR. O'BRIEN: Well, I don't know who it's said to. I mean, we get to - - - the jury - - - a juror says it, and the prosecutor responds to that.

But I don't know who it's addressed to.

And as a practical matter, I mean, if somebody were to object or if the court were to step in here, the practical effect would be you'd send the jury back into the jury room, they'd send out a note that says we want you to pause it at a particular

point; I mean, it would change nothing. There's nothing the defense can offer here.

2.4

JUDGE CIPARICK: But there's more control over the courtroom that way, actually. I mean, it's cleaner that way, if the judge had taken - - -

MR. O'BRIEN: It's cleaner. And if the defense wanted it to be cleaner, they could have objected to it and they could have cleaned it up that way. And again, I mean, I think this is all happening on the record in front of the defense attorney. If this is a problem to the defense attorney, they can object to it at the time when it can be cured, and it could be cured.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay. Thanks, counselor.

Counselor, rebuttal.

MR. ECKERT: Yes, Your Honor. Thank you.

With regard to - - - it can't be harmless as an Ahmed error. I mean, what was the harm in Ahmed? It was the law clerk - - - there's no indication that the law clerk got the law wrong. With regard to Mays where the two attorneys answered the question, there's no indication there was any harm there that either of them got it wrong. So I think the fundamental holding in Ahmed is that

turning over judicial function to a nonjudicial person deprives a defendant of the right to trial as guaranteed under the Constitution.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But do you think there's a distinction between substantive and what went on here? In many ways, I understand your argument is stronger here because - - -

MR. O'BRIEN: Yeah.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - it's not a neutral - - - a person who he's giving over the courtroom to. But what about this distinction between substantive and the running of the video machine?

MR. ECKERT: The jury request was simply to see the tape. The prosecutor was the one who determined that the tape would be stopped at different places. I think that's a change in the jury note, the change that was determined by someone other than the judge. And there were repeated other discussions between the prosecutor making suggestions and doing other things which you're not permitted to do during the course of these things.

But the decision that the jury note would be modified to provide them with something else was made by the prosecutor and not by the judge and that

the additional communication between the prosecutor and the jurors were O'Rama errors, and you can't have a case in which an O'Rama error is committed by someone other than a judge unless the judicial function is being performed by someone other than the judge.

And I think there's a reason that Ahmed, with regard to harmlessness - - - and the last thing I'll say - - - is the reason that there's a violation of the trial by jury under Ahmed requires reversal is that the Constitution provides that the right to trial by jury shall remain inviolate forever as was guaranteed in common law. And that means that any judicial function carried out by some person other than a judge requires reversal of the trial and that the entire trial is tainted.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay. Thank you both, appreciate it.

(Court is adjourned)

## CERTIFICATION

I, David Rutt, certify that the foregoing transcript of proceedings in the Court of Appeals of People v. Calvin Mays, No. 225 was prepared using the required transcription equipment and is a true and accurate record of the proceedings.



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