1	COURT OF APPEALS
2	STATE OF NEW YORK
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4	EAST MIDTOWN PLAZA HOUSING COMPANY, INC.,
5	Appellant,
6	-against- No. 187
7	ANDREW M. CUOMO, et al.,
8	Respondents.
9	27 Madison Avenue
10	New York, New York 10010
11	October 10, 2012 Before:
12	
13	CHIEF JUDGE JONATHAN LIPPMAN ASSOCIATE JUDGE CARMEN BEAUCHAMP CIPARICK
14	ASSOCIATE JUDGE VICTORIA A. GRAFFEO ASSOCIATE JUDGE SUSAN PHILLIPS READ
15	ASSOCIATE JUDGE ROBERT S. SMITH ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE F. PIGOTT, JR.
16	ASSOCIATE JUDGE THEODORE T. JONES
17	Appearances:
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24	Jessica B. Cahill
25	Official Court Transcriber

1	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: East Midtown Plaza,
2	number 187.
3	Counselor, would you like any rebuttal
4	time?
5	MR. RICHARDSON: Two minutes, Your Honor.
6	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Two minutes. Go
7	ahead.
8	MR. RICHARDSON: May it please the Court.
9	My name is George Richardson, and it is my pleasure
10	to appear before you this morning on behalf of the
11	appellant East Midtown Plaza Housing Company.
12	This case involves two legal points. The
13	first involves jurisdiction under the Martin Act; and
14	the second involves a question of how properly to
15	count a vote to privatize and exit the Mitchell
16	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counselor, how do you
17	get around the certificate of incorporation?
18	MR. RICHARDSON: On the on the vote
19	question?
20	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yes, on the vote
21	question.
22	MR. RICHARDSON: The reason we get
23	the reason that that does not apply to this vote is
24	very simply because in counting the vote the housing
25	company followed precisely the rule of its

1 supervising authority, respondent HPD. HPD's rule 2 says specifically that to privatize you have to have 3 a vote of two-thirds of the outstanding shares of the 4 corporation as mandated by the Business Corporation 5 Law. And that is precisely how the vote was conducted. It was how the shareholders were told the 6 7 votes would be - - -8 JUDGE SMITH: Suppose - - - I mean, suppose 9 that in this particular case the Business Corporation 10 Law did not mandate it? Does the building - - - does 11 the HPD regulation still require you to do it? MR. RICHARDSON: Sure, if it didn't have -12

MR. RICHARDSON: Sure, if it didn't have -

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JUDGE SMITH: Well, why are the words "as mandated by the Business Corporation Law" in there?

MR. RICHARDSON: There is no case law construing that, Judge Smith, but it is my interpretation, and I think HPD agrees with it, is what the idea was of that is to have the supermajority provision that appears in Article 10 of the BCL. That is - - Article 10 of the BCL says "in order to engage in an extraordinary corporate transaction you must have two-thirds majority."

That's what the trial court held - - -

JUDGE SMITH: So you take "as mandated by"

1 to mean by the majority required in the BCL? MR. RICHARDSON: Yes, and that's what the 2 3 trial court held in this case as well. 4 JUDGE GRAFFEO: But doesn't your 5 certificate say the shareholders get one vote? MR. RICHARDSON: It does, Your Honor. Yes, 6 7 it does. But - - -8 JUDGE GRAFFEO: So to do it by the way that 9 you folks did it, by shares, doesn't that dilute the 10 voting power of the smaller residences? 11 MR. RICHARDSON: It dilutes the voting 12 power if you look at it in the context of the 13 department's vote. If you look at it in context of 14 people vote; no, not at all. It enfranchises far 15 more people. That's because the larger apartments 16 have more shares allocated to them; and by HPD rules, 17 larger apartments must be occupied by greater numbers 18 of people. 19 So the greater apart - - - the larger 20 apartments, which have more shares allocated to them, 21 have more people living in them by HPD rules. 22 JUDGE CIPARICK: So if there are two people 23 - - - there are two tenants, a couple let's say, each 2.4 of them get a vote, is that what you're saying?

MR. RICHARDSON: No, the shares would vote.

1	Whatever the number of shares allocated to the
2	apartment are, but
3	JUDGE CIPARICK: The certificate of incorp
4	the certificate specifically says "regardless
5	of the number of shares held by such holder." It
6	talks about a holder, a singular holder
7	MR. RICHARDSON: Yes.
8	JUDGE CIPARICK: voting one share.
9	MR. RICHARDSON: Yes.
10	JUDGE CIPARICK: I mean I guess we're
11	reading that to mean unit, correct?
12	MR. RICHARDSON: When you're reading the
13	certificate of incorporation or if you're reading the
14	HPD rule?
15	JUDGE CIPARICK: Well, I'm reading the
16	certificate of incorporation which says, "Each holder
17	of shares."
18	MR. RICHARDSON: Yes, the certificate of
19	incorporation has voting by apartment. We don't
20	disagree with that proposition.
21	What we are saying is that we follow the
22	HPD rule.
23	JUDGE GRAFFEO: Well, why shouldn't the
24	certificate govern
25	MR. RICHARDSON: Sure.

JUDGE GRAFFEO: - - - as opposed to the HPD 1 2 rule? I guess that's the - - -3 MR. RICHARDSON: That's the question. 4 JUDGE GRAFFEO: - - - fundamental question. 5 MR. RICHARDSON: That's the question, is if 6 you have a supervising authority that says that you -7 - - if you wish to engage in this corporate 8 transaction you must count the vote in this method, 9 does that trump the certificate of incorporation? 10 And I think there's no question, Judge Graffeo, that 11 it does in this case for the simple reason that HPD 12 has a companion rule, which is obviously cited in our 13 brief, that says if you have something in your 14 organizational documents contrary to HPD rules 15 they're null and void. 16 So HPD says - - -17 JUDGE GRAFFEO: Did the tenants know this? I mean that's one of - - -18 MR. RICHARDSON: Sure, this was - - -19 20 JUDGE GRAFFEO: - - - the problems I'm 21 having. 22 MR. RICHARDSON: Yes, absolutely dis - - -23 JUDGE GRAFFEO: I can understand they'd 2.4 know what was in the certificate - - -25 MR. RICHARDSON: Yeah.

1	JUDGE GRAFFEO: but are they going to
2	know these rules are going to change?
3	MR. RICHARDSON: They sure did. In the
4	plan, it was specifically disclosed what the
5	certificate of
6	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So HPD's rules trump
7	everything else, the BCL, the certificate of
8	incorporation everything? It goes by their rules?
9	Does that
10	MR. RICHARDSON: I don't
11	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Does that make any
12	sense?
13	MR. RICHARDSON: Chief Judge, I don't
14	believe that the HPD rules could trump the BCL, but
15	they don't have to in this case. All they have to do
16	is trump the organizational documents, and they are
17	the supervising authority of all Mitchell-Lama
18	housing projects in the city. And they do have a
19	-
20	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Doesn't 612 say vote
21	my share unless the certificate of the incorporation
22	says otherwise?
23	MR. RICHARDSON: It does, but that
24	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: And doesn't 1001 say
25	two-thirds votes of those entitled.

1 MR. RICHARDSON: It does. 2 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So everything goes to 3 this - - - all of this, including the certificate of incorporation, is kind of obviated by the HPD rule? 4 5 MR. RICHARDSON: By the HPD rule, that's exactly right. 6 7 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Why? Why? 8 MR. RICHARDSON: Let me - - - let me step -9 10 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What's the logic of 11 that? MR. RICHARDSON: Sure, let me step back, if 12 13 I may. In 2004, EMP had their first vote to go private. At the time HPD's rule said what it says 14 15 when took the second vote; and that is count the shares, two-thirds of the outstanding shares of the 16 17 corporation. The vote was taken. It passed according to two-thirds of the shares - - - of the 18 19 outstanding shares of the corporation. 2.0 EMP mailed the notice - - - sent a notice 21 over to HPD saying we've held this vote; this is how 22 we counted the vote. HPD had no objection 23 whatsoever. 2.4 JUDGE SMITH: Well, did it matter in 2004? 25 MR. RICHARDSON: It did not. According to

1 a subsequent rule change by HPD it didn't matter, but 2 at the time we did say that. HPD didn't respond; and 3 what does HPD say to this Court, well, I guess we didn't look at the certificate of incorporation back 4 5 then when we didn't object to the vote in 2004. JUDGE SMITH: And has HPD ever - - - I mean 6 7 I understand what you're saying, that they implicitly read their rule your way back in 2004. Have they 8 9 ever explicitly read it that way? 10 MR. RICHARDSON: Not that I'm aware of, but 11 I can tell you by their actions they explicitly read 12 it that way, because subsequent to our vote they 13 amended their rule to say voting has to be by 14 apartment. 15 JUDGE SMITH: They, of course, would say it's a clarification? 16 17 MR. RICHARDSON: They would say it was a clarification. 18 19 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: The Attorney General 2.0 has been consistent in their position, right? 21 MR. RICHARDSON: On the vote issue or on 22 the jurisdiction of the Martin Act? 23 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: On both. 2.4 MR. RICHARDSON: They have - - - they have 25 - - they have not been consistent, Your Honor. No,

they have not.

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CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: In what sense?

MR. RICHARDSON: It was only, I believe, in a year or two before the second vote. Remember we started this process in 2004. It was a short time in that time span before the second vote, which took place in January where the Attorney General called up and said to counsel - - - corporate counsel for the company - - HPD has informed us that they look at their rule differently now and that we're going to expect that the vote be counted that way. And, again, this was disclosed in the plan.

We said this is what the terms of the certificate of incorporation say, this is how we're going to control the vote, the AG and HPD take a different view, and we reserve our right to go to court if the vote doesn't work regardless of the way you count the votes.

If I may, move to the Martin Act issue?

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Go ahead.

MR. RICHARDSON: Okay. The Martin Act does not apply in this case for a very simple reason.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Why is it this is a very - - if this goes through, why isn't this a totally different universe in terms of the

1	shareholders?
2	MR. RICHARDSON: Sure. There's certainly
3	things that change, Your Honor, but there are
4	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: And why doesn't that
5	make it
6	MR. RICHARDSON: there's one
7	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: subject to the
8	Martin Act?
9	MR. RICHARDSON: It is not subject to
LO	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: The privatization.
L1	MR. RICHARDSON: Yeah, it's not subject to
L2	the Martin Act for a simple reason that there was no
L3	dissolution, there was no offer or sale of shares,
L4	there was no transfer of the property
L5	JUDGE CIPARICK: The original your
L6	original plan contemplated transfer of shares, right?
L7	MR. RICHARDSON: Judge Ciparick
L8	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But what's the
L9	MR. RICHARDSON: yes, it did.
20	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But what's the
21	difference? Isn't it a new private corporation?
22	MR. RICHARDSON: No, it is not. It is the
23	same
24	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What go ahead.
25	MR RICHARDSON: it is the same

1	company before and after. All we were doing was
2	amending the certificate of incorporation and there -
3	
4	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: It's night and day,
5	in terms of the effect on the people
6	JUDGE CIPARICK: Tenants?
7	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: who live there,
8	isn't it?
9	MR. RICHARDSON: I disagree, Your Honor.
LO	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: It's not night and
L1	day?
L2	MR. RICHARDSON: I disagree.
L3	JUDGE GRAFFEO: Some of them are going to
L4	lose subsidies, aren't they?
L5	MR. RICHARDSON: They are
L6	JUDGE GRAFFEO: Isn't that the substantial
L7	change for them?
L8	MR. RICHARDSON: The only the only
L9	difference should be that in one case they were under
20	a regulation of HPD and the other way they are not.
21	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: That's the only
22	difference to
23	MR. RICHARDSON: Yes.
24	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: to the
25	shareholders?

1 MR. RICHARDSON: Yes. And the reason - - -2 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: How can that be the 3 only difference. JUDGE CIPARICK: They're going to lose 4 5 reserve accounts, they're going to lose - - - their 6 maintenance is going to go up. MR. RICHARDSON: Judge Ciparick, their 7 8 maintenance is not going to go up. That is pure 9 speculation on the part of the Attorney General. 10 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What happens when 11 they sell their apartments? 12 MR. RICHARDSON: Say again. 13 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What happens when they want to move out? What's the difference to the 14 15 individual person who has an apartment under the old plan, and then if this is allowed to go through? 16 17 MR. RICHARDSON: Under - - - when you're 18 within Mitchell-Lama you put your shares back to the 19 company. 2.0 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So you may have a 21 few, whatever it is your shares are worth, a few 22 thousand dollars when you got 'em, and then when you 23 get back you get those monies. What happens after it 2.4 changes?

MR. RICHARDSON: You can sell your shares

1	to anybody you like.
2	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: And you mean you can
3	sell your shares for a million dollars?
4	MR. RICHARDSON: Yes, that's certainly
5	possible.
6	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: That would be really
7	a pretty big difference, wouldn't you think?
8	MR. RICHARDSON: It is not a significant
9	difference. It's a difference of a million dollars.
10	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: For the people who
11	live there it's not a significant difference?
12	MR. RICHARDSON: It is not a significant
13	difference in tripping the jurisdictional means of
14	the Martin Act. The Martin Act
15	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Why not? Why isn't
16	it?
17	MR. RICHARDSON: Because the Martin Act
18	requires the sale or offer of securities. It is not
19	a general business statute; it is not a general fraud
20	statute.
21	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: You mean if you don't
22	get a new stock certificate, that's the determining
23	factor
24	MR. RICHARDSON: In
25	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: rather than the

1 substance of what's going on? 2 MR. RICHARDSON: But the substance - - -3 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: You follow what I'm 4 saying? 5 MR. RICHARDSON: I follow you. It is the 6 form. Let me give you a very simple example. 7 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: It's the form that 8 matters? 9 MR. RICHARDSON: It's the form that matters 10 because of the Martin Act. If there is a building in 11 Manhattan, and I want to buy that building, there's two ways for me to do it. I can exchange cash for 12 13 the deed, that's one way to do it; or, I could buy 14 all of the shares in the corporation that owns the 15 building. One is a securities transaction, the other is not. 16 For hundreds of years lawyers have been 17 structuring transactions to embrace the benefit or 18 19 avoid the burden of particular statutes. The form of 2.0 this transaction matters. 21 JUDGE SMITH: Could I just add - - -22 because, I mean, I'm confused about something. 23 Suppose you win the argument you're just making and 2.4 the Attorney General has no jurisdiction, but you

lose the other argument on the majority required.

1	What good does it do you, you still can't close your
2	deal?
3	MR. RICHARDSON: Well, if there is no
4	jurisdiction under the Martin Act, then the Attorney
5	General's refusal to accept the plan for filing is
6	out of the way.
7	JUDGE SMITH: Yeah, but you can't you
8	still can't privatize, because you haven't got the
9	votes.
10	MR. RICHARDSON: That depends on what HPD
11	says, and HPD hasn't said anything. As we say in our
12	papers, they stood mute in response to the when
13	we filed the second amendment, which would be
14	effective.
15	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But if you get the
16	Attorney General out of the picture, then HPD will be
17	more receptive to this?
18	MR. RICHARDSON: I have no idea, Your
19	Honor.
20	JUDGE SMITH: But doesn't it also depend on
21	what the law if we say the law says that you
22	got to have two-thirds by apartment, then aren't you
23	wasting your breath arguing the other issue?
24	MR. RICHARDSON: Yes.
25	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay. Thanks,

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay. Thanks,

1	counselor, you'll have your rebuttal.
2	Okay, counselor, do you want any rebuttal
3	time, Mr. McConnell?
4	MR. MCCONNELL: Two minutes also, Your
5	Honor, please.
6	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Two minutes. Go
7	ahead, you're on.
8	MR. MCCONNELL: Pardon me. Kevin
9	McConnell, I'm the attorney for the East Midtown
10	Plaza Tenant-Cooperator Association, a voluntary
11	association of individuals and families who reside at
12	East Midtown Plaza, and we are in favor
13	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counsel, what's your
14	interest? Why is it advantageous to the people in
15	your association to have this
16	JUDGE CIPARICK: Privatize?
17	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: pass?
18	MR. MCCONNELL: Mainly one of the
19	primary reasons, Your Honor, is the condition of East
20	Midtown Plaza at this point in time. It's not
21	allowed to
22	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But isn't it, in
23	reality, that you would want to be able to sell your
24	apartment at market price?

MR. MCCONNELL: Yes, Your Honor.

1	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Even with the fee
2	that's
3	MR. MCCONNELL: Even
4	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: I mean that's the
5	main that's what this all about, isn't it?
6	MR. MCCONNELL: This is about the right to
7	one, sell apartments
8	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Right, okay.
9	MR. MCCONNELL: two, to put East
10	Midtown Plaza back in the kind of shape that it
11	should be in
12	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay.
13	MR. MCCONNELL: because forty-five
14	percent of the sale of any apartment will go back
15	into the building with respect to this flip tax.
16	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Right.
17	JUDGE GRAFFEO: That's for the first sale,
18	right?
19	MR. MCCONNELL: That's for the first sale,
20	yes, Your Honor.
21	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yeah.
22	MR. MCCONNELL: With regard to the
23	certificate of incorporation, there's an exception in
24	the certificate of incorporation. The certificate of
25	incorporation, of course, is that document that the

residents at East Midtown Plaza have devised so that way they can run their affairs. And the exception is it's a per shareholder vote except as otherwise provided by statute.

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And where do we look with regard to the statute? Well, you have the Private Housing Finance Law, Section 35(2) and (3), which provide the means by which a company can withdraw from the Mitchell-Lama program. Dissolution: upon dissolution, the company can either sell the apartment - - sell the building to another corporation or reconstitute.

What East Midtown Plaza did here was it reconstituted. Now, in order to dissolve a corporation, what do we look for? Well, HPD regulation says, as mandated by the BCL, voluntary dissolution and/or reconstitution. The certificate of incorporation says you look to the BCL, because the company's operations are subject to the limitations and provisions of the BCL.

The Private Housing Finance Law itself says you look to the Business Corporation Law.

JUDGE SMITH: But the BCL says you can put what you want in your certificate of incorporation.

MR. MCCONNELL: It can, except as otherwise provided by law, and there is statute, the

1 supermajority statute of 1001(a), which speaks to 2 dissolution. How does it - - -3 JUDGE CIPARICK: That's very circular. 4 It's very circular. 5 MR. MCCONNELL: Your Honor - - - it's direct, Your Honor. And the direct is certificate of 6 7 incorporation says, except as otherwise provided by 8 statute. 9 JUDGE CIPARICK: And the statute says? 10 MR. MCCONNELL: 1001 says two-thirds of the 11 HPD's own regulation says two-thirds of the shares. 12 shares. 13 JUDGE SMITH: Suppose you had a corporation 14 with actually two classes, with Class A and Class B 15 stock and they vote ten for one. Each Class A gets 16 ten votes, each Class B gets one. Are you saying 17 that if there's a vote to dissolve under 1001, they 18 have to vote one for one? 19 MR. MCCONNELL: What 1001 says, Your Honor, 2.0 for the shares entitled to vote thereon. 21 JUDGE SMITH: Yeah. 22 MR. MCCONNELL: Of course, Class A stock 23 may be entitled to vote, Class B stock may not be 2.4 entitled to vote.

JUDGE SMITH: No, no. But suppose they're

both voting shares, but they vote ten for one. Are you saying that the effect of Section 1001 is to suspend that and make them vote one for one on dissolution?

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MR. MCCONNELL: Two-thirds of the shares entitled to vote thereon, Your Honor.

JUDGE SMITH: That's a yes?

MR. MCCONNELL: If both shares - - - yes, it's a yes. If both shares are entitled to vote, then you must obtain two-thirds of the shares.

JUDGE SMITH: There must have been a lot of corporations with weighted voting that dissolved. Is there any precedent on how it's done? I mean in the history of - - I mean weighted - - shares with different votes are not unknown in the corporate world and a lot of those corporations must have dissolved. I guess I don't know, but I'd be surprised to know that they all abandoned the weighted voting when they voted on dissolution.

MR. MCCONNELL: Your Honor, I don't know the answer to that. I do know that dissolution is such a - - is a significant economic event, and shares of stock generally decide how decisions of corporations are to be conducted, by shares. So, therefore, BCL 1001 says two-thirds of the shares

1 entitled to vote thereon. 2 JUDGE GRAFFEO: How do you address 612, 3 subdivision A, because it clearly says "unless otherwise provided in the certificate of 4 5 incorporation." MR. MCCONNELL: It does, Your Honor. 6 7 way to address it is it an Attorney General opinion back in 1910 in which the Attorney General opined 8 9 that you can have a vote by per shareholder vote 10 except as otherwise provided by law. If law says 11 that a percentage of the shares must vote on an 12 issue, then that was - - - that is what must be 13 followed. And here we have a law, namely the BCL 1001, and we even have - - -14 15 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: 1001 controls, is 16 what you're saying. 17 MR. MCCONNELL: What I'm saying is 1001 controls as does the HPD regulation, which says two-18 19 thirds of the shares, and then it goes on to say - -2.0 21 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: And the certificate 22 of incorporation in 612(a), what about them? 23 MR. MCCONNELL: They're not inconsistent. 2.4 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Do they fall by the

25

wayside?

1 MR. MCCONNELL: No, Your Honor, because the certificate of incorporation says "except as 2 3 otherwise provided by statute." One vote per 4 shareholder except as otherwise provided by statute. 5 Where do we look? BCL. 612(a) says one vote per 6 share except as otherwise provided in the certificate 7 of incorporation, and the certificate of 8 incorporation leads you directly to the BCL 1001 and 9 to HPD regulations. 10 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: I think Judge Ciparick's description of circular is certainly true 11 12 here. 13 MR. MCCONNELL: You're going straight through, Your Honor. Certificate of incorporation 14 15 says otherwise provided by statute. JUDGE GRAFFEO: There's another clause in 16 17 1001. 18 MR. MCCONNELL: And mainly because, Your 19 Honor, if I may on that point. And that is because 2.0 we have a - - - pardon me for interrupting, Your 21 Honor - - - is you have a specific statute. The 22 specific statute, i.e., dissolution controls. 23 There's no conflict between 612(a). And if there

were a conflict between 612(a) with its exception,

with the certificate of incorporation, nonetheless,

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1 you look at the specific statute that controls here. 2 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Judge Graffeo. 3 JUDGE GRAFFEO: Why can't the two statutes 4 work together, because 1001 says "shares entitled to 5 vote thereon"? Why doesn't that mean you look at the 6 certificate of incorporation to figure out which 7 shares are entitled to vote, and it would be the first share? 8 9 MR. MCCONNELL: It would not, Your Honor, 10 because that would - - - the certificate also says 11 that there should be only one class of stock. That's 12 it, one class of stock. If some shares are entitled 13 to vote on an issue and other shares are not, when 14 the statute calls for per share vote, you would then 15 create two classes of stock. That's what this court held in FeBland. 16 17 JUDGE GRAFFEO: So we have to determine 18 that 1001 takes precedence over 612? 19 MR. MCCONNELL: What the determination is, 2.0 is it's not a question of overruling or whatever, it 21 is the more specific statute that should apply. 22 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counselor. 23 Thanks, you'll have your rebuttal. 2.4 MR. MCCONNELL: Thank you, Your Honor. 25 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counselor.

1 MR. DEARING: Thank you, Your Honor, Richard Dearing for the Attorney General. 2 The shareholders of East Midtown Plaza face 3 a transformative choice. It's a choice whether to 4 5 leave - - -6 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: He says but there's 7 no securities involved. There are no new stock certificates. 8 9 MR. DEARING: There are no new stock 10 certificates. The law goes - - -11 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So of what importance 12 are they? Your adversary says that the form 13 controls. MR. DEARING: Your Honors have said 14 15 precisely the opposite in All Seasons Resorts dealing 16 with a closely analogous, but a question out of the 17 Martin Act says it's economic reality, it's substance over form. 18 19 And this is a key difference - - - if I may 2.0 just address the statement from my adversary that 21 there are hundreds of years of structuring transactions to minimize burdens. That might be true 22 23 under tax statutes, under commercial statutes. What we're dealing with here is an antifraud disclosure 2.4

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protection.

1	JUDGE SMITH: Well, suppose these things -
2	suppose I buy a condo instead of a co-op, is that
3	within the Attorney General's jurisdiction?
4	MR. DEARING: If you buy yes. Condo
5	and co-op are both
6	JUDGE SMITH: Condominiums are treated as
7	co-operative interests in real property?
8	MR. DEARING: Yes, condos and co-ops are
9	both cooperative interests in real property.
10	The key here is that this choice this
11	shareholder vote is transformative. They're leaving
12	a comprehensive regulatory regime for affordable
13	housing under Mitchell-Lama, a hugely successful
14	regime of affordable housing. People are clamoring
15	to get in there.
16	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But even though it's
17	hugely successful, so many of these have turned over
18	into a private type organization.
19	MR. DEARING: They have started to turn and
20	those that have
21	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Right, but
22	MR. DEARING: have filed offering
23	plans under the Martin Act.
24	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But that seems to be
25	how old is the Mitchell-Lama law?

1	MR. DEARING: Mid-fifties originally
2	enacted.
3	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But that seems to be
4	a trend. After all of these years many of them are
5	being privatized, even given the successes.
6	MR. DEARING: I think that's fair to say,
7	and we're not
8	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Not unusually, I
9	guess, is my only point.
10	MR. DEARING: Not unusual, but the key is
11	that
12	JUDGE CIPARICK: And you have no problem
13	with the privatization.
14	MR. DEARING: No.
15	JUDGE CIPARICK: You just want it to be
16	done.
17	MR. DEARING: Precisely. We have no
18	problem with it. Everyone acknowledges that the
19	matter must be put to the shareholders
20	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So what's wrong with
21	what they're doing, tell us?
22	MR. DEARING: Well, what's well, first,
23	I just want to say that what we're saying is that
24	there must be full disclosure under the Martin Act -
25	

1	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Right.
2	MR. DEARING: so that shareholders
3	can make an evaluation. I'll get to what's
4	wrong specifically here
5	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yes.
6	MR. DEARING: is the voting question,
7	which I'll get to in a minute. Frankly
8	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Go ahead.
9	MR. DEARING: it's much less
10	important than this question
11	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Go ahead.
12	MR. DEARING: which is do Mitchell-
13	Lama tenants deserve full and informed disclosure so
14	that they can make a meaningful choice?
15	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Why didn't they have
16	disclosure here?
17	MR. DEARING: They had it up until the
18	point where the voting rule the attempt to
19	declare the plan effective on a rule that was
20	different from the one disclosed and different from
21	what is legally required.
22	I'm asking a prior question, which is
23	JUDGE SMITH: Is this really a disclosure
24	problem or is the problem they didn't get the votes?
25	MR. DEARING: I think it's both, Your

1 Honor, and here's why. JUDGE SMITH: Well, I don't - - - I'm not 2 3 getting this picture of these Mitchell-Lama tenants 4 sitting in ignorance of what's going on. It's just a 5 question of whether they got the votes or not. MR. DEARING: But the bottom line is this 6 7 is really running a campaign. When you run a 8 campaign you have to know how you judge who wins or 9 loses. It wasn't properly disclosed. Voting is 10 different - - -11 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What did - - - what 12 did they do that was deceptive or not disclosed? 13 MR. DEARING: What they did was they said -- - HPD said this vote needs to be done by two-thirds 14 15 of apartments; we reserve the right to challenge it, 16 but they don't say anything more. They sit back, 17 they wait until the vote happens, they get two - - -JUDGE SMITH: Isn't the sensible way to 18 19 read that they say that, and we might want - - -20 we're not sure they're right and if it becomes an 21 issue we'll find out? What's deceptive about that? 22 MR. DEARING: Well - - -23 JUDGE SMITH: They're keeping the promise 2.4 that they made of litigating that issue.

MR. DEARING: Well, there's more than just

deceptive under the Martin Act. There's appropriate 1 2 disclosure. And our position is the voting rule - -3 - the bottom line rule is going to determine - - -CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Has HPD been 4 5 consistent? MR. DEARING: I don't know of any 6 7 inconsistency on HPD's part. They're reading kind of 8 9 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: They've always said 10 that it's two-thirds of the apartment? 11 MR. DEARING: I don't know. I'm not aware 12 of any instance in which they've said that it's two-13 thirds of shares - - -14 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: They say that their 15 regulation trumps and their regulation says - - -16 MR. DEARING: The real answer - - - this is 17 simple on voting. It's real simple. Start - - - if this is a dissolution, what counsel called a 18 19 significant economic event, start with BCL 1001. 2.0 says what you need is two-thirds of the votes of 21 shares entitled to vote. 612(a) says, how do you 22 count votes; one vote per share unless the 23 certificate of incorporation says a different rule. 2.4 What does their certificate of incorporation say?

One vote for apartment. That's the end of the story

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2	JUDGE JONES: But he says unless otherwise
3	provided by
4	MR. DEARING: But there is no statute
5	providing otherwise. The statutes lead you to the
6	certificate of incorporation, not the other way
7	around.
8	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: He says it leads you
9	to 1001.
10	MR. DEARING: I know, but their argument is
11	all about what trumps what, but there is no trumping.
12	These are all in harmony.
13	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: The certificate of
14	incorporation controls here, essentially, the bottom
15	line?
16	MR. DEARING: It ultimately ends up with
17	the certificate, and the certificate says one vote
18	for apartment.
19	I want to return, though, to the Martin Act
20	question
21	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Go ahead.
22	MR. DEARING: because it's critically
23	important to understand what's going on in a
24	privatization. People are leaving this comprehensive

regime of affordable housing. As Your Honor said, on

the equity side they have limited equity ownership under Mitchell-Lama. They get a return of money paid in. They don't participate in upside appreciation of the property. What they get in exchange is highly subsidized and reduced carrying charges to carry that interest in property through tax subsidies - - - significant and generous tax subsidies and through public subsidized financing.

And when they're confronting the question whether to go to the private unregulated co-op, they must decide whether those increased potential carrying charges, taking away potentially the affordability of the housing, is compensated for by the equity participation.

JUDGE SMITH: Either way you slice it, the great majority of them have decided we'd like the money please, right?

MR. DEARING: That's right, but - - -

JUDGE SMITH: And is it -- I mean just looking at the equities overall is it really fair to

than a third, depending on how you count, keep this

let the majority - - - minority that is maybe more

whole thing in limbo?

MR. DEARING: Well, that's to quibble with the voting rule, but that's what the BCL requires.

1 We say when that voting rule is established by the 2 BCL it has to be disclosed properly, like everything 3 else. JUDGE SMITH: Well, what's so bad about 4 5 their disclosing the Attorney General thinks this is 6 the rule, HPD thinks this is the rule, we're not so 7 sure. Who's deceived? MR. DEARING: Well, I think the real answer 8 9 to that is when you're talking about the question, 10 where are you going to draw this bright line and 11 determine thumbs up, thumbs down, that needs to be 12 clear in advance and part of the reason is this is 13 like a campaign. The shareholders - - -14 JUDGE SMITH: And they have to -- their 15 disclosure is inadequate unless they say in their 16 disclosure you're - - - that you're right and they're 17 wrong? MR. DEARING: No, it's that before they 18 19 vote - - - if they're going to take the different 20 view, before they vote that needs to be established, 21 and they disclose that. 22 JUDGE SMITH: Well, so they can't say we 23 may take a different view, they have to say we will 2.4 take a different view?

MR. DEARING: No, the rule has to be

1	settled before the vote occurs. You can't come back
2	after the vote and use a rule different from the one
3	you told shareholders you would use.
4	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What's the difference
5	in how they're going to vote in knowing that?
6	MR. DEARING: This is why, because it's a
7	campaign. Shareholders go around trying to recruit
8	people to their side of the issue, and it changes
9	_
10	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Do they know how much
11	value your vote has, is that why?
12	MR. DEARING: Well, they do know, and they
13	know who has
14	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: No, what I'm saying
15	is by
16	MR. DEARING: Yeah.
17	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: if they
18	disclose totally is the difference that the voter
19	knows how much weight they have in this fight?
20	MR. DEARING: That's precisely it. I mean,
21	by the same logic you don't even
22	JUDGE SMITH: But what if nobody knows?
23	MR. DEARING: need to tell them
24	JUDGE SMITH: Nobody knows until we decide
25	it, so how can they disclose it? Why can't they just

1 disclose there's a dispute about this and the dispute 2 may become moot. 3 MR. DEARING: Well, the - - -4 JUDGE SMITH: And at the time they do the 5 disclosure they don't know whether the two-thirds is going to be different, whether it's by apartment or 6 7 by share. MR. DEARING: That's fair, but I think it 8 9 should be another vote. If the rule is settled on a 10 different thing than the shareholders said were going 11 to be used there should be another vote under that 12 new rule. 13 JUDGE GRAFFEO: Isn't the dispute really 14 who wants to stay and who wants to go? 15 MR. DEARING: Well, I'm not sure if that's 16 the essence of the dispute. I do think it's 17 important - - -18 JUDGE GRAFFEO: Well, is the lang - - - you 19 have had other offering plans submitted to the 20 Attorney General's office - - -21 MR. DEARING: Yes, ma'am. 22 JUDGE GRAFFEO: - - - from Mitchell-Lama 23 projects. 2.4 MR. DEARING: Yes, Your Honor, we have. 25 JUDGE GRAFFEO: All right, is the term in

1	this certificate unusual?
2	MR. DEARING: No, they're common. This
3	particular term you mean the one apartment per
4	one vote per apartment rule.
5	JUDGE GRAFFEO: Yes.
6	MR. DEARING: It's common in Mitchell-
7	Lamas. We haven't seen it in any other kind of co-
8	operative, but they are common in Mitchell-Lamas.
9	And
10	JUDGE GRAFFEO: So this is the first time
11	this is being litigated?
12	MR. DEARING: I think it's the first time
13	the difference
14	JUDGE GRAFFEO: Is this the first
15	MR. DEARING: in counting is
16	dispositive.
17	JUDGE GRAFFEO: privatization that's
18	involved this language in the certificate?
19	MR. DEARING: No, it's not the first
20	privatization that's involved that language. It's
21	the first one where it changes the outcome.
22	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So what's the logic
23	as to why in Mitchell-Lamas it's generally the one
24	per apartment?
25	MR. DEARING: I think the real logic is

1 that this is - - - this is an attempt to build equity 2 ownership in low and middle income housing areas and 3 the idea was that it was - - - this is not a private 4 for profit enterprise. Who has more shares is not 5 the determinative factor. It is essentially - - -6 it's a limited profit cooperative arrangement and 7 therefore it's an equitable voting regime. JUDGE READ: Well, he made the - - -8 9 MR. DEARING: That's the basic principal. 10 JUDGE READ: - - - he made the point 11 though, didn't he, that the bigger the apartment the 12 more live in it. 13 MR. DEARING: Right, there may be children 14 living there, but the bottom line is - - - it's not 15 completely true. The shares - - - some aspect of the 16 share allocation is based on size, but there are 17 other factors. 18 All I know, really, at the end of the day, 19 is that you see this exact language again and again 20 in Mitchell-Lama certificates of incorporation, and 21 you don't see them in private co-ops. 22 Just to briefly touch, again, I know I keep 23 coming back to it, but I think it's vitally important 2.4

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Go ahead.

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MR. DEARING: - - - and I want to make sure it's understood. The basic disclosure of the protections of the Martin Act must apply. Counsel says it's the form; we can structure our way out of an investor protection regime. This court has said otherwise, it's the substance. I'll note on that point, that intervenor's counsel says directly two things that are significant.

One, it involves a dissolution. what the statute says. Major corporate transformation. He calls it, "A significant economic transaction." There's dissenters' rights involved, there's a choice put to these shareholders to make a fundamental change in the nature of their ownership interest and their homes. They should have received

JUDGE SMITH: But you know, people buy and sell homes all the time without the Attorney General's help. It's just that these happen to be in co-operative apartments.

MR. DEARING: It's not that they happen to There was a problem in the late 1950s in New York with fraud, abuse, predatory practices in co-op marketing and the Martin Act offering plan disclosure protections were enacted for the specific reason of

1 addressing that problem. 2 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counselor. 3 MR. DEARING: Thank you very much. 4 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Thank you, counselor. 5 Counselor? 6 JUDGE CIPARICK: Can you describe how HPD's 7 regulations changed over this period of time and why? 8 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: And were you or were 9 you not inconsistent? 10 MS. SCALZO: I'm sorry, Your Honor. 11 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Were you or were you 12 not inconsistent in the position you've been taking. 13 MS. SCALZO: No, Your Honor. At the time that the notice of intent was submitted to HPD, it 14 15 was received - - - it was not rejected at that time, 16 because the certificate of incorporation was not 17 examined at the time. There was not an inconsistent 18 interpretation. HPD did not take an interpretation 19 that - - -2.0 JUDGE SMITH: You say it was just an error? 21 MS. SCALZO: Yes, Your Honor. The - - -22 had the certificate of incorporation been examined at 23 that time, it would have been - - - the notice of 2.4 intent would have been rejected, because the

appropriate vote had not been reached.

1	JUDGE SMITH: Well, why did your rule say
2	vote by shares?
3	MS. SCALZO: HPD's rule did not say vote by
4	shares. The at the time of
5	JUDGE SMITH: Well, you used some language
6	that sounded a lot like that.
7	MS. SCALZO: The specific language of
8	at that time at the time of the notice
9	that the notice of intent was submitted to HPD,
10	Section 314(i)(7) provided that dissolution required
11	approval of two-thirds of the outstanding shares of
12	the corporation as mandated by the Business
13	Corporation Law. That's one continuous phrase.
14	JUDGE SMITH: So why and why did it
15	say that?
16	MS. SCALZO: As mandated by the Business
17	Corporation
18	JUDGE SMITH: Before you get to that, why
19	did it say the first part? Why did it say two-thirds
20	of the outstanding shares of the corporation if it
21	didn't mean that?
22	MS. SCALZO: But it doesn't end at
23	outstanding shares of the corporation.
24	JUDGE SMITH: Okay, Okay, but can you
25	_

1	MS. SCALZO: it continues as mandated
2	by the corp
3	JUDGE SMITH: Okay, can you explain why
4	those words are in there?
5	MS. SCALZO: Because 1001 of the BCL is the
6	provision that controls dissolution. BCL 1001
7	requires that requires a vote of two-thirds of
8	the votes of all outstanding shares entitled to vote
9	thereon.
10	The "entitled to vote thereon" language
11	-
12	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So you were tracking
13	that language? Was that what you were doing?
14	MS. SCALZO: It's a reference to that
15	language. HPD's rule
16	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: And then your view is
17	that "those entitled" qualifies that?
18	MS. SCALZO: The yes, the "entitled
19	to vote thereon" refers to only those shares that are
20	entitled to vote. That brings us back to
21	JUDGE GRAFFEO: You didn't have that
22	phraseology though in your rule.
23	MS. SCALZO: The entitled to vote thereon?
24	JUDGE GRAFFEO: Right.
25	MS. SCALZO: That phraseology was not in

the rule, but, again, we referenced the Business 1 Corporation Law, that's 1001. Since that is the 2 3 provision of the Business Corporation Law, that - - -4 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So you're saying 5 whatever it may sound like that that's not what it 6 meant? 7 MS. SCALZO: What was meant was as a reference to 1001. 8 9 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay. 10 MS. SCALZO: Now, BCL 1001 specifically 11 refers to the votes that - - - the shares that are 12 entitled to vote. 13 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Right. 14 MS. SCALZO: And that brings us back to the 15 certificate of incorporation. The certificate of 16 incorporation, which was executed in 1968 and never 17 amended, unequivocally provided for one vote per dwelling unit for all - - - any and all purposes 18 19 unless - - -20 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: And you agree with 21 the Attorney General that most of these Mitchell-Lamas that's what it provides? 22 23 MS. SCALZO: Although I don't know that 2.4 specifically, I - - - certainly now our - - - HPD's 25 rule does provide for that - - -

1 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay. 2 MS. SCALZO: - - - and it's my 3 understanding that that is a common voting method. But the certificate of incorporation required one 4 5 vote per dwelling unit for all purposes unless otherwise provided by statute. 6 7 Now, the Appellate Division correctly determined that there is no statutory exemption of 8 9 the one vote per dwelling. 10 JUDGE SMITH: Well, even if there - - - but 11 even if it were not otherwise required by statute, if 12 it were required by a binding regulation, then the 13 regulation would override the certificate of 14 incorporation, wouldn't it? 15 MS. SCALZO: Your Honor, it would not, because HPD's rule is not a statute, but it - - -16 17 JUDGE SMITH: I understand that. I'm not interpreting the certificate of incorporation. 18 19 saying whatever the certificate of incorporation says 2.0 if there's a binding valid regulation that says do it 21 this way, they got to do it this way. That's all 22 there is to it. 23 MS. SCALZO: There is no - - - the 2.4 petitioner has never identified any either statute or 25 binding regulation that required - - -

1	JUDGE SMITH: Well, they say that your
2	regulation is such a thing. They say your regulation
3	says vote by shares. You dispute the meaning of it.
4	Isn't that what isn't that what the whole case
5	comes down to
6	MS. SCALZO: We definitely disagree with -
7	
8	JUDGE SMITH: or at least on this
9	issue?
LO	MS. SCALZO: that interpretation of
L1	the rule of HPD's rule.
L2	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But do you agree with
L3	Judge Smith that the regulation would control if
L4	that's what it means, as opposed to the statute or
L5	the certificate of incorporation?
L6	MS. SCALZO: Well, the certificate of
L7	incorporation is definitely the central document
L8	here.
L9	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Right, but what about
20	the answer to that question? What if HPD's rule
21	conflicted with the certificate?
22	MS. SCALZO: Well, I would say that the
23	certificate of incorporation is controlling. It's -
24	

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So it's above and

1 beyond whatever your regulation says or doesn't say? 2 MS. SCALZO: Well, the certificate of 3 incorporation is in keeping with the Business Corporation Law, and it specifically - - -4 5 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So your answer is that the statute and the certificate of incorporation 6 7 control and your regulation doesn't, is that right or 8 wrong? 9 MS. SCALZO: I believe that they are all 10 consistent. That's why I think I'm having some 11 trouble with that. CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: I think - - - but the 12 13 judge's hypothetical was if yours - - - if yours did 14 say contrary to the certificate does your regulation 15 control? 16 MS. SCALZO: It would not since it's not a 17 statute, and the certificate of incorporation specifically provides for one vote per dwelling 18 19 unless - - -2.0 JUDGE SMITH: Well, but they - - - the 21 point we're making, I think, is the certificate of 22 incorporation can't - - - the corporation can't say, 23 well, we only obey statutes, we don't obey 2.4 regulations. If the statute - - - if the regulation

binds them, it binds them.

1	MS. SCALZO: Well the
2	JUDGE SMITH: You say it doesn't bind them,
3	but I I mean I don't quite it seems to me
4	maybe you could concede the point that if the
5	regulation said what they say it says you say
6	it doesn't but if it said that it would be
7	binding.
8	MS. SCALZO: Again, though, Your Honor
9	_
LO	JUDGE SMITH: Okay.
L1	MS. SCALZO: I keep coming back to -
L2	though it's not
L3	JUDGE GRAFFEO: Let me try to get at this a
L4	different way. From a practical standpoint, why is
L5	your interpretation of the language of your earlier
L6	regulation, why is that the better rule?
L7	MS. SCALZO: The
L8	JUDGE GRAFFEO: In other words, why is
L9	voting by apartments a better rule than voting by
20	shares? Does the agency have an opinion on that?
21	MS. SCALZO: Oh, well, HPD may believe that
22	that is a preferable method of voting, but that is
23	not
24	JUDGE GRAFFEO: And why? That's
25	MS SCALZO: $-$ - the reason $-$ -

1	JUDGE GRAFFEO: And why?
2	MS. SCALZO: Well, for policy reasons that
3	were actually articulated later when the rule was
4	amended. However, that
5	JUDGE GRAFFEO: Could you share those with
6	us? What are the policy reasons?
7	MS. SCALZO: To have to enable each
8	dwelling unit to have an equal say in this type of
9	voting. But HPD's belief or feeling that that is a
10	preferable voting method is not what was guiding
11	here. It was the fact that the certificate of
12	incorporation provided for that.
13	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay.
14	MS. SCALZO: If the certificate had not
15	provided.
16	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counselor,
17	thanks.
18	MS. SCALZO: Thank you.
19	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counselor.
20	MR. MALLIN: Good morning, Your Honors, my
21	name is Barry Mallin. I'm here on behalf of the
22	intervenor-respondent East Midtown Plaza
23	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counsel, you don't
24	want the building privatized the Midtown
25	privatized right?

MR. MALLIN: Well, the concern here - - -1 2 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Now, why not? 3 MR. MALLIN: Well, the concern here is about the affordability - - - the continued 4 5 affordability of these apartments. CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Your maintenance 6 7 charges will go up, is that what most of the people 8 in your - - -9 That's the concern here. MR. MALLIN: 10 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - group believe? 11 MR. MALLING: For example, we have a 12 situation where the operating budget is dependent on 13 the flip tax revenues from the sale of apartments. 14 So many people may or may not sell, but if these 15 revenues fall short that's going to have an impact on 16 17 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Most of your people 18 want to stay in the building? 19 MR. MALLIN: They do. In fact - - -20 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: And they're fearful 21 of what you're saying? MR. MALLIN: They do, and they will feel -22 23 - - they get to bear the burden of increased 2.4 maintenance costs if not enough people sell. If 25 there's not enough revenues from the flip taxes, the

operating budget has to then go up. They're going to bear the burden of having to pay the increased maintenance, and then being priced out of their apartments, which for many of these people they've been there for generations, and that's a real concern.

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CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Would you say it's a fair summary that generally the people who are there for less time generally are the ones who want to privatize, and the people who have been there forever kind of don't want change?

MR. MALLIN: I would say that's probably a true statement; and there is that concern that the benefits that they enjoy now, because of the discussion about, you know, improvements needed in the complex, well, the Mitchell-Lama co-ops are entitled to certain low interest loans from various government agencies.

So there is a mechanism if they remain in Mitchell-Lama to take care of the building and to maintain the affordability of - - - $\,$

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Well, there are also certain rules that go with it, right, that HPD has or whatever?

MR. MALLIN: Yes, and they can - - -

1	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: That would be very
2	different under the
3	MR. MALLIN: It would be absolutely
4	different here. There were would be loss of senior
5	citizen benefits
6	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Right.
7	MR. MALLIN: there would be loss of
8	tax abatements. All of these have an impact on the
9	maintenance, and
LO	JUDGE JONES: Have your fears been realized
L1	in the conversion of other Mitchell-Lamas?
L2	MR. MALLIN: I'm sorry, Your Honor.
L3	JUDGE JONES: Have the fears which you
L4	described, about increase in maintenance, has that
L5	happened in the conversion of other Mitchell-Lama co-
L6	ops?
L7	MR. MALLIN: Well, from what I hear that
L8	has become an ongoing problem of maintaining budgets.
L9	But the important point here is that you can disagree
20	on whether to go private or not, but we need that
21	disclosure. We need that information and that's why
,	the Martin Act is so important here.
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23	JUDGE SMITH: Well, what is the information

MR. MALLIN: Well, we had - - - in this

1 case there was an offering plan that provided the 2 information. They're now disavowing the need for 3 that offering plan. 4 JUDGE SMITH: Oh, you're talking - - - you 5 mean you need the protection of the Attorney 6 General's jurisdiction - - -7 MR. MALLIN: Absolutely. 8 JUDGE SMITH: - - - is what you're saying? 9 MR. MALLIN: Absolutely. JUDGE SMITH: Okay. 10 11 MR. MALLING: Otherwise, we're going to 12 have more than 700 shareholders stumbling in the dark 13 without the necessary information that's needed to 14 determine whether to vote for privatization or not. 15 I don't understand from their position - - -16 JUDGE SMITH: Of course, a lot of people 17 buy real estate, buy their homes, without having the 18 Attorney General - - - without reading an offering 19 statement for the Attorney General. Why are co-op 2.0 tenants different? 21 MR. MALLIN: Because the statute requires 22 an offering plan when they're a public offering of 23 securities in real estate involving co-operative 2.4 apartments.

JUDGE SMITH: And I think that's a correct

answer, but I guess what I was trying to get at is what is the policy underlying the statute which makes co-ops special or different from other real estate?

MR. MALLIN: Well, this is probably an issue for the Attorney General, but I know that these people are, for the most part, not sophisticated, they don't understand all of the ramifications, and they need that kind of disclosure here. And if there's no disclosure I don't understand the argument of appellant in how are these people going to get that information that they need to make an intelligent and well-founded decision.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counselor. Thanks, counselor.

Rebuttal.

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MR. MCCONNELL: Your Honors, one I should like to speak to Justice - - - Judge Jones' inquiry about what happens with other co-ops.

In this co-op a forty-five percent flip tax is significant. I think it's the largest flip tax in any of the buildings that have withdrawn out of the Mitchell-Lama program. The estimate set forth in that 740 page document, the reconstitution plan, the estimates as to what maintenance will be if it does withdraw from the Mitchell-Lama program are all set

forth. Those were never really disputed by anyone, either by the Attorney General, HPD, or by the intervenors who are against the withdrawal.

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Secondly, Your Honor, with regard to that exception which is in the certificate of incorporation, if only one share per shareholder is entitled to vote, then the exception is meaningless. It's meaningless, because then any vote would have to be by shareholder, but that's not what the certificate says. That's not what the BCL says. In certain instances such as dissolution, withdrawal from the Mitchell-Lama program, two-thirds of the shares are the determinative factor.

Lastly, Your Honor, the obverse to the question that Judge Smith asked, and that is if the Attorney General does indeed have jurisdiction, but HPD is incorrect, AG's decision was solely based upon the opinion of the HPD. It said that absent a judicial determination that HPD was wrong we can't accept this second amendment. Well, the obverse is certainly true. If there's a judicial determination that HPD's opinion was wrong, then the Attorney General must accept that second amendment. The offering - - - the reconstitution plan must go forward and privatization must take place. Thank

1 you, Your Honor. 2 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, thanks, 3 counselor. Counselor, rebuttal. 4 5 MR. RICHARDSON: Just a minute, Your Honor, 6 thank you. Just let me follow-up with what Mr. 7 McConnell said. 8 In rejecting the plan the Attorney General 9 submitted two documents. One was a letter in 10 response to the plan. That was drafted by Linda 11 Roots, the Assistant Attorney General in charge of 12 reviewing this for us at the AG's office. She gave 13 one and only one reason for rejecting the plan and that was because it did not comply with the vote 14 15 count. 16 When this litigation started, Ms. Roots 17 submitted an affidavit. In her affidavit she said 18 the Attorney General rejected the plan for one and 19 only on reason, and that is because it did not comply 20 with the vote count. They never raised a 21 misrepresentation in any of those documents prior to 22 the time that this case got to the First Department.

JUDGE SMITH: Well, the only - - - as I understand it the only misrepresentation they're talking about, if there is a misrepresentation, is a

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1 misrepresentation of how many votes are needed. 2 mean isn't this - - - isn't this case - - - I 3 understand that in the great scheme of things whether 4 the Attorney General has jurisdiction is very 5 important, but still, doesn't the outcome of this - -- the fate of this particular building turn on 6 7 whether the - - - on how you count the votes. Τf 8 you've got the votes, if you haven't got the votes, 9 that's all there is to it. 10 MR. RICHARDSON: I think in essence it 11 does, Judge, yes. And also, I would just like to 12 address very briefly the HPD's interpretation of its 13 rule. If it reads its rule the way they say they do, it reads the rule out of existence. The rule says 14 15 two-thirds of the outstanding shares of the 16 corporation as mandated by the Business Corporation 17 Law or by any other document the corporation seems to have. 18 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Do you find their 19 2.0 reading at least plausible of what they're saying 21 they meant? 22 MR. RICHARDSON: Plausible? 23 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yeah. 2.4 MR. RICHARDSON: With all respect, Your

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Honor, I do not.

1 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: They're referring to 2 the BCL, they use that term, and then they refer to 3 the BCL. 4 MR. RICHARDSON: But then they stop. Let's 5 not go read any - - -CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: And all - - -6 7 MR. RICHARDSON: - - - more into the BCL. 8 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Again, I understand 9 your argument too, but I'm saying the argument is 10 that they're kind of tracking that language, but 11 maybe didn't do it particularly artfully. 12 MR. RICHARDSON: I think the argument works 13 perfectly if what you say is the HPD rule said twothirds of the outstanding shares as mandated by the 14 15 Business Corporation Law and what it meant was the super-majority provision, the two-thirds, because 16 17 that is as mandated by the BCL. If you keep reading the BCL, then it reads 18 19 the entire thing out of existence. It says, well, 2.0 then your certificate of incorporation can do 21 whatever it wants, and it is - - - fundamentally with 22 respect to the vote, Your Honor, we played by HPD's 23 rules, and at the end of the day they changed the rules and said we couldn't do it the way we wanted 2.4

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to.

1	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Thank you, counselor.
2	Thank you.
3	MR. RICHARDSON: Thank you.
4	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: I thank all of you.
5	Appreciate it.
6	(Court is adjourned)
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CERTIFICATION

I, Jessica B. Cahill, certify that the foregoing transcript of proceedings in the Court of Appeals of East Midtown Plaza Housing Company, Inc. v. Andrew M. Cuomo, et al., No. 187 was prepared using the required transcription equipment and is a true and accurate record of the proceedings.

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