1	COURT OF APPEALS
2	STATE OF NEW YORK
3	
4	MATTER OF ANTWAINE T.,
5	Respondent.
6	
7	No. 116
8	
9	20 Eagle Street
10	Albany, New York 12207 May 08, 2014
11	
12	Before: CHIEF JUDGE JONATHAN LIPPMAN
13	ASSOCIATE JUDGE VICTORIA A. GRAFFEO ASSOCIATE JUDGE SUSAN PHILLIPS READ
14	ASSOCIATE JUDGE ROBERT S. SMITH ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE F. PIGOTT, JR.
15	ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA ASSOCIATE JUDGE SHEILA ABDUS-SALAAM
16	Appearances:
17	DONA B. MORRIS, ESQ.
18	CORPORATION COUNSEL OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK Attorneys for Appellant
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20	JOHN A. NEWBERY, ESQ.
21	THE LEGAL AID SOCIETY Attorneys for Respondent
22	199 Water Street 3rd Floor
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24	Penina Wolicki
25	Official Court Transcriber

1	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: 116, Matter of
2	Antwaine T.
3	Counsel, would you like any rebuttal time?
4	MS. MORRIS: I'd take two minutes, please?
5	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Two minutes. Go
6	ahead.
7	MS. MORRIS: May it please the court, I'm
8	Dona Morris, and I'm representing the appellant
9	presentment agency in this case.
10	JUDGE PIGOTT: I'm sorry, I can't quite
11	hear you.
12	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Speak up, counselor,
13	yes.
14	JUDGE GRAFFEO: Can you pull the microphone
15	down? Thank you.
16	MS. MORRIS: Bring it down? Can you hear
17	me now?
18	JUDGE PIGOTT: Yes.
19	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yes, go.
20	MS. MORRIS: I'm representing the appellant
21	presentment agency. And our argument here is
22	is that the petition in this case, which was under
23	Penal Law 265.05, a strict liability statute, no
24	intent requirement, any it's unlawful for

weapons to be possessed by persons under the age of

1	sixteen.
2	JUDGE SMITH: And, well, suppose a kid in
3	an area where where machetes are commonly used
4	to cut underbrush is carrying a machete to help his
5	father cut a path to to the field, is he
6	violating the law?
7	MS. MORRIS: Well, the petition says that
8	he was found the machete, which as we all
9	understand, is a heavy knife
10	JUDGE SMITH: Well, what's the answer to my
11	question?
12	MS. MORRIS: I would say, probably at that
13	time, it would be daytime and he would be with his
14	father. In this case, it was
15	JUDGE PIGOTT: So your answer would be no?
16	JUDGE READ: No?
17	JUDGE SMITH: No, he's not violating the
18	law?
19	MS. MORRIS: If a machete is
20	inherently two
21	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yeah, but
22	JUDGE SMITH: You can explain it all you
23	want but it's a yes or no first?
24	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: in the context
25	of

1	MS. MORRIS: Yes
2	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: what Judge
3	Smith said? In that hypothetical, what's your
4	MS. MORRIS: I I understand that, but
5	this in this specific case the the youth
6	
7	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yeah, yeah, but he's
8	asking you about a hypothetical case that's not this
9	case. Is the answer yes or no?
10	MS. MORRIS: I think you could say the
11	petition was sufficient, and it was a prima facie
12	case, and then they could rebut it and say he was
13	going to use it for agricultural purposes.
14	In this case, the pet the youth who
15	pled was found at 11:23
16	JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, there's a certain
17	amount of discretion within the police. Is that
18	- is that essentially what your argument is? I mean,
19	if you see a you know, a twelve- or fourteen-
20	year-old kid out in the field with a sickle or a
21	scythe
22	MS. MORRIS: Yes, you would be unlikely to
23	arrest him.
24	JUDGE PIGOTT: no one's going to go
25	after him But if you're standing

1	MS. MORRIS: But
2	JUDGE PIGOTT: in the middle of, I'll
3	say Times Square, because a lot of people know where
4	that is with one of these things, then maybe
5	it's a dangerous weapon.
6	JUDGE RIVERA: But weren't you arguing that
7	it's inherently dangerous?
8	MS. MORRIS: It's
9	JUDGE RIVERA: But now it sounds like
10	you're arguing that you always look to the
11	circumstances. Which which
12	MS. MORRIS: Well
13	JUDGE RIVERA: rule is it that you
14	say applies from Jamie D.?
15	MS. MORRIS: In Jamie D., basically,
16	there's three ways, and a which refers to
17	a dangerous knife, which is not otherwise defined.
18	So first you look at to the statute which says
19	"weapons". Then you ask yourself, is this
20	objectively a weapon? A machete, with a fourteen-
21	inch blade, a broad, heavy knife, is objectively a
22	weapon.
23	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: You would agree that
24	the supporting deposition is spare, to say the least?
25	MS. MORRIS: It is spare. But it does give

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1
          you the - - -
 2
                    CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: You think it just
 3
          jumps out at - - - at you by the surrounding
          circumstances?
 4
 5
                    MS. MORRIS: It - - -
 6
                    CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: I mean, is that your
 7
          argument?
                    MS. MORRIS: But what I'm saying is, you
 8
 9
          don't have to go to the elaborate circumstances - - -
10
                    CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: You're saying it's
11
          objectively dangerous. Is that your - - -
12
                    MS. MORRIS: I'm saying objectively - - -
13
                    CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - given - - -
          given?
14
15
                    MS. MORRIS: - - - it's dangerous. I think
16
          if any of us saw this weapon - - -
17
                    CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But it's in context,
18
          right? In - - - in juxtaposition to what Judge Smith
19
          was asking you before where, in a different context,
20
          it might not be objectively dangerous, right? Or is
21
          that wrong?
22
                    MS. MORRIS: Well, it's objectively
23
          dangerous. It could be put to a utilitarian use,
2.4
          which is usually - - -
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CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yeah, yeah. But - -

2.4

JUDGE GRAFFEO: But I thought under Jamie
D., under that there there is a provision
that says "or the circumstances of its possession
indicate its intent." So why why isn't the
circumstances under which the possession occurs
relevant? Why do we have to declare this
MS. MORRIS: Because this is

JUDGE GRAFFEO: - - - objectively dangerous
in all situations?

MS. MORRIS: Because of its very nature, it is a big, heavy knife, car - - - that is capable of use as a weapon. And to answer - - -

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yeah, but - - - but the question before, and what we're trying to get at is, if you're in the middle of cane fields, you know, in the middle of the day, and everyone has a - - - machetes and they're cutting down, you know, the - - - these canes, that's not objectively dangerous, is it, in that context?

MS. MORRIS: It's obj - - - still objectively capable - - -

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So a machete, whatever the size of it - - - of that size, is always a dangerous instrument, and you don't need to say

1 anything more about it? MS. MORRIS: Well, when you - - - when you 2 3 have the petition, it always has the time and the 4 place - - -5 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yes, but that's what I'm asking you. That - - - that - - - it's not 6 7 always the case. In a certain context, you could - -8 - you could imagine that it would not be objectively 9 dangerous. 10 MS. MORRIS: You could imagine. But what 11 we're saying is - - -12 JUDGE SMITH: But suppose - - - suppose you 13 have exactly this petition, change only two things: 14 time of occurrence, change p.m. to a.m., 15 approximately 11:23 a.m.; place of occurrence says in 16 the vicinity of Tompkins Avenue and Halsey Street, 17 Brooklyn, New York, change to in the - - - in the 18 vicinity of John Brown's farm in South Ovid, or 19 wherever. Does that - - - is it still a sufficient 20 petition? 21 MS. MORRIS: Probably not. But we're 22 dealing with this petition. And this - - -23 JUDGE GRAFFEO: But we're trying to 2.4 articulate a rule that's going to affect anybody

who's in possession of a machete. So we can't just

look at the facts of this case. 1 MS. MORRIS: Well, then I would say that a 2 3 machete is a prima facie case of an - - - a wea - - -4 a big, heavy knife, with a long history of being a 5 dangerous con - - -6 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Wouldn't you have a 7 better argument to say that in one circumstance it -- - it can be a danger - - - objectively dangerous, 8 9 and in another it's not? 10 MS. MORRIS: Well, I think it - - - I think 11 it is a weapon. And so all you have to be - - - have 12 in a petition is a prima facie case. Jamie D. was 13 after a fact finding. And the problem that - - with Jamie D. is that it tends to take a - - - a 14 15 statute which is a strict liability statute - - -16 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yeah, but I guess 17 that point that's being made here, isn't context 18 important? It has no - - - no relevance as to 19 whether it's in a - - - on a farm or in the middle of 20 the night in an - - - in an urban street? 21 MS. MORRIS: I would argue, fundamentally, 22 the petition is sufficient to make out a prima facie 23 case. 2.4 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: I - - - we understand 25 that's your argument.

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1
                    MS. MORRIS: Well - - -
 2
                    JUDGE RIVERA: So - - - so every big knife
 3
 4
                    MS. MORRIS: Not every - - -
 5
                    JUDGE RIVERA: - - - is dan - - -
 6
                    MS. MORRIS: - - - big knife.
 7
                    JUDGE RIVERA: Okay, so what distinguishes
          the machete from - - -
 8
 9
                    MS. MORRIS: A machete - - -
10
                    JUDGE RIVERA: - - - every big knife?
11
                    MS. MORRIS: Well, a machete is - - - a
12
          machete is a particular kind of knife. There are
13
          many different variations on them. But they are
14
          heavy. They have a wide blade. They have a - - - a
15
          history of being used as an offensive and defensive
16
          weapon. A machete looks scary.
17
                    I'm not sure where you would draw the line.
18
          But it's certainly not - - -
19
                    JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: But didn't we - - -
20
                    MS. MORRIS: - - - the other knife - - -
21
          excuse me. Yes?
22
                    JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Didn't we draw the
23
          line in Jamie D.? Machete was not one of the
2.4
          examples that was listed. There was - - -
25
                    MS. MORRIS: No, but the - - - Jamie D.
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1 does not say - - -2 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: - - - bayonets, 3 stilettos, and daggers. MS. MORRIS: - - - it had to - - - Jamie D. 4 5 did not say that it had to be one of the weapons listed. It - - -6 7 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: No, but it wasn't immediately one of the examples that was listed. 8 9 MS. MORRIS: But they - - -10 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: That's my point. You 11 say it's - - -MS. MORRIS: - - - but they men - - - they 12 13 mentioned a - - - a bayonet, which is not mentioned in the Penal Law. There's certain knives which, by 14 15 their inherent characteristics, are - - - are 16 weapons. 17 JUDGE RIVERA: Yeah, but the difference 18 between the bayonet, is that it usually doesn't have any utilitarian purpose, right? The point of it is 19 20 as a weapon. But to the extent that machetes around 21 the world are used for other purposes, agricultural 22 and otherwise, and perhaps in part of the state are 23 used for that purpose - - -2.4 MS. MORRIS: Well - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: - - - I think that's the

1 challenge. And the question of - - - of why not look 2 at the circumstances? Why is it, it has to be 3 categorized inherently as falling within the Penal Section? 4 5 MS. MORRIS: Because it's inherently a 6 It has a history of being a weapon. weapon. 7 JUDGE READ: Well, are you saying it's - -- it has a dictionary definition included? 8 9 MS. MORRIS: Yes. The dictionary def - - -10 definition is that it's a broad, heavy knife, used 11 either as a weapon or for cutting sugar cane or thick 12 vegetation. But it's definitely defined as a weapon. 13 A steak knife is not defined as a weapon. A - - -JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: So if this were not -14 15 - - going back to Judge Smith's hypothetical, if we 16 changed a couple facts - - - it's the summertime. 17 There's a community garden in the area where the kid 18 was found, and it's not pitch black all - - - it's, 19 you know, relatively light out, this would still be, 20 in your view, a weapon, not something that he could 21 actually go out and use in the garden? 22 MS. MORRIS: No, I can't make the argument 23 that you can't use it in a garden. I'm saying - - -2.4 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: But you're saying it -25 - - it would be a weapon no matter what.

1	weapon that would still be used in
2	MS. MORRIS: Well, in itself, it is a
3	weapon. It can be used for an agricultural purpose.
4	JUDGE SMITH: You you say that any
5	petition that says he has a machete, anytime,
6	anyplace, is a sufficient petition, but that it can
7	be defeated by proof that he had an innocent use for
8	it?
9	MS. MORRIS: Yes.
10	JUDGE SMITH: And would you say may
11	say the same if a bayonet if I'm carrying a
12	bayonet around, and I prove that I was going to use
13	it to what do I
14	MS. MORRIS: Peel and orange?
15	JUDGE SMITH: what would I use it
16	for.
17	JUDGE PIGOTT: You're in a play.
18	JUDGE SMITH: To show to show my son
19	how to make holes in the wall.
20	JUDGE RIVERA: March in the parade. March
21	in the parade.
22	JUDGE READ: To pick up trash.
23	JUDGE SMITH: Yeah. Yeah, or to pose
24	to pose for a picture. Is that a defense?
25	MS. MORRIS: Yes. A petition is only

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has to make a prima facie case that the - - -
 1
 2
                    JUDGE SMITH: Okay, but I'm - - - I'm
 3
          asking a - - -
 4
                    MS. MORRIS: - - - that the - - -
 5
                    JUDGE SMITH: - - - different question.
 6
          Are you really saying that in the bayonet case, you
 7
          can defend on the ground that you were going to use
          the bayonet to pick up trash?
 8
 9
                    MS. MORRIS: Or to show you son how you
10
          behaved in the war.
11
                    JUDGE SMITH: So you're saying yes, to
          that, because - - -
12
13
                    MS. MORRIS: I guess I am.
                    JUDGE SMITH: - - - it's not obvious to me.
14
15
          I mean, I can imagine the - - -
16
                    MS. MORRIS: What I'm saying - - -
17
                    JUDGE SMITH: - - - law could be that a
18
          bayonet - - -
19
                    MS. MORRIS: - - - that this - - -
20
                    JUDGE SMITH: - - - is always illegal.
21
                    MS. MORRIS: Is a - - - the bayonet I don't
22
          believe is listed in the Penal Law.
23
                    JUDGE SMITH: Okay. But I can still
2.4
          imagine.
25
                    JUDGE RIVERA: But despite the - - - the
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1	words in Jamie D. that specifically identify a
2	bayonet? Remember, this is about minors, it's not
3	about adults.
4	MS. MORRIS: This is that's right.
5	There's no intent involved in this statute. We don't
6	do not want children carrying around machetes,
7	bayonets, or other
8	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counsel.
9	MS. MORRIS: dangerous knives.
10	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: You'll have your
11	rebuttal time.
12	MS. MORRIS: Thank you.
13	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Let's hear from your
14	adversary.
15	Counselor?
16	MR. NEWBERY: Good afternoon. May it
17	please the court, my name is John Newbery. I'm
18	counsel for Antwaine T.
19	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counsel, does context
20	matter?
21	MR. NEWBERY: Context certainly does
22	matter, Your Honor. I think as the Second Department
23	correctly did, it applied the circumstances test in
24	Jamie D. to this situation
25	JUDGE SMITH: Well, the circumstan I

JUDGE SMITH: Well, the circumstan - - -  $\rm I$ 

mean, how - - - how likely is it that a boy - - -1 2 he's a boy, right, he's under sixteen? 3 MR. NEWBERY: Yes. JUDGE SMITH: A boy of fifteen carrying a 4 5 machete in Brooklyn half an hour before midnight, is 6 planning to use it to cut vegetation? 7 MR. NEWBERY: That's not the test, Your 8 Honor, how likely is it? Respectfully, the fact that 9 you're asking that question to me, shows that the 10 petition doesn't tell you what it - - - the question really is, another version of what's he doing with 11 12 that at this hour - - -13 JUDGE GRAFFEO: Then aren't you writing an 14 intent - - -15 MR. NEWBERY: - - - of night? 16 JUDGE GRAFFEO: - - - element into the 17 statute, if that's what the petition has to say? MR. NEWBERY: I don't believe I'm reading 18 19 an intent element into the statute. I'm not quite 20 sure why the legislature, in enacting this statute 21 used the term "dangerous knife" without giving any 22 definition or guidance. 23 JUDGE GRAFFEO: What are you claiming was 2.4 the legitimate purpose that he had the machete for -25

1	MR. NEWBERY: I don't
2	JUDGE GRAFFEO: at that time of
3	night?
4	MR. NEWBERY: I don't think that's my
5	burden, Your Honor. I think the burden is for the
6	prosecution to set forth sufficient allegations to
7	make out a prima facie case that
8	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Well, or is it that
9	they make out that under the circumstances, it's
10	dangerous, and then you could come in and give some
11	innocent reason
12	MR. NEWBERY: Well
13	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: why he has it?
14	MR. NEWBERY: Well, what what are the
15	circumstances? The circumstances that
16	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: These particular
17	circum tell us what the circumstances are, why
18	they don't jump out at you and say this is
19	objectively dangerous.
20	MR. NEWBERY: I'm not sure what the
21	circumstances are.
22	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Well, we know the
23	_
24	MR. NEWBERY: I can tell you
25	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: time and the

1	place.
2	MR. NEWBERY: Right.
3	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: And we know the item
4	itself.
5	MR. NEWBERY: We we know the time.
6	I'll grant that. The place, I I don't know if
7	I'm
8	JUDGE READ: Well, the item itself is
9	generally understood and defined by dictionaries to
10	be a weapon.
11	MR. NEWBERY: To be a utilitarian
12	instrument which has been used as a weapon, Your
13	Honor. I think there's a difference. Now, in
14	JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, if he had told the
15	officer that he got a phone call from someone who
16	told him that he wanted to fight, and he immediately
17	went to the address and found fifty people fighting
18	each other, and found himself in the mix, does that
19	help?
20	MR. NEWBERY: It doesn't help me. It
21	certainly helps the prosecution.
22	JUDGE PIGOTT: You don't I mean
23	MR. NEWBERY: If they if they put
24	that in their
25	JUDGE PIGOTT: you could

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1
                    MR. NEWBERY: - - - dep - - - if they put
          it in the deposition - - -
 2
 3
                    JUDGE PIGOTT: You - - if that was in
 4
          there, would you then be happy?
 5
                    MR. NEWBERY: I think it would be
          sufficient.
 6
 7
                    JUDGE PIGOTT: Which - - - which goes to, I
 8
          think, to Judge Graffeo's point, that you - - -
 9
          you're saying there has to be an intent. And that's
10
          not what the statute says. And it just seems to me,
          can't there be a little common sense here?
11
                    MR. NEWBERY: Well, I - - - this court in
12
13
          Jamie D. set - - - set out the test.
14
                    JUDGE PIGOTT: I know.
15
                    MR. NEWBERY: So I'm speaking about - - -
16
          about the test of - - -
17
                    JUDGE PIGOTT: But as - - as we pointed
18
          out, I mean, they mentioned three - - - that - - - we
19
          didn't mention three to the exclusion of everything
20
          else.
21
                    MR. NEWBERY: I'm sorry, you didn't - - -
22
                    JUDGE PIGOTT: In Jamie D., they said a
23
          bayonet, a stiletto, and I - - -
2.4
                    MR. NEWBERY: Right.
25
                    JUDGE PIGOTT: - - - forget what the other
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1	one is.
2	MR. NEWBERY: But
3	JUDGE PIGOTT: But that was not to the
4	_
5	MR. NEWBERY: Exactly.
6	JUDGE PIGOTT: if the if Jamie
7	D. had said had been a machete, it may have
8	been in there. I mean, it
9	MR. NEWBERY: That's right. But I think
10	the reason why the court then singled out those three
11	implements as illustrative examples, is it was trying
12	to figure out what is the essence of the prescription
13	in that statute.
14	JUDGE PIGOTT: Right.
15	MR. NEWBERY: It's going after a weapon.
16	For instance, a bayonet, a stiletto or a dagger.
17	Those primarily are intended and designed for use as
18	weapons. That's not the case with a machete.
19	JUDGE PIGOTT: But you're making the
20	argument that that a machete and I don't
21	want to get into the dictionary; I just want to get
22	into common sense. I mean, we're trying to protect
23	kids. He's fifteen. He it's a it's in
24	the middle of the night. And and he says that

- that he found himself in the middle of a fight.

1 So the officer arrests him, charges him with 2 possession of a dangerous weapon, says date, time and 3 place, and you're saying, well, you know, he had to -4 - - he had to say that he had intent to - - -5 MR. NEWBERY: No, I'm - - -6 JUDGE PIGOTT: - - - use it. 7 MR. NEWBERY: - - - I'm - - - maybe I'm 8 misunderstanding your question. In that - - - that 9 hypothetical you're setting up, assuming those facts 10 which are not what we have here, I think there - - -11 that it would be sufficient. But - - -12 JUDGE READ: Are you saying that a mache -13 - - that it's not sufficient to say a machete, with 14 or without the - - - the circumstances, because it 15 can have a utilitarian use? 16 MR. NEWBERY: That's certainly part of it. 17 Now, as to - - - as to this machete being described, 18 and with reference to the dictionary definition, as a 19 big heavy knife, all we know from this petition, is 20 the officer calls it a machete but certainly doesn't 21 - - - it has a fourteen-inch blade, but - - -22 JUDGE RIVERA: But can't we - - - can't you 23 infer from an officer's experience, that - - - that 2.4 the officer knows what a machete is?

MR. NEWBERY: I don't know what experience

1	I don't know what experience he has.
2	JUDGE PIGOTT: But you're talking
3	MR. NEWBERY: It could be but let's
4	assume
5	JUDGE PIGOTT: wait a minute. Wait a
6	minute. You're talking facial sufficiency.
7	MR. NEWBERY: Right, right.
8	JUDGE PIGOTT: It says machete.
9	MR. NEWBERY: Okay. All right. So
10	JUDGE PIGOTT: You can't say, well I didn't
11	know what he meant by it, because if he'd said
12	bayonet, you'd sure as hell know, and it may not be a
13	bayonet.
14	MR. NEWBERY: Well, I think the I
15	think there's a question as to whether, based on that
16	description, you can fairly get from it, it's a
17	machete
18	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: So what's missing?
19	MR. NEWBERY: but assuming.
20	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: What's missing from
21	this prima facie what's missing from the
22	incident
23	MR. NEWBERY: What's missing? Well, number
24	number one, in the vicinity of these two
25	streets, I don't know, you know, what's the

1	intersection. But
2	JUDGE PIGOTT: Oh, so your argument is that
3	that
4	MR. NEWBERY: Well, that's part of it.
5	JUDGE PIGOTT: venue is not proper?
6	MR. NEWBERY: No. I don't know where
7	I don't know where this is. We don't know I
8	don't think any of us can say was this inside, was
9	this outside? And we keep hearing it's on the
10	on the streets of Brooklyn.
11	JUDGE RIVERA: Well, but it's on a city.
12	What does it matter, it's inside or outside, to that
13	extent? I mean, either way
14	MR. NEWBERY: Well, an apple
15	JUDGE RIVERA: she's saying that this
16	is a minor carrying a machete with a fourteen-inch
17	bland, late at night, in an urban environment.
18	MR. NEWBERY: Well
19	JUDGE RIVERA: In inside the
20	building, outside the building? It's less dangerous,
21	more dangerous?
22	MR. NEWBERY: Well, I think under Jamie
23	D.'s circumstances test, certainly it does matter if
24	you have it
25	JUDGE PIGOTT: But if it was a bayonet

1 2 MR. NEWBERY: - - - inside or outside. 3 JUDGE PIGOTT: - - - you'd say well, it's dismissible. It doesn't say what - - -4 5 MR. NEWBERY: Because it's primarily de - -6 JUDGE PIGOTT: - - - it doesn't say whether 7 it's inside or outside. So I - - - I win, dismiss 8 9 the case. 10 MR. NEWBERY: No, I wouldn't say that in the case of a bayonet. 11 12 JUDGE PIGOTT: When you're - - -13 MR. NEWBERY: Because a bayonet - - - a 14 bayonet is primarily designed and intended as a 15 weapon. Whereas the very definitions that even they cite in their brief - - -16 17 JUDGE RIVERA: Is - - -MR. NEWBERY: - - - that is not the case. 18 19 JUDGE RIVERA: - - - is it possible, 20 however, that given the history of a machete in - - -21 in an urban environment, which is just the only thing 22 that's being referred to here, that one cannot see the utilitarian use of it? There's no argument for 23 2.4 the utilitarian use of it? 25 MR. NEWBERY: Well, sure there's an

1	argument for utilitarian use.
2	JUDGE RIVERA: What would that be?
3	MR. NEWBERY: Certainly in the city of New
4	York, they do sell sugar cane and they do sell
5	coconuts. I know that they
6	JUDGE GRAFFEO: So he was he was out
7	in at this hour of night planning to cut down
8	dandelions?
9	MR. NEWBERY: Well
10	JUDGE GRAFFEO: I mean, I do think Judge
11	Pigott's right. Don't we have to bring a little
12	common sense to this?
13	MR. NEWBERY: Certainly we do, but I think
14	also we have to bring common sense in in
15	recognizing that really the fact of these questions -
16	that you're asking these questions, it's because
17	really, we don't know; it doesn't say in the in
18	the petition itself; it gives us no clue what he was
19	doing. And that's that's the prosecution's
20	minimal
21	JUDGE SMITH: Well, suppose
22	MR. NEWBERY: burden
23	JUDGE SMITH: the officer
24	MR. NEWBERY: to be
25	JUDGE RIVERA: All you have to know is that

1 he's possessing it. 2 JUDGE READ: Yeah. 3 MR. NEWBERY: Sorry? 4 JUDGE RIVERA: All - - - don't you - - -5 only - - - you have to know he's possessing it. Isn't that the point of the statute? Are you in 6 7 possession of a dangerous knife? Isn't that the 8 point? Just by possession? 9 MR. NEWBERY: But the circums - - - our 10 position is under Jamie D., that the circumstances 11 test applies. And so presumably, at that point, when 12 the officer sees whatever is going on, and I don't 13 know what was happening here, and presumably has probable cause to arrest him, there are circumstances 14 15 to make the officer conclude that it was a dangerous 16 knife. 17 JUDGE SMITH: Well - - -JUDGE GRAFFEO: If we don't look at the 18 19 circums -20 MR. NEWBERY: It's a minimal burden. 21 JUDGE GRAFFEO: - - - if we don't look at 22 the circumstances, and we add machete to the list of 23 bayonet, stilettos and daggers, aren't you worse off? 2.4 I mean, the circumstance test allows more of a

defense, doesn't it? I realize in this particular -

1 2 MR. NEWBERY: If - - -JUDGE GRAFFEO: - - - case, perhaps your -3 4 5 MR. NEWBERY: Yes. JUDGE GRAFFEO: - - - your client won't be 6 7 successful. But it would - - - it would allow other 8 juveniles that perhaps possess this to be able to - -9 10 MR. NEWBERY: Well - - -11 JUDGE GRAFFEO: - - - explain a different 12 set of circumstances that could justify agricultural 13 or other legitimate use of this. MR. NEWBERY: Well, one consideration to 14 15 take into account is this is - - - this is not a 16 situation that's going to be limited exclusively to 17 juveniles. 265.01(2) penalizes possession of dangerous knives. 265.15(4) gives a presumption of 18 19 unlawful intent if you possess a dangerous knife. 20 JUDGE GRAFFEO: Yeah, well, if somebody's 21 standing in a bar with a machete, I wouldn't be too 22 excited about that. I mean, that's probably - - -23 that's probably a dangerous weapon in that situation 2.4 as well. I don't care what the age of the - - -

MR. NEWBERY: Might be.

JUDGE GRAFFEO: - - - person is. 1 2 MR. NEWBERY: Might - - - might be. Might 3 be. JUDGE SMITH: Well, 265.01(2) has in it the 4 5 element of intent to use the same unlawfully against 6 another. 7 MR. NEWBERY: Right. Right. It does. 8 that - - - and that element can be supplied through 9 application of a presumption, which can be satisfied 10 by establishing that the person possesses a dangerous 11 knife. So in the - - - in the Campos case, the First 12 Department did find that somebody charged with that 13 particular section with possessing a machete, that 14 that was under the Jamie D. test, a dangerous knife, 15 because in contrast to the situation here, it wasn't 16 simply that he was carrying it under circumstances 17 which made its agricultural use unlikely, he was 18 waving it; he was threatening people; he was shouting; he told an officer - - -19 20 JUDGE SMITH: Okay. Let me - - -21 MR. NEWBERY: - - - I have this for 22 protection. 23 JUDGE SMITH: - - - let me ask you - - -2.4 JUDGE GRAFFEO: That's the intent. 25 JUDGE SMITH: - - - if I could just one.

As a practical matter, you're saying and off - - - a police officer who sees a young - - a fifteen-year-old boy carrying a fourteen-inch - - - machete with a fourteen-inch blade, in the streets of Brooklyn, at 11:30 at night, and apart from the machete, the boy has done nothing wrong, he's - - he's just minding - - he's just an innocent kid minding his own business, the officer is - - is not entitled to do anything? He's supposed to say, have a nice day, son?

2.4

MR. NEWBERY: Well, I - - - I suppose the officer can certainly ask him some questions. But I don't think the officer - - - well, to bring it in - - - into the context here, if those are the only facts that - - - which wind up in the charging instrument, regardless of what happens, I don't think that's a sufficient - - -

JUDGE SMITH: Well, okay. Suppose - - - but isn't it perfectly conceivable that they're the only facts that existed, that that's all the officer did know?

MR. NEWBERY: Well, then I think under

Jamie D. it wasn't a violation of 265.05. It may

have been a violation of the administrative code for

possessing a knife which was more than four - - -

with a blade with more than four inches, but that 1 2 wasn't charged here. 3 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counsel. 4 Thanks. Counselor, rebuttal? 5 6 MS. MORRIS: Yes. I would just be brief. 7 Jamie D. was trying to define - - - find out how you found out a knife was dangerous. There were three 8 9 routes. One of them was an objective test of is this 10 knife a weapon. And under that - - - and this is a 11 case where we're only talking about the facial 12 sufficiency of a petition in an - - - under a statute 13 which requires no intent. And therefore - - -14 JUDGE SMITH: Let me just be clear. Maybe 15 you made this clear already. For you - - - is it 16 your position that a machete and a bayonet are the 17 same for these purposes? MS. MORRIS: I'm not expert on bayonets, 18 but I would say it - - - actually there is more 19 2.0 likelihood that you could find a utilitarian purpose 21 somewhere for a machete. But a machete is defined as 22 a broad, heavy knife used as a weapon. 23 JUDGE SMITH: Well, I thought we said - - -2.4 I thought we said in Jamie D. there's some things:

bayonets, dirks and stilettos or bayonets, daggers

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and stilettos - - - whatever it is - - - that are
 1
 2
          always dangerous.
 3
                    MS. MORRIS: I think I would put a machete
 4
          in that case.
 5
                    JUDGE SMITH: You would put a machete in
 6
          that category.
 7
                    MS. MORRIS: For the purpose of a having a
          petition - - - a petition or - - -
 8
 9
                    JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, the third one - - -
10
          you mentioned there were three - - - the third one is
11
          the possessor considers the knife to be a weapon
12
          rather than a utilitarian instrument based on the
13
          totality of the circumstances.
14
                    MS. MORRIS: Right. We don't have to go
15
          there.
16
                    JUDGE PIGOTT: Okay.
17
                    MS. MORRIS: And then - - - and - - -
18
                    JUDGE RIVERA: But - - -
19
                    MS. MORRIS: - - - which is irrelevant here
2.0
21
                    JUDGE RIVERA: - - - but let's say we - - -
22
                    MS. MORRIS: - - - to say it was some
23
          utilitarian - - -
2.4
                    JUDGE RIVERA: - - - but - - - counsel,
25
          let's say we - - -
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1	JUDGE READ: But if we disagree with you -
2	
3	JUDGE RIVERA: disagree with you on -
4	on sort of the inherent nature of this, that it
5	first the first category in Jamie D. and now we're
6	going over to the last category, circumstances.
7	The circumstances here are, he's standing
8	on the street corner carrying this machete
9	MS. MORRIS: At
LO	JUDGE RIVERA: in the middle of the
L1	night?
L2	MS. MORRIS: In the middle of the night.
L3	JUDGE RIVERA: Okay. Does it matter, the
L4	neighborhood?
L5	MS. MORRIS: I think it probably matters
L6	that it's an urban neighborhood rather than
L7	JUDGE RIVERA: Well, does it matter which
L8	urban neighborhood?
L9	MS. MORRIS: No.
20	JUDGE RIVERA: I only ask because there are
21	many mentions of a particular urban neighborhood in
22	your brief, so I thought that you were going to
23	MS. MORRIS: That's that's true.
24	That seems
25	JUDGE RIVERA: say there was

something unique. MS. MORRIS: No, there seems to be a particular problem with gangs in Brooklyn using machetes. But that doesn't mean that if somebody were standing across the street here at 11 o'clock with a machete, and you were leaving the office, you might feel fear. We're basically asking for the application of common sense for the facial sufficiency under a statute that requires no intent. CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counsel. Okay. Thanks, counsel. Thank you both. (Court is adjourned) 

## 2 CERTIFICATION

I, Penina Wolicki, certify that the

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