1	COURT OF APPEALS	
2	STATE OF NEW YORK	
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4	CUSIMANO, ET AL.,	
5	Respondent,	
6	-against-	No. 200
7	SCHNURR, ET AL.,	NO. 200
8	Appellant.	
9		20 Eagle Street
10		20 Eagle Street Albany, New York 12207 November 18, 2015
11		November 10, 2015
12	Before: CHIEF JUDGE JONATHAN	I TDDMAN
13	ASSOCIATE JUDGE SUSAN PH ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE F.	ILLIPS READ
14	ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY ASSOCIATE JUDGE SHEILA ABDUS-S	Y RIVERA
15	ASSOCIATE JUDGE LESLIE ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE	E. STEIN
16	ADDOCIATE OUDGE EUGENE	r. raibi
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2	Appearances:
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24	Sara Winkeliob
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1 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: We'll go now to 200, Cusimano v. Schnurr. 2 3 Counsel, would you like any rebuttal time? MR. HELLER: Yes, Your Honor. I'd like one 4 5 minute, please. 6 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: One minute; go ahead. 7 MR. HELLER: May it please the court, my name is Alan Heller. I'm from the firm of Garvey 8 9 Schubert Barer, and I represent all the appellants 10 except for Appellant Bernadette Strianese. We were asked by the chief clerk to split our argument in 11 12 two, so I'm going to handle the waiver argument while 13 Mr. McCormick is going to handle the FAA argument. 14 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: All right, let's talk 15 about the waiver argument. Go ahead. 16 MR. HELLER: Okay. So the Cusimanos 17 charted their own - - - charted - - - charted their 18 own course, and that's why, as a result, they waived 19 their right to have the arbitrators determine 2.0 limitation. 21 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: If - - -JUDGE STEIN: If - - - if - - - I'm sorry. 22 23 If it's under the federal standard, is that enough? 2.4 MR. HELLER: Absolutely, because there - -25 - there was prejudice here. There was extreme

1	prejudice. There's
2	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yeah, but there's a -
3	there's a very strong presumption, right, under
4	the FAA that that, you know, you're going to
5	have the terms of that arbitration agreement carried
6	out and you really have to have a pretty strong case
7	to get away from that.
8	MR. HELLER: Well, assuming the FAA
9	applies, but
10	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Assume it applies for
11	the sake of this.
12	MR. HELLER: Assuming it applies for this -
13	for this argument, the problem is is that there
14	could be a waiver
15	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What's the test if
16	the FAA applies?
17	MR. HELLER: The FAA is that if there's
18	prejudice. The test if the FAA applies, that is
19	- Mr. McCormick is going to deal with that issue and
20	that is the Allied-Bruce and the progeny
21	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Right, okay.
22	MR. HELLER: So for my argument, we're
23	going to assume it applies, okay. But I'm going to -
24	
25	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, go ahead.

1 MR. HELLER: But I'm going to show that 2 there was waiver, because there was substantive 3 waiver here, and the substantive waiver is that they put the issue of limitations before Justice Ramos, 4 5 and let - - - let's even go back to the beginning. They were the plaintiffs here. They filed this case. 6 7 It's not like we were a defendant - - - they were a 8 defendant that was answering a complaint and did some 9 preliminary discoveries and some preliminary 10 discussions. They were the plaintiff and - - -11 JUDGE PIGOTT: Could you - - - could you 12 have moved to dismiss the complaint saying that the 13 FAA applied? MR. HELLER: Could we have moved to 14 15 dismiss? We did not believe the FAA applies, so we 16 would not have done that. What we were going to do -- - and we let the court know on day one when we 17 18 appeared when there was a motion to disqualify us as 19 counsel - - - in the record, we said we're here to 20 deal with disqualification and we are going to move 21 to dismiss on limitations and send this to 22 arbitration. We wanted to arbitrate from day one,

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So would you - - - would you say that - - - that the other side was

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25

but we - - -

1	trying to avoid arbitration?
2	MR. HELLER: Absolutely.
3	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Was that the tenor -
4	
5	MR. HELLER: Absolutely.
6	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: of the
7	litigation?
8	MR. HELLER: Absolutely. Look at the
9	record. Let's let's start from day one.
10	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What what
11	gives us the the high points that it that
12	demonstrate that they were trying to avoid
13	arbitration.
14	MR. HELLER: Let's start
15	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: And that their
16	actions were inconsistent
17	MR. HELLER: Okay, so I
18	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: with
19	arbitration.
20	MR. HELLER: I will start with the
21	two lawsuits
22	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Go ahead.
23	MR. HELLER: they commenced in Nassau
24	County. There was one lawsuit on a company called
25	Berita and one lawsuit on a

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Right.

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MR. HELLER: - - - company called the FLIP. Each of them had arbitration clauses. Our clients were forced to move to compel arbitration in each of those cases. Those pre-dated this case, but involved the same entities at issue. After losing the motion to compel arbitration with the Berita case, they continued to appeal that case through the date that the statement of claim was filed by them in this case.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But didn't in the end
--- didn't --- in the end, weren't they okay with
arbitration?

MR. HELLER: They were only okay with arbitration because Justice Ramos told them that their case was going to be dismissed. He already dismissed parts of it.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So it was a last resort for them to go to arbitration?

MR. HELLER: Absolutely. Because what happened was they - - - they were given two chances by Justice Ramos to go to arbitration. The first chance was when Mr. Calica, prior counsel, showed up in court in the motion to disqualify and Justice - -

1 JUDGE RIVERA: Well, he actually asked and 2 the judge actually asked - - -3 MR. HELLER: He asked them. He asked them. JUDGE RIVERA: - - - and then he said - - -4 5 MR. HELLER: He said - - -JUDGE RIVERA: - - - you don't want to go 6 7 to arbitration? Correct, Your Honor. 8 MR. HELLER: Yeah, correct, Your Honor. 9 And then Mr. Pegno was asked the same question during 10 oral argument before Justice Ramos has told him that 11 his claims were time barred, they said Mr. Pegno, why 12 don't you go to arbitration? He says, I - - - why 13 should I go to arbitration? Just because Mr. Heller 14 wants me to? 15 So they didn't want to go to arbitration. 16 The only reason why they went to arbitration is 17 because Judge Ramos said, I think your claims are friv - - - frivolous. I am going to dismiss them. 18 19 I'm going to give you an opportunity to amend the 20 complaint to fix the pleading deficiencies in the 21 breach of fiduciary duty and the fraud claims, but 22 once you fix those up, I am going to let the 23 defendants make a motion for summary judgement to 2.4 dismiss those claims. He said that in the record.

JUDGE STEIN: This would have been a

different case if they brought the action here and 1 then the statute of limitations was raised and at 2 3 that point they said no, Judge, we don't want you to decide statute of limitations, that should go to 4 5 arbitration, we changed our mind. Would - - - would it be a different case then? 6 7 MR. HELLER: Would it be - - -8 JUDGE STEIN: Is the time - - - in other 9 words, is the timing of it - - - is the fact that 10 they then - - - that they fully litigated the issue 11 in Supreme Court before they said they wanted 12 arbitration? 13 MR. HELLER: Well, that - - - that is a big 14 problem. 15 JUDGE STEIN: Well, I'm - - - I'm saying, 16 is that the - - - is that the determinative issue? 17 MR. HELLER: Well, that's the substantive prejudice issue, that's the substantive prejudice 18 19 argument, because they put the issue before the court 20 and then didn't like what the court said and then 21 they said okay, goodbye, we're going to arbitration. 22 That - - - that's a big problem for them. 23 Now, if they did not - - - if they just 2.4 filed the - - - the complaint and then they said you

know what, Mr. Heller's right - - -

1	JUDGE RIVERA: No, let's go back. What's
2	the prejudice? The prejudice is the loss of time and
3	money, which I'm not trying to trivialize or
4	minimize.
5	MR. HELLER: That's not what I'm saying
6	because that's a separate prejudice. There are two
7	types of prejudice.
8	JUDGE RIVERA: Okay.
9	MR. HELLER: There's substantive prejudice
10	and then there's the prejudice of loss of time and
11	money. There's clearly prejudice loss of time and
12	money, but I'm going even further than that. Where
13	the substantive prejudice is is they had an
14	opportunity
15	JUDGE RIVERA: To re-litigate it again?
16	MR. HELLER: to and they get -
17	they get a do-over.
18	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Is this consistent -
19	your position consistent with the federal
20	prejudice analysis?
21	MR. HELLER: Absolutely, because federal
22	prejudice
23	JUDGE FAHEY: Well, when you look at
24	what is it Leadertex?
25	MR. HELLER: Leadertex, the the

1	the case was actually they ruled a waiver.
2	They they cite Leadertex, but they said it was
3	waiver on the loss of time and money reason.
4	JUDGE FAHEY: Well, and I'm talking about
5	comparing Leadertex with I think the New York
6	case is Stark, and and the fact the
7	factor seems stronger for you under New York law than
8	they do under federal law.
9	MR. HELLER: But if you look at the
10	Louisiana Stadium case
11	JUDGE FAHEY: Um-hum.
12	MR. HELLER: which is a Second
13	Circuit case, that case is almost on all fours with -
14	with our case. That that is a very
15	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: This your view
16	is forum shopping, is that what's going on here?
17	MR. HELLER: Absolutely.
18	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay.
19	MR. HELLER: And they they con
20	it's consistent. They've forum shopped their way up
21	to here.
22	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: All right. Let's
23	hear let's hear from your colleague and we'll
24	go from there.

Counsel, you want any rebuttal time?

1	MR. MCCORMICK: Yes, one minute please,
2	Your Honor.
3	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: One minute; go ahead.
4	MR. MCCORMICK: May it please the court, my
5	name is Patrick McCormick from Campolo, Middleton &
6	McCormick, and as you know, I represent the
7	appellant.
8	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So what issue are you
9	going to deal with?
10	MR. MCCORMICK: The FAA issue. It's an
11	easy issue, in our view. The contracts at issue here
12	between individuals do not in any way evidence a
13	transaction involving interstate commerce.
14	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Is that consistent
15	with the purpose of of the FAA, that that
16	this is as simple as what you say that there's
17	MR. MCCORMICK: Well, that's
18	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: this is a what,
19	a family dispute, nothing to do with interstate
20	commerce?
21	MR. MCCORMICK: Well, you don't necessarily
22	have to look at whether it's a family dispute. You
23	look at the purpose and the transaction at issue in
24	the contract.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: If it impacts it,

1	that's the test, right?
2	MR. MCCORMICK: If it the test is
3	-
4	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: It's not what the
5	intention was, it's what the impact is, right?
6	MR. MCCORMICK: Absolutely. Contemplation
7	is not relevant.
8	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, so tell us why
9	there there's no impact, particularly on two of
10	the three that does have properties outside the
11	state. How could there be no impact on interstate
12	commerce?
13	MR. MCCORMICK: Your question, Your Honor,
14	respectfully, is looking at the wrong time period.
15	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Go ahead.
16	MR. MCCORMICK: The issue is the
17	transaction at issue, the transaction evidenced by
18	the contracts, the formative contracts, are the
19	formation of the entities, Berita, the LLC, and the
20	partnership.
21	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What are the entities
22	designed to do?
23	MR. MCCORMICK: Well, the stated purpose
24	was a general stated purpose, unlike the N.J.R. case
25	where there was a specific purpose. It was a general

1	formation of two business entities.
2	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: To do what?
3	JUDGE STEIN: So we don't look at what the
4	yeah, we don't look at what those entities are
5	supposed to do?
6	MR. MCCORMICK: No, because the entities
7	are not parties to the agreement that was between two
8	individuals. The arbitration agreement is contained
9	in the formation documents
10	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: That is that in
11	touch with reality, that they're not going to look at
12	what they do?
13	MR. MCCORMICK: I I
14	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Does that make any
15	sense?
16	MR. MCCORMICK: I hear the chuckling but
17	yes, that is absolute
18	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: In an analysis as to
19	whether you come under FAA, we don't look at what
20	these entities are designed to do and what they in
21	fact do do?
22	MR. MCCORMICK: The entities
23	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: That's a hard a
24	hard row to hoe.
25	MR. MCCORMICK: I I don't believe it

1	is. The entities are not parties to the agreement.
2	The individuals are parties to the agreement. The
3	individuals in these in this case, in each of
4	the
5	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: And your argument is
6	that the individuals don't impact in interstate
7	commerce and that's the end of the story?
8	MR. MCCORMICK: It it's not relevant
9	that the individuals may, because here the
10	individuals don't, the entities do. What the
11	entities did afterwards is separate and independent
12	from the formation, which is the transaction the
13	contracts evidence to to
14	JUDGE RIVERA: What's the point of the
15	contract?
16	MR. MCCORMICK: To form the entity and to -
17	
18	JUDGE RIVERA: To to do what? What
19	did the they form the entities to?
20	MR. MCCORMICK: To
21	JUDGE RIVERA: Finish it off.
22	MR. MCCORMICK: It it was a broad
23	- it was a it was a nonspecific unlike
24	N.J.R., a nonspecific purpose
25	JUDGE RIVERA: Or to form the entities to

1 participate in interstate commerce. 2 MR. MCCORMICK: There's no - - -3 JUDGE RIVERA: Does that work? MR. MCCORMICK: No, I don't know that I 4 5 would say it that far. I will certainly agree with 6 what you are trying to drag out of me that the 7 business entities were - - -JUDGE RIVERA: By kicking and screaming, 8 9 apparently. 10 MR. MCCORMICK: Well, the - - - I'm not 11 going to sit here and - - - and lose credibility by 12 saying the business entities were not going to engage 13 in business. That was in all likelihood what was intended. They didn't have to. 14 15 JUDGE RIVERA: Um-hum. 16 MR. MCCORMICK: They could have - - - and 17 it happens very often, they could have been formed and sat dormant for - - - for years. 18 19 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Isn't the test what 20 ultimately happens, whether there is an impact? 21 Isn't that what all the cases seem to say? 22 MR. MCCORMICK: All - - - all the cases say 23 the test is you look at whether the transaction that 2.4 is evidenced by the contract involves or affects, the 25 two words are interchangeable under the Supreme Court

1	rulings, interstate commerce.
2	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So?
3	MR. MCCORMICK: So you look at the
4	contracts, the formation documents, and what
5	what do they evidence? They evidence the formation
6	of the entities. The that contract, the
7	the limited liability company operating agreement,
8	the limited partnership agreement, does not involve a
9	contract, an agreement, or any other type of of
10	of agreement to do anything.
11	JUDGE FAHEY: What you're saying is they
12	weren't they weren't agreements to do anything,
13	they were agreements to exist
14	MR. MCCORMICK: They were
15	JUDGE FAHEY: in a certain form.
16	MR. MCCORMICK: They were absolutely
17	agreements to exist.
18	JUDGE FAHEY: Right.
19	MR. MCCORMICK: And in order for something
20	else to happen
21	JUDGE RIVERA: Agreements to create
22	companies that are authorized to participate in
23	interstate commerce?
24	MR. MCCORMICK: They're authorized to do
25	anything. They were they were broad

1	JUDGE RIVERA: Including participate in
2	interstate commerce.
3	MR. MCCORMICK: Absolutely. Absolutely
4	including but
5	JUDGE FAHEY: So so let me ask this.
6	They they were authorized to conduct real
7	estate transactions, right, to acquire property, to
8	do those things?
9	MR. MCCORMICK: Yes, yes.
10	JUDGE FAHEY: So
11	MR. MCCORMICK: Well, if if I may, I
12	apologize. When you say "they", you're referencing
13	the entities, yes.
14	JUDGE FAHEY: The entities, yes.
15	MR. MCCORMICK: Yes.
16	JUDGE FAHEY: So doesn't that get you back
17	around to Russell and then real estate transactions
18	are inherently interstate commerce?
19	MR. MCCORMICK: Let me answer it in parts.
20	JUDGE FAHEY: However you want.
21	MR. MCCORMICK: Real estate contracts, in
22	all likelihood there can be some that aren't,
23	but in all likelihood will involve because
24	there's probably some type of financing involving
25	banks, et cetera

JUDGE FAHEY: Um-hum. 1 2 MR. MCCORMICK: - - - there's no doubt 3 about that. However, the real estate contract here -4 - - to the extent there were contracts not in the 5 record, but even if we assume that - - - were entered 6 into by the entity, not the individuals. It's the 7 rights and obligations of the individuals here that is at - - - that's at issue. That's what - - -8 9 JUDGE PIGOTT: In your - - - in your - - -10 if I understand it, let's assume you got - - - you 11 and I form a - - - form an agreement and we're going 12 to open donut shops and - - - and it's only - - -13 only in - - - in the Albany area, all right, no 14 interstate commerce. But then we decide we're going 15 to form - - - we're going to get fifty more, we'll 16 put one in every state. Are we still not an 17 interstate commerce because you and I are sitting 18 here talking about what we're going to do? 19 MR. MCCORMICK: If we are - - - well, if -20 - - if the - - - the premise of your question is that 21 was the stated purpose of the entity, to open up the 22 donut shop. 23 JUDGE PIGOTT: Donut shops, yeah.

MR. MCCORMICK: And in that case, because

it's a stated purpose, it inches closer to the

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1 possibility because the purpose of the entity, the 2 purpose of the - - -3 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: You mean, if you did 4 a - - if you did an entity and you didn't say that 5 they were going to be open up donut shops, you're 6 okay, they're not interstate comm - - - and then you go and open them, it doesn't matter? 7 8 MR. MCCORMICK: I didn't say you're okay, I 9 said you're inching closer. It depends on other 10 facts. Was there financing - - -11 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But isn't it in the 12 end - - - what Judge Pigott is asking - - - in the 13 end, it's what you do. It doesn't matter what you 14 intended to do, it's what you do. Isn't that what 15 the federal cases say about the - - - the FAA? 16 MR. MCCORMICK: They say it, but I believe 17 your - - - your premise is being misapplied here. 18 19 JUDGE STEIN: You're trying to draw - - -20 are you trying to draw a line between the - - - the 21 formation of - - - of this entity and - - - and apart 22 from that, if the entity then goes and enters into a 23 contract to - - - to actually open up the Dunkin' 2.4 Donuts, that, you say, would be affecting interstate

25

commerce?

1	MR. MCCORMICK: That is the line. That
2	- that
3	JUDGE STEIN: That's the line you're trying
4	to set?
5	MR. MCCORMICK: In every case cited in
6	- in all the I'm up.
7	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Go ahead. Finish
8	your answer.
9	MR. MCCORMICK: In all of the briefs, it is
10	the entities themselves that have entered into
11	contracts to do something that involves interstate
12	commerce. Here, we are talking about the individuals
13	and their rights and obligations vis-a-vis each
14	other. That's markedly different than all of those
15	cases and that's the line.
16	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counsel.
17	You'll have your rebuttal. Let's hear from your
18	adversary.
19	MR. PEGNO: Thank you. May it please the
20	court, David Pegno on behalf of the Cusimanos.
21	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counsel, do you buy
22	the line that the your adversaries are trying
23	to draw?
24	MR. PEGNO: Not a bit, Your Honor.
25	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Why not? What

1 what is the - - -2 MR. PEGNO: The argument that you just look 3 at the face of the contract, that's fundamentally 4 what their argument is, to - - - to determine whether 5 interstate commerce is implicated just doesn't get 6 off the ground. 7 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So what is the test? What's the test? 8 9 MR. PEGNO: The - - - the test in Allied-10 Bruce is whether the - - - the contract in fact, as 11 carried out, involved interstate commerce - - - which 12 is a very, very broad standard, and I'm going to 13 disagree with the - - - with the - - - the 14 hypothetical about the donut shop. You open up a 15 donut shop, you would have to look at - - - at that 16 type of activity as it's done across the country in 17 the aggregate, and that's interstate commerce. But -18 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What - - - what if 19 20 the contract doesn't say you're going to open up 21 donut shops? 22 MR. PEGNO: If it just says there's going 23 to be a formation, you look at what in fact happened.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: And then - - - and

then they open up donut shops, right.

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1	MR. PEGNO: You you look at what
2	_
3	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: That that are
4	all over the country.
5	MR. PEGNO: What what Justice
6	Breyer's decision in Allied-Bruce, he he said
7	you don't look at expectation of the parties, you
8	don't look at the objective expectation of the
9	parties; you look at whether it turns it turns
10	out in fact that's the language he uses
11	that interstate commerce was involved. And every one
12	of
13	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So if you're just
14	saying we have a contract to form an entity
15	MR. PEGNO: That's correct.
16	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: doesn't say
17	anything about what you're going to do, and then you
18	go out and open whatever it is, donut shops or
19	whatever around the country, FAA?
20	MR. PEGNO: Absolutely applies. And let me
21	point out here that that
22	JUDGE PIGOTT: Then why why did you
23	sue? I mean, if this
24	MR. PEGNO: Pardon?
25	JUDGE PIGOTT: was so clear, why did

you - - - why did you go to court?

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MR. PEGNO: Here's the - - - the - - - we're now moving over to the waiver point, Your Honor. And we reject this notion of - - - of, you know, an escape hatch out of - - - out of litigation. It was in fact - - - we did in fact sue. We did in fact bring a claim in - - - in court. There's no doubt about that. But what we were faced with was repeated motions by the other side here to compel arbitration that were successful, and we had adversaries who were saying this case needs to be arbitrated.

This very case, the - - - the so-called accountants in this case, were saying that this case is subject to mandatory arbitration. They still say that to this day. They - - - the only waiver that they're claiming is - - - is not waiver of arbitration, it's waiver of arbitration with respect to one issue, the statute of limitations, and there is no authority, no case that they've cited, and no case that exists - - -

JUDGE STEIN: But haven't you done the same thing by - - - by - - - by letting the litigation on the statute of limitations go to completion?

MR. PEGNO: Your Honor, that's not what

1 happened. That's not remotely what happened. There 2 was a motion to dismiss that - - - that raised a 3 number of grounds - - -4 JUDGE STEIN: That you actively opposed. 5 MR. PEGNO: - - - that we opposed. 6 JUDGE STEIN: That's right, and - - - but 7 at that point you could have said, whoa, whoa, wait a 8 minute. We don't want to get involved in all this 9 litigation here. We should just go and this should 10 be arbitrated. 11 MR. PEGNO: Your Honor - - -JUDGE STEIN: To me it would have been a 12 13 different situation had you done it at that juncture. 14 MR. PEGNO: I - - - I understand your - - -15 your point, but what happened was - - - you have to 16 look at - - - at exactly what happened. 17 happened was that - - - was that Justice Ramos 18 initially dismissed the complaint, not based just on the statute of limitation, there were - - - there 19 20 were a number of different grounds based - - - there 21 were pleadings grounds that they were based. He then 22 set up a - - - a regime - - -23 JUDGE STEIN: I - - - I know what he did. 2.4 But - - - but, you know, you - - - you saw that 25

coming.

1 MR. PEGNO: But - - - but my point, Justice 2 -- - Judge Stein, is -- - is not that the -- - the 3 statute of limitations issue was not adjudicated to 4 completion. The - - - he - - - he permitted leave to 5 re-plead all the claims and - - - and it was that - -- that pleading and - - - and we re-pleaded those 6 7 claims that - - - that then was the subject of the motion. 8 9 JUDGE STEIN: But you don't deny that you 10 litigated that - - - that issue and I'll call - - - I 11 know it's a procedural issue, but substantively 12 litigated it. 13 MR. PEGNO: And we were - - - we were given 14 leave to re-plead that issue as well, to - - - to 15 defeat the statute of limitations as well, and we will have to face that point in - - - in arbitration. 16 17 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counsel - - -18 counsel. 19 MR. PEGNO: Yes, Judge. 20 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Are there precedents 21 to - - - that - - - that tell us that if your actions 22 are totally inconsistent, you know, with what you're 23 doing, that - - - that if you - - - if you - - -2.4 everything you did was towards litigation, you know,

25

why is that not - - -

1	MR. PEGNO: That's not
2	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: dispositive in
3	relation?
4	MR. PEGNO: That's not the test, Judge.
5	The test is prejudice.
6	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What is the test?
7	MR. PEGNO: The the touchstone for -
8	for waiver under the FAA
9	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yes.
10	MR. PEGNO: is is prejudice and
11	and time and delay and expense
12	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: And you can't be
13	forum shopping
14	MR. PEGNO: are insufficient.
15	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: to such an
16	extent that there's prejudice to the other side?
17	MR. PEGNO: Well, we we reject the
18	notion that that there's there was forum
19	shopping.
20	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What were you doing
21	if you weren't forum shopping?
22	MR. PEGNO: The the point is that
23	after Justice Ramos set up this regime where
24	where we'd have another pleading and no and
25	then we'd have a motion

1 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: And - - - and Judge 2 Ramos was making all kinds of statements about 3 frivolous litigation and that kind of thing. MR. PEGNO: He did not make a statement as 4 5 - - - as it related to the amended pleading. 6 was - - - that was the - - - the prior pleading. But 7 what he set up a regime that would have a motion - -8 9 JUDGE RIVERA: What about the resp - - -10 what about the response, "you don't want to go to 11 arbitration; correct, Your Honor." What - - -12 MR. PEGNO: Absolutely. That's - - -13 that's absolutely the case. But what happened was 14 after Justice Ramos came up with this regime and we -15 - - we determined to bring in other parties into the 16 case where there had been motions to compel, 17 successful motions to compel arbitration, we decided 18 if you can't beat them, join them, let's go to 19 arbitration, rather than having a motion for summary 20 judgment - - -21 JUDGE RIVERA: So you got beaten down. 22 MR. PEGNO: Pardon me? 23 JUDGE RIVERA: You got beaten down. 2.4 MR. PEGNO: No, well, Your Honor - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: You were correct and then

1	you feel like you're losing and you say
2	MR. PEGNO: Not
3	JUDGE RIVERA: I'm going to take my
4	papers with me and go to arbitration.
5	MR. PEGNO: Not at all, Your Honor. The -
6	the point was that we would face, after dealing
7	with the the statute of limitations issue, a
8	motion to to compel arbitration. And all of
9	that litigation and associated appeals could take
10	literally years and they determined, after they
11	decided to to add additional parties who had
12	already successfully moved to compel arbitration, to
13	go to arbitration for the whole dispute and
14	JUDGE STEIN: But now if you go to
15	arbitration
16	MR. PEGNO: Yes, Judge.
17	JUDGE STEIN: don't those same issues
18	have to be resolved?
19	MR. PEGNO: The the statute of
20	limitations issue has to be resolved. And let me
21	just point out there there
22	JUDGE STEIN: And so what you know,
23	what are you saving, you know, maybe a little bit of
24	time?
25	MR. PEGNO: Well, Justice Ramos never

1	should have decided the the statute of
2	limitations issue in the first place on this on
3	the
4	JUDGE STEIN: Yeah, but you you
5	MR. PEGNO: amended pleading.
6	JUDGE STEIN: you let him. You
7	didn't you didn't argue that when he when
8	you knew he was going to do it.
9	MR. PEGNO: Not with respect to the amended
10	pleading, Judge. That that
11	JUDGE FAHEY: The thing the thing
12	that jumps out as a judge, the thing that jumps
13	out at if it had gone the other way, would you
14	be asking for arbitration. That's what jumps out at
15	me in this.
16	MR. PEGNO: Your Honor, if he had if
17	he had set up well, we you know, we will
18	never what what exactly would happen if he
19	- if we, you know, went back in time
20	JUDGE FAHEY: It's all right. Just answer
21	my question. Don't worry about that.
22	MR. PEGNO: If he had set up a regime
23	JUDGE FAHEY: Um-hum.
24	MR. PEGNO: whereby there had been a
25	a motion for summary judgment without discovery

	and then we'd have to face a a motion to compe
2	arbitration, whatever the remaining plead
3	claims had been, we very well may have gone to
4	arbitration rather than
5	JUDGE FAHEY: So you're saying even if you
6	had won that motion, you would have you would
7	still be in arbitration?
8	MR. PEGNO: We very well may have may
9	have opted out of the the lengthy and expensive
10	regime. And let me
11	JUDGE STEIN: What was it about the fact of
12	the two prior actions which were very
13	strenuously argued to go to arbitration, made
14	you think that that wouldn't happen in this action?
15	MR. PEGNO: Well, the the action as
16	it was originally constituted involved
17	JUDGE STEIN: I know. The accountants
18	only, right.
19	MR. PEGNO: again, the accountants
20	who
21	JUDGE STEIN: Right, but they but
22	they were kind of you know, they were closely
23	related.
24	MR. PEGNO: It's a it's a different
25	issue in terms of arbitration whether it's a

1 signatory or not signatory. JUDGE STEIN: So you didn't expect - - -2 3 you didn't expect - - - okay, I understand. MR. PEGNO: We would have - - - we 4 5 certainly would have faced it an - - - an arbitration 6 issue. And let me just point out that the - - - the 7 key is - - - is not an intent to - - - to invoke 8 litigation or not; it is prejudice and delay and 9 expense standing alone - - -10 JUDGE PIGOTT: But you knew that when you 11 started. I - - - I worried, you know, that - - -12 that you didn't like what the judge was doing and you 13 said, let's - - - let's - - - normally, if somebody begins a lawsuit and then - - - and there's an 14 15 affirmative defense that the contract calls for 16 arbitration you go, whoops, they're right, you know, 17 we got to go arbitration. You don't, you know, 18 resist, resist, resist, and then say oh, wait a 19 minute, you know, we're going to go through this what 20 you call regime and that's going to be time and 21 expensive and so we're leaving. MR. PEGNO: Yeah, well, the time and 22 23 expense, Judge, is - - - is insufficient standing in 2.4 itself under the FAA.

JUDGE PIGOTT: Okay, I understand.

1	MR. PEGNO: You have to show prejudice and
2	and
3	JUDGE PIGOTT: I understand that. I'm just
4	I'm just curious why this happened. I
5	JUDGE FAHEY: It's it's the
6	submission to a dispositive motion that disturbs me.
7	You submit yourself to a dispositive motion that
8	could go either way, and then it could settle the
9	case or it could you know, or it could
10	and outline the path of the case and then after
11	that's done you say no, new path.
12	MR. PEGNO: But but Judge Fahey
13	JUDGE FAHEY: And that that's where
14	we're back to what Judge Pigott was saying, we're
15	back to the forum shopping.
16	MR. PEGNO: Judge Judge Fahey, you
17	have to look at at the the context. It's
18	not like there was a a just a decision on
19	the on the dispositive motion and then we went
20	to arbitration. We were given leave to re-plead and
21	that we
22	JUDGE FAHEY: Right.
23	MR. PEGNO: re-pled pleading would
24	have been tested in arbitration. And let me just
25	point out on on the on the prejudice

point, the - - - the Leadertex case that - - - that my esteemed adversary mentioned, in that case there was eight months of litigation; discovery was completed, dispositive motions were filed, and at that point, there - - - there was - - - there was a motion - - -

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JUDGE FAHEY: Well, that's the strongest argument you have. I - - I think the New York law favors your opponents a little more than Leadertex does. Leadertex is a little tougher standard. But the waiver argument that you - - is a strong argument for them.

MR. PEGNO: Well, Your Honor, again, just to - - - to finish the point about Leadertex, there was a waiver considered there, but it wasn't based on the litigation that had gone on; it was because of the delay and the impact that that had had on the - - - the party involved. If you look - - -

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counsel, this - -
this is almost a classic case of waiver. I mean, in

terms of you look at - - - your - - - the whole

thrust of what you did, you know, and this whole in
- - in these litigations is - - - is totally towards

- - towards wanting to stay away from arbitration

and - - and now, all of a sudden? I mean, I - -

1 I - - - I don't - - - if this isn't a waiver, where 2 is there a waiver? 3 MR. PEGNO: Well, let me just address that 4 point. This - - - this, you know, classic case of 5 waiver, as you - - - as you put it. The - - - the 6 waiver argument by two of the defendants, the - - -7 Bernadette and Bernard Strianese, just has no basis 8 whatsoever. There was - - - there was no litigation 9 in this case against them. There - - - there were -10 - - there was attempted litigation in - - - in Nassau 11 County, but there was a motion to compel arbitration and they won. The arbitration was compelled. 12 13 JUDGE STEIN: Well, you - - - you're not -14 - - you wouldn't suggest that if we find waiver for -15 - - for the accountants and not for - - -MR. PEGNO: I think that that would - - -16 17 JUDGE STEIN: - - - that - - - that we - -18 - that we should split this up, are you? 19 MR. PEGNO: I think that is - - - that that 20 would be an unfortunate result, but you cannot have a 21 waiver here with respect to - - - to Bernadette and 22 Bernard Strianese. 23 JUDGE STEIN: Doesn't that go against your 2.4 whole argument that you're trying to promote 25 efficiency?

MR. PEGNO: It - - it certainly wouldn't provide a lot of efficiency, but how can you possibly have a situation where you have waiver of - - - of arbitration against parties who have moved to compel arbitration and won? I mean, you talk about forum shopping; they moved to compel arbitration. They - - - they - - - they are successful and then they go to Justice Ramos and - - - after we filed the arbitration against them, they go to Justice Ramos and say no, we want you to decide the statute of limitations, all right.

And keep in mind, the - - - the accountants here are not arguing that there was a waiver of arbitration. There was a waiver of arbitration only as to one issue, the statute of limitations. And there is no authority for the - - - for the piecemeal type of waiver that - - - that they're asserting here. There's - - - there's no case that they cite for - - - for that, and - - - and to Judge Stein's point that would be completely inconsistent with the - - - with the notions behind arbitration for there to be a speedy and efficient adjudication of disputes.

So - - - so this is - - - this would be a brand new type of - - - type of waiver that has no

1	support in any of the case law.
2	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counsel.
3	Anything else?
4	MR. PEGNO: Well, Your Honor, I I
5	would like to, you know, address the the point
6	on the threshold issue here the threshold
7	issue of arbitrability is in fact for the arbitrators
8	under this court's decision in Life Receivables, and
9	that's because the arbitration agreements at issue in
LO	this case all incorporate the the rules of the
L1	American Arbitration Association. Those rules
L2	provide that the arbitrators have the power to deter
L3	determine their jurisdiction. This court in
L4	Life Receivables has and and many other
L5	courts have ruled that that means that the
L6	arbitrators decide the question of arbitrability.
L7	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: There there are
L8	instances where the court can determine that, right,
L9	under
20	MR. PEGNO: Well
21	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: under New York
22	law?
23	MR. PEGNO: Under general general
24	_
25	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Can determine the

statute of limitations issue. This is not some - - -1 2 yeah, go ahead. 3 MR. PEGNO: No, Judge Lippman. It - - the - - - the usual rule is that the - - - is that 4 5 the court determines arbitrability. CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yeah. 6 7 MR. PEGNO: That's the usual rule, but what's different about this case is that the - - -8 9 the - - - the parties have incorporated the AAA rules 10 into their - - - into their agreement. 11 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Even in that circumstances, there could be situations where the 12 13 court determines that issue? MR. PEGNO: I - - - I - - -14 15 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: No? 16 MR. PEGNO: I'm - - - I'm not aware of 17 those circumstances that - - -JUDGE STEIN: Well, you're - - - you're 18 19 equating waiver with arbitrability, right? 20 MR. PEGNO: The - - - the waiver issue also 21 should - - - should be determined by - - - by the 22 arbitrators under that provision, because the 23 arbitrators - - - the parties have agreed that the 2.4 arbitrators are to decide the - - - the question of 25 arbitrability.

1 JUDGE STEIN: Arbitrability, but that - - that doesn't necessarily extend to the waiver 2 3 question. MR. PEGNO: Well, waiver is just the flip 4 5 side of - - - of arbitrability. It's whether the - -6 - the question is to be arbitrated or not, and it's 7 part of the jurisdiction of the - - - of the 8 arbitrators, which is what the AAA rule says. 9 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counsel. 10 Thanks. 11 MR. PEGNO: Thank you, Your Honor. CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Rebuttal. 12 13 MR. HELLER: Just quickly. 14 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yes, go ahead, 15 counsel. 16 MR. HELLER: I'll just deal with the Life 17 Receivables issue and the arbitrability issue. CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yeah. 18 19 MR. HELLER: This is a trap, because what 2.0 he's trying to say is that first we have to go to the 21 arbitrators to determine whether I could go to the court to determine limitations. So what will happen 22 23 is I go to the arbitrators, I say can I go to the 2.4 court to determine limitations? The arbitrators say

yeah, go to court. Then you go to the court and it

says, under 7502, you participated in the arbitration so we can dismiss on limitations grounds. It's the N.J.R. case.

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2.4

So that is absolutely wrong. Arbitrability is looking at the arbitration clause and determining whether under that arbitration clause, the issue is arbitrable, not the limitations issue. That's a totally separate issue that's governed by 7502, and I had every right to move under 7502; once they filed the case and once they filed the arbitration, I had every right to move and ask Justice Ramos to dismiss those claims.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, thanks, counsel.

MR. HELLER: Thank you, Your Honor.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Rebuttal.

MR. MCCORMICK: Briefly, Your Honor. The parties to the agreement did not engage in any economic activity themselves and the contracts don't evidence any general practice subject to federal control. That takes it out of the discussion that we've been having.

Allied-Bruce got brought up. Allied-Bruce was a party to the agreement that had the arbitration clause in it. That's not the case here. These

1	individuals did not engage in any economic activity.
2	That's the distinguishing factor. The entities at
3	issue have no contract to do anything at the time.
4	The individuals had no contract to do anything at the
5	time.
6	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yeah, but your
7	argument is even if you don't prevail on that issue,
8	there's waiver here, right?
9	MR. MCCORMICK: A hundred percent, there's
LO	no question. They they opened up themselves to
L1	the judicial forum. They got a decision on the
L2	statute of limitations. To suggest that there's no
L3	prejudice after a year's worth of litigation is
L4	is is
L5	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So assuming, for the
L6	sake of argument, that FAA applies in your view you
L7	still win?
L8	MR. MCCORMICK: There's no question.
L9	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay.
20	MR. MCCORMICK: Thank you, Your Honor.
21	Thank you very much.
22	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Thank you. Thank you
23	all.
24	(Court is adjourned)

CERTIFICATION

I, Sara Winkeljohn, certify that the foregoing transcript of proceedings in the Court of Appeals of Cusimano v. Schnurr, No. 200 was prepared using the required transcription equipment and is a true and accurate record of the proceedings.

Considerich and

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