1	COURT OF APPEALS
2	STATE OF NEW YORK
3	
4	PEOPLE,
5	Appellant,
6	-against-
7	No. 50 REBECCA GUTHRIE,
8	Respondent.
9	
10	20 Eagle Street Albany, New York 12207
11	February 19, 2015
12	Before:
13	CHIEF JUDGE JONATHAN LIPPMAN ASSOCIATE JUDGE SUSAN PHILLIPS READ
14	ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE F. PIGOTT, JR. ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA
15	ASSOCIATE JUDGE SHEILA ABDUS-SALAAM ASSOCIATE JUDGE LESLIE E. STEIN
16	ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE M. FAHEY
17	Appearances:
18	BRUCE A. ROSENKRANS, ADA WAYNE COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
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20	Suite 202 Lyons, NY 14489
21	ANDREW D. CORREIA, ESQ.
22	WAYNE COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER Attorneys for Respondent
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24	
25	Penina Wolicki Official Court Transcriber

1	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Good afternoon.
2	Great to see all of you. We're going to start with
3	number 50, People v. Guthrie.
4	Counselor, would you like any rebuttal
5	time?
6	MR. ROSENKRANS: One minute, please, Your
7	Honor.
8	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: One minute. Go
9	ahead. You're you're on.
10	MR. ROSENKRANS: September 2009, a police
11	officer observes a vehicle run a stop sign
12	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Let's let's
13	cut to the chase, counselor. What's the what's
14	the stop sign all about? Is it a real stop sign? Is
15	it a version of a stop sign? Does it look like a
16	stop sign? Is it authorized under the local law?
17	MR. ROSENKRANS: It was not authorized
18	under the local law. The record that we are stuck
19	with makes no mention as to the size, dimension, or
20	even location.
21	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What's the
22	consequence of the first point, that it's not
23	recognized under local law?
24	MR. ROSENKRANS: I think you have to take

into consideration the presumption that the same

statute gives, 1100(d), that it gives - - - absent other legal competent evidence, there is a presumption, although it's rebuttable, that the sign is enforceable. And the officer made a stop based upon seeing this vehicle pass - - run through the stop sign at fifteen miles an hour.

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CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: And was the - - - in this particular case, why - - - what do you think was the motivation of the officer? Was it a - - - did he think under the law it was a sign - - - it was a real stop - - - did he make a mistake of fact or a mistake of law? And what's the consequence of all of that?

MR. ROSENKRANS: I believe he felt it was a -- - I can't say what was in his mind. We're stuck with the record that we've got. But I think -- -

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Does it matter whether it was a mistake of law or a mistake of fact, why he stopped him?

MR. ROSENKRANS: That all depends if this court adopts the rule - - - recent Supreme Court ruling in the Heien case where the Supreme Court held that a mistake of law, under certain circumstances, does not invalidate reasonable cause or reasonable suspicion for a stop. That you have to take - - -

JUDGE STEIN: Do we know how many stop

1 signs there are in - - - in this particular 2 municipality? 3 MR. ROSENKRANS: In the munici - - - total municipality, or at this intersection? 4 5 JUDGE STEIN: No, in the municipality. 6 Because if we're going to talk about whether it's reasonable or unreasonable, don't we need to know, 7 8 you know, if there's three stop signs in the 9 municipality, well, then obviously the officer should 10 know. But if there are 3,000, you know, maybe it's 11 not reasonable. 12 And - - - and is that - - - is that a line 13 we want to try to draw? MR. ROSENKRANS: This - - - well - - -14 15 that's not a line - - - that shouldn't be a line 16 based - - - because it would put an undue restraint 17 on the police officer. All the cases - - -18 JUDGE PIGOTT: What's your best case? What 19 - - - what case do you think supports your position 20 the best? 21 MR. ROSENKRANS: The Estrella case for 22 state - - - on the state case where there was a 23 tinted window on a Georgia vehicle, and Georgia had 2.4 held that that law was unconstitutional. But the

officers at the time, making the stop, it was less

1	than what was permitted under the there
2	was more tint on it than what was permitted under New
3	York law. They had reasonable belief
4	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: And what kind of
5	mistake did we find that to be?
6	MR. ROSENKRANS: That was a mistake of law,
7	because in the meantime the Georgia had
8	Supreme Court had declared the their statute
9	unconstitutional.
10	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Didn't we determine
11	that the officer had made a mistake of fact about
12	that as opposed to a mistake of law? About whether
13	the the windows
14	MR. ROSENKRANS: Well, that's the problem
15	with a mistake of law and mistake of fact argument.
16	How is the local officer to know?
17	JUDGE FAHEY: Well, the standard's
18	reasonable belief, right?
19	MR. ROSENKRANS: That's correct.
20	JUDGE FAHEY: Is isn't that the
21	standard that you want us to adopt and because
22	in fact, this was an invalid stop sign. So if
23	if we don't adopt your reasonable belief standard,
24	then it was an illegal stop, correct?
25	MR. ROSENKRANS: Correct.

JUDGE FAHEY: And the Fourth - - - those are Fourth Department cases. So as a recent transplant from the Fourth Department, there's some contradiction in the case law that you have Byers which says one thing, and it seems to imply something - - - and Estrella says something else. So there's some ambiguity there.

But then you have the recent U.S. Supreme Court case of Whren. And I think there's a Second Circuit case, Spencer, that seems to argue in favor of your point.

But you know, there's subtle distinctions, and you may want to comment on it. Be some - - - because some cases, for instance, somebody doesn't turn on their left turn signal, and that stop was held - - and they weren't required to make a left turn signal pulling out of a driveway. And since that was - - that was held not to be a violation of the law, because it wasn't breaking of the law, but you could argue that the officer had a reasonable belief to make that stop.

Here we have the very same thing. Somebody sees a stop sign, it's pretty reasonable to think that a police officer sees he could blow the stop sign, you've broken the law, except in point of fact,

1 you hadn't, because the stop sign was not a valid stop line (sic) under the village ordinance. 2 3 So distinguishing those cases in terms of 4 reasonability seems to be the tough part of your goal 5 here today. The - - - in any 6 MR. ROSENKRANS: Yes. 7 case where the argument is between what the - - -8 because - - - but you have to look at the 9 circumstances that the officer had. 10 We're talking shortly after midnight. 11 We're talking an intersection where the three others 12 - - - it was a controlled intersection. There were 13 three other stop signs. So I know there were at 14 least three stop signs in the Village of Newark. 15 that intersection, there were three stop signs on the 16 dedicated highway, which I think was Fitch Street and 17 Miller Street, if I remember correctly. 18 JUDGE READ: And they were all registered? 19 MR. ROSENKRANS: They were on a dedicated 20 street, so the registration wasn't required. 21 JUDGE READ: Okay. 22 MR. ROSENKRANS: It was just that the 23 registration had to be - - - because the one stop 2.4 sign was in the par - - - was - - -

JUDGE READ: At the exit of the parking

lot?

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MR. ROSENKRANS: - - - at the egress out of the parking lot for Wegmans.

I think it's - - - the officer can also take into consideration that based upon the time, that this was not an emergent - - - someone making an emergency run for diapers or milk, a late night run, is not going to run that stop sign. He could reasonably have believed that the driver was intoxicated, which would change this to - - - elevate this to the second level of DeBour, reasonable sus - - - I'm sorry - - - reasonable - - - probable cause that a traffic infraction has been committed or reasonable cause - - - reasonable suspicion that a crime was in fact in the process of being committed.

JUDGE RIVERA: So where do you draw the line on the - - - the many reasonable hypotheticals you've come up with why someone might act in a particular way that a police officer might imagine, in the moment? It sounds like a lot of speculation. It can't be this; oh, I bet it's not for diapers; I bet it's not for that. Where - - - where do you draw the line? Or where would you like us to draw the line? Let me put it that way?

MR. ROSENKRANS: This one - - - I think

1	this case drew the case for itself. I think it was
2	common sense for the officer to believe that that
3	stop sign that she had committed the violation of
4	Section 1172 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law.
5	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Counsel, do we
6	JUDGE READ: But we'd have to follow
7	we'd have to follow we'd have to adopt Heien
8	right, in order to find in your favor?
9	MR. ROSENKRANS: Our briefs were submitted
10	prior to the Heien decision coming out.
11	JUDGE READ: But now you have that. I'm
12	assuming
13	MR. ROSENKRANS: Yeah, I have that.
14	JUDGE READ: And I'm assuming
15	MR. ROSENKRANS: And I also have I -
16	
17	JUDGE READ: we you think even
18	if we didn't even if that were not the case,
19	even if the Supreme Court had not decided what it
20	did, that we could still rule in your favor?
21	MR. ROSENKRANS: Prior to that, I relied on
22	the presumption provided by 1180(d), which I don't
23	think they ta the court took into
24	consideration. And there's several cases here
25	in fact the standard is that you don't have to have

1 "beyond reasonable doubt" to survive a stop issue. 2 The question is what - - - was there reasonable 3 cause, not beyond a reasonable doubt. 4 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Is there another 5 section of the VTL that might assist you in this argument, counsel? You mentioned 11 - - - I think 6 7 you said 1180(d) and you might have mentioned 1100(b). But what about 1110(c) which authorizes an 8 9 officer to presume that a traffic sign which looks 10 like an official traffic sign - - - we don't have it 11 in the record whether it was or it wasn't or what it 12 looked like - - - is an official traffic sign, that 13 it's proximately placed, does that help your cause at all? 14 15 MR. ROSENKRANS: I think I misspoke. 16 think that is the presumption that - - - the statute 17 that creates the presumption, is 1110(c). And I 18 apologize for that. 19 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counsel. Let's 20 hear from your adversary, and then you'll - - -21 you'll have your rebuttal. 22 MR. CORREIA: Thank you. May it please the 23 court, Andrew Correia for Ms. Guthrie, from the Wayne 2.4 County Public Defender's Office.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counsel, is there a

1	bright-line rule here in these kind of situations?
2	MR. CORREIA: I
3	THE COURT: Should it always be, if it's
4	not not recognized by the locality, should it
5	always be no good?
6	MR. CORREIA: I I think there is a
7	bright-line rule here. And I think you can base it
8	on cases that
9	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Is that the bright-
10	line rule?
11	MR. CORREIA: The bright-line rule would
12	be, this is a mistake of law. And if this is a
13	mistake of law, your cases already support the
14	determination that the law enforcement should not
15	benefit from making a mistake of law.
16	JUDGE READ: You're relying on Gonzalez?
17	MR. CORREIA: In part, yes. And also, we -
18	I've already talked about Byer v. Washington
19	(sic) from the Fourth Department, which is I'm
20	sure I know you are familiar with the facts
21	- a turn signal out of a parking lot.
22	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: What about Estrella?
23	MR. CORREIA: Estrella, I think, can easily
24	be distinguished from this circumstance, because
25	Estrella dealt with an out-of-state law. And I'm not

sure, under any circumstances, it would be reasonable 1 to expect that local law enforcement would have 2 3 knowledge of out-of-state laws, never mind con - - the Constitutional status of those out-of-state laws. 4 5 JUDGE STEIN: But you do think that it's reasonable to expect a local law enforcement officer, 6 7 no matter what the size of the municipality is, to know which stop signs are registered? 8 9 MR. CORREIA: Fantastic question. 10 exactly why you shouldn't go down the road of 11 reasonability in this situation. JUDGE STEIN: But if we do? 12 13 MR. CORREIA: Right. But if you do, you 14 will have a challenge, and you'll have a challenge in 15 every case that comes in front of you on this, because you'll have to determine, not just 16 17 reasonability of how many stop signs are there in Newark, which I do not know. However, there is a 18 19 list, and it's referred to in the local court's 2.0 original order - - -21 JUDGE STEIN: Well, we know how many registered stop signs there are, because the list - -22 - I think it's about 130. But - - -23 2.4 MR. CORREIA: Okay.

JUDGE STEIN: - - - but I have no idea how

1	many unregistered.							
2	MR. CORREIA: You have more information							
3	than I have. And certainly more than was in the							
4	record.							
5	JUDGE READ: Well, it's in the Code. It's							
6	in the Code. It says							
7	MR. CORREIA: Right. But I'm looking at							
8	the judge's order.							
9	JUDGE RIVERA: But it's not every							
10	let's just clarify.							
11	MR. CORREIA: Sure.							
12	JUDGE RIVERA: The Code here isn't talking							
13	about every traffic sign, it's talking about parking							
14	lots.							
15	MR. CORREIA: We're right; right.							
16	JUDGE RIVERA: So we're we are							
17	talking about a finite number of areas that you're							
18	dealing with, which may not be unreasonable for the							
19	local constable to be familiar with?							
20	MR. CORREIA: I agree. And especially if -							
21								
22	JUDGE PIGOTT: Let me let me follow							
23	you up follow up on that. So if if your							
24	client was arrested by a state trooper, this would be							
25	okay?							

1	MR. CORREIA: No, no. Absolutely not.
2	JUDGE PIGOTT: So you don't mean
3	MR. CORREIA: No.
4	JUDGE PIGOTT: you don't mean a local
5	constable
6	MR. CORREIA: I don't mean to go down that
7	road that varies by law enforcement agency.
8	JUDGE PIGOTT: I'm not trying to go down a
9	road. I'm just I thought, you know, the
10	question was, you got a local constable who ought to
11	know where the stop signs are. And you said
12	absolutely right.
13	MR. CORREIA: Yes, sir.
14	JUDGE PIGOTT: If a state trooper makes the
15	same arrest, you're saying that's okay, because he's
16	not a local?
17	MR. CORREIA: Well
18	JUDGE PIGOTT: In fact, you're saying the
19	opposite. You're saying no
20	MR. CORREIA: Right.
21	JUDGE PIGOTT: all all New York
22	State police officers have to know whether or not a
23	stop sign is is right or wrong?
24	MR. CORREIA: I'm going to say yes to that,
25	because if I don't say yes to that, it's not a

1 mistake of law. We're talking about a mistake of law 2 here. 3 Now, the real problem - - -4 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Well, what about the -5 - - counsel, what about the presumption under the VTL 6 7 MR. CORREIA: Right. JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: - - - the officer is 8 9 presumed to be able to say this is an official sign? 10 MR. CORREIA: Sure. Let me get back to 11 you, Judge Pigott. 1110(d), I believe the language is: 12 13 "Placed in a position approximately conforming to the 14 requirements of this chapter, it shall be presumed to 15 have been placed by official act or direction of 16 lawful authority unless the contrary shall be 17 established by competent evidence." I think the stipulation made in the local 18 19 court prior to the hearing, the basis of - - -20 basically the factual basis for the finding, was that 21 it is not a registered stop sign. 22 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: That's after-the-fact, 23 though? 2.4 MR. CORREIA: Sure. And I'm not sure the

statute's clear about how does an officer acquire

information that would establish it contrary to 1 2 competent evidence, unless we would expect that they 3 would have some familiarity with the unregistered 4 stop signs in their jurisdiction. I mean - - -5 JUDGE READ: Why is - - - why isn't - - -MR. CORREIA: - - - and I have a collateral 6 7 point to that that I'd like to - - -JUDGE READ: - - - it enough that - - - why 8 9 isn't it enough for it to just look like a stop sign 10 - - - like every other stop sign? 11 MR. CORREIA: Sure. Because then I think 12 you open the door to private businesses, private 13 citizens, putting their own signs up - - - their own signage. And let me be clear - - -14 15 JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, I don't think that's the - - - the social contract that we're worried 16 17 about violating, that people are going to start 18 putting up their own. 19 MR. CORREIA: Well - - -20 JUDGE PIGOTT: Here's a situation - - - let 21 me - - - let me change this hypothetical or this 22 reality that we've got now. Instead of - - - instead 23 of a DWI, that this lady was charged with, let's 2.4 assume she had two children in - - - in her car that

were not properly belted or in - - - or in seats.

1	MR. CORREIA: Okay.
2	JUDGE PIGOTT: She walks? The officer
3	stops her. And and because she ran the
4	stop sign, and she's charged with endangering the
5	welfare of a child, because she doesn't properly fix
6	them in the car. She walks on that?
7	MR. CORREIA: Yes. She should. If the
8	initial intrusion was in violation of the Fourth
9	Amendment, if the stop of the motor vehicle
10	JUDGE PIGOTT: If there was a robbery
11	there's there's nothing there's no crime,
12	there's no violation of any type that can be
13	sustained if the initial stop was because an officer
14	assumed that a stop sign that was there was run, but
15	it's not registered.
16	MR. CORREIA: That is correct. And I say
17	that knowing that there are some severe consequences
18	to that.
19	However, if the only violation, as in this
20	case, the facts are very narrow. There is no other
21	violation
22	JUDGE PIGOTT: Let me turn it around there.
23	JUDGE RIVERA: Well, you're only talking
24	about a stop sign in a parking lot.

MR. CORREIA: Right.

1 JUDGE RIVERA: It's not every stop sign. 2 MR. CORREIA: Right. 3 JUDGE PIGOTT: Let me - - - let me turn it around. Let's assume for a minute that you - - -4 5 you've got a - - - a college sticker on your back window, which is a violation of the Vehicle and 6 7 Traffic Law, can that be used to stop somebody and charge them with a vio - - - with a DWI? 8 9 MR. CORREIA: This hypothetical sounds 10 familiar to me. 11 JUDGE PIGOTT: I bet it does. 12 JUDGE RIVERA: I bet it does. 13 JUDGE PIGOTT: Burned in my brain. 14 MR. CORREIA: I'm going to say no. I'm not 15 in favor of that. 16 So I guess I did want to touch - - -17 because you were concerned about law enforcement 18 agencies and whether it applies to all law 19 enforcement agencies. I think it has to, if it's a 20 mistake of law, because a stop sign standing in a 21 location in a parking lot is the culmination of an 22 entire legal process that starts with the V and T 23 Law, 1172, that incorporates 1100. The municipality 2.4 has to take action. And I don't want - - -

JUDGE PIGOTT: But in - - - in - - -

1	MR. CORREIA: them to be let off the
2	hook.
3	JUDGE PIGOTT: don't we look at the -
4	you know, whether or not there's reasonable cause
5	to believe something was done?
6	MR. CORREIA: Only if you adopt Heien. I
7	believe Judge Read might have posed that.
8	JUDGE READ: And by the way, do you think
9	Gonzalez is still good law after Heien?
10	MR. CORREIA: I think that we're fjording
11	that issue that right now. I mean, if the
12	court decides to adopt Heien, then I think clearly
13	Gonzalez, I think, doesn't survive
14	JUDGE READ: Well, I guess
15	JUDGE RIVERA: It might raise a state
16	constitutional issues. Did you did you raise
17	your claim under the state constitution?
18	MR. CORREIA: Yes. Yes, I we did.
19	JUDGE RIVERA: Okay, so this is just a
20	question of whether or not we think our state
21	constitution should follow the Supreme Court's recent
22	wisdom on
23	MR. CORREIA: Right. And I would suggest
24	that you do not need to
25	JUDGE RIVERA: on the federal

1	Constitution.
2	MR. CORREIA: I would thank
3	you.
4	JUDGE READ: Where, by the way, did you
5	raise the state constitutional question?
6	MR. CORREIA: I believe that it was cited
7	in our briefs, not only the U.S. Constitution, but
8	New York's
9	JUDGE READ: What about below, though? I
10	don't I don't mean in I don't mean in the
11	Court of Appeals. Where did you raise it at the
12	below-us level court?
13	MR. CORREIA: You know, off the top of my
14	head, I'm not sure if it was raised in the local
15	court. I believe it was cited in the our
16	our brief in response to the appeal in county court.
17	I'm certain that we cited the New York State
18	constitutional statute of
19	JUDGE RIVERA: I believe Judge Nesbitt did
20	refer to it
21	MR. CORREIA: And I think he
22	JUDGE RIVERA: in the decision.
23	MR. CORREIA: It didn't seem to me that he
24	clearly based the decision on that issue
25	JUDGE RIVERA: I understand. But he raised

1	it with
2	MR. CORREIA: But he did raise it. He did
3	raise it.
4	JUDGE PIGOTT: And what issue is that? I'm
5	sorry.
6	MR. CORREIA: I'm sorry?
7	JUDGE PIGOTT: What issue, the state
8	constitution?
9	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yeah.
10	MR. CORREIA: Right. The right, the
11	state constitutional issue. And I'm suggesting that
12	the court doesn't need to adopt Heien on these facts
13	and that you have the current case law in front of
14	you to make a finding of a mistake of law.
15	And I would be concerned about how many
16	cases would come in front of you, where you would
17	have to determine the range of reasonability that
18	would be very difficult to
19	JUDGE RIVERA: So they'll end up time
20	as a pragmatic matter? Is that what you're
21	suggesting, or is there a
22	MR. CORREIA: Well, that's part of it.
23	JUDGE RIVERA: legal argument?
24	MR. CORREIA: It's it's
25	JUDGE RIVERA: As to our state

constitution?

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MR. CORREIA: Right. I believe that you should continue the trend in certain cases that the New York State constitution is more protective than the federal Constitution, specifically on these facts. I think it opens a - - an unnecessary can of worms to probe the reasonability of these kinds of stops that are in front of you.

And it's - - - it's unnecessary on these narrow facts that you have before you.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, thanks, counsel.

MR. CORREIA: Thank you.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counselor, rebuttal?

MR. ROSENKRANS: Thank you.

JUDGE PIGOTT: Your opponent is drawing a very sharp line. And Judge Nesbitt did too. He said there's no question the police officer was acting in good faith. No one suggests the police officer needed to independently verify the legality of the traffic sign. He's just saying, bad sign, bad stop.

MR. ROSENKRANS: I would agree - - - okay.

In Robinson, it stated that our constitution is - - our Section 12 is very similar to the federal

Constitution. Robinson also said, "Rather than

restrain the police in these instances, the police should be permitted to do what they are sworn to do, uphold the law."

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They need - - - these cases are decided on a factual basis, quite frequently. They don't usually get to this level, because this is not a fact-based court. But the Appellate Divisions and the local courts have to deal with this, and the officer on the street has to deal with it - - - with this decision every single day.

It's what is a reasonable person standard, was the officer - - - did the officer reasonably believe that Ms. Guthrie ran that stop sign?

minute. Mr. Correia is - - - wants to be narrow.

But if this - - if there had been an automobile accident, in other words, if she'd run the stop sign and hit someone or another vehicle, I would think whoever put that sign up might be in trouble one way or the other, because - - I mean, it's not a legitimate sign. I assume - - maybe the supermarket put it up.

But somebody put a sign up there that should not have been there. Isn't that a fair statement?

MR. ROSENKRANS: I don't know. It may have 1 2 been required as part of the zoning when the plaza 3 went up. They may have required that it be done, and it was an oversight that it wasn't registered. 4 5 JUDGE PIGOTT: Just - - - okay. JUDGE RIVERA: So it may have been lawful 6 7 at one point? 8 MR. ROSENKRANS: It may have been lawful at 9 one point. 10 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yeah, but - - -11 MR. ROSENKRANS: It may have been required 12 when the plaza was built. 13 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But aren't we really opening up - - - I think in your adversary's words -14 15 - - just a can of worms that go on and on and on, as 16 to what's reasonable in every conceivable situation? 17 Wouldn't it be better to just say, you know, if it's - - - if it's not a real sign, it's not a real sign? 18 19 Why isn't that just an easier way - - - a more 20 appropriate way to deal with it? 21 MR. ROSENKRANS: Even so, that should not 22 take away from - - - just because you can't convict 23 on the stop sign, it should not take away from what 2.4 was discovered as a basis of the stop. With the - -

- upon what the officer reasonably believed at the

1 time. 2 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So you're getting 3 back to - - - I think Judge Pigott had raised it 4 earlier. It's that people shouldn't be allowed to -5 - - if they violate the law, even though you're 6 starting with a sign that's problematic, you don't 7 want the consequence of saying in all circumstances 8 if it's not a sign, it's not a sign. 9 MR. ROSENKRANS: Correct, it's - - -CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay. 10 11 MR. ROSENKRANS: - - - it's too extreme and too binding on the - - -12 13 JUDGE RIVERA: Do we - - - do we have 14 existing law - - - let's say we disagreed with you on 15 the stop, which I think what is really what you're 16 trying to deal with now - - - disagreeing with you on 17 the stop. Is there exist - - - existing law you can 18 point to that says nevertheless, you shouldn't 19 exclude, you shouldn't suppress the evidence? 20 MR. ROSENKRANS: I can't think of any right 21 now - - -22 JUDGE RIVERA: Okay. 23 MR. ROSENKRANS: - - - Your Honor, thank 2.4 you.

JUDGE RIVERA: Fair enough.

1		CHIEF	JUDGE	LIPPMA	N:	Okay,	thank	you	both.
2	Appreciate	it.							
3		(Court	is ad	ljourne	ed)				
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CERTIFICATION

I, Penina Wolicki, certify that the foregoing transcript of proceedings in the Court of Appeals of People v. Rebecca Guthrie, No. 50 was prepared using the required transcription equipment and is a true and accurate record of the proceedings.

Penina waish.

Signature:

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