1	COURT OF APPEALS
2	STATE OF NEW YORK
3	
4	PEOPLE BY CUOMO & C.,
5	Respondent,
6	-against- No. 63
7	GREENBERG, ET AL.,
8	Appellants.
9	20 Eagle Street Albany, New York 12207 May 28, 2013
10	Before:
11	ASSOCIATE JUDGE VICTORIA A. GRAFFEO
12	ASSOCIATE JUDGE SUSAN PHILLIPS READ ASSOCIATE JUDGE ROBERT S. SMITH
13	ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE F. PIGOTT, JR. ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA
14	ASSOCIATE JUDGE SHEILA ABDUS-SALAAM ASSOCIATE JUSTICE WILLIAM F. MASTRO, APP. DIV. SECOND DEPT.
15	Appearances:
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JUDGE GRAFFEO: Number 63, People of the State 1 of New York by Cuomo against Greenberg. 2 3 Counselor, do you wish to reserve any time for 4 rebuttal? 5 MR. BOIES: Five minutes, Your Honor. JUDGE GRAFFEO: Granted. You can proceed. 6 7 MR. BOIES: Thank you, Your Honor. 8 May it please the court, my name is David Boies, 9 and I represent the appellant, Mr. Maurice Greenberg. 10 We moved for summary judgment in the trial 11 court, and we moved for summary judgment on two grounds in 12 addition to our allegation that there was not adequate 13 evidence to set forth the underlying claims that were 14 charged. First, with respect to damages, we said this 15 action was preempted by federal law. JUDGE GRAFFEO: Do we still have preemption in 16 17 front of us, as far as you're concerned? MR. BOIES: I don't believe we do, Your Honor. 18 I believe that's over with because they've withdrawn the 19 20 damage claim. 21 JUDGE GRAFFEO: Okay. So what's the second 22 issue? 23 MR. BOIES: The second thing we said was that 2.4 there was no basis for injunctive relief. In their 25 original complaint, they had had both a claim for

injunctive relief and a claim for damages. 1 JUDGE GRAFFEO: They do mention - - - they do 2 3 mention injunctive relief in the complaint, correct? 4 MR. BOIES: Yes, they do, Your Honor. 5 JUDGE GRAFFEO: Now - - -MR. BOIES: Not - - - not actually the 6 7 injunctive relief that they're now claiming, but they do 8 mention injunctive relief in the complaint. So when we 9 moved - - -10 JUDGE GRAFFEO: So do you - - - do you dispute that in a - - - in an appropriate case that the Attorney 11 12 General, under the Martin Act, could pursue equitable 13 relief? 14 MR. BOIES: No, Your Honor, we do not. In fact, 15 we said to the trial court that in an appropriate case 16 there could be injunctive relief sought on a - - -17 JUDGE GRAFFEO: So why is it inappropriate here? 18 MR. BOIES: Because, Your Honor, we moved for 19 summary judgment. We said there is no basis in this case 20 for injunctive relief. We said - - -21 JUDGE SMITH: So you're saying there never was a 22 basis for injunctive relief or there - - - or there isn't 23 now? 2.4 MR. BOIES: Well, when we moved for summary 25 judgment, we said there was no basis ever and we said

1 there was particularly no basis then, and the reason for 2 those two different arguments, Your Honor, is in order to 3 get injunctive relief, they must show either some danger 4 of continuing violation or they must show some ability to 5 ask for disgorgement or restitution. 6 JUDGE SMITH: There's a general rule, if the - -7 - if the Attorney General shows that a defendant has 8 committed some outrageous violation of the Martin Act, 9 shouldn't he normally get an injunction against repetition 10 of the - - - of the wrong? 11 MR. BOIES: Only if there is some danger that it could be repeated, Your Honor. This - - - this - - -12 13 JUDGE SMITH: Well, I understand that, but can't 14 - - - can't that danger usually be inferred by the - - -15 by committing a willful - - - from the commission of a 16 willful violation? 17 MR. BOIES: Remember, Your Honor, there was no evidence here of a willful violation. 18 19 JUDGE SMITH: Okay, but - - -2.0 MR. BOIES: The whole theory here - - -21 JUDGE GRAFFEO: But you have issues of fact in 22 the CAPCO situation, correct? 23 MR. BOIES: No, Your Honor. Even with respect 2.4 to CAPCO and with respect to GenRe, the theory below was 25 that you did not need scienter, you did not need a willful

violation. What the court ruled is the court prevented us from having certain discovery because the court said scienter is not an issue here. So I - - - I would say that under those circumstances, you do need to have a basis.

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But in addition to that, Your Honor, by the time we made our motion for summary judgment, we had a situation in which there already had been an injunction issued with the SEC, and we said, there is no basis for restitution, there's no basis for disgorgement because there was never any illegal gains. We said there's no danger of a repetition; there already is an injunction. So we said there that there was no basis. Now, that could

JUDGE SMITH: Grant - - - granting that you said all this, did - - - has any - - - until the damage case went away, every - - - the - - - no one's been paying much attention to the injunctive side of this case. Is that a fair statement?

MR. BOIES: Well, Your Honor, we were paying attention to it.

JUDGE SMITH: Well, okay, and every - - - and everyone including both courts below ignored you?

MR. BOIES: No. The reason - - - the reason that they didn't address it was they didn't dispute it.

1 They never put forward something contrary to our 2 arguments. In other words, when we said there is no 3 danger of a continuing violation, there's no basis for restitution - - -4 5 JUDGE SMITH: But nobody - - -MR. BOIES: - - - they didn't say - - -6 7 JUDGE SMITH: But nobody ever dismissed the 8 injunctive branch of the case. 9 MR. BOIES: Well, that was what we were asking 10 for in our summary judgment. 11 JUDGE SMITH: And you didn't get it. 12 MR. BOIES: We did not get it, but we didn't get 13 it not based on the fact that there was a basis for 14 injunctive relief; we didn't get it because they said 15 there was a basis for damages. The only - - -JUDGE SMITH: Well, basically - - - but isn't 16 17 that - - - well, that's what I was suggesting. Everyone's 18 focusing on the - - - on the damages issue, and every - -19 - and even despite the fact that you would mention it now 20 and then, nobody paid much attention to the injunction. 21 MR. BOIES: Your Honor, with respect, I just 22 don't think that's so, okay, because we argued, and we - -23 - we argued - - - if you look at the record at 14777, 2.4 14780, 14933, we argued in the trial court, we argued in

our Appellate Division brief appealing the grant, in part,

of the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, page 4.

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JUDGE SMITH: Your - - - your position is you argued it, they didn't oppose it; nevertheless, no court dismissed that part of the case. And I'm suggesting isn't - - - on your theory, that has to be an oversight because no one was paying attention since your motion was essentially unopposed as to the injunctive point.

MR. BOIES: Let me try a slightly different way, if I could, Your Honor. It's not that there's this part of the case and that part of the case. What it is is they've got a claim, and what we said is that that claim we deserve summary judgment on; because there are only two ways for them to justify that claim. One is damages and one is injunctive relief. We said they have not put a basis in the record for either of those two legs.

JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Counsel, normally, when you move for summary judgment and it's not opposed, you usually win on that argument, don't you, when you're arguing and there's no opposition?

MR. BOIES: By you see, they did oppose, on the grounds that they could get damages. In other words - - -

JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: How does that relate to the injunctive relief though?

MR. BOIES: Because there is a - - - a claim there for a violation of the Martin Act. You can have a

1	claim for a violation of the Martin Act if you can seek
2	either or both, of damages or injunctive relief. We said
3	there is no basis under either theory. That is, we asked
4	for summary judgment not of damages, not of injunctive
5	relief; we asked for a summary judgment on their whole
6	claim.
7	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: And when you didn't get it,
8	you didn't move to reargue or to clarify or do anything of
9	that sort, did you, on the injunctive relief?
10	MR. BOIES: No, because we didn't have to
11	because the court didn't decide against us on that ground.
12	JUDGE GRAFFEO: Well, let let me ask you
13	another way. What what is there in the federal
14	settlement that would eliminate the need for the Attorney
15	General to pursue the injunctive relief here?
16	MR. BOIES: There is
17	JUDGE GRAFFEO: I mean, especially in terms of
18	the possibility of repetition.
19	MR. BOIES: Sure. There is a very broad
20	injunction that was agreed to in connection with the SEC.
21	JUDGE GRAFFEO: That does that was what?
22	I guess that's what I'm asking more specifically.
23	MR. BOIES: That that agrees that
24	JUDGE GRAFFEO: Are are both of these
25	individuals banned from ever participating in securities

industry again?

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MR. BOIES: No, they're not, Your Honor, and that's a very important aspect of it, okay.

JUDGE GRAFFEO: So is that something the Attorney General is entitled to pursue?

MR. BOIES: Not now. And the reason I say not now, Your Honor, is because they did not ask for it in their complaint; they did not ask for that in their complaint. They did not ask for it in the trial court. They didn't preserve it in the Appellate Division. This is a situation in which they have never been seriously pursuing injunctive relief. They abandoned it in the trial court. They abandoned it in - - in the Appellate Division. They did not preserve that argument. They never asked for this kind of relief even in their complaint. And now, because - -

JUDGE SMITH: I - - - I assume that the complaint - - - I assume the complaint does say other and further relief?

MR. BOIES: I - - - I'm sure it does, Your

Honor, but it's - - - it - - - it says injunctive relief

in the - - - in the general category that they won't do

this kind of violation again, which is - - -

JUDGE SMITH: Which you say they've already got or somebody's already got.

MR. BOIES: In the SEC.

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JUDGE READ: What - - - what if we don't agree with you? What happens to the case? Does it go back to Supreme Court?

MR. BOIES: Well, Your Honor, you recall that in addition to the injunctive relief argument on the grounds that there's nothing left after they abandon their damages claim, we have pointed out, and as the dissent pointed out in the Appellate Division, that there is no admissible evidence that supports any violation here at all.

JUDGE READ: That gets back to your evidentiary point about whether or not there was anything in admissible form in opposition to the - - - could you - - - could you address that for a little bit?

MR. BOIES: Yes, Your Honor. As this court held in 2004 in Hyman against Queens Bancorp, 3 N.Y. 3d, I think 743, you have to have admissible evidence in order to oppose a summary judgment. In fact, if I can get the exact quote, it says, "A party opposing a motion for summary judgment must produce admissible evidence sufficient to require a trial on material questions of fact upon which the claim rests."

JUDGE SMITH: There's an exception, isn't there, when the - - - when the opposing party shows a sufficient excuse for not having admissible evidence?

MR. BOIES: In - - - in an earlier case, a case 1 2 that preceded the Hyman case - - -3 JUDGE SMITH: I mean, as a general rule, you'd 4 admit that - - - let's say you don't have admissible 5 evidence because one of the witnesses who you would need 6 to support your - - - the key witness is taking the Fifth Amendment, and if it's foreseeable that maybe that - - -7 8 maybe the criminal matter would be resolved and he might 9 not take the Fifth Amendment, would that be a sufficient 10 excuse to justify denying summary judgment? 11 MR. BOIES: I - - - I think, Your Honor, in some 12 - - - some places it could be. In Friends of Animals v. 13 Associated Fur Manufacturers, a 1979 case, this - - - this court held that if someone could "demonstrate acceptable 14 15 excuse for his failure to meet the strict requirement of 16 tender in admissible form, you might be able to avoid" - -17 JUDGE SMITH: Well, in - - - in this case - - -18 19 in this case, can we - - - I mean, is it - - - I don't 20 even know if your adversary is arguing this, but can't - -21 - can they say, look, we don't have Ferguson and Milton 22 but we can't say we're never going to have them. 23 - their problems could be resolved. 2.4 MR. BOIES: Well, Your Honor, I - - - I suggest

that under Friends of Animals and all the other cases,

And with

it's got to be more than sort of speculation or conjecture 1 2 that says maybe we could get it. 3 JUDGE SMITH: Okay. You're almost out of time, so let me switch, if I can, for a moment, why is it - - -4 5 forget about the hearsay problem. Why isn't it enough 6 that you have the boss of the company who originated the 7 transaction, can't - - - is it - - - can't a jury infer or 8 isn't - - - for a summary judgment, isn't the inference a 9 possible one that the - - - that his subordinates didn't 10 do a crooked deal without asking him? 11 MR. BOIES: Well, Your Honor, if that were the 12 case, somebody who is running a 160-billion-dollar 13 corporation with thousands of these transactions - - -14 JUDGE SMITH: Yeah, yeah, but this is - -15 16 MR. BOIES: - - - who are responsible for every 17 month - - -JUDGE SMITH: This isn't - - - this isn't 18 19 thousands of these transactions. This is a transaction 20 that he called up Mr. Ferguson to originate. 21 MR. BOIES: Yes, but remember, Your Honor - - -JUDGE SMITH: And it's a 600 - - - 600 million 22 23 is money even - - - even to AIG.

MR. BOIES: It is, but there were thousands of

transactions of hundreds of millions of dollars.

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1 respect to calling up Mr. Ferguson, the evidence is 2 absolutely clear - - - it is undisputed - - - that the 3 original transaction that Mr. Greenberg asked for on October 31st, 2000, was a legitimate transaction. 4 5 JUDGE SMITH: How come - - - why did the Second Circuit conclude that a jury could - - - they could have 6 concluded that the conspiracy began on October 31st? 7 8 MR. BOIES: Your Honor, I - - - I don't know why 9 that was concluded, but what I - - - what I can tell you 10 is, as far as Mr. Greenberg was concerned, the evidence is 11 absolutely clear, including from Mr. Napier, their own 12 witness, the original thing that was asked for by Mr. 13 Greenberg was entirely legitimate, and they spent two 14 weeks trying to construct that. 15 JUDGE SMITH: What about - - -16 17 18

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JUDGE GRAFFEO: Well, why isn't the Attorney General entitled to delve deeper into this issue to determine if, in fact, there was knowledge?

MR. BOIES: Your Honor, they've been delving into this for eight years. They've had hundreds of depositions, millions of pieces of paper produced. This has gone on for eight years. They have delved into these transactions with greater scrutiny than anybody - - -

JUDGE SMITH: What about - - - what about the Napier call to Milton? Napier calls Milton and says, in

effect, we don't want to do this the legal way; we're 1 2 going to do it the crooked way. Milton says, I'll get 3 back to you. Then Milton does get back to him. Couldn't a fact-finder infer from that that Greenberg was informed 4 5 of what was going on? MR. BOIES: Your Honor, I don't think so. 6 7 mean, that is pure speculation and conjecture. I mean, if 8 you're going to - - -9 JUDGE SMITH: Who - - - who would Milton 10 possibly have to check with other than Greenberg?

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MR. BOIES: Well, there were a whole lot of people that were senior who were involved in the transaction. And in addition to that, he might want to think about it; he might want to ask his lawyers. There were all sorts of lawyers involved in this transaction on both sides.

JUDGE RIVERA: So you're arguing the only way they can oppose your summary judgment is if they actually have the smoking gun?

MR. BOIES: No, Your Honor. There are all sorts of ways. Someone might have talked to Mr. Greenberg about some of the illegal aspects of the transaction. There were all sorts of documents and e-mails.

JUDGE SMITH: Suppose - - - suppose a deal is about to be closed and in the - - - in the conference room

where the documents are being signed, someone presents
essentially a crooked deal to Mr. Milton. Greenberg is
not in the room; Greenberg is in another conference room.

Milton takes a look at it, puts it down, walks out of the
room, comes back and signs. Could someone infer that he
checked with Greenberg?

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MR. BOIES: I think if they were there together and they were at nearby conference rooms, there might be an inference, Your Honor. None of that is present in this case. None of that has ever been argued. And indeed, when you're talking about an acceptable excuse, nobody said in the Appellate Division in - - - this is - - - this case was entirely changed. This was - - - this was a case they argued one way below. They didn't preserve the arguments they're making to this court now, and what they're trying to do is just somehow keep this case alive so that they can delve into it more after eight years of not finding anything.

JUDGE GRAFFEO: Counsel, you'll have your time for rebuttal.

MR. BOIES: Thank you, Your Honor.

MR. SAMA: Good afternoon, Your Honors. Vincent Sama for Mr. Smith.

I want to follow up on what you discussed with Mr. Boies by focusing on this - - -

1 JUDGE GRAFFEO: Do you want any rebuttal of your few minutes? 2 3 MR. SAMA: Yeah, one minute, please. JUDGE GRAFFEO: Yes. 4 5 MR. SAMA: Thank you - - - by focusing on one -6 - - this case has been going or eight years. There were 7 fifty depositions, million - - - tens of millions of - - -JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, it started out - - - it 8 9 sound - - - you know, if you read the briefs from the very 10 beginning, it sounds like you're - - - you're suggesting 11 that the Attorney General of the State of New York has 12 absolutely no power under - - - under its blue sky laws 13 because of federal preemption. And I - - - and I agree 14 with Mr. Boies that it seems to have now bubbled down to -15 16 MR. SAMA: Correct. 17 JUDGE PIGOTT: - - - you know, a very, very small - - -18 19 MR. SAMA: Very - - -JUDGE PIGOTT: - - - thing. 20 21 MR. SAMA: Correct. 22 JUDGE PIGOTT: But nevertheless, that's where we 23 are. And if you're conceding that the Attorney General 2.4 has certain authority under - - - are we just arguing

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pleadings?

1 MR. SAMA: No. I am - - - I'm saying that the 2 Attorney General has a - - - they took discovery in this 3 case. But now after eight years, if you look at the 4 evidence very carefully as to what they're saying against 5 Mr. Smith, it's nonexistent. We get - - -JUDGE SMITH: What - - - what about - - - what 6 7 about his handwriting on that e-mail? MR. SAMA: That - - - what - - - he has his 8 9 handwriting on an e-mail. That's all that he's 10 acknowledged. 11 JUDGE SMITH: I mean, it's - - - it's an e-mail 12 - - can the e-mail fairly be read as saying, let's do a 13 sham deal and get the fee back to us under the table? MR. SAMA: I don't - - - I don't believe so. I 14 15 believe that's doc - - - the document that he - - - was 16 hand delivered. He's not copied on that document. 17 brought to him. His handwriting is on it. There's two 18 things that they're now arguing about that, that a 19 different - - -20 JUDGE SMITH: The handwriting says let's have a 21 meeting about it. 22 MR. SAMA: Yes. 23 JUDGE SMITH: If - - - if - - - assume you do 2.4 read it - - - I understand you don't admit it. Assume you 25 read it - - -

1	MR. SAMA: Yes.
2	JUDGE SMITH: the way I the way I
3	suggested, that this e-mail we're going to do a sham
4	no-risk deal and get the money back in a in a phony
5	way, and he writes on it, let's have a meeting about this,
6	could you infer that he knew?
7	MR. SAMA: I I would first say that that's
8	not what the e-mail says. Attached to that e-mail
9	JUDGE SMITH: Okay. But I guess what you're
10	- you I can understand you got a
11	MR. SAMA: Yeah, you're saying
12	JUDGE SMITH: a problem with my
13	assumption, but if you made my assumption, you would admit
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15	MR. SAMA: That that, in itself
16	JUDGE SMITH: that it would infer
17	knowledge?
18	MR. SAMA: If you're saying that that is
19	improper, what that's not necessarily improper. He
20	has a transaction in front of him with four
21	JUDGE SMITH: My question is can you infer that
22	he knew what was going on, on my
23	MR. SAMA: No.
24	JUDGE SMITH: on my assumption.
25	MR. SAMA: No, I don't believe so, because if

1 you follow that document forward through the rest of the 2 case, there is no communication with Mr. Smith with anyone 3 at GenRe. He does not involve an accounting. Everyone 4 who's testified, including all the DVG accountants that 5 did the accounting, that booked the transaction, that did 6 the written analysis to make their own determination that this was a finite transaction, properly booked his 7 8 insurance. 9 JUDGE GRAFFEO: Well, is it for us to reach 10 these factual determinations - - -11 MR. SAMA: No. My - - - the - - -12 JUDGE GRAFFEO: - - - or is that why the 13 Attorney General should be permitted to proceed? 14 MR. SAMA: No. The point is, under - - - under 15 the Hyman case then followed by the Lynn G. v. Hugo case 16 and Alverez here, it's the function of the - - - the rules 17 that are supposed to apply in this case is when one party 18 comes forward with admissible evidence, the other side, to 19 defeat summary judgment, has to come up - - - come back 20 with admissible - - - you can't, at this stage - - -21 JUDGE SMITH: Well, what about - - -22 MR. SAMA: - - - if they - - -23 JUDGE SMITH: - - - what about the contradiction 2.4 between Smith and Jacobson? Smith - - - Smith says, I had

nothing to do with the accounting, it was Jacobson; and

Jacobson said, it wasn't me, it was either Smith or whoever said he was going to do it.

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MR. SAMA: Jacob - - - what Jacobson did - - - I don't believe that that's exactly what Jacobson said.

What Jacobson said that - - - he had a - - - he learned about the transaction from Mr. Smith, he discussed it. He said that as - - - because it's - - - as the CFO, he signed the financial statements, it's Mr. Smith; however, everyone - - - everyone who looked at the transaction signed off it; it was at DVG - - -

JUDGE SMITH: But wait a minute, wait a minute.

At Smith's deposition, they read him Jacobson's testimony in which he says, this was not my problem, and Smith says, I don't agree with that, isn't that a contradiction?

MR. SAMA: Right. Well, I think the fact is that the DVG accountants booked the transaction. Mr. Smith, by virtue of being the CFO, signed the financial statements, but the fact that it had to come out of the unit that booked it, did the actual insurance DVG, Mr. Jacobson was the CFO of that unit, but the 10Ks has disclosed that DVG would book their own; they had their own accounting staff, and the people actually did it, and no one who did the accounting - - - they testified in this case that they did not speak to Mr. Smith about it. No one spoke to Mr. Smith about it, not one person.

1 Mr. Jacobson, in his own deposition, also said 2 that he didn't speak to the people that actually did it, 3 the accounting for the transaction. What I respectfully 4 submit to you is that Mr. Jacobson was just giving that 5 testimony so he could avoid responsibility for the DVG 6 actually accounting for the transaction, what the 7 subsequent discovery indisputably proved. 8 JUDGE GRAFFEO: Your red light is on. 9 MR. SAMA: Thank you. 10 JUDGE GRAFFEO: Counsel, is this the Johnny-11 come-lately-type situation here? It doesn't appear from 12 the record that injunctive relief was at all the focus of 13 what the Attorney General's office was seeking. 14 MS. UNDERWOOD: Injunctive relief was always 15 You're right that it - - - less attention was 16 given to injunctive relief at a time when a very large, 17 enormously large - - -JUDGE GRAFFEO: Was it abandoned? 18 19 MS. UNDERWOOD: - - - damage - - - it was never 20 abandoned. We asked for it in the complaint. We asked 21 for injunction, disgorgement, restitution, damages, such 22 other equitable relief as may be necessary and such other 23 relief as may be may be - - -2.4 JUDGE SMITH: What is - - - what is the

equitable relief you're now asking for?

1	MS. UNDERWOOD: The equitable relief we'd asked
2	for in the first instance is an injunction the
3	suggestion has been there are several things that
4	might be that might be enjoined.
5	JUDGE PIGOTT: What do you want?
6	MS. UNDERWOOD: We we would like enjoining
7	further fraud. We would like enjoining
8	JUDGE SMITH: He he says you've he
9	says that's already been done.
10	MS. UNDERWOOD: That's not correct. This
11	the injunction the consent injunction with the SEC
12	bars violating federal law, period, and
13	JUDGE GRAFFEO: So so what are you looking
14	to bar them specifically from doing?
15	MS. UNDERWOOD: Well, we would we would
16	look to bar him from the securities industry. We would
17	look to bar him from serving as a them from serving
18	as officers and directors of public companies, possibly -
19	
20	JUDGE GRAFFEO: Does the stat does the
21	statute allow that? This the Martin Act talks about
22	being prohibited from participating in the securities
23	industry, but how do you get to expand that beyond the
24	breadth of the statute?

MS. UNDERWOOD: The Martin Act and Executive Law

1 6312 are both fundamentally equitable in nature. 2 - they created broad power in the Attorney General to seek 3 and courts to grant, in the exercise of their equitable discretion, such remedies - - -4 5 JUDGE GRAFFEO: Bar them working ever again? MS. UNDERWOOD: Well, that might not - - - that 6 7 8 JUDGE GRAFFEO: - - - in any - - - in any 9 industry? 10 MS. UNDERWOOD: I wouldn't suggest that any court or any Attorney General would find that to be 11 12 equitable. But there is - - - there is broad power to 13 determine what is necessary and appropriate under the 14 circumstances. 15 JUDGE PIGOTT: We're really down to barring 16 these two from the securities industry and being on 17 boards. We're going to trial on that? I'm looking at this record. I - - - are you going to warn this jury as -18 19 - - you know, what you're - - -20 MS. UNDERWOOD: We are also pursuing the 21 possibility of disgorgement of ill-gotten gains. 22 Defendant suggests that that's not available. We would be 23 in - - - we're looking into - - -2.4 JUDGE SMITH: Wait. Disgorgement? I mean, the 25

- - - I thought - - - I thought the damages issue was out

_	of the case. You're saying that's not damages?
2	MS. UNDERWOOD: That's not the idea would
3	be some if there is some form
4	JUDGE SMITH: Did they did they
5	understand, do you think, when they settled with the
6	in the federal case, that that you were going to ask
7	them for a few more hundred million?
8	MS. UNDERWOOD: I don't know what they
9	understood, but we have
LO	JUDGE SMITH: Well, you're saying you're
L1	saying you are.
L2	MS. UNDERWOOD: We're saying we are looking. I
L3	can't promise that we will be able to establish it. We
L4	are entitled to attempt to determine to find
L5	performance-based compensation that's what
L6	disgorgement would be performance-based compensation
L7	that was effected by these frauds
L8	JUDGE PIGOTT: Can you can you
L9	MS. UNDERWOOD: not the damages they
20	inflicted on somebody else.
21	JUDGE SMITH: I guess I guess when I heard
22	that damages were out of
23	JUDGE GRAFFEO: You mean whether they got
24	bonuses?
25	MS INDERWOOD: Yes

1	JUDGE GRAFFEO: Is that
2	MS. UNDERWOOD: Correct.
3	JUDGE GRAFFEO: Is that what you're talking
4	about?
5	MS. UNDERWOOD: Correct.
6	JUDGE PIGOTT: And how much is that?
7	MS. UNDERWOOD: We don't I can't put a
8	finger on it now, but we're entitled to pursue that.
9	JUDGE SMITH: But don't you think that maybe
10	people when we heard that damages were out of the
11	case, we didn't we were I was sort of
12	surprised to hear that you're now asking him for money.
13	MS. UNDERWOOD: Damages are the harm done to
14	victims. We're not talking about that. This court said
15	in Applied Card made clear that there's a
16	distinction between damages, which is the harm to victims
17	which can sometimes be precluded by a federal the
18	settlement of a federal class action, and disgorgement of
19	of ill-gotten profit.
20	JUDGE PIGOTT: I think that was in your is
21	your letters, but
22	MS. UNDERWOOD: Yes, it is.
23	JUDGE PIGOTT: Mr. Boies makes the point
24	that there's been eight years of discovery. Has there
25	been discovery as to how much you would be seeking in

1 terms of this disgorgement? MS. UNDERWOOD: No. I think that it's - - - I 2 3 don't believe so. I think it's - - - first of all, about 4 the eight years, three years have been on this 5 interlocutory appeal. 6 JUDGE GRAFFEO: So have - - - so have you waived 7 some of these issues - - -8 MS. UNDERWOOD: We - - - we have not - - -9 JUDGE GRAFFEO: - - - then if they were not 10 dealt with in the discovery phase? 11 MS. UNDERWOOD: We have not waived issues. Ιt 12 is conventional to look at remedies after you have 13 liability. I think that the - - - the notion that because 14 we didn't specify exactly what injunction we wanted or 15 exactly what the predicate would be means that we've 16 waived it - - -17 JUDGE SMITH: Is there - - -MS. UNDERWOOD: - - - is just mistaken. 18 19 JUDGE SMITH: At this - - - at this point in the case, from you - - - from your point of view, isn't there 20 21 a symbolic aspect to it? I mean, aren't you really 22 looking for a moral victory here? 23 MS. UNDERWOOD: What we are looking for is to 2.4 protect the markets of New York from fraud, to hold him 25 accountable.

1 JUDGE SMITH: What - - - what's going to happen to the citizens of New York if this case gets dismissed 2 3 that - - - that you're protecting them from? 4 MS. UNDERWOOD: I think one thing that will 5 happen to the citizens of New York is that they will see that it is possible to avoid responsibility for fraud by 6 buying delay - - -7 8 JUDGE SMITH: I - - - I see your point. 9 MS. UNDERWOOD: - - - by litigation delay. 10 JUDGE SMITH: I see your point, but isn't that 11 essentially a symbolic measure? You're - - - you're going 12 to show the citizens of New York these people can't get 13 away with this. 14 MS. UNDERWOOD: I'm not - - - I'm resisting 15 symbolic because I think it has an effect; I suppose 16 symbols have an effect. We're looking for a deterrent 17 effect for these people and for people who engage in comparable activities. He has - - - in his consent 18 19 decrees, he has never acknowledged that there was a fraud, 20 much less that he was responsible for it, and so there's 21 no reason to think that he would avoid like behavior - - -22 JUDGE GRAFFEO: That's at the heart of this, 23 isn't it - - -2.4 MS. UNDERWOOD: - - - in the future. 25 JUDGE GRAFFEO: - - - that - - - that since

1 there hasn't been an admission of guilt, that's what 2 you're looking for? Is - - -3 MS. UNDERWOOD: There's been no admission. There's been no finding, and we - - - and we believe that 4 5 we're looking for that and for the remedies that go with it, which are - - - which are the heart of what the 6 7 statute was about. These statutes start - - - damages 8 came late in these statutes. These statutes started as -9 - - the principal remedy in them was injunctive relief, 10 equitable relief. 11 JUDGE PIGOTT: That's true. The - - - when this 12 case started, though, it - - - it read like - - - the 13 briefs read like there was a total assault on - - - on 14 your - - - your authority under the blue - - - our blue 15 sky laws, and that all seems to have gone away. Am I - -16 - am I right in that assessment - - -17 MS. UNDERWOOD: I hope so. 18 JUDGE PIGOTT: - - - that they've now - - -19 they've now conceded all of your authority. They're 2.0 simply saying that what authority you have you haven't 21 properly pled, is about what we're down - - -22 MS. UNDERWOOD: I'm not - - - I'm not going to 23 try and restate what they've said. They have - - - there 2.4 was a huge assault on our authority, which we - - - which

we thought very important to defend. They seem to have

1 limited it, though, to our authority to seek damages, the damages that were obtained in the settlement of the 2 3 federal class action. We have withdrawn that claim, and 4 as I understand it, they've withdrawn the challenge to our 5 authority. They're now claiming something else. 6 claiming that the evidence doesn't warrant or the - - - I 7 guess the equities - - - the evidence doesn't warrant a 8 finding of liability. 9 JUDGE PIGOTT: We're almost down to what a 3212 10 In other words, is the burden of proof on - - - on means. 11 someone who's opposing a motion for summary judgment - - -12 MS. UNDERWOOD: That's one of the things - - -13 JUDGE PIGOTT: - - - or briefs on that. 14 MS. UNDERWOOD: That's one of the things we're -15 16 JUDGE RIVERA: Yes. Could you address the - - -17 the inadmissible hearsay issue? What - - - I know that 18 you argue in your briefs that you have, apart from the 19 hearsay, sufficient admissible - - -20 MS. UNDERWOOD: That's correct. 21 JUDGE RIVERA: - - - evidence. Could you address that issue? 22 23 MS. UNDERWOOD: Yes. The summary judgment 2.4 record shows, without regard to inadmissible hearsay, that 25 AIG and GenRe created a sham reinsurance deal in order to

1	falsely inflate AIG's loss reserves and increase the price
2	of AIG stock. And Greenberg's deposition puts him in a
3	critical role in the transaction. He's the one who called
4	GenRe's CEO to initiate it. Two weeks later, he says he
5	personally negotiated and finalized its terms with
6	Ferguson.
7	JUDGE SMITH: But but you but you
8	concede that there's a legitimate and an illegitimate way
9	of doing it?
10	MS. UNDERWOOD: Yes.
11	JUDGE SMITH: And how do how do we
12	what is the evidence that he was party to an agreement to
13	do it in the illegitimate way?
14	MS. UNDERWOOD: Well, the simplest evidence is -
15	is that it was done in an illegitimate way, and it
16	- and we know that because
17	JUDGE SMITH: And your your theory is that
18	doesn't happen without the boss knowing?
19	MS. UNDERWOOD: That's correct. That's
20	that's one piece of the
21	JUDGE PIGOTT: And is
22	JUDGE GRAFFEO: What transaction of this
23	dimension
24	MS. UNDERWOOD: The transaction of this
25	dimension doesn't happen. And then that's true in

1 general. It's even more clearly true in this case in 2 which - - -3 JUDGE GRAFFEO: But is that speculation - - -4 MS. UNDERWOOD: No. It's in - - - it's a fair -5 6 JUDGE GRAFFEO: - - - then; are you asking us to 7 speculate? MS. UNDERWOOD: It's a fair inference from the 8 9 evidence when his - - - when Greenberg's point person, 10 Milton, knew about the side arrangement, first, he - - -11 he had the inquiry that was discussed earlier about 12 whether they would accept an illegal, nonrisk deal. 13 after the conversation between Ferguson and Greenberg, for 14 which we don't have eavesdropping evidence, we have Napier 15 sending Milton a draft contract with a cover e-mail about 16 the illicit side deal. 17 JUDGE PIGOTT: Ms. Underwood, is it - - - at some - - - a lot of this, when you look at it, it really -18 19 - - it could be argued that they did not meet their 20 initial burden of establishing their entitlement to 21 judgment as a matter of law and therefore you did not have 22 to go forward with - - - you know, with other proof. 23 what - - - by the time you get done reading all this, is 2.4 it - - - have they established as a matter of law that the

- - - that the two defendants here were not party to - - -

to all of what went on?

2.4

either this - - - we know that this deal was done fraudulently. Either it was fraudulent from the outset when - - - when Mr. Greenberg proposed it - - - we don't have direct evidence of that - - - or it became fraudulent at some point during the working out of it. And according to Greenberg, according to his deposition, Milton wouldn't do that without telling him. He said, Milton - - in answer to a question, Milton wouldn't change the terms of a deal in a manner that would expose us to liability for fraud without telling me. I think it's a fair inference, then, that he - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: You wouldn't hire the person who went later - - - you wouldn't hire them later when you had to leave AIG if they, in fact, did this on their own.

MS. UNDERWOOD: Exactly right. Greenberg - - - the - - - there is a conceivable alternative explanation that perhaps Milton and Ferguson and Napier were doing this on their own and concealing it from Greenberg. A, that seems entirely implausible given the - - - not - - - given not just that Greenberg was the boss but given the particular relationship that he testified to with Milton in his deposition and - - -

JUDGE GRAFFEO: So if we agree with you, what

1 happens next? 2 MS. UNDERWOOD: Case goes back to trial, which 3 is where it belongs. 4 JUDGE GRAFFEO: We have another so many years of 5 discovery or is there - - -6 MS. UNDERWOOD: I don't - - -7 JUDGE GRAFFEO: - - - is there a trial? 8 MS. UNDERWOOD: I don't think so. There's a 9 trial. There's a - - - there may be some - - -10 JUDGE SMITH: Are - - - are they entitled to 11 discovery on your - - - on your disgorgement theories or on - - - on the need for injunctive relief? I mean, it 12 13 obviously hasn't been the main focus up to now. Nobody 14 bothered to take any discovery on it, practically. 15 MS. UNDERWOOD: The - - - the nature of the case 16 has changed. I don't really know how - - - that would be 17 up to the trial court, and he could certainly control the scheduling of - - - of such matters. 18 19 JUDGE SMITH: If - - - if I could go back to a 20 detail for a moment, do you rely - - - on the issue of 21 summary judgment, I understand you say you've got plenty 22 of evidence as it is. Do you, in the alternative, rely on 23 the possibility that maybe, by the time of trial, Ferguson 2.4 or Milton will be available to testify?

MS. UNDERWOOD: That's a possibility. I would

1 all - - - yes. I would also say that - - -2 JUDGE SMITH: What - - - what is the status of 3 their - - - of their problem, Ferguson and Milton? 4 MS. UNDERWOOD: To the best of my knowledge, 5 their convictions were overturned on evidentiary grounds, 6 and then they, I believe, have entered deferred 7 prosecution agreements of some sort. So I think their 8 matters are either disposed of or nearly so. 9 They are in a deferred - - - do JUDGE PIGOTT: 10 you know what that means in terms of their availability in a - - - in a subsequent trial, this deferred - - -11 12 MS. UNDERWOOD: At some point, it will mean they 13 will be - - - they will no longer have the Fifth Amendment 14 I do not know, as I stand here, whether they - - claim. 15 whether that - - - we have reached that point at this 16 moment. I would also say that there's - - - the testimony 17 from the Connecticut trial, which they keep characterizing 18 as hearsay, is - - - is admissible on summary judgment 19 because it is compara - - - not because it's admissible at 20 trial; because like an affidavit, it is a proffer of 21 admissible testimony. 22 JUDGE SMITH: Well - - -23 MS. UNDERWOOD: It is - - - it is the statement

of somebody under oath about something about which he has

personal knowledge. And so while their briefs keep saying

2.4

1	that the trial testimony wouldn't be admissible at that -
2	at this trial, and we quite agree with that, the trial
3	testimony is comparable to an affidavit which is a classic
4	
5	JUDGE MASTRO: What is the significance of the
6	restatement?
7	MS. UNDERWOOD: Significance of the restatement
8	is that it admits that the transaction did not have
9	it's a business record which admits that the transaction
10	did not have risk and was improperly booked. It does not
11	attribute mental culpability to anybody.
12	JUDGE SMITH: That that's not really a
13	disputed point, anyway. I mean
14	MS. UNDERWOOD: I hope not.
15	JUDGE SMITH: they admit it was they
16	admit it was a crooked deal. They just say their people
17	didn't weren't involved.
18	MS. UNDERWOOD: I I believe that's
19	correct. I'm not you'd have to ask them whether
20	that's so. So so there is there is
21	JUDGE GRAFFEO: What what are you asking
22	us to do here?
23	MS. UNDERWOOD: To affirm the judgment of the
24	Appellate Division which affirmed the judgment of the
25	Supreme Court, denying summary judgment on this on -

1 - - denying their motion for summary judgment on the GenRe 2 transaction and sending that case, therefore, back to 3 trial where it belongs. 4 JUDGE GRAFFEO: And on the - - - on the other 5 case? 6 MS. UNDERWOOD: That's not on this appeal. 7 JUDGE GRAFFEO: So we don't have - - -8 MS. UNDERWOOD: That is - - - that is - - -9 JUDGE GRAFFEO: We don't - - - there's no need 10 for us to address - - -11 MS. UNDERWOOD: That's right. 12 JUDGE GRAFFEO: - - - the other transaction? 13 MS. UNDERWOOD: That is already in the trial 14 court, ready for - - - ready for trial. This would be 15 tried with that case, and the - - - and the two somewhat 16 similar sham reinsurance frauds are both ready for trial. 17 JUDGE GRAFFEO: Anything further? Thank you. Mr. Boies. 18 19 MR. BOIES: Thank you, Your Honor. 20 Let me first address the question of whether we 21 made a prima facie case that we were entitled to judgment. 22 First, we have the testimony both of Mr. Greenberg and of 23 Mr. Smith. They were - - - Mr. Greenberg was deposed for 2.4 three days. He was extensively examined about this. He

testified that he did not engage in anything improper. He

testified that he did not have any knowledge of any of the 1 2 improprieties. He testified that what he initially sought 3 was legitimate loss portfolio transaction. In addition to that, we had the testimony from numerous witnesses who 4 5 testified that for two weeks after Mr. Greenberg's 6 telephone conversation with Mr. Ferguson, what GenRe did 7 was they attempted to construct an entirely legitimate transaction, and that's at record - - -8 9 JUDGE SMITH: Well, was he asked when he first 10 found out it wasn't legitimate? 11 MR. BOIES: He never - - - he was never told 12 that it was not legitimate. 13 JUDGE SMITH: But he - - - he says today it's 14 legitimate? Do you say it's legitimate? 15 MR. BOIES: What he - - - what he said - - -16 what he said at - - - at his deposition and what the 17 dissenting justice said in the Appellate Division is that there is no proof as to whether this transaction had or 18 19 did not have enough risk to be qualified as insurance. 20 People talk about this as a crooked transaction, and 21 that's - - - and that's - - -22 JUDGE SMITH: So - - - so I was wrong in my 23 question to Ms. Underwood; you don't admit that it was a

MR. BOIES: We - - - we do not admit that that

2.4

crooked deal?

1 was - - -2 JUDGE SMITH: Do you admit there's evidence from 3 which a jury could find or a fact finder could find it was a crooked deal? 4 5 MR. BOIES: Not on this record and not - - - not 6 that you'll find anywhere in the stuff in front of you. 7 JUDGE SMITH: So - - - so we're wasting our time with all this stuff about their knowledge. You can get 8 9 summary judgment on - - - on the fact this was - - - that 10 there's no evidence of - - - of illegality? 11 MR. BOIES: I think it's a lot easier to get 12 summary judgment on the - - - on the grounds that there's 13 absolutely no evidence that my client had any involvement 14 in it, and - - - and - - -15 JUDGE RIVERA: Yeah, but that's because your 16 client says I didn't do it. 17 MR. BOIES: Well, not only - - -18 JUDGE RIVERA: You can't - - - you can't survive 19 - - - you cannot succeed on summary judgment by simply 20 saying I didn't do it. 21 MR. BOIES: But you can, Your Honor, if there's 22 no evidence that you did do it, and then that's - - -23 JUDGE RIVERA: Well, but that's what I asked you 2.4 before is can you - - - are you saying that the only way

they can survive - - - or they could succeed in objecting

1 is if there's an actual smoking gun. 2 MR. BOIES: No, not a smoking gun but for - - -3 for example, Your Honor, suppose that after Mr. 4 Greenberg's conversation with Mr. Ferguson on October 5 31st, they had gone out to do an illegitimate transaction. 6 Mr. Greenberg talks to Mr. Ferguson, they immediately go 7 out to do an illegitimate transaction. 8 JUDGE RIVERA: Um-hum. 9 MR. BOIES: Maybe you have an inference from 10 that. 11 JUDGE RIVERA: Um-hum. 12 MR. BOIES: But that's not what happened. 13 happened was Mr. Greenberg had a conversation with Mr. 14 Ferguson; they then go out to do a legitimate transaction. 15 As we've pointed out in our brief, we cite to the record all of the evidence is of what they tried to do for the 16 17 two weeks after that conversation is a legitimate 18 transaction. 19 JUDGE PIGOTT: Your - - - your point was that 20 you did establish your entitlement to judgment and - - -21 and when I was asking about - - -22 MR. BOIES: Yes. 23 JUDGE PIGOTT: - - - the other evidence that 2.4 only can come in to - - - to establish a - - - a question 25 of fact on their side.

2 to come forward and - - -3 JUDGE RIVERA: But the fact that it devolves, 4 you're saying, then they cannot rest on his shoulders; 5 they have to do something more? MR. BOIES: Well, they - - - they have to do 6 7 something more than to say, this is the boss, he must have 8 known that something had turned out to be fraudulent. He 9 asked for a legitimate transaction. That's absolutely 10 clear in the record. There's no evidence - - -11 JUDGE SMITH: Could - - - could that - - - could 12 that evidence ever be possible if you have a very hands-on 13 boss whose subordinates have done something that works 14 greatly to the country - - - company's advantage? Can a 15 fact finder in a civil case not infer that - - - that that 16 was done with the boss's approval? 17 MR. BOIES: I - - - I don't think that you could 18 have a civil case that says - - - and I don't think 19 there's any case that's ever been decided - - - maybe this 20 court will do it, but I don't think there's ever been a 21 case that said, just because you're the boss, you - - -22 you are charged with the illegal conduct of all your 23 subordinates. 2.4 JUDGE SMITH: No, but I'm - - - I'm - - -25 JUDGE RIVERA: Well, that's not the question.

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MR. BOIES: Right. And now - - - now they have

1 JUDGE SMITH: Yeah. The question is, is it ever rational as a matter of fact to infer - - -2 3 MR. BOIES: But - - -JUDGE SMITH: - - - that says something is 4 5 highly unlikely this would have gone on without the boss's knowledge. 6 7 MR. BOIES: But, Your Honor, there is - - - you could have had evidence of that. You could have had 8 9 evidence in the record - - -10 JUDGE GRAFFEO: But what if they're able - - -11 MR. BOIES: - - - if that's the way it operated. JUDGE GRAFFEO: What if they're able to bring -12 13 MR. BOIES: But there isn't. 14 15 JUDGE GRAFFEO: - - - in the other two 16 individuals - - -17 MR. BOIES: I'm sorry? 18 JUDGE GRAFFEO: - - - Milton and Ferguson? 19 the self-incrimination impediment is gone for Milton and 20 Ferguson at - - - by the time this case is tried, would 21 that change the situation? 22 MR. BOIES: It - - - it wouldn't, Your Honor, 23 because there isn't any evidence in the record right now 2.4 that those people would say anything that would 25 incriminate Mr. Greenberg. In other words, what you have

now is you simply have a hope, a speculation - - -

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JUDGE SMITH: Well, they both - - - they've both - - - they've both been convicted of - - - although the conviction was overturned. The jury found them guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of conspiring with Greenberg.

It's not ridiculous to think they might have something to say about it.

MR. BOIES: But, Your Honor, if 4517(a) meaning anything, it means that you've got a right, before something is used against you, to participate in that trial and cross-examine. I mean, this is a situation in which there simply isn't any conventional evidence. is a situation in which - - - I mean, the - - - the injunctive relief that we've been talking about - - ordinarily - - - and I've been sitting here listening to these other cases. Ordinarily, you require people to preserve arguments. You don't allow them to come into this court and - - - and raise arguments that they didn't raise in the trial court, didn't raise in the Appellate Division. They never raised these arguments in the Appellate Division. They never tried to preserve their -- - their claims in the trial court or in the Appellate Division based on injunctive relief.

JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Mr. Boies, what about Ms. Underwood's statement that you first have to establish

1 liability before you can talk about relief, and the 2 injunctive relief is just that, belief? 3 MR. BOIES: But - - - but we moved for summary judgment on their entire claim. And one of the reasons -4 5 - - one of the bases - - - and - - - and we - - - we cited this in our - - - in our briefs, and I referred to the 6 7 pages of the record before. We said, you're not entitled 8 to this claim because you have no basis for injunctive 9 relief and no basis for damages. They never disputed that 10 first one. They disputed the second one until they 11 withdrew it a few weeks ago. 12 JUDGE MASTRO: They never - - - they never 13 conceded anything, though. MR. BOIES: Well - - -14 15 JUDGE MASTRO: They never conceded your point. 16 MR. BOIES: They - - - they never - - - they 17 never came out and say, we concede it, but they didn't ever come forward and say, no, you're wrong, we do have 18 19 evidence that would justify injunctive relief. You will 2.0 look throughout their briefs, and you will not be able to 21 find any - - -22 JUDGE MASTRO: Maybe a footnote? 23 MR. BOIES: What? The footnote - - - footnote 2.4 16 or whatever it is - - - the footnote - - -25

JUDGE MASTRO: No.

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MR. BOIES: - - - in there, first of all, that's here; that's not in their briefs to the Appellate Division. They didn't preserve it in the Appellate Division. The footnote here simply says they're not precluded. They have made - - - they've pled it. They don't, in that footnote, give you any evidence. Remember, they've got to come forth with evidence to respond to our summary judgment argument. They don't have any evidence that supports that pleading. We're not saying they didn't plead it, but we're saying that they - - -

JUDGE SMITH: You're - - - you're saying, I guess, if they were serious about injunctive relief and you were arguing all this time about whether the - - - whether the damages claims were pre-empted, you would have expected them to say, well, even if we are pre-empted, we still got an injunctive claim?

MR. BOIES: We would, and we - - - and we would have expected them in response to your motion for summary judgment to say, you've said we - - - you don't need injunctive relief for these reasons, here is our contrary evidence, here is the evidence as to why we - - -

JUDGE GRAFFEO: Disgorgement was not a topic during the discovery period?

MR. BOIES: Your Honor, they have never - - - she says, even today, I don't know how much the

1 disgorgement is. There isn't any disgorgement. He never 2 sold a share of stock. He never profited from this. 3 That's what we said in our - - - said to the trial court. 4 We said it to the Appellate Division. 5 JUDGE GRAFFEO: But I they they're claiming - -6 7 MR. BOIES: They never came back. 8 JUDGE GRAFFEO: - - - there may have been 9 additional compensation. 10 MR. BOIES: But they never came forward and ever 11 said - - - said that. I mean, this has gone on for eight years. We have tried, in our summary judgment motion, to 12 13 put forward our evidence as to why we were entitled to 14 summary judgment. They were then required to come forward 15 with evidence of their own as to why we were not. 16 never did that with respect to injunctive relief. 17 never came forward and said, this is the basis, this is 18 why we're entitled to injunctive relief. 19 JUDGE RIVERA: Apart from disgorgement, why 2.0 can't they get the other injunctive relief? 21 MR. BOIES: I'm sorry? 22 JUDGE RIVERA: Apart from the disgorgement 23 question, why can't they pursue the other injunctive 2.4 relief that they've already discussed?

MR. BOIES: Well, with respect to the breadth of

the SEC injunction?

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JUDGE RIVERA: Yes, yes.

MR. BOIES: I just asked the court to look at record 13987 to 13988, and you will see how broad the SEC injunction is. Second, as we've - - - as we've pointed out - - -

JUDGE MASTRO: Yeah, but as - - - let me just interrupt you right there. That doesn't give the Attorney General any ability to enforce anything.

MR. BOIES: No, Your Honor, it - - - that does not give the Attorney General any authority to do it. But the question is whether, in the scope of the powers of the equity court, it's a useful and desirable exercise of that power to give another injunction where you already have one and to pursue it. If ---

JUDGE MASTRO: It was - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: Well, they can ask?

MR. BOIES: You - - - you could ask for it.

That's exactly my point. You could make an argument that says the SEC injunction isn't going to be enforced or there's a danger it won't be enforced, therefore we want to have it. You could make that argument. My point is that they didn't. My point is that when we said the SEC injunction is enough, you have enough, you don't need this one. Mr. Greenberg's eighty-eight years old; he hasn't

worked in this - - - in this - - - for a public company
for eight years. There's no indication he's going to in
the future. There's no basis for injunctive relief. They
could have come forward, like they're supposed to, like
conventionally they have to, in a summary judgment
situation and said, no, these are the reasons, this is the
evidence that indicates we need injunctive relief. They
didn't do it, and the reason they didn't to it is nobody
thinks this is an injunctive relief case. Nobody's ever
thought it was.

JUDGE GRAFFEO: Thank you.

MR. SAMA: Thank you. Your Honor, I'd like to make a few brief points about the standing injunction.

We, I think, point out in argument to this case, two cases that the Attorney General didn't respond to, that's the New York v. Holiday Inns and Hawaii v. Standard Oil, where courts have clearly held if you have one injunction, there's no basis to get another injunction. And the Holiday Inn's case was a case where private litigants - -

JUDGE GRAFFEO: Mr. Sama, what is - - - what is your client specifically barred from doing in the securities industry under the federal - - -

MR. SAMA: It's not addressed as securities industry because he's not in the securities industry.

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Typically, the SEC will go after an injunction against someone who's an officer of a company, does not address securities industry injunction, what they're telling me; it's apples and oranges. What they address is future fraud, not just federal securities laws, contrary to what the Attorney General said, but any action that would have the scheme or artifice; it's a very long - - and Mr. Boies gave you the reference. I can give you the other reference. It's R-13999 to 14013 in this record. It's very broad. And in the Holiday Inns case, the Attorney General tried to get injunction as well, but the court in that case said, prior litigants have the injunction; one injunction is sufficient to stop that conduct. And that - - - that's that one point.

On disgorgement, the one point I would make that Mr. Boies alluded to is that, to the extent to which there was any disgorgement, that would have been a claim by AIG. And it's a matter of record here that these defendants - - - these appellants settled with AIG in which they get an express release, that's in the -- it's 8K that was filed on November 25th, 2009; they released these defendants from all claims that AIG may have had in the past or in the future relating to their service of the company.

The final point I wanted to - - on hearsay is that, one thing that was avoided that Justice Ramos

clearly held in this case that there was insufficient evidence for the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule to apply to Mr. Smith. And if you look at the Attorney General's brief, really, when they - - - the reason why they - - - they try to argue that, and notwithstanding that, even though there's Hecht - - - the Hecht case and this court clearly makes it clear that you cannot argue something that you didn't appeal - - -they're arguing, I respectfully submit, because if you look at the evidence, there is insufficient evidence to -- - given the Lynn G./Hugo cases and Alverez, they really just have unsuspect - - - unsustained assertions and arguments eight years later rather than admissible evidence. Thank you. JUDGE GRAFFEO: Thank you. (Court is adjourned)

1	CERTIFICATION
2	
3	I, David Rutt, certify that the foregoing
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5	People v. Greenberg, No. 63 was prepared using the
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