1	COURT OF APPEALS
2	STATE OF NEW YORK
3	
4	MARCIA L. CARONIA, ET AL.,
5	Appellants,
6	-against-
7	No. 227 PHILIP MORRIS USA, INC.,
8	Respondent.
9	
10	20 Eagle Street Albany, New York 12207 November 13, 2013
11	Before:
12	CHIEF JUDGE JONATHAN LIPPMAN
13	ASSOCIATE JUDGE VICTORIA A. GRAFFEO ASSOCIATE JUDGE SUSAN PHILLIPS READ
14	ASSOCIATE JUDGE ROBERT S. SMITH ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE F. PIGOTT, JR.
15	ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA ASSOCIATE JUDGE SHEILA ABDUS-SALAAM
16	Appearances:
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1	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Caronia v. Philip
2	Morris.
3	MS. PHILLIPS: May it please the court.
4	I'm Victoria Phillips for the plaintiffs in this
5	action. If I could reserve five minutes for
6	rebuttal?
7	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Five minutes. Go
8	ahead, counselor.
9	MS. PHILLIPS: Your Honors, this action
10	seeks to provide a lifesaving form of technology,
11	low-dose computed tomography, to a class of
12	individuals at high risk for developing lung cancer,
13	which is the leading cause of cancer death in the
14	United States, currently responsible for
15	approximately 160,000 deaths each year.
16	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counsel, is this case
17	on all fours with Donovan, the Massachusetts case?
18	MS. PHILLIPS: When you mean it's on
19	on all they're sister companion cases, so
20	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yes, is it are
21	the same issues involved?
22	MS. PHILLIPS: Yes, it is.
23	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Is Massachusetts the
24	only state that's recognized this kind of a equitable
25	cause of action in this

1	MS. PHILLIPS: There
2	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: context?
3	MS. PHILLIPS: There are many states that
4	have recognized medical monitoring, and I'd be happy
5	to discuss it
6	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Right, but I mean, in
7	relation to tobacco and in this particular context.
8	MS. PHILLIPS: To my knowledge,
9	Massachusetts is the only one on these identical
10	records where the same plaintiffs' counsel and, in
11	this case, the same defense counsel have gone forward
12	on the same proofs and pleadings.
13	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay. Tell us, in a
14	nutshell, why from a policy perspective, why
15	should New York recognize an equitable cause of
16	action along these lines?
17	MS. PHILLIPS: Okay. There are a number of
18	reasons, and some of the
19	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: And are there
20	practical let me do it in two parts. What are
21	the policy reasons why we should recognize it, and
22	what are the practical difficulties in doing so?
23	MS. PHILLIPS: Thank you for the
24	opportunity. I
25	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Go ahead.

MS. PHILLIPS: - - - would be pleased to address it. The courts in Ayers, and also in the Potter case in California - - - I think it's Potter v. Firestone - - - have walked through multiple policy considerations that support medical monitoring. And indeed, New York's courts have been cited by the Askey decision as recognizing some of these goals as well.

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CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So what are they?

MS. PHILLIPS: One - - -

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What are the policy considerations?

MS. PHILLIPS: Sure. One is deterrence, that wrongdoers who cause people to sustain an increased risk of developing cancer should be responsible, ultimately; that equity demands that the wrongdoer pay for the cost of it, rather than the public at large or the party who's been harmed.

Another is, obviously, the interest in saving lives and in reducing mortality. And here, that's extraordinarily compelling. There are two New England Journal of Medicine articles that have concluded that this form of technology can save lives. And if you look at the amicus submission of the Lung Cancer Alliance and the Legacy Foundation,

1	they speak in extraordinary detail to the compelling
2	science here. This can save lives. It's been shown
3	to save as much as some people think eighty or
4	ninety percent increased chance of life, and
5	certainly twenty percent for the
6	JUDGE PIGOTT: Is this the only situation
7	where this type of monitoring would be called upon?
8	MS. PHILLIPS: You mean "this" being for
9	smoking or
10	JUDGE PIGOTT: Right.
11	MS. PHILLIPS: The answer is overwhelmingly
12	lung cancer is caused by
13	JUDGE PIGOTT: But I mean, would there be -
14	could you could you conceive of monitoring
15	other defendants for other ailments that cause this
16	type of concern?
17	MS. PHILLIPS: Could meaning, LDCT,
18	in particular, or could other monitoring actions
19	_
20	JUDGE RIVERA: I think the question is
21	where do you draw the line.
22	MS. PHILLIPS: Oh, where do you draw the
23	line? Well, I think the short answer is, is that on
24	the certified facts in the record here there's no
25	question that the equities call for it. Whether New

York should recognize it in other contexts, I would submit that there are compelling cases, and we could talk about some of them - - -

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CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What are the practical difficulties with doing it, if we - - - if we buy your general argument that this is good, from a policy perspective, what are the practical difficulties of recognizing this kind of cause of action?

MS. PHILLIPS: Okay. Well, I would say for starters, the court wants to deal with the - - - and should deal with the accrual question. And there the Donovan court provides helpful guidance. Because the court's got to decide, a medical monitoring action, the reason why we're talking about an equitable cause of action and the reason why we're talking about the elements is that we need to know when such a claim is timely and how it can be brought. And there, Donovan provides very useful guidance from a court that rendered a thoughtful decision and recognized that in a situation such as here, where there was no form of relief available until the action was brought in New York and Massachusetts in 2006, and where the defendant continued to misbehave and the plaintiff continued to sustain harm and an increased risk of

cancer, that it's appropriate to deem the plaintiffs' claims timely. But certainly you have to grapple with the question of when a medical monitoring claim accrues, because it's not like your conventional, typical personal injury suit - - -

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CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Do you need - -
MS. PHILLIPS: - - - like a car accident.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Do you need a lot of

experts to come in, in this kind of a - - - a - -
MS. PHILLIPS: I'm sorry - - -

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: --- cause of --- would you need experts? What would experts tell you and ---

MS. PHILLIPS: Most courts have found that medical monitoring claims should be supported by competent expert proofs. And certainly here you can look at the proofs from Albert Miller, a prominent physician and pulmonologist, or from Dr. Markowitz, who has experience organizing monitoring programs for Department of Energy workers. But certainly you'd need somebody to come in and testify to the fact that the plaintiffs are at increased risk. In this case you'd want some testimony about the defendant's misconduct. And Dr. Farone, who's been cited very positively by Judge Kessler in United States v.

1 Philip Morris, is an expert who talks about the 2 misconduct and how cigarettes could have been 3 designed in a safer way, the steps that could have 4 been taken. He can address what he'll - - -5 JUDGE GRAFFEO: Let me ask you something more basic - - -6 7 MS. PHILLIPS: Sure. 8 JUDGE GRAFFEO: - - - because this is a 9 consumer product, unlike the Department of Energy's 10 situation. I could see where someone's working 11 somewhere and exposed to a toxic hazard, there's a 12 higher degree of susceptibility. How do you know 13 with a consumer product that these individuals have 14 only used this particular product, that they didn't, 15 for fifteen or twenty years, smoke some other type of 16 other manufacturer's cigarette but they've now 17 decided to say I only smoked Marlboros? 18 19 that Philip Morris raised, without success, in

MS. PHILLIPS: That's actually an argument that Philip Morris raised, without success, in Massachusetts. So I'd - - - my short answer, rather than taking up the fifteen minutes would be to - - -

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JUDGE GRAFFEO: Well, we're - - -

MS. PHILLIPS: - - - to point you to - - -

JUDGE GRAFFEO: You know, this is a different state, and we've got our concerns, too. So

1	I'm asking, for consumer products, because once you
2	do it here
3	MS. PHILLIPS: Uh-huh.
4	JUDGE GRAFFEO: we're going to be
5	faced with other consumer product claims
6	against other consumer products.
7	MS. PHILLIPS: In
8	JUDGE GRAFFEO: How do you determine that
9	issue?
10	MS. PHILLIPS: In the case of an individual
11	plaintiff going forward, there can be testimony and
12	there was testimony from Ms. Caronia, Ms. Feldman,
13	Ms. McAuley, who came forward and said I smoked
14	Marlboro cigarettes and
15	JUDGE GRAFFEO: So as long as they say it,
16	that's it?
17	MS. PHILLIPS: Well, certainly in personal
18	injury cases, theoretically, the defendants could
19	challenge it. In fact the reality is, is that
20	doesn't tend to be the issue in the litigation.
21	JUDGE RIVERA: You're saying you handle it
22	like you handle
23	MS. PHILLIPS: Let me
24	JUDGE RIVERA: other evidentiary
25	questions?

1 MS. PHILLIPS: Yes, I'm being pointed to 2 something very - - - very helpful which is that we 3 know and we learned in Massachusetts, and it's 4 subject to a protective order so I can't get into the 5 details of it, but it was before the court in Massachusetts that Philip Morris maintains extensive 6 7 consumer lists in a database documenting its customers. And the details of that are confidential. 8 9 JUDGE RIVERA: What - - -10 MS. PHILLIPS: But it was - - - the court 11 reached a ruling on ascertainability, which is 12 essentially the question you're asking. 13 JUDGE RIVERA: What happens when - - - and 14 let's say we'll hope - - - when there's an even 15 better technology that comes around the corner. 16 MS. PHILLIPS: That's another - - -17 JUDGE RIVERA: What do we do - - - if we 18 recognize this particular cause of action, what do we 19 do? Then this is no longer a fund that Philip Morris 20 has to put money into, rather, we set up a different 21 fund? What happens? What if the technology changes? 22 MS. PHILLIPS: Theoretically, for 2.3 plaintiffs who are not yet proper candidates at the 2.4 time of this suit, they might be able to go ahead and

pursue a different form of technology. So if there's

someone who's a - - - you know, today is not a proper candidate but fifty years from now, conceivably, they might be able to seek something even better in the future. For the class that exists today, there was nothing until LDCT, and this is disputed - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: No, no, no, but that's not my question.

MS. PHILLIPS: Oh.

undisputed by the parties.

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JUDGE RIVERA: Let's say in a year - -
let's say we recognize it, you set up the fund, they

start the testing, and in a year there's a new

technology that's even better so that this one that

you're seeking for the clients - - - for the

prospective class is now outdated and not the state

of the art and it's not supported by the medical

community, it's not the standard.

MS. PHILLIPS: I think the virtue of equity is that the remedy is specific to the particular circumstances. And so to the extent that it's a minor tweak of the technology, you know, you need a slightly bigger CAT scan or a slightly - - - you know, the standard of care changes such that people should now receive it every one year versus every two year, conceivably a funded mechanism could address

1 the - - - a minor tweak in the technology. 2 JUDGE RIVERA: Is it possible to discover 3 it's not the technology you think it is? 4 MS. PHILLIPS: I think that's 5 extraordinarily unlikely in this particular case. There was a 53,000-person trial that the defendants 6 7 pointed to as the gold standard trial, conducted by 8 the National - - -9 JUDGE RIVERA: All right. 10 MS. PHILLIPS: - - - Cancer Institute. 11 JUDGE RIVERA: Then one more question. 12 What do we do with a situation where you have members 13 of your class who continue to expose themselves to 14 this toxicity? Why shouldn't we treat them 15 differently from those who have stopped smoking? 16 MS. PHILLIPS: The answer to that is that -17 - - and I - - if I may turn the question slightly -18 19 JUDGE RIVERA: Yeah. 20 MS. PHILLIPS: - - - which is the defendant, of course, is continuing to expose them by 21 22 itself not manufacturing a safer product. 2.3 Morris has the capacity, has long had the capacity to 2.4 design a safer cigarette. The reason why class

members continue smoking is that they're addicted,

because they continue to sell the most lethal, most 1 2 addictive product known to mankind. 3 JUDGE RIVERA: Well, it's legal. 4 MS. PHILLIPS: It is legal. 5 JUDGE RIVERA: It's a completely legal 6 product. 7 MS. PHILLIPS: And no one's arguing - - -8 no one's arguing otherwise, but there are many legal 9 products out there - - -10 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counsel, one other 11 question. Your time is running out. 12 MS. PHILLIPS: Sure. 13 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What about the new health care - - - what does that - - - how does this 14 15 affect it? Does it make it redundant if this kind of 16 thing is covered? How does - - - what's the impact 17 of that? 18 MS. PHILLIPS: Not at all. I wish that 19 that - - -20 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Why? Tell us. 21 MS. PHILLIPS: - - - were so. 22 MS. PHILLIPS: The very, very short answer 2.3 is the brief of the American Legacy Foundation and 2.4 the Lung Cancer Alliance addresses it. But the 25 Affordable Care Act, it's - - - first of all, they're tentative recommendations.

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CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Right.

MS. PHILLIPS: But beyond that, they're not going to cover the entire class. They're not going to be implemented until, at a minimum, I believe, 2016. And beyond that, there's no reason why Philip Morris should be absolved of liability simply because there may be collateral sources in existence.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So your argument is that there might be some coverage to offset some of it, but that that's not the answer as to whether or not Philip Morris is responsible, and that we don't know the extent of the coverage. Is that - - -

MS. PHILLIPS: That's exactly right. There certainly won't be any for many years, and we can only hope that it covers some portion of the class. But just like if I got drunk, went out, and hit a pedestrian, if the person was sixty-seven years old, they might be covered by Medicare. That doesn't mean that I shouldn't be on the hook - - -

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: All right.

MS. PHILLIPS: - - - for my misconduct.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So your view is that it doesn't obviate the need for this course of action.

MS. PHILLIPS: Yes. 1 2 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: 3 MS. PHILLIPS: That's correct. 4 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Let's hear from your 5 adversary. MR. PARSIGIAN: Good afternoon, Your 6 7 Honors. Ken Parsigian, representing Philip Morris 8 USA. 9 Let me start by addressing - - -10 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Let me ask you the 11 same question I asked your adversary. From a policy 12 perspective, why shouldn't we create this cause of 13 action? Your adversary basically says the wrongdoing 14 is clear, we can save money, we can help people. 15 is this not a good thing to do for New York? 16 MR. PARSIGIAN: As you might imagine, 17 there's a long list of reasons. Let me run them off 18 for you. 19 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Well, give us a few. 20 MR. PARSIGIAN: I'm going to start them for It starts with opening the floodgates to 21 22 litigation. Okay? If we look at the one state that 2.3 has actually had experience with medical monitoring 2.4 claims, where a case has already gone all the way to

trial, you've got West Virginia. We cited in our

1 case the Henry case from Michigan Supreme Court where 2 they detailed some of - - -3 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yeah, but we can do 4 it the way we do it in New York. I mean, it's not 5 necessarily going to be on all fours with any other 6 state. 7 MR. PARSIGIAN: Not necessarily going to be 8 on all fours, but as the court recognized, several 9 judges recognized, you're not making a decision here 10 that will apply only to this defendant or only to 11 this claim. If medical monitoring - - - this is a claim - - - let's remember, what plaintiffs are 12 13 saying is no injury, no symptoms. Right? And the 14 vast majority of them will never get an injury. 15 JUDGE RIVERA: Well, they claim there's an 16 injury. They claim at the cellular level there's an 17 injury. 18 MR. PARSIGIAN: Actually, Your Honor, that 19 is a brand new claim in their brief here that was not 20 claimed below. And in fact, if you turn to page 62 -21 22 JUDGE RIVERA: But are you denying that 2.3 there's a cellular injury every time you smoke? 2.4 MR. PARSIGIAN: That's an interesting

question. There is - - - it's an interesting

1 question because there's a difference between 2 cellular change and cellular injury. There is 3 absolutely evidence that every time you smoke cells 4 change. It's also the case that every time you walk 5 down the street, that a car exhaust is there, cells 6 change. Whether it's injury, in a legal sense, it's 7 certainly not compensable injury. Plaintiffs 8 themselves concede it's not compensable injury. 9 Okay? So it depends on what we mean by injury. 10 But if we look at what they say at page 62 11 of their brief, they say, "Here plaintiffs neither 12 asserted nor conceded that they suffered an injury at 13 all." That's plaintiffs' words. So the claim in a footnote that there's subcell - - - if we need to 14 15 show injury, there's subcellular harm, this court is 16 hearing this case on certified questions of law. 17 They're not hearing their motion to amend their 18 complaint - - -19 JUDGE RIVERA: If a - - -MR. PARSIGIAN: - - - to assert new 20 21 allegations. 22 JUDGE RIVERA: If a member of the class 2.3 gets lung cancer, can they sue you?

MR. PARSIGIAN: Absolutely.

JUDGE RIVERA: If a member of this class

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got lung cancer - - - now we've got the symptom and 1 2 the injury - - - can they sue you? 3 MR. PARSIGIAN: Absolutely. Many do. 4 JUDGE RIVERA: And can they sue you for all 5 of the medical bills that they incurred, testing 6 themselves up to the time - - -7 MR. PARSIGIAN: The things that they - - -8 JUDGE RIVERA: - - - that they were 9 identified to have lung cancer? 10 MR. PARSIGIAN: - - - incurred in the past? 11 JUDGE RIVERA: Correct. 12 MR. PARSIGIAN: Well - - -13 JUDGE RIVERA: Until the time they 14 identified the lung cancer. 15 MR. PARSIGIAN: No. Of course, up till 16 now, it wouldn't have happened at all, because this 17 particular medical monitoring didn't exist. Now the 18 question has been asked about the Affordable Care 19 Act, and it's responsive to your question, Your 2.0 Honor. The Affordable Care Act, we've got the United 21 States Preventive Services Task Force, which has made 22 a temporary recommendation that the screening should 2.3 be done. They expect to be giving their final recommendation for - - -2.4

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So does that let you

1 off the hook, or is that just an offset if - - -2 MR. PARSIGIAN: I do believe it does let us 3 off - - -4 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - if it is 5 covered, some of that, it's an offset. MR. PARSIGIAN: I believe, Your Honor - - -6 7 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But why isn't that 8 just the answer to that? 9 MR. PARSIGIAN: The reason it's not the 10 answer is you're being asked to create an entirely 11 new cause of action. And one of the things this 12 court has always considered in deciding whether to 13 create a new cause of action itself or to leave it to 14 the legislature, is to look at whether there's 15 already a way to get relief. And here there are two 16 ways to get relief. 17 First of all, let me just address the 18 Affordable Care Act. Here's what happened. If the 19 U.S. Protective (sic) Services Task Force 20 recommendation finally recommends a B level, as it 21 has suggested it will do early next year, all health 22 insurers, except for grandfathered plans, will be 2.3 required to provide it for free without copay. It 2.4 will also become the standard of care, in which case,

even the grandfathered plans are going to pay for it.

1 JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, in a present case of a 2 tort, when somebody sues and gets damages, they get 3 damages for their medical expenses, and then it's a 4 collateral source thing, and the one who paid it, the 5 innocent insurance company, gets reimbursed. 6 MR. PARSIGIAN: Correct. 7 JUDGE PIGOTT: So it's conceivable here 8 that while the ACA may cover it, if this were to go 9 into effect, you would be paying for it, and that 10 would save money on the ACA side, right? MR. PARSIGIAN: If the collateral source 11 12 rule applies - - -13 JUDGE PIGOTT: Right. 14 MR. PARSIGIAN: - - - and if you create the 15 cause of action. Both are relevant. First of all, 16 when you think about whether you should create a 17 cause of action, let's look at what the Supreme Court 18 said in Buckley. Let's look at what the cases they 19 rely on say - - -20 JUDGE RIVERA: Well - - -21 MR. PARSIGIAN: - - - like Ayers. 22 JUDGE RIVERA: Well, I thought they claim 2.3 2.4 MR. PARSIGIAN: They - - -25 JUDGE RIVERA: I thought they claim that

1 New York has already recognized medical monitoring. 2 They just think it applies to you. 3 MR. PARSIGIAN: No, there's a big 4 difference, Your Honor. What New York has done 5 already, in the Askey case, among others, is 6 recognize that a plaintiff who proves an injury in a 7 normal cause of action, negligence, strict liability, 8 may recover medical monitoring as part of 9 consequential damages. That's what Askey found. 10 It's not the question before this court, not what 11 they're asking for. 12 JUDGE READ: Because you're saying there's 13 no - - -MR. PARSIGIAN: They're asking for - - -14 15 JUDGE READ: - - - there's no inj - - -16 MR. PARSIGIAN: I'm sorry, Your Honor? 17 JUDGE READ: Because you're saying there's 18 no injury here? 19 MR. PARSIGIAN: Well, because what they're 20 asking for - - - let's look at the precise question: Does New York recognize an independent equitable 21 22 cause of action for medical monitoring? Okay? 2.3 That's a whole different thing than what Askey said. 2.4 Askey said if you have an injury and you can prove a

negligence or a strict liability claim. Let's

remember they brought those claims here. They 1 2 brought them, and the district court assumed, under 3 Askey, that they could recover medical monitoring if 4 they had prevailed on those claims. The district 5 court found they couldn't prevail on their negligence or strict liability claims because of the statute of 6 7 limitations. So what they're really trying to do is 8 create - - - get you to create a new claim that will 9 let them circumvent the statute of limitations. 10 had a remedy for medical monitoring; they just 11 couldn't make out the claim. That's what happened 12 below. And that's not before you. 13 JUDGE RIVERA: Because they - - -14 MR. PARSIGIAN: The question before you is 15 independent - - -16 JUDGE RIVERA: Because they should have 17 brought those claims when? 18 MR. PARSIGIAN: They should have brought 19 those claims - - - the trial court found - - - I 20 might argue something differently - - -21 JUDGE RIVERA: I understand. 22 MR. PARSIGIAN: - - - but the trial court 2.3 found that - - - the federal district court, that 2.4 they should have brought them when they had a twenty-

year pack history of smoking, because that's when

1 they had increased risk of lung cancer. 2 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: So then this - - -3 JUDGE RIVERA: And then - - -4 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: - - - was back in the 5 '90s? 6 MR. PARSIGIAN: It was a few years before 7 they brought suit in the '90s, is correct, Your 8 Honor. What - - - if you look at - - -9 JUDGE RIVERA: But I thought you said you 10 couldn't monitor at that point. It's only recently 11 that you can. MR. PARSIGIAN: That's correct. 12 That is 13 correct. Just like - - - just as is the case that 14 you can't have a car accident with someone who's 15 judgment-proof and wait twenty years until they win 16 the lottery to bring your claim. Or you can't suffer 17 an injury that has no treatment, and thirty years 18 later, when medicine discovers one, bring your claim. 19 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Is there a difference 20 here between the consumer product, sort of, analysis that was alluded to earlier and some environmental 21 22 toxin that, you know, some people can't avoid? 2.3 other words, these - - - these plaintiffs choose to 2.4 smoke, even though they may be addicted. There are

ways of, you know, dealing with addictions too, but

they're choosing, apparently, not to do that. So is there a difference here?

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MR. PARSIGIAN: There is a difference. I might just, before I answer it, very briefly say, this is not an addiction case. They have not alleged addiction as part of their claim. And of course there are more people who have quit smoking than are current smokers. And the evidence is that anybody can quit. But your specific question, yes, there's a difference between environmental exposure and this exposure. And Your Honor identified it, which is, whether it's voluntary or not. If you look at somebody who lives in a neighborhood that has an exposure, those people didn't have any choice, they didn't know it was coming. These people smoked cigarettes that have carried warnings on the packs, about the very risk they're talking about, since 1966.

JUDGE PIGOTT: So if this was a lead paint case, they would have a stronger argument, you'd think?

MR. PARSIGIAN: I don't think they would have a stronger argument, but in response to the specific question of whether there's a difference between the two, there is a difference between an

environmental exposure. I don't think this court 1 2 should recognize an independent equitable cause of 3 action for an environmental exposure - - -4 JUDGE RIVERA: So if you're - - -5 MR. PARSIGIAN: - - - either. JUDGE RIVERA: - - - if you're exposed to 6 7 secondhand smoke, do you have a claim? 8 MR. PARSIGIAN: May - - -9 JUDGE RIVERA: I don't want to be exposed 10 to secondhand smoke - - -11 MR. PARSIGIAN: Yeah. 12 JUDGE RIVERA: - - - but I am. 13 MR. PARSIGIAN: Everyone is exposed to some 14 secondhand smoke in their life, and that's a pretty 15 good illustration of why this could be a problem. 16 When I talk about opening the floodgates and 17 potentially millions of suits, the U.S. Supreme Court 18 said there could be tens of millions of exposed 19 plaintiffs from people walking down the street and 20 having car fumes, from secondhand smoke - - -21 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: If we - - - if we 22 recognize the cause of action, would this be a prod 2.3 to you to produce safer cigarettes? 2.4 MR. PARSIGIAN: Your Honor, Philip Morris 25 has had a range of cigarettes on the market for fifty

1	years.
2	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: No, but I'm asking
3	you a specific question. If we recognize this kind
4	of cause of action, couldn't that be viewed as
5	something that would promote better public health?
6	MR. PARSIGIAN: No, it couldn't, Your
7	Honor, and here's why.
8	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Why not?
9	MR. PARSIGIAN: That's what I'm trying to
10	answer. We have made those products available for
11	fifty years, and people choose not to smoke them.
12	They're on the market now. You can go out right now
13	and buy products that have extraordinarily low levels
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15	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So you're saying
16	-
17	MR. PARSIGIAN: of tar and nicotine.
18	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: you make the
19	safest products possible, and this
20	MR. PARSIGIAN: They're available.
21	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: This
22	MR. PARSIGIAN: People don't choose them.
23	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: This would have no
24	effect on you, really?
25	MR. PARSIGIAN: It would not it would

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          have no effect in that way. And let me say, this is
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          a significant piece - - -
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                    CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: You're a business,
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          aren't you? Wouldn't that have an effect if it - - -
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          if - - -
                    MR. PARSIGIAN: We're a business, but
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          people have to - - - if people don't want to buy it,
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          no business is going to sell any - - -
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                    JUDGE RIVERA: But - - -
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                    MR. PARSIGIAN: - - - we make it already.
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                    JUDGE RIVERA: But aren't you really - - -
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                    JUDGE PIGOTT: You mean if they took the
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          alcohol - - -
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                    JUDGE RIVERA: But aren't you really - - -
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                    JUDGE PIGOTT: - - - out of the beer they
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          wouldn't buy it?
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                    MR. PARSIGIAN: Excuse me?
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                    JUDGE PIGOTT: You mean if you took the
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          alcohol out of the beer they wouldn't buy it?
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                    MR. PARSIGIAN: Well, people - - - there is
          no-alcohol beer, and not very many people buy it.
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                    JUDGE RIVERA: So but - - -
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                    MR. PARSIGIAN: Right? It's there; it
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          wouldn't change what you do.
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JUDGE RIVERA: Aren't you really arguing

1 whether - - - not whether or not we should recognize 2 medical monitoring, but whether or not they can 3 satisfy whatever might be the elements to medical 4 monitoring? 5 MR. PARSIGIAN: I'm arguing that - - -JUDGE RIVERA: It strikes me as a whole 6 7 different question. MR. PARSIGIAN: Of course it - - - that's 8 9 the second question, right? And in fact, really the 10 second question isn't whether they can satisfy the 11 elements. 12 JUDGE RIVERA: Right. 13 MR. PARSIGIAN: It's just for this court to 14 identify the elements if it creates the claim. But 15 the point is, there is no reason to create this 16 claim. 17 I only got through the first one of my 18 answers to Your Honor, but if I might go through the 19 list very quickly - - -20 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Sure, go ahead. 21 MR. PARSIGIAN: - - - the concern about 22 overwhelming the courts is a great one, but there's 2.3 also the harm to potential plaintiffs. What the 2.4 Supreme Court recognized in the Buckley case, and

many other courts have recognized, is that if we

1	allow independent claims for medical monitoring like
2	this, there's no limit. Right? Askey creates a
3	limit; you have to actually be able to prove a
4	negligence claim or a strict liability
5	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What about the
6	benefits to potential claimants?
7	MR. PARSIGIAN: Well, here that's where you
8	get into the Affordable Care Act. Lives are not at
9	stake.
10	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Wouldn't it be a lot
11	
12	MR. PARSIGIAN: This is a question
13	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Wouldn't it be a lot
14	cheaper if people were able to be cured, if this new
15	technology allows people to be cured earlier, or
16	before they even really get any kind of significant
17	damage? Wouldn't that be a tremendous benefit to
18	claimants?
19	MR. PARSIGIAN: Your Honor, the answer is
20	no, for a number of reasons.
21	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: It might be at your
22	expense, but it might be tremendous benefit to
23	claimants.
24	MR. PARSIGIAN: It would not be.
25	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Why not?

1 MR. PARSIGIAN: Okay. First of all, the 2 ones who want the monitoring are going to get it 3 anyway. If this becomes the standard of care, if it 4 is authorized by the federal government - - -5 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Maybe they'll get it 6 in part, and maybe they won't get it in part. 7 MR. PARSIGIAN: Well - - -8 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Maybe it's not the 9 same as you could provide. 10 MR. PARSIGIAN: Actually, it likely will be 11 better than we could provide - - -12 JUDGE RIVERA: Yeah, but - - -13 MR. PARSIGIAN: - - - because instead of -14 - - if I might, Your Honor - - -15 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: There's a lot of 16 commentaries that the - - - the new health care bill 17 maybe, you know, won't provide such good care. I 18 mean, I think it's - - - that's a very subjective 19 viewpoint that they could do it a lot better than 20 you. There's a lot of people arguing today that 21 that's not the case. 22 MR. PARSIGIAN: There are; that's why I 2.3 only said maybe to agree with you. But this is 2.4 exactly the kind of - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: But counsel - - -

MR. PARSIGIAN: - - - policy calculus that
the legislature is better suited to address, Your

Honor.

JUDGE RIVERA: Counsel, I've never heard - - well, okay. So I'm struck by the fact that an
alleged tortfeasor is arguing that there's no claim

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- - well, okay. So I'm struck by the fact that an alleged tortfeasor is arguing that there's no claim because the public should pay for the injury that they caused. So I don't see - - -

MR. PARSIGIAN: No, that's not what I'm arguing, Your Honor. But let me make a quick - - - JUDGE RIVERA: It sure sounds like it.

MR. PARSIGIAN: Okay. Well, then let me - I apologize for the lack of clarity. When this
court is considering whether to create a new cause of
action - - - see, this would be diff - - - let's say
they could make out the Askey claim. They had a
negligence claim, they sued, and they wanted to
collect their expense, then that's a normal case,
right? The collateral source rule applies, we have
to pay for it; nobody cares whether they get
insurance to pay for it.

This is a different question. The question here is, as the U.S. Supreme Court said, if we open the door to independent claims for medical monitoring, we run the risk of using precious

resources, both of courts and of defendants, on claims that aren't as valuable, as they put it, that aren't as strong, that aren't as serious, and running out of money before you get to the people or running out of resources before you get to the people who have real injury claims.

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CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So we wait - - MR. PARSIGIAN: So - - -

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But I think that the whole question is what comes first, you know, the cart or the horse. Do you wait until people are seriously ill and then say, okay, now we understand, and then you get a cause of action, and then, you know, you have to pay for it, or whatever happens after that. Or this is - - - this is a novel approach that says, hey, let's not wait for that. Let's use modern technology for the benefit of everybody in order to - - - and maybe even including Philip Morris - - - for the benefit - - - let's get it at an early point before people are really sick. Let's do this monitoring because the new science tells us that people can be cured or never really impacted. Why isn't that more a logical way to do business, or is it just that, in your view, it violates the way we normally do litigation? Is it

1	the novelness of it that bothers you? That's what
2	I'm
3	MR. PARSIGIAN: Well, certainly the no
4	-
5	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: trying to get
6	at.
7	MR. PARSIGIAN: Certainly the novelty is an
8	issue, right? This court is capable and has before
9	created novel causes of action.
10	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: That's what I'm
11	asking.
12	MR. PARSIGIAN: It has the power to do it.
13	I'm telling you why
14	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: That's not inherently
15	bad, to do a novel cause of action.
16	MR. PARSIGIAN: Is it inherently bad? No.
17	Is it bad here? Yes. It's bad here because one of
18	the reasons is they will get the relief, both because
19	claimants in their position, an individual claimant
20	who actually demonstrates an injury, can prove a
21	negligence claim or a strict liability claim, can get
22	monitoring under New York law. So we've got that.
23	Second, if it becomes the standard of care
24	this court doesn't want to go there to start
25	suggesting monitoring if it's not the standard of

1 care. In fact, if you go to the hospital today and 2 get a CT scan, they're going to give you a warning 3 that you shouldn't get too many of them, because they 4 have risks. Those kinds of policy evaluations are 5 done by the medical community, which the U.S. 6 Preventive Services Task Force is doing right now. 7 And if they decide, early next year, that it's 8 available, it will be avail - - - so you're not 9 making a decision that we need to create a new cause 10 of action because there are a whole bunch of people 11 who can't get this care. They will be able to get 12 the care. So then the question is - - -13 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: If the government - -14 - because the government will pay for it. 15 MR. PARSIGIAN: Because the gov - - -16 because health insurance will pay for it. And the 17 question is, in a circumstance like that, not if they 18 could prove a claim, should we get out from under, 19 but that's a reason not to - - -20 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: I understand, but - -21 MR. PARSIGIAN: - - - act here, not to act 22 2.3 precipitously. 2.4 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But you agree there

is an argument that maybe Philip Morris, if - - - if

1 there's wrongdoing here, should pay for it, rather 2 than the taxpayer. 3 MR. PARSIGIAN: If there's wrong - - -4 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: That could be an 5 argument that one could make, right? MR. PARSIGIAN: There's a - - of course 6 7 that's an argument one could make. And the general 8 rule is that if you have an injury, then that would 9 apply. But what you're being asked to do is, is this 10 a circumstance, is this one of those rare circumstances where this court should throw out the 11 12 injury requirement, which limits the claims to a 13 manageable number of people, and throw out hundreds of years of tort law principles to create a new cause 14 15 of action. 16 If I might just say one thing - - -17 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: One thought; go 18 ahead. 19 MR. PARSIGIAN: Okay. The one thing is if you create a new cause of action, the critical 20 21 component we didn't get to discuss is the elements. 22 And I want to say one thing about one element. 2.3 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: One thing; go ahead. 2.4 MR. PARSIGIAN: That is the trial court 25 here found that even if we had made the alleged safer

1 cigarette and all of the class members, the purported 2 class members - - - because it hasn't been certified 3 - - - had smoked it, that they still would have 4 needed exactly the same medical monitoring. And we 5 submit that that is one of the critical elements that this court should make clear is that for someone - -6 7 - if there is an independent cause of action for 8 medical monitoring, claimants should have to prove, 9 as all the cases they cite say, if you read the 10 elements, that you wouldn't have gotten - - -11 wouldn't have needed exactly the same medical 12 monitoring absent the misconduct. 13 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counselor. 14 Thank you. 15 Okay, counsel, you're up; rebuttal. 16 MS. PHILLIPS: Okay. What - - -17 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What are the 18 elements, if there's a cause of action created? 19 MS. PHILLIPS: Okay. The elements, if I 20 can, to save time, are at the back page of our brief. 21 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay. But tell us in 22 a nutshell; what are the elements? 2.3 MS. PHILLIPS: I can turn to the page. 2.4 defendant's misconduct was a substantial factor in

causing the plaintiff to become exposed to a

hazardous substance. 1 2 JUDGE PIGOTT: Can I get medical monitoring 3 because I've been subjected to the secondhand smoke? 4 MS. PHILLIPS: The answer is you - - - you 5 would have to make - - - I think you'd have to come 6 in with expert proofs to show that you'd been exposed 7 to sufficiently large quantities of it, which in the 8 case of a secondhand smoke case may well be a more 9 difficult hurdle to jump over. But I don't see a 10 categorical reason why that would be an 11 impossibility. 12 JUDGE RIVERA: He says you've not got an 13 injury. JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Why can't we let the 14 15 legislature decide this? 16 MS. PHILLIPS: Oh, I got two questions. 17 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Judge Abdus-Salaam 18 first. 19 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Why shouldn't we let 20 the legislature consider these policy concerns and 21 other things where they're more - - - I think where 22 they're more appropriately considered in hearings and 2.3 other things, rather than two lawyers arguing them 2.4 here?

MS. PHILLIPS: In answer to that question,

1 I would say that Askey has been on the books, and has 2 been cited, I think, over 200 times by New York's 3 courts, federal courts. And this is a situation where the legislature has really had an opportunity, 5 if it wanted to, and it has passed tort reform 6 packages in the past; it hasn't done a think to alter 7 Askey. So the concept of medical monitoring has been 8 part of New York jurisprudence. 9 JUDGE GRAFFEO: There's a big difference 10 between having monitoring as part of consequential 11 damages and establishing a separate tort, because 12

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that has economic/fiscal impact - - -

MS. PHILLIPS: I think there - - -

JUDGE GRAFFEO: - - - on the state. mean, maybe not in Philip Morris' case because it's such a large corporation, but you could have another product involved where the monitoring ends up bankrupting the company, so that those individuals that actually have injuries and could have brought negligence cases are now not going to have - - -

> MS. PHILLIPS: That - - -

JUDGE GRAFFEO: - - - are now not going to have a pot for recovery.

MS. PHILLIPS: Effectively, that's the argument Philip makes, but the cases it points to as

1 an example of that is the asbestos context, which is 2 wildly inapposite. It's a situation where you have, 3 you know, I think, tens, if not hundreds of 4 bankrupted defendants. And the notion that Philip 5 Morris would ever be in those circumstances is really 6 implausible. And the certified question, of course, 7 is concerned with cigarettes and the cigarette - - -8 JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, the other part of - -9 10 JUDGE RIVERA: What's your - - -11 JUDGE PIGOTT: - - - asbestos, too, is that 12 it was an enormous, and I guess remains an enormous 13

JUDGE PIGOTT: - - - asbestos, too, is that it was an enormous, and I guess remains an enormous burden on the court system. I mean, there's a limit to how much, you know, judges and courts can do.

What does this - - - what impact would this have if you were to prevail here?

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MS. PHILLIPS: I think the realistic impact it would have is that this one case would go forward and that the plaintiffs might be able to seek some lifesaving - - -

JUDGE PIGOTT: What happens when I want to bring my monitoring case, and because I had secondhand smoke I've got to get an expert, and I'm going to lose, and then I want to appeal, and I'm - - you know, and then my - - my brother and my

1	uncle, who used to live in New York and smoked in New
2	York, but now lives in California and wants to come
3	over here and do it, I would think he's got a claim,
4	right?
5	MS. PHILLIPS: The limitless liability
6	argument that Philip Morris makes
7	JUDGE PIGOTT: I'm not talking about that;
8	I'm talking about the court burden.
9	MS. PHILLIPS: The burden
10	JUDGE PIGOTT: In other words in
11	other words, I got my case, I got my brother's case,
12	I got my uncle Joe, who now thinks that he deserves
13	medical monitoring in California because he smoked in
14	New York.
15	MS. PHILLIPS: Realistically, these cases
16	are only ever brought as class actions, and rarely
17	then.
18	JUDGE PIGOTT: But all right, we're going
19	to give you the class, but does my Uncle Joe in
20	California fit in the class because he lives in
21	California?
22	MS. PHILLIPS: Because he what is the
23	connection to the
24	JUDGE PIGOTT: He smoked in New York.
25	MS. PHILLIPS: State of New York? I

MS. PHILLIPS: - - - State of New York? I

don't think that under choice of law principles or 1 2 forum non conveniens principles - - -3 JUDGE PIGOTT: But he's going to have to 4 make that argument and we're going to have to make 5 that decision. MS. PHILLIPS: I think once that decision 6 7 gets made once or twice people are capable of reading 8 forum non conveniens jurisprudence, choice of law 9 jurisprudence, and they're only going to craft a 10 class that they think has a realistic chance of 11 getting through. 12 JUDGE RIVERA: What - - - sorry. 13 MS. PHILLIPS: Go ahead. JUDGE RIVERA: What's - - - I know that 14 15 you've debated this in the briefs. He takes the 16 position you have no harm - - - injury. 17 MS. PHILLIPS: Yes, that - - -18 JUDGE RIVERA: Let's hear your argument on 19 the injury. I believe it's the twenty-pack injury. 2.0 MS. PHILLIPS: That's exactly right, and if you look at Dr. Miller's report - - - I think it's 21 22 also in Dr. Morabia's report - - - there is no 2.3 question that a person who has smoked twenty 2.4 pack-years and is fifty years of age, which is a

critical factor I'd like to return to in a second,

has not just cellular changes but cellular injuries.

And the reports make that absolutely plain.

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JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: They have no lung cancer yet, and there are people who never smoked a day in their lives who are suffering with lung cancer and dying.

MS. PHILLIPS: It's actually a very small fraction. Overwhelmingly, people who do - - - it's about ninety percent or eighty percent of smokers, depending on the gender, are people who develop it because of smoking. But the fact of the matter is, is that cigarette smoking is the primary and almost the exclusive risk factor for developing lung cancer.

because I think that's a critical fact misapprehended by the federal judiciary that should bear on your timeliness analysis. Importantly, Ms. Caronia - - - Marcia Caronia didn't even turn fifty until the year before this action was filed in 2006. So for persons like her, I think it's critical for the court to recognize and to stress that she wasn't even a proper candidate for medical monitoring until the action was brought. And to say that she should have brought the action back in 1996 would be forcing her to bring suit at a time when she could - - not only was

there no relief available, but she wasn't even sufficiently at risk, under either side's experts, to be able to - - -

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JUDGE RIVERA: Because that's how you define the class, based on what medical science tells us is the point in time when there is this injury you're talking about.

MS. PHILLIPS: That's exactly right. That should be in the reports of Drs. Miller, Dr. Morabia
- - - I think also Dr. Markowitz addresses that.

If I could turn to the question of - - CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: No, no, you can have
one thought. Go ahead.

MS. PHILLIPS: Okay. One thought is going to be consumer products, because I think there was a division that was being drawn by defense counsel that maybe environmental torts are okay but not consumer products. And I just have to respond. First of all, there are people who are utterly blameless using products such as a heart valve that malfunctions, who may need medical monitoring, and the notion that because it's not an environmental tort they should be barred, seems to me unjust.

Beyond that, if we're going to talk about blaming the plaintiff, which is effectively what

1	Philip Morris is doing, it's important to take into
2	account and statistics and the Surgeon
3	General's reports will bear me out on this
4	overwhelmingly, not just the class representatives
5	but the class as a whole, are targeted as children by
6	this industry, become addicted as children
7	become addicted as children, and are incapable of
8	stopping smoking. And to say that these people are
9	not entitled to monitoring, particularly when Philip
10	Morris, which designs e-cigarettes with no tars, and
11	has many if you look at Dr. Farone's report,
12	has many, many ways in which it could have made its
13	cigarettes cigarettes more safer. To say
14	that these people aren't entitled to or deserving of
15	relief that can save their lives
16	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, coun
17	MS. PHILLIPS: constitutes an
18	injustice
19	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Thanks, counselor.
20	Thank you both. Appreciate it.
21	(Court is adjourned)
22	

CERTIFICATION

I, Sharona Shapiro, certify that the foregoing transcript of proceedings in the Court of Appeals of Marcia L. Caronia, et al. v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., No. 227 was prepared using the required transcription equipment and is a true and accurate record of the proceedings.

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