| 1 | COURT OF APPEALS |
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| 2 | STATE OF NEW YORK |
| 3 | |
| 4 | PEOPLE, |
| 5 | Respondent, |
| 6 | -against- |
| 7 | No. 114 KENNETH PADILLA, |
| 8 | Appellant. |
| 9 | |
| 10 | 20 Eagle Street Albany, New York 12207 May 2, 2013 |
| 11 | |
| 12 | Before: |
| 13 | CHIEF JUDGE JONATHAN LIPPMAN ASSOCIATE JUDGE VICTORIA A. GRAFFEO |
| 14 | ASSOCIATE JUDGE SUSAN PHILLIPS READ ASSOCIATE JUDGE ROBERT S. SMITH |
| 15 | ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE F. PIGOTT, JR. ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA |
| 16 | Appearances: |
| 17 | RANDALL D. UNGER, ESQ. |
| 18 | Attorneys for Appellant 42-40 Bell Boulevard |
| 19 | Suite 302 Bayside, NY 11361 |
| 20 | MATTHEW T. MURPHY, ADA |
| 21 | NEW YORK COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE Attorneys for Respondent |
| 22 | Appeals Bureau One Hogan Place |
| 23 | Room 854 New York, NY 10013 |
| 24 | |
| 25 | Karen Schiffmiller Official Court Transcriber |

| 1 | CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: And we'll start with |
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| 2 | number 114, People v. Padilla. Counsel? |
| 3 | (Pause) |
| 4 | MR. UNGER: Your Honors, there are three |
| 5 | substantial reasons why the defendant's conviction |
| 6 | should be reversed in this case: an unlawful search |
| 7 | and seizure, insufficient evidence and serious |
| 8 | prosecutorial misconduct. |
| 9 | CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counsel, the |
| 10 | what exactly happened with the with the car? |
| 11 | In other words, why is it that the are the |
| 12 | speakers did they come with the car? |
| 13 | MR. UNGER: We don't know. |
| 14 | CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: I mean |
| 15 | MR. UNGER: We really don't know. |
| 16 | CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: you know, was |
| 17 | it more like a fixture that was there, or is it |
| 18 | something that looked sort of unusual? You know what |
| 19 | I mean, added after the fact? |
| 20 | MR. UNGER: As I understand it, the |
| 21 | defendant purchased the car used. It is equally |
| 22 | possible that he purchased the vehicle with the |
| 23 | speakers already affixed in the trunk. |
| 24 | CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: You don't know. |
| 25 | MR. UNGER: There's no proof either way. |

| 1 | CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Let me just stop you |
|----|--|
| 2 | in that thought for a second. Rebuttal time, how |
| 3 | much? |
| 4 | MR. UNGER: Oh, I'm sorry, two minutes. |
| 5 | CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Two minutes. |
| 6 | MR. UNGER: Thank you. |
| 7 | CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Continue, yeah. |
| 8 | MR. UNGER: So we don't know the answer to |
| 9 | that question. I would respectfully submit that that |
| 10 | was the prosecution's burden to prove, for example, |
| 11 | that the defendant did it. |
| 12 | CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Well, let's say |
| 13 | let's does it ma does that issue matter? |
| 14 | MR. UNGER: I think it does. |
| 15 | CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: I mean, if you see |
| 16 | something, if you go into the trunk and you see |
| 17 | something that looks unusual, added, you know, is it |
| 18 | okay to go in there, as opposed to if it came with |
| 19 | the car; that would be a more intrusive kind of |
| 20 | thing? |
| 21 | MR. UNGER: We're not arguing that it |
| 22 | wasn't all right for the police officer to open the |
| 23 | trunk, and to review |
| 24 | CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: No, no, but to go |
| 25 | beyond |

| 1 | MR. UNGER: to view it. |
|----|--|
| 2 | CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: behind the |
| 3 | speakers. |
| 4 | MR. UNGER: Well, I |
| 5 | JUDGE GRAFFEO: You're objecting to the |
| 6 | dismantling of the speakers, is that or |
| 7 | MR. UNGER: I don't I don't think |
| 8 | _ |
| 9 | JUDGE GRAFFEO: What is it that bothers you |
| 10 | about |
| 11 | MR. UNGER: What bothers me is the |
| 12 | JUDGE GRAFFEO: what they did in the |
| 13 | trunk? |
| 14 | MR. UNGER: I'm sorry. The search in |
| 15 | general, the officer admitted during the suppression |
| 16 | hearing that he was searching for contraband. That |
| 17 | flies in the face of what an inventory search |
| 18 | JUDGE SMITH: Well, he he |
| 19 | admitted that at one point he was he was |
| 20 | looking in a place where he thought drugs might be, |
| 21 | but the but didn't didn't both courts |
| 22 | below find that it wasn't a pretextual search? |
| 23 | MR. UNGER: We submit that those courts |
| 24 | were incorrect in their finding, because |
| 25 | JUDGE SMITH: If an officer if an |

| 1 | - yeah, if you're doing an inventory search |
|----|--|
| 2 | MR. UNGER: Yes. |
| 3 | JUDGE SMITH: and you see an opening |
| 4 | in the car where you think drugs are likely to be, |
| 5 | are you supposed to say, I better leave those alone; |
| 6 | they might be drugs? |
| 7 | MR. UNGER: You know, I that's a |
| 8 | difficult question to answer. The purpose of the |
| 9 | inventory search, primarily, is to inventory the |
| 10 | contents of the vehicle. |
| 11 | JUDGE SMITH: I understand, but wouldn't it |
| 12 | be a little bit embarrassing if you did an inventory |
| 13 | search |
| 14 | MR. UNGER: Well |
| 15 | JUDGE SMITH: and it turned out later |
| 16 | you've left drugs in the car? |
| 17 | MR. UNGER: If there's something I would |
| 18 | suggest that's apparent to the officer at the time |
| 19 | he's viewing, let's say, the seats or the floor, and |
| 20 | there seems to be something that's askew. |
| 21 | CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What's the |
| 22 | significance of the taking apart some of the seats |
| 23 | prior to this thing to the trunk? |
| 24 | MR. UNGER: Well |
| 25 | CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What's that all |

1 about? 2 MR. UNGER: The evidence - - -3 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Does that make a difference? 4 5 MR. UNGER: Yes, there was evidence presented at the hearing that the vehicle had been 6 7 damaged by the police. There was evidence that the 8 seats had been opened up, all sorts of things that 9 were changed. 10 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So in an - - - so in 11 answer to Judge Smith's question, if it's readily 12 apparent, I think everyone would agree and you're 13 doing an inventory search - - -MR. UNGER: Of course. 14 15 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - so you 16 inventory whatever, even if it's contraband or 17 whatever it is. But are you saying that - - - that 18 you can't go beyond a cursory examination in the 19 ordinary course or can you lift things up, look 2.0 underneath? Let's say they - - - putting aside the 21 damage that there may have been to the car, can you 22 look under things? Can you say, oh, under these 23 speakers, if you would take a normal - - - could that

be in the normal course?

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MR. UNGER: Yes, if the Patrol Guide issued

| 1 | by the police department |
|----|--|
| 2 | CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: I see. |
| 3 | MR. UNGER: if it authorizes these |
| 4 | activities, these types of things to be done. |
| 5 | CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So there's got to be |
| 6 | a protocol and you got to follow the protocol. |
| 7 | MR. UNGER: Exactly. |
| 8 | CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yeah. |
| 9 | MR. UNGER: And one of the protocols that |
| 10 | this officer certainly violated was taking the |
| 11 | contents of the passenger section of the vehicle and |
| 12 | handing them over to a relative of the defendant, |
| 13 | without making a meaningful inventory of what he |
| 14 | turned over. |
| 15 | JUDGE GRAFFEO: Is |
| 16 | JUDGE PIGOTT: That was just doing you a |
| 17 | favor, wasn't it? |
| 18 | MR. UNGER: That's right. And it's a kind |
| 19 | gesture. It may not have been a gesture that the |
| 20 | officer would have made if it wasn't to a fellow |
| 21 | officer |
| 22 | JUDGE PIGOTT: Right. |
| 23 | MR. UNGER: who the sister happened |
| 24 | to be. |
| 25 | JUDGE GRAFFEO: Didn't the officer write |

| 1 | something in the memo book |
|----|---|
| 2 | MR. UNGER: She signed |
| 3 | JUDGE GRAFFEO: about and she |
| 4 | signed? |
| 5 | MR. UNGER: She signed that I received a |
| 6 | lot of stuff. That's it. No meaningful inventory. |
| 7 | It's for the officer who's conducting the so-called |
| 8 | inventory search, to make it |
| 9 | JUDGE RIVERA: But if he then comes back |
| 10 | and follows let's for one moment say he came |
| 11 | back, then, after that, and he follows the protocol |
| 12 | otherwise, does the original let's call it a |
| 13 | breach of the Patrolman's Guide, vitiate what might |
| 14 | be proper conduct afterwards? |
| 15 | MR. UNGER: Well, I think what it does is, |
| 16 | it demonstrates that the officer was acting with |
| 17 | discretion. And it's counterintuitive, I |
| 18 | acknowledge, when we say an officer's using |
| 19 | discretion, but in the area of inventory searches, |
| 20 | that's what's forbidden. And this officer |
| 21 | CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: No discretion? |
| 22 | MR. UNGER: No discretion. |
| 23 | JUDGE GRAFFEO: So you don't |
| 24 | MR. UNGER: He follows |
| 25 | JUDGE GRAFFEO: So you didn't you |

don't want - - - you didn't want him to give the 1 2 plastic bags with the kid's stuff to the sister? 3 MR. UNGER: You know what? As one of the 4 Judges said a moment ago, it was a good, kind, 5 gesture. But it demonstrates the kind of discretion that an officer conducting an inventory search is 6 7 forbidden from doing. 8 JUDGE SMITH: Are you - - -9 JUDGE READ: So he can't do it at all, or 10 it would have been okay if he had listed everything? 11 MR. UNGER: It'd be okay, for example, if 12 the Patrol Guide has a provision: you may return 13 property to - - -JUDGE SMITH: But does any - - - does any 14 15 departure from the Patrol Guide require suppressing 16 the result of the search? 17 MR. UNGER: If it's a substantial breach, 18 and this one was, yes. I would suggest that it does. 19 JUDGE SMITH: Is there a case that says 2.0 that? 21 MR. UNGER: Well, I think that this court 22 in its prior decisions, I think the Supreme Court has 23 emphasized the importance of a protocol that sets 2.4 forth the rules that need to be followed by officers

and that the officers must comply with. And if they

| 1 | don't |
|----|---|
| 2 | JUDGE GRAFFEO: We've we've allowed |
| 3 | some flexibility in the descriptions and how thorough |
| 4 | the in |
| 5 | MR. UNGER: Well |
| 6 | JUDGE GRAFFEO: how thorough the |
| 7 | documentation is completed. Doesn't that kind of |
| 8 | fall under that umbrella? |
| 9 | MR. UNGER: I don't know that it does, |
| 10 | because I think then we're getting into almost a |
| 11 | harmless error type of analysis, which doesn't apply |
| 12 | in search and seizures. So I don't think that would |
| 13 | be appropriate. If I can just quickly go to the |
| 14 | other points, which I think |
| 15 | CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Quickly, counsel, you |
| 16 | better |
| 17 | MR. UNGER: merit the court's |
| 18 | attention. The sufficiency of the evidence. The |
| 19 | whole case here depended on the statutory |
| 20 | presumption, which is a rebuttable one and was in |
| 21 | fact, in this case, rebutted. |
| 22 | CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: How was it rebutted? |
| 23 | MR. UNGER: Rebutted by the fact that other |
| 24 | people |

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: That's enough?

1 MR. UNGER: I think that alone was enough. 2 The fact that there was no access. The defendant 3 himself, even if he was in the vehicle - - - which 4 was disputed - - - but even if he was seated in the 5 driver's seat at the time the police stopped him, he had no access to the area in the trunk. 6 7 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, cou - - -8 quickly, what's your other points, because your red 9 light's on. 10 MR. UNGER: Just the last one, the 11 prosecutorial misconduct, which I think is - - -12 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Go ahead. 13 MR. UNGER: - - - egregious in this case. 14 The prosecutor mercilessly vouched for the 15 credibility of the police officers, reversed the 16 burden of proof, denigrated the defense, did so many 17 improper things, both during examination of witnesses and during summation. I think that would be another 18 19 ground for this court to reverse. 2.0 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counsel. 21 MR. UNGER: Thank you. 22 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Thanks, you'll have 23 your rebuttal, counsel. 2.4 MR. UNGER: Thank you.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Thank you.

| 1 | Counsel? |
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| 2 | MR. MURPHY: Good afternoon, Your Honors, |
| 3 | Matthew Murphy for the People. |
| 4 | CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counsel, what were |
| 5 | the protocols that the officer followed here? |
| 6 | MR. MURPHY: He made a detailed list, as |
| 7 | the hearing court found. He made a detailed and |
| 8 | complete list of each and every item, more than two |
| 9 | dozen items that were retained by the police |
| 10 | department. And he listed all of the more valuable |
| 11 | items that he |
| 12 | CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: He didn't list what |
| 13 | he gave to the other officer, right? |
| 14 | MR. MURPHY: He did actually list the most |
| 15 | valuable items that he released to her, and that's |
| 16 | actually supported by her testimony as well, that the |
| 17 | types of items that he released to her were things |
| 18 | like diapers, flip-flops and baseballs. Whereas the |
| 19 | things that he recorded in the memo book that he |
| 20 | released to her, were things like an iPod, a cell |
| 21 | phone |
| 22 | CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Why did why did |
| 23 | he open up the go under the speakers; that |
| 24 | apparently took him a while to do that? |

MR. MURPHY:

Не -

| 1 | CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Why why did he |
|----|--|
| 2 | do that? |
| 3 | MR. MURPHY: First of all, in terms of the |
| 4 | timing, he testified that the reason why it actually |
| 5 | took a long amount of time was he needed to find a |
| 6 | screwdriver. So the bulk of the time in between |
| 7 | there was just him finding a screwdriver. |
| 8 | CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Well, what's |
| 9 | what's the protocol that allows him to do that? |
| 10 | MR. MURPHY: The protocol not only allows |
| 11 | him |
| 12 | CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Is there anything in |
| 13 | the manual or in general |
| 14 | MR. MURPHY: Yes. |
| 15 | CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: about their |
| 16 | instructions? |
| 17 | MR. MURPHY: The manual and the protocol |
| 18 | not only allows him to remove the speakers, it |
| 19 | requires him to remove any |
| 20 | CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What does it say that |
| 21 | requires it? |
| 22 | MR. MURPHY: It's and he testifies at |
| 23 | the hearing that he has to remove anything from the |
| 24 | car that is not factory installed. And that's noted |
| 25 | in the |

JUDGE SMITH: Is that in writing somewhere 1 or is that just his understanding of the policy? 2 3 MR. MURPHY: It's his understanding of the 4 policy and it's the hearing - - - the hearing court 5 credits his testimony. JUDGE SMITH: But he - - - he testified 6 7 that he knew the pound - - - the pound wouldn't take 8 the car if the speakers were still there. 9 MR. MURPHY: Yes, and one of the purposes 10 of inventorying these items is so that they're not 11 stolen when they go to the pound. And an expensive, 12 multi-part speaker and stereo system like this, would 13 have been the first thing stolen from the car when it 14 15 JUDGE PIGOTT: How about four chrome 16 wheels? 17 MR. MURPHY: Is the question whether chrome wheels would also - - -18 19 JUDGE PIGOTT: Do you jack the car and take 20 them off, because they're not factory installed and 21 they could get stolen? MR. MURPHY: If it can be done without 22 23 damaging the vehicle, yes. Those should - - -2.4 JUDGE PIGOTT: I just didn't see that 25 anywhere either, and I - - - I was just curious about

the - - - not particularly necessarily to this case,
but generally speaking, when you have a situation
like this where you're doing a favor for somebody and
then you're - - - you're admitting that, yeah, I
shouldn't have - - - I shouldn't have been looking in
the panels, but, you know, I did, and, you know,
maybe that was a breach to the protocol.

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And then taking these speakers out and taking an hour to do them, I'm just wondering, how much time do police officers have to do inventory? I would think that this - - - that the speakers would have stayed; the wheels would have stayed; they'd have put it in the impound lot and move on.

MR. MURPHY: Well, as he testified at the hearing, the reason why it actually took so long, was first, he had to - - - the officer had to give in - -

JUDGE PIGOTT: Forget that, though. Forget that. I'm just thinking, generally speaking, the police officers are going to do an inven - - is this a - - is this a forfeiture? Does he lose the car if he gets convicted?

MR. MURPHY: There are separate forfeiture proceedings. I don't believe that happens automatically, but I'm not sure and that wasn't in

1 the record. 2 JUDGE PIGOTT: Is that possible in this 3 case? 4 MR. MURPHY: I'm not sure how the 5 forfeiture proceedings progress - - -JUDGE PIGOTT: Because there's testimony 6 7 that it was a forfeiture. But - - -MR. MURPHY: He - - - I think --8 9 JUDGE PIGOTT: - - - he gets the car back 10 at some point. Does he - - - does he have to put the speakers back in and - - - I'm just wondering the 11 12 logic of that. Is - - - because I don't remember 13 seeing it in the manual either - - -14 MR. MURPHY: The - - -15 JUDGE PIGOTT: - - - that they would go to 16 that length. 17 MR. MURPHY: The logic of it, and it is in 18 the manual that one of the purposes of removing these 19 items from the car is so they're not stolen or 20 they're not then later claimed to have been stolen, a 21 claim of theft against the police department - - -22 MR. MURPHY: Why wouldn't - - - again, I'm 23 not - - - I'm not - - - why wouldn't you simply say, 2.4 you know, personally installed speakers. Take a 25 picture of them, leave them in - - - you know, I

1 don't why you - - -2 MR. MURPHY: Because if they're left - - -3 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: I don't know why police officers would want to spend so much time 4 5 taking things out of a car that's ultimately going to be returned to the owner. 6 MR. MURPHY: I don't - - - they're not 7 8 doing it because they want to, they're doing it 9 because they're required to do it, and the pound - -10 11 JUDGE PIGOTT: That's what I'm saying. MR. MURPHY: The pound - - - and the - - -12 13 Officer Lanzi - - -14 JUDGE PIGOTT: Who says it's required to do 15 it? 16 MR. MURPHY: Officer Lanzisero says it at 17 the hearing. 18 JUDGE PIGOTT: I know that, but I mean, he's not - - - he's not the commissioner. 19 20 MR. MURPHY: Right, it's also - - -21 JUDGE PIGOTT: He's not - - - he's not the 22 Supreme Court of the United States. I'm just 23 wondering, who says that when you impound a car that 2.4 you have to go to these lengths when police officers 25 have a lot more - - - better to do than to look for a

screwdriver for forty-five minutes. That's all. I 1 2 just don't - - - don't get it. 3 MR. MURPHY: He testifies that that's the 4 departmental policy and that the impound lot would 5 not accept any vehicle with these nonfactoryinstalled items, and certainly the fact that this is 6 7 a large - - -CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But - - - but what 8 9 about the damage to the seats? What's that all 10 about? 11 MR. MURPHY: The only person who 12 characterizes any sort of damage to the seats being 13 done throughout the entire hearing is the defense 14 attorney. And the judge, upon looking at the 15 pictures that were offered by the defense in 16 evidence, says to the defense attorney at the 17 hearing, you keep using the phrase "ripped apart"; 18 what are you talking about? They're not ripped 19 apart. 20 JUDGE SMITH: Do we - - - do we have those 21 pictures? 22 MR. MURPHY: They were - - - they were the 23 defense exhibits. I don't believe that they were 2.4 provided. I have trial exhibits with me. I'm happy

to provide a copy to the court. And it's my

| 1 | understanding they were the same photos. But they |
|----|---|
| 2 | were not technically the People's hearing exhibits. |
| 3 | But upon |
| 4 | JUDGE RIVERA: If if I believe, |
| 5 | it's Ms. Vasquez. If Ms. Vasquez had said, I want to |
| 6 | take the speakers, would he had allowed her to take |
| 7 | the speakers? |
| 8 | MR. MURPHY: He it not only appears |
| 9 | he would have allowed her, she says in her testimony |
| 10 | they were simply too heavy to carry. |
| 11 | JUDGE RIVERA: Couldn't take them; they |
| 12 | were too heavy. So if she had taken them, right, |
| 13 | does does then the search of the trunk stop? |
| 14 | MR. MURPHY: Well, it wouldn't have stopped |
| 15 | because the wheel wells still hadn't been searched |
| 16 | yet. |
| 17 | JUDGE RIVERA: So he has to do that part |
| 18 | also? |
| 19 | MR. MURPHY: He is he's obligated to |
| 20 | search the car thoroughly under police protocols, and |
| 21 | that |
| 22 | JUDGE SMITH: So if the speakers if |
| 23 | the speakers hadn't been there, he still would have |
| 24 | found the gun. |

JUDGE RIVERA: Would have done the same

thing.

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MR. MURPHY: Absolutely. And in terms of whether these were factory-installed speakers or not, it's important to remember that these speakers actually prohibited someone from opening that spare tire compartment, which is not the way that presumably Lexus designs their speakers in the back of their cars.

JUDGE RIVERA: In he had searched and there were no speakers, he opens up the trunk and does he have to also inventory the spare tire itself? Does he have to remove it? What does he have to do?

MR. MURPHY: He - - - he test - - - he doesn't say this explicitly at the hearing. He later clarifies it even further at trial, that the wheel itself and the owner's manual are the only things that can be left.

JUDGE RIVERA: Um-hum.

MR. MURPHY: And that testimony - - - he doesn't elaborate that fully at the hearing, but he makes it clear in other words. All this - - -

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So your view is everything here was in the ordinary course?

MR. MURPHY: Everything was in the ordinary course. And another way to think of it is literally

the only thing that Lanzisero does that may even be slightly improper, is that he fails to record a limited number of these less valuable items that he releases to the sister as a courtesy. Everything else was completely in keeping with the policy, and the hearing court noted that.

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JUDGE PIGOTT: Did he say something about taking off the panels?

MR. MURPHY: He didn't - - - he didn't take off the panels; it seems that he slid them aside, because he noticed that they were askew. He didn't - - he didn't remove seatback panels. What he testified to is he saw that they were askew, and he was aware that these were compartments that were occasionally used - - -

JUDGE PIGOTT: No, I'm just - - - I'm just questioning when you say he said, you know, that the only thing he did that was not part of the protocol was, and I think he even said that that was not part of the protocol, and for the reasons that you are now saying. But it's not protocol for them to remove these panels.

MR. MURPHY: It actually - - - it is - - - it is protocol to search the entire car, and that would - - -

JUDGE PIGOTT: But he misspoke?

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MR. MURPHY: I don't believe that that's - I may be wrong, but I don't believe that that's
the way he phrased it. And he continually tries to
explain himself at the hearing, and is cut off by the
defense attorney. Eventually the judge has to
interject and tell him - - -

JUDGE PIGOTT: I don't - - - I'm not trying to - - - I thought he did a very nice job of testifying. I'm not picking on him. I - - - and the defense did not challenge the whole procedure, where it sounds like, the more you keep describing it, they take the car apart as part of the inventory. You're saying they can slide these panels; that's protocol. They can - - - they can - - - everything is fair game except the owner's manual and the spare tire. I mean, at some point, inventory becomes search.

MR. MURPHY: Well, it's - - -

JUDGE PIGOTT: And that's kind of what we're looking for, because if you don't probable cause for a search, you probably can't do it. And if you're simply doing an inventory to protect, as they say, the three things: the police, the stuff, and the defendant's stuff - - -

MR. MURPHY: They have an obligation to

search every area of the car. And the fact that this 1 2 is an area where there could be drugs hidden, it 3 could be an area where there's cash hidden, it could 4 5 JUDGE PIGOTT: Oh. So your argument is, 6 that when he was stopped on the street, they had a 7 right to search for drugs, even though they had no probable cause to believe there's any drugs in the 8 9 car; it's just what they do. MR. MURPHY: 10 They're not searching for 11 They're conducting an inventory search - - drugs. 12 JUDGE PIGOTT: But isn't that the 13 difference? MR. MURPHY: Well, I - - - whether the 14 15 officer was subjectively hoping to find drugs, 16 whether he believed based on his prior experience 17 that he might find drugs, has really no impact on the legitimacy of him following - - -18 19 JUDGE SMITH: Doesn't - - - doesn't Johnson 20 suggest otherwise? Doesn't Johnson say that the 21 Robinson rule that motive doesn't matter is 22 inapplicable in inventory cases? 23 MR. MURPHY: It does say that, Judge, but 2.4 this is very distinct from Johnson. There was a 25 detailed inventory list. This does not have the air

of a ruse the way that the facts were in Johnson.

And the hearing court explicitly - - -

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JUDGE PIGOTT: I think that's true, but you keep saying that there's no - - - that there's no bounds. You keep saying they - - - this is protocol; this is what they do. They search panels. They take the trunk apart. They can look under the hood. They can - - - they can do everything. The only thing they have to do is leave the spare tire and the owner's manual in the car, and that's it. And I'm not sure you want to make that argument. And I don't think that's what --

MR. MURPHY: I'm not - - - I'm not making that argument, Judge, that there's no bounds. I'm actually saying that there are bounds, and that they require the police to search the car thoroughly.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counsel, but don't - don't you accept the basic premise of Judge

Pigott's question, which is, there's a point at which
this, sort of, falls over into the search cate - - that it could be that - - - that at some point,
there's got to be a difference between an inventory
and searching for something.

I mean, isn't there a line there? Is it always - - - is it always - - - are you saying the

| 1 | two of them always fall together? |
|----|--|
| 2 | MR. MURPHY: No, I'm saying the question - |
| 3 | and I think that the line would be is this a ruse |
| 4 | simply to look for evidence? And the hearing court |
| 5 | |
| 6 | CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: In your mind if |
| 7 | there's no motive to look for evidence, and the |
| 8 | and the normal protocol is you take apart the whole |
| 9 | car? I think that's what Judge Pigott's saying. If |
| 10 | you can if you can take off the panels, if you |
| 11 | can take out everything except whatever it is, |
| 12 | the manual, doesn't that, in effect, become |
| 13 | become a search? |
| 14 | MR. MURPHY: No, because it's removing |
| 15 | - it's removing their discretion. It's obligating |
| 16 | them to look through the car thoroughly according to |
| 17 | the departmental procedures |
| 18 | CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Thoroughly means the |
| 19 | whole car goes out? Everything comes out of the car |
| 20 | MR. MURPHY: Not everything not |
| 21 | everything is out of |
| 22 | CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What if you took the |
| 23 | seats out too? If you |
| 24 | MR. MURPHY: The seats presumably were |
| 25 | installed by the factory. |

1 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: No, no, no. But I'm saying could it - - - would it be, if it was the 2 3 normal protocol to where you inventory everything, if 4 you took everything out of the car and put it on the 5 side of the car - - -6 MR. MURPHY: That protocol --7 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - would that 8 still be an inventory search? 9 MR. MURPHY: That protocol itself may be 10 crossing - - -11 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Per se no good. 12 MR. MURPHY: - - - crossing the line, but 13 that's not the case here, and there's never even been 14 a challenge to the protocols themselves. 15 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, thanks, 16 counsel. 17 MR. MURPHY: Thank you, Your Honors. 18 JUDGE PIGOTT: Mr. Unger, isn't he right, 19 that you're not challenging the procedures, you're 20 just challenging what happened here? 21 MR. UNGER: Well, what I'm challenging is, we have the Patrol Guide, which is supposed to give 22 23 the police officers guidance as to how they conduct an inventory search. And if the officer doesn't 2.4 25 follow that guide - - -

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1
                    JUDGE PIGOTT: Right. You're saying the
          quide's - - -
 2
 3
                    MR. UNGER: - - - then it's not a true
 4
          inven - - -
 5
                    JUDGE PIGOTT: You're saying the guide's
          fine. If he vio - - - if he goes beyond the guide,
 6
 7
          then there's an issue.
 8
                    MR. UNGER: I - - -
 9
                    JUDGE PIGOTT: Mr. Murphy's saying - - -
10
                    MR. UNGER: Yes. I don't - - -
                    JUDGE PIGOTT: - - - if you get - - -
11
12
                    MR. UNGER: I'm sorry, Judge. I don't
13
          think that the Patrol Guide gives the officers carte
          blanche to tear the car apart. I'm sure - - -
14
15
                    CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Are you saying - - -
16
                    MR. UNGER: - - - there's nothing in it.
17
                    CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Do you think, under
18
          the record here, that every one of these so-called
          inventory searches are really searches?
19
20
                    MR. UNGER: This one.
21
                    CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Or are you saying
22
          that this one went beyond what's the normal course?
23
          In general - - -
2.4
                    MR. UNGER: The latter.
25
                    CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - inventory
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| 1 | searches are all right? |
|----|--|
| 2 | MR. UNGER: Well, inventory searches are |
| 3 | all right, if they follow the protocols. |
| 4 | CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: I mean, in light of |
| 5 | the testimony of the officer of what goes on, is |
| 6 | every one of them bad, or is it just |
| 7 | MR. UNGER: I |
| 8 | CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: his |
| 9 | interpretation is bad? |
| LO | MR. UNGER: Again, when you say "an |
| L1 | officer's interpretation", you're getting into |
| L2 | dangerous territory of discretion |
| L3 | CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Because they have |
| L4 | discretion, yeah. |
| L5 | MR. UNGER: which is not supposed to |
| L6 | be exercised. In terms I wanted to address |
| L7 | _ |
| L8 | JUDGE SMITH: What did he what did he |
| L9 | do other than give the stuff to the sister, |
| 20 | what did he do that he wasn't supposed to do? Take |
| 21 | out the speakers, you say is wrong? |
| 22 | MR. UNGER: Sliding the panels. Taking |
| 23 | _ |
| 24 | JUDGE SMITH: What did he do with the |
| 25 | panels? |

| 1 | MR. UNGER: He was sliding them, damaging - |
|----|--|
| 2 | |
| 3 | JUDGE SMITH: You mean, you can't |
| 4 | MR. UNGER: damaging |
| 5 | JUDGE SMITH: When you do an inventory |
| 6 | search, and there's a panel that's loose, you can't |
| 7 | slide it to see what's behind it? |
| 8 | MR. UNGER: Well, there was evidence that |
| 9 | it wasn't loose until the officers got a hold of it. |
| 10 | I think that's what really what happened here. |
| 11 | JUDGE SMITH: You say that he you say |
| 12 | he dismantled it? |
| 13 | MR. UNGER: I'm not saying he did it |
| 14 | himself, but there were other officers who certainly |
| 15 | had that opportunity. |
| 16 | JUDGE SMITH: So really, I mean, is that - |
| 17 | is that can we accept on this record as a |
| 18 | fact that somebody dismantled the car? Or dismantled |
| 19 | part of the car? |
| 20 | MR. UNGER: Well, the car was dismantled. |
| 21 | It was not in the condition that it was left. |
| 22 | JUDGE SMITH: Well, you say that there was |
| 23 | a panel that was loose. It might have been loose |
| 24 | when they got it. |

MR. UNGER: Anything is possible, but I

| 1 | think the evidence was |
|----|--|
| 2 | JUDGE SMITH: Well, but, well but |
| 3 | MR. UNGER: sufficient to rebut that |
| 4 | that assertion. |
| 5 | JUDGE SMITH: Is the mere existence of a |
| 6 | loose panel that he looked behind, does that justify |
| 7 | suppressing the evidence? |
| 8 | MR. UNGER: Well, with that assumption, no, |
| 9 | but that's not what the record, I think, reflects. |
| 10 | And I think it was the officers who actually caused |
| 11 | the damage in a search for evidence. |
| 12 | JUDGE SMITH: And what's the best evidence |
| 13 | that they caused it? |
| 14 | MR. UNGER: You have the damage to the |
| 15 | seats themselves. I think that alone tells us what |
| 16 | was really going on here, and the officer admitting, |
| 17 | when he testified, I was looking for contraband. |
| 18 | JUDGE READ: The damage the damage to |
| 19 | the seats you're talking about, is that reflected in |
| 20 | the pictures we don't have in the record? |
| 21 | MR. UNGER: Well, I believe that the |
| 22 | pictures did show the damage, yes. |
| 23 | JUDGE READ: Okay. |
| 24 | MR. UNGER: So I think the court would be - |
| 25 | |

1 JUDGE PIGOTT: You can see the officer's 2 point, though, if there's a loose panel or something, 3 and, you know, after this case is over, the defendant 4 says, you know, that 10,000 dollars I had in the - -5 - you know, behind the panels is missing. MR. UNGER: Sure, sure. And - - -6 7 JUDGE RIVERA: So if he had - - -MR. UNGER: I'm sorry. 8 9 JUDGE RIVERA: If he had followed the 10 protocol until he got to the trunk, are you saying he 11 breaches the protocol when he takes time to find a 12 screwdriver to unscrew the speakers? 13 MR. UNGER: I think - - - I can't answer 14 the question the way it's exactly phrased, but I 15 think the fact that he takes up to an hour to unscrew these speakers - - - he determines that these are not 16 17 factory-installed, he determines that they have to be removed - - -18 JUDGE SMITH: Well, he - - - he - - - he 19 20 testified that he knew that the pound would not take 21 the things with the speaker in there. We - - -22 MR. UNGER: Well - - -23 JUDGE SMITH: We have to accept that as 2.4 true, don't we? 25

MR. UNGER: Well - - -

| 1 | JUDGE SMITH: Or at least, is there any |
|----|--|
| 2 | _ |
| 3 | MR. UNGER: Again |
| 4 | JUDGE SMITH: basis for rejecting it? |
| 5 | MR. UNGER: I would say that sounds like |
| 6 | another interpretation that this officer used in |
| 7 | doing what he did in this case, not |
| 8 | JUDGE RIVERA: But if there no if |
| 9 | there were no speakers, could he have opened the |
| 10 | trunk, lifted, looked at the spare, is there any |
| 11 | problem with that? |
| 12 | MR. UNGER: I don't think that there would |
| 13 | be a problem. I don't think so at all. |
| 14 | CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counsel. |
| 15 | MR. UNGER: Thank you. |
| 16 | CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Thanks. Appreciate |
| 17 | it. Thank you both. |
| 18 | (Court is adjourned) |
| 19 | |
| 20 | |
| 21 | |
| 22 | |
| 23 | |
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CERTIFICATION I, Karen Schiffmiller, certify that the foregoing transcript of proceedings in the Court of Appeals of People v. Kenneth Padilla, No. 114 was prepared using the required transcription equipment and is a true and accurate record of the proceedings. Hour Laboffmills. Signature: Agency Name: eScribers Address of Agency: 700 West 192nd Street Suite # 607 New York, NY 10040 Date: May 10, 2013