| COURT OF APPEALS |
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| STATE OF NEW YORK |
| |
| PEOPLE |
| Respondent, |
| -Against- |
| No. 43 BORIS SHAULOV (papers sealed) |
| Appellant. |
| 20 Eagle Street |
| Albany, New York 12207 February 17, 2015 |
| |
| Before: CHIEF JUDGE JONATHAN LIPPMAN |
| ASSOCIATE JUDGE SUSAN PHILLIPS READ ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE F. PIGOTT, JR. |
| ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA ASSOCIATE JUDGE SHEILA ABDUS-SALAAM |
| ASSOCIATE JUDGE LESLIE E. STEIN ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE M. FAHEY |
| Appearances: |
| STUART D. RUBIN, ESQ. |
| LAW OFFICE OF STUART D. RUBIN, ESQ. Attorney for Appellant |
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| AMY APPELBAUM, ADA KINGS COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE |
| Attorneys for Respondent Renaissance Plaza |
| 350 Jay Street Brooklyn, NY 11201 |
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| 1 | CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Number 43, People v. |
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| 2 | Shaulov. |
| 3 | Counselor, you want any rebuttal time? |
| 4 | MR. RUBIN: Yes, two minutes, please, Your |
| 5 | Honor. |
| 6 | CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Two minutes, sure. |
| 7 | Go ahead. |
| 8 | MR. RUBIN: May it please the court. My |
| 9 | name is Stuart Rubin. I represent Appellant Boris |
| 10 | Shaulov. |
| 11 | CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What did the |
| 12 | did the how did the judge abuse the court |
| 13 | abuse its discretion in this case? |
| 14 | MR. RUBIN: With respect to point two, Your |
| 15 | Honor, there was a pre-trial Spicola ruling and, very |
| 16 | specifically, the court ruled that with respect to |
| 17 | both theories of prosecution, rape in the third |
| 18 | degree, two theories |
| 19 | CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Right. |
| 20 | MR. RUBIN: one, statutory rape, the |
| 21 | other |
| 22 | CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Right. |
| 23 | MR. RUBIN: a lack of consent, no |
| 24 | means no. What happened here is, of course the |
| 25 | defense attorney relied upon the prosecution's |

in reliance upon that, when a defense lawyer does an opening statement, when you're going to be very fact-specific, you do so at your peril if indeed the facts don't pan out. In this case, based upon the - - -

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JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Well, do we know - - - do we know when the prosecution learned that this - - - there was some sort of outcry of some sort? I don't even know if it is a prompt outcry if nobody - - - if - - - if the witness, who supposedly got the information, isn't the one saying that she told me something but - - -

MR. RUBIN: Well, I think it could come from two sources: one, from the complainant in this case; that would be the - - - the person that's on the witness stand testifying to it. And then it could, but it didn't in this case, come from the friend, who also did indeed testify.

But I think Your Honor's question could be answered - - - can be gleaned from the record. When the District Attorney was - - - when the facts first came out, I told her what happened; I just didn't tell her that I didn't want it to happen. Then there was the objection in the colloquy that followed, and the District Attorney stated that I want - - - I was

abo - - - I expected her to answer my further questions that we had intercourse. And she said it immediately, upon the court's inquiry, and she said it several different times.

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She also did state, at that time, that it came up at the last minute because the friend, who also did testify, did not remember that in the - - - in the phone call. But it was corroborated by the phone records; the- - - the first phone call that was made when she got out of the subway - - - when the complainant got out of the subway was to her best friend.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counsel, is it prompt outcry or is it like a partial disclosure?

MR. RUBIN: Well, here it's - - - it's prompt outcry as to the statutory rape count. It's not prompt outcry as to the lack of consent count. And of course, he was only convicted of those counts that were associated with the prompt outcry. And of course, that was the first jury question: we want a read-back on what the complainant told her best friend in that phone call immediately when she got out of the subway.

JUDGE PIGOTT: Can you explain to me how it could be a prompt outcry in one case and not in

another?

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MR. RUBIN: I'm sorry, Your Honor?

JUDGE PIGOTT: You said it's prompt outcry when it comes to the statutory rape, but it's not prompt outcry when it came to the other charge.

MR. RUBIN: Well, what - - - what happened here was the complainant testified that she called her friend, she told her that - - - that something happened, and the court interpreted that as that they had intercourse, and the attorney said, by inference, she said they had intercourse. And the prosecutor said that she was about to bring that word into it. She did not say that it was done by force. So the lat - - - there was two different theories of prosecution here, both rape in the third degree and the associated sexual abuse counts and so on, but the prompt outcry was that yes, we had sex; I later told my brother-in-law everything later. And then she went to the District Attorney and made her further allegations about lack of consent.

So there were two different theories here of prosecution, and the expert, when she came on to testify, testified that it's common for people to tell a partial disclosure, because they don't want to say everything at the beginning - - -

JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Counsel, I'm trying to get back to the question I - - - $\!\!\!$

MR. RUBIN: Sorry.

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JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: - - - asked about when the prosecutor might have known that there was going to be any testimony regarding - - - if - - - if it is prompt outcry, anything like that. Because, as I understand it, one of your arguments is that the defense was totally surprised by this, obviously, and that - - - and by opening on this is not - - - you're not going to hear anything about a - - - essentially, a prompt outcry; you're going to hear that - - - that this victim tells someone months later, that that totally lost - - - by doing that, the defense counsel totally lost credibility with the jury and was - - you know, his whole strategy was thrown off. So I'm trying to pin down when do you think the prosecutor learned about this so that she could not have informed either the court or defense counsel about this?

MR. RUBIN: She had to learn about it well before opening statements, because the sequence of events was the court gave preliminary instructions, the prosecutor then immediately opened; there was no recess. Defense immediately opened; no recess. The

complaining witness got on the witness stand; no recess. When the issue came up, the prosecutor told the court I wanted to go - - - after the witness testified, I immediately called my girlfriend and told her what happened; I just didn't tell her that I didn't want it to happen, the prosecutor wanted to go further with that inquiry. And the prosecutor, in the record, and in the appendix, is - - -

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JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: So - - - so, if the prosecutor had been as surprised as defense counsel to hear this information, would that have changed anything for the defense?

MR. RUBIN: If - - - if the prosecutor was as surprised, then the prose - - - then the prosecutor certainly would have had no obligation to revisit the court's Spicola ruling before opening statements. But here, the prosecutor clearly knew that the complainant had told her friend about intercourse, because in the court's inquiry, she said - - - the prosecutor says it in about three different occasions within that long colloquy that happens on this issue, that she was trying to elicit that they had intercourse, she expected the witness to say that she had - - - that they had intercourse. It was that her friend did not recall the conversation.

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JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: So I'm trying to understand your argument. Is it that the prosecutor withheld the information or that it was a surprise to the defense, however it came out?

MR. RUBIN: Both. Both. In - - in other words, it was a total surprise to the defense because the Spicola ruling clear - - - the court, in its Spicola ruling, said specifically, the expert could testify as to both theories, the age theory - - - the court specifically said - - - in fact, the prosecutor said that - - - in talking about Spicola, talked about it as an age-based issue because, if you recall, in the defense lawyer's argument, he said, listen, it's not a forcible rape case, and that's where this comes in. The prosecutor countered no Spicola itself, and the other cases where this comes in is age-based. The court said, in its ruling, that it found no case where statutory rape - - - that the same rules don't apply to statutory rape as they would to forcible rape. So it was both theories that were at issue here. And that's why the - - - the defense lawyer opened as to both theories, saying, basically, you're not going to hear any - - anything about a prompt outcry in this case.

JUDGE STEIN: So would it have made - - -

1 MR. RUBIN: It was debunked immediately. 2 JUDGE STEIN: Would it have made any 3 difference at all if the defense counsel had learned 4 what was going to come out from the victim before he 5 opened - - - I mean, any time before he opened? MR. RUBIN: Certainly. The defense lawyer 6 7 wouldn't have opened on that subject. And he did so 8 at his peril, but he did so because he detrimentally 9 relied upon the prosecutor's proffer at the beginning 10 of the case that there would be no prompt outcry. 11 Clearly, the prosecutor knew that there was going to 12 be prompt outcry, but only as to intercourse, not as 13 to force. 14 JUDGE RIVERA: So the prosecutor didn't say 15 the same thing? 16 MR. RUBIN: I'm sorry, Your Honor? 17 JUDGE RIVERA: The prosecutor didn't also 18 open with the same statement? 19 MR. RUBIN: The prosecutor - - -20 JUDGE RIVERA: I mean, didn't they both say 21 the same thing? 22 MR. RUBIN: Well, I agree, Your Honor, they 23 - - - the prosecutor did open with respect to that, 2.4 but the prosecutor when - - - and - - - and 25 hindsight, of course, is twenty-twenty, but what the

1 prosecutor was later talking about clearly was the 2 force issue and was ignoring this - - -3 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Should have - - -4 what should have the judge done when this happened? 5 MR. RUBIN: Well, there were two remedies 6 at the time. One was striking the testimony and one was declaring a mistrial. And the reason why a 7 mistrial should have been declared at that point is 8 9 because the defense lawyer only opened on two - - -10 on two theories. One was witness credibility, as - -- and the prime example was the delayed outcry. And 11 12 the other was the fact that the probation officers 13 were in the location. 14 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counselor. 15 You'll have your rebuttal. 16 MR. RUBIN: Thank you, sir. 17 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Let's hear from your 18 adversary. 19 MS. APPELBAUM: May it please the court. 2.0 My name is Amy Appelbaum. 21 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counselor, what happened here? What did the - - - what did the 22 23 prosecution know, and what was it thinking when this 2.4 came out, since it had to have a pretty good idea of

what was going to be said? What was the - - - the

thought process for the prosecutor?

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MS. APPELBAUM: Your Honor, I - - - I don't know when the prosecutor learned that the complainant was - - - was going to say that she had had intercourse, but certainly she learned it before the - - -

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Right.

MS. APPELBAUM: - - - complainant said it.

And she should have let the defense and the court know about that, but she didn't. It seems that the prosecutor didn't really understand what a prompt outcry was and also perhaps didn't quite get the prior inconsistent statement concept either.

But nonetheless, the court didn't abuse its discretion in denying the request for a mistrial because it was the same witness, the - - - the victim, who - - - who made that statement that she had called her friend and told her what happened but not what really happened. That was - - - the victim was the one who testified to everything that happened here.

So certainly if the jury was going to believe her about her testimony about the crime, it really wouldn't matter that she also added, oh, and I called my friend and told - - - and told my friend

1 what happened for - - -2 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But what about your 3 adversary, that they're opening and saying, look, you're going to hear that the victim didn't say 4 5 anything for a lengthy period of time. What - - what's the effect on them and the theory that they're 6 7 trying to espouse to the - - - to the jury? 8 MS. APPELBAUM: Well, they - - - they both 9 did open on that. They both basically did say the 10 same thing - - -11 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: It seems so odd - - -12 MS. APPELBAUM: - - - on - - -13 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - that they're 14 both opening and then you get that testimony. 15 MS. APPELBAUM: I think that - - - again, I 16 think, Your Honor, that - - -17 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: You just don't think 18 it's relevant? 19 MS. APPELBAUM: - - - that goes to the 20 prosecutor's misunderstanding here of the - - - the 21 legal concepts. 22 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yeah, but what - - -23 but my point is, I guess - - - but I get you and I 2.4 hear you on that, that maybe that wasn't the perfect

way for the prosecutor to approach this, not exactly

understanding the theories. But I guess what I'm

trying to focus on, so what's the consequence on them

--- on -- on the defendant, and I recognize what

you're saying, that it really wouldn't have made a

difference. Would it have made a difference, though,

in their strategy as how they, you know, decided

they're going to try the case? Is that enough?

MS. APPELBAUM: I think ---

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CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Or is it totally - - when that situation comes up, is it really totally
a matter of discretion for the judge?

MS. APPELBAUM: It is a matter of discretion, and the judge properly exercised his discretion, for a few reasons, but it - - - the - - - the primary strategy of - - - of the defense was that - - - that the - - - the victim didn't tell anybody about what really happened for a long time. So the fact that she testified at trial that she told her friend that they had sex but didn't tell her what really - - -

JUDGE STEIN: But isn't it curious that -
- that ultimately he was convicted on the age-related

crimes, of which she testified she did tell her

friend, she did make a prompt outcry, but not on the

- - on the forcible issues? Doesn't that back up -

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| 2 | MS. APPELBAUM: Your Honor, the |
| 3 | JUDGE STEIN: the the defense |
| 4 | argument? |
| 5 | MS. APPELBAUM: We could look at that two |
| 6 | ways. First, again, even though that is the on |
| 7 | those were the only counts they convicted him of, |
| 8 | again, it was still just the victim testifying to |
| 9 | that, so it seems like it wouldn't add any additional |
| 10 | weight to her testimony about the crime. For |
| 11 | example, Your Honor |
| 12 | JUDGE STEIN: But they didn't believe her |
| 13 | on everything, obviously, or they would have |
| 14 | convicted him of all of the charges. |
| 15 | MS. APPELBAUM: Well, Your Honor, I I |
| 16 | can't really speculate about the jury's rationale |
| 17 | here for why they chose the statutory counts in that |
| 18 | |
| 19 | JUDGE FAHEY: Was there ever a charge |
| 20 | did any did anyone either did anybody |
| 21 | request a prompt outcry charge at all? |
| 22 | MS. APPELBAUM: Um |
| 23 | JUDGE FAHEY: Because a charge is normally |
| 24 | given when you when you talk about the |

credibility of the witnesses and - - - and there's a

1 prompt outcry charge in the CJI. Did anyone request 2 I didn't think they did. 3 MS. APPELBAUM: I don't know, but I - - - I 4 don't recall that. I- - I'm not sure, Your Honor. 5 Your Honor, I just - - - just to go back to 6 your point for a moment. Let's say the witness had 7 said not only I called my friend and told her what 8 happened, but I called my sister, my brother, my 9 teacher, would that - - - would her saying that have 10 made her overall testimony any more credibil - - -11 any more credible? I think it wouldn't. And also, 12 in this case, the defense counsel was actually able 13 to use her testimony about calling her friend to his 14 advantage, to an extent, because he was able to - - -15 to impeach her by saying - - -16 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Did you say that a 17 victim telling a number of people that something 18 terrible happened to her would be irrelevant? 19 MS. APPELBAUM: Well, those people didn't 20 testify. Here the friend didn't testify to confirm 21 that. So again, all we have is her - - - her word 22 that the event ha - - -23 JUDGE RIVERA: Oh, but the friend testified 2.4 that there was a call, and you've got the phone

That makes her look more credible than if

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records.

1 you didn't have that. 2 MS. APPELBAUM: Well, her friend - - - her 3 friend testified that - - - that they had had - - yes, her friend did testify about the- - -4 5 JUDGE RIVERA: And his - - -MS. APPELBAUM: - - - series of phone calls 6 7 JUDGE RIVERA: - - - his whole defense is 8 9 you believe me, not her; she's not telling the truth. 10 And it's not just my word against hers; it's that she 11 didn't tell anybody and it's also that other people 12 showed up to this apartment and were there at the 13 time that she claims she's being raped. 14 MS. APPELBAUM: Well, Your Honor, I could -15 - - I could address that point, the point concerning 16 the probation officers. There actually was - - -17 there - - - there was no evidence presented, through the probation records or otherwise, that the officers 18 19 actually entered the apartment. And there was no 20 testimony that the victim and the defendant were at 21 each other's sides the entire time that she was in 22 the apartment. 23 JUDGE RIVERA: Well, I understand your 2.4 argument that it might not be very persuasive, it

might be weak, but the - - - the point of the defense

| 1 | is she's not credible, it's not believable. And |
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| 2 | certainly if if she says I did call someone, |
| 3 | and then you've got an expert that says, yes, |
| 4 | someone in this kind of situation might actually say |
| 5 | only partially what happened, initially. Why doesn't |
| 6 | that undermine the defense? And shouldn't he have |
| 7 | known that in advance? |
| 8 | MS. APPELBAUM: Your Honor, I I do |
| 9 | understand what you're saying now. The the |
| 10 | part I I hadn't really thought about that |
| 11 | that just the fact that a phone call was made |
| 12 | could have could have helped the prosecution, |
| 13 | but again, that would that would be a a |
| 14 | very minimal amount of help, because we don't know - |
| 15 | |
| 16 | JUDGE RIVERA: That may be all it takes |
| 17 | with this kind of a case. |
| 18 | MS. APPELBAUM: Well well, Your Honor |
| 19 | |
| 20 | JUDGE RIVERA: It's not one the prosecution |
| 21 | has shied away from, that's for sure. |
| 22 | MS. APPELBAUM: Excuse me? |
| 23 | JUDGE RIVERA: You didn't shy away from it; |
| 24 | the prosecution didn't shy away from the using |
| 25 | the evidence. |

| 1 | MS. APPELBAUM: That's |
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| 2 | JUDGE RIVERA: There were more questions |
| 3 | asked of the complainant. You've got the phone |
| 4 | records. You've got the friend saying, well, I don't |
| 5 | remember, but she did call me. |
| 6 | MS. APPELBAUM: That's that's true, |
| 7 | Your Honor, but I but again, without the friend |
| 8 | actually corroborating what the victim said, it |
| 9 | really was would have been of minimal value to |
| 10 | the prosecution and |
| 11 | CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But wouldn't |
| 12 | shouldn't the judge have seriously considered a |
| 13 | mistrial at that point? |
| 14 | MS. APPELBAUM: At the point of the friend |
| 15 | testifying? |
| 16 | CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: At the point of this |
| 17 | coming out. |
| 18 | MS. APPELBAUM: Oh, at well, Your |
| 19 | Honor, the judge the judge explained on the |
| 20 | record, basically, what I've been saying here, that - |
| 21 | that it that the the ultimate |
| 22 | question was for the jury to decide the |
| 23 | CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So your basic |
| 24 | MS. APPELBAUM: witness' credibility. |
| 25 | CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Your basic argument |

1 is the judge was weighing it, it's discretionary, and 2 felt it was of limited harm. 3 MS. APPELBAUM: But I think the judge - - -4 to the extent that the judge might take into account 5 the prosecutor - - - he didn't talk about this, but 6 to the extent that he might be thinking of or taking 7 into account whether the - - - whether this was done 8 on purpose, I think it's evident from the record that 9 although the prosecutor - - - this really shouldn't -10 11 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But the motive - - -12 MS. APPELBAUM: - - - have happened - - -13 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But I agree with you 14 that - - - that maybe it just reflected a lack of 15 knowledge about the law. But regardless of the 16 motive, I guess what the judge has to consider is, so 17 what's the consequence of - - -18 MS. APPELBAUM: But - - - but - - -19 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - this happening, 20 and your - - - your basic view - - - and I'm not 21 saying this in a negative sense; I'm just trying to -22 - - your basic view is that's a discretionary 23 decision by the judge at- - at that point in time? 2.4 MS. APPELBAUM: Yes, it - - - it is

discretionary. And again, here the defense counsel

1 was able to use - - - use that to his advantage to 2 try to further impeach the witness, because he did 3 bring out her grand jury testimony where she said she had told no one for many months. So that also worked 4 5 in his favor. And - - -6 JUDGE RIVERA: I'm sorry. Wasn't there 7 expert testimony that - - - that - - - again that - -8 9 MS. APPELBAUM: Well - - -10 JUDGE RIVERA: - - - giving only partial 11 information soon afterwards is not uncommon? So isn't it a little bit of a difficult position for the 12 13 defendant to really try and use that information to 14 impeach? 15 MS. APPELBAUM: Well, Your Honor, he did -16 - - he did bring out - - - the - - - it's two 17 different issues. The fact that the - - - that there 18 was expert testimony on the issue doesn't - - -19 doesn't undercut the fact that the witness said one 20 thing to the grand jury and said another thing at 21 trial. 22 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counselor. 23 MS. APPELBAUM: Thank you. 2.4 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Thanks, counsel. 25 Let's have the rebuttal.

| 1 | MR. RUBIN: Just briefly. I think this |
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| 2 | issue of the prosecutor not understanding what prompt |
| 3 | outcry is |
| 4 | CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Well, does it matter? |
| 5 | MR. RUBIN: Well, as a |
| 6 | CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Does it matter the - |
| 7 | |
| 8 | MR. RUBIN: practical consequence, it |
| 9 | doesn't. |
| 10 | CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Does it matter the |
| 11 | motive? I mean, what's the difference |
| 12 | MR. RUBIN: Well, the prac as a |
| 13 | practical matter, it doesn't. But there's plenty in |
| 14 | this record to suggest that the prosecutor knew what |
| 15 | was going on. |
| 16 | CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: That they did it |
| 17 | intentionally? |
| 18 | MR. RUBIN: Yes. And that's simply because |
| 19 | of the |
| 20 | CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But why in |
| 21 | answer to her basic argument, which is, it's up to |
| 22 | the judge; it's a matter of discretion at that point. |
| 23 | Is is that why is that not the case? |
| 24 | MR. RUBIN: Opening statements are not |
| 25 | evidence, but they are very important when a defense |

| 1 | lawyer takes on a factual issue |
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| 2 | CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Your view is |
| 3 | MR. RUBIN: and it's debunked in the |
| 4 | first minute. |
| 5 | CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: you got started |
| 6 | with a tremendous disadvantage, given |
| 7 | MR. RUBIN: A tremendous disadvantage. If |
| 8 | if there's a touchdown on the opening kickoff, |
| 9 | it's a disadvantage. If there's a penalty, it's |
| 10 | called back. This should have been called back |
| 11 | JUDGE RIVERA: Can I go back and clarify - |
| 12 | |
| 13 | MR. RUBIN: to use a football |
| 14 | analogy; I apologize. |
| 15 | JUDGE RIVERA: what you said were the |
| 16 | two defense theories of the case? |
| 17 | MR. RUBIN: I'm sorry, Your Honor? |
| 18 | JUDGE RIVERA: Can you go back and just |
| 19 | clarify what you say were the two defense theories of |
| 20 | the case, because I thought that |
| 21 | MR. RUBIN: Thank you've |
| 22 | JUDGE RIVERA: the theory was she's |
| 23 | just not credible; you believe my story or hers. |
| 24 | MR. RUBIN: Yes, but the other the |
| 25 | other issue, and it's very important, was what |

both parties are in agreement now, and not so at trial, so hindsight's twenty-twenty, but at trial, Exhibit C, we both agree now, is conclusive proof that the probation officers were there in the evening. At trial, they contested it, and the attorney utterly failed to prove that fact. He didn't publish Exhibit C, he didn't put it on a board and argue it to a jury, he didn't have Probation Officer Usamah testify to it. It was completely lost on the jury, and I don't think that - - -JUDGE RIVERA: That's going to what theory? 12 MR. RUBIN: That was going to the theory 13 that - - - that the incident didn't happen; they

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weren't together that - - - that they were not together that night, they weren't in that apartment together, because the probation officers who come in, look around, verify that somebody lives where they say they're living. So both issues were - - counsel's fault and then the prosecutor's fault; both issues were debunked. And that resulted in not a fair trial - - -

> CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counselor. MR. RUBIN: - - - for this defendant. CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Thank you both.

MR. RUBIN: Thank you very much. Thank you.

| 1 | CHIEF 3 | TUDGE | LIPPMAN | I: Aj | pprecia | te i | Lt. |
|----|---------|-------|----------|-------|---------|------|-----|
| 2 | (Court | is a | djourned | l) | | | |
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CERTIFICATION

I, Sharona Shapiro, certify that the

foregoing transcript of proceedings in the court of

Appeals of Matter of People v. Boris Shaulov, No. 43,

was prepared using the required transcription

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Shanna Shaphe

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