1	COURT OF APPEALS
2	STATE OF NEW YORK
3	
4	PEOPLE,
5	Respondent,
6	-against- No. 201
7	LUIS ORTIZ,
8	Appellant.
9	
10	20 Eagle Street Albany, New York 12207 November 18, 2015
11	Before:
12	CHIEF JUDGE JONATHAN LIPPMAN
13	ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE F. PIGOTT, JR. ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA
14	ASSOCIATE JUDGE SHEILA ABDUS-SALAAM (By Video)
15	ASSOCIATE JUDGE LESLIE E. STEIN ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE M. FAHEY
16	Appearances:
17	ANANT KUMAR, ESQ.
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20	CATHERINE M. RENO, ADA
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24	
25	Karen Schiffmiller Official Court Transcriber

1	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: People v. Ortiz,
2	Number 201.
3	One second, counsel.
4	Counselor, do you want any rebuttal time?
5	MR. KUMAR: Yes, I'd like to reserve two
6	minutes of my time for rebuttal.
7	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Two minutes, you have
8	it. Go ahead.
9	MR. KUMAR: May it please the court, Anant
10	Kumar for Mr. Luis Ortiz. Mr. Ortiz's retrial
11	presents two separate errors warranting reversal.
12	First, in contravention of this court's decision in
13	People v. O'Toole, the prosecution was allowed to
14	present evidence that Mr. Ortiz allegedly used a
15	razor as part of the events. He
16	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What did the
17	what did the first trial demonstrate, in regard to
18	the razor?
19	MR. KUMAR: The first jury's verdict
20	necessarily concluded that the razor was not involved
21	at all.
22	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: How? From the
23	burglary one, burglary two?
24	MR. KUMAR: Yes. From the acquittal of
25	burglary one, involving use or threatened use of a

dangerous weapon, and also notably, acquitting Mr.

Ortiz of robbery in the first degree, also predicated
on use or threatened use of a dangerous instrument.

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CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Is it not conceivable that that sort of - - we don't know exactly what - - why the jury did what it did, or under O'Toole, is it clearly the issue of the razor blade is - - - is out?

MR. KUMAR: It is clearly the involvement of the razor blade, because the only evidence they heard as to the razor blade's involvement was that Mr. Ortiz allegedly held it to complainant Nunez's throat. Under those circumstances, it is clearly used or threatened to be used, and it is a dangerous instrument. No one disputes that it could sever an artery and cause damage in a manner - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: Well, how - - -

JUDGE PIGOTT: Let's assume - - - let's assume for a minute that you've got somebody who's charged with vehicular homicide and speeding. And because of the lapse of time, the speeding ticket is - - is dismissed on statute of limitations grounds. Okay? Can they introduce the speed in the trial?

MR. KUMAR: Well, Your Honor, in fact, Goodman, I believe, speaks to this. And it

1 recognizes that sometimes there'll be procedural 2 issues that - - - that come in to complicate the 3 issue. But here, we have a definitive finding and a 4 reasonable finding by the first jury. 5 JUDGE PIGOTT: Is that a "yes", that they 6 could bring in the speed? 7 MR. KUMAR: Yes. 8 JUDGE PIGOTT: All right. 9 MR. KUMAR: They could, be - - -10 JUDGE PIGOTT: So - - - so in this case, 11 they're not going to - - - they're not going to 12 convict you of robbery first or any of the charges 13 with respect to the blade, but - - - but in order to 14 let the jury know what went on here, why wouldn't 15 they be able to bring in the facts as they evolved? 16 MR. KUMAR: You - - -17 JUDGE PIGOTT: Otherwise you're - - -18 you're deceiving the jury, aren't you? 19 MR. KUMAR: Your Honor, that same concern 20 came up in People v. O'Toole, and - - -21 JUDGE PIGOTT: Yeah, it sounds like the dissent in O'Toole, doesn't it? 22 23 MR. KUMAR: It - - - it certainly does, 2.4 Your Honor, and un - - - the court - - - the majority 25 of the court said that you could excise a gun from a

forcible robbery case. In that situation, the gun was clearly a central part of their narrative. It explained how the victim was drawn out from the barber shop. If the gun can be removed from O'Toole despite that concern, the razor can be removed here.

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And indeed, our case is even stronger than O'Toole, because here, you already have an account that omits mention of the razor, and here I'm talking about Pura Nunez's 911 call. In that 911 call, she gives a narrative account of what's happening, and she says the thief pushed his way in. She responds to several specific questions by the 911 operator. Is the thief armed? No. The only weapon she mentions - - -

JUDGE STEIN: But wasn't - - - I mean, she was focused on what was happening right then and there, and the questions that were being asked of her, I - - -

MR. KUMAR: Your Honor, at some point in that call, if it were true that a razor had been held to her throat, her life had been threatened that way, it would have come out, both in narrative form and in response to specific - - - repeated specific questions. Questions, is anyone hurt? She simply did not mention it, and that explains why the jury -

- - the first jury rejected that portion of complainant's accounts.

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CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But there are lots of different narratives here as to what went on. The stories are very different.

MR. KUMAR: There are two competing narratives. There's the complainant's story that this was a dangerous home invasion and that there's - - - there's Mr. Ortiz's testimony that this was an altercation because he was being insulted in front of his girlfriend. And what happens - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: But you're trying to add a third narrative, right? Because the - - - that narrative about the home invasion, you say, can be done without the use of a weapon, right? So you're actually breaking that narrative down into yet another narrative?

MR. KUMAR: The narrative can be told - -
JUDGE RIVERA: The question is, is that

contradictory and - - - and result is, as Judge

Pigott has already said, in deceiving the jury?

MR. KUMAR: It is not tantamount to deceiving the jury. The first jury already found with reasonable basis that there was no razor involved. Does the story - - -

JUDGE STEIN: What if the jury had found that there was a razor? They had the razor in evidence at the first trial, right? Couldn't they have found that - - - taking a look at this razor and say this is completely dull; this is incapable of causing serious physic - - - physical injury?

MR. KUMAR: Your Honor, neither of the parties disputed it. No one argued that in summation. The court, in fact - - - the first jury was instructed - - -

JUDGE STEIN: Does it matter that nobody argued it?

MR. KUMAR: It does when you start to look at this court's precedent - - - Acevedo, O'Toole - - - which are talking about realistic, reasonable, rational readings of the record. There is simply no record support for this claim of a nondangerous instrument. Again, the evidence they heard is that it was held to Ms. Nunez's throat, and that her life was threatened in that manner.

Under those circumstances, the partial acquittal definitively tells us, just as it did in O'Toole, that they found that the razor blade wasn't involved.

JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, then why did the judge

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allow it? What was his reasoning?

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MR. KUMAR: The judge engaged in a sort of relevance analysis, which seemed to miss the point of collateral estoppel. And that is one reason, I believe, they let it in. The judge at that time didn't have, maybe, the clarity, the persuasive force of O'Toole, to rely on. The judge's decision was made before O'Toole was decided.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What about the other issue, counsel? The witness issue? The lawyer becoming a witness?

MR. KUMAR: Yes. Indeed, Your Honor, Mr.

Ortiz was separately prejudiced because the prosecution was allowed to engage in a misleading and unfair impeachment with his attorney's statement from arraignment - - -

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: The stipulation didn't take care of the problem?

MR. KUMAR: The stipulation did not take care of the problem for several reasons. The biggest reason being that the stipulation cannot cure the glaring advocate witness problem here. So counsel, of course, has to explain - - once this impeachment is allowed at all, has to explain to the jury that it was a mistake.

JUDGE PIGOTT: Can this never be done? I - I agree with you. I was kind of - - - I was kind
surprised that anyone would do it, number one, but
then I think counsel cited cases where it was
allowed.

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MR. KUMAR: Your Honor, the cases that have been cited from this court, Brown, and then the adoption of the decision in Rivera, those are qualitatively different situations. In one of those cases, it was a Sandoval hearing. It wasn't arraignments. They - - you had hours to discuss - - over months to discuss wi - - with your client the facts of the case, and in the other, it was a written sworn affirmation.

This court has already - - - already held in cases like Burgos-Santos and Rodriguez, you can't use a withdrawn alibi notice to impeach the defendant. And in that situation, you're switching from something like "I wasn't even there" to justification. Here, on its face, it's a reasonable mistake. At that time, counsel simply confused razor with knife.

JUDGE RIVERA: Did - - -

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Did the counsel have to be relieved? Did the judge have to relieve the

counsel?

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MR. KUMAR: Once the impeachment was				
allowed, the only realistic course of action was a				
mistrial. Again, this was a credibility contest				
between Mr. Ortiz and the complainants. Having				
allowed the impeachment, Mr. Ortiz's credibility was				
severely damaged. At that point, you you can't				
unring that bell. And you you can't simply				
relieve counsel and have a new counsel step in. The				
only option would be was a mistrial at that				
point. And it before				

JUDGE FAHEY: How many - - - another - - - another tack here is, how many arraignments had counsel handled that night that Mr. Ortiz was arraigned?

MR. KUMAR: I'm sure she had handled - - - as she represented on the record as an officer of the court - - some thirty arraignments at that point.

JUDGE FAHEY: Over what time period?

MR. KUMAR: In a single night.

JUDGE FAHEY: Okay. She was - - - was she assigned that night or had she been assigned before? Was she assigned an arraignment or - - -

MR. KUMAR: I do not believe she had any involvement with the case before arraignments.

1 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counsel. Let's 2 hear from your adversary and then you'll have 3 rebuttal. 4 Counsel? 5 MS. RENO: May it please the court, Catherine Reno for the Office of the Bronx District 6 7 Attorney. 8 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counsel, how could 9 they - - - how could the first trial - - - how could 10 the - - - the razor blade issue not have been 11 determined when they - - - when they throw out the -12 - - a burglary one and - - - and leave two? 13 MS. RENO: Well, there are any number of reasons, one of which - - -14 15 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yeah, but what's 16 their reason - - - what's the reasoning that would 17 allow the razor blade to be introduced in the second trial? 18 19 MS. RENO: Well, defendant has a very heavy 20 burden. He has to establish that they necessarily 21 decided, not that they probably decided, not that 22 they liked - - -23 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What else could they 2.4 have decided in that situation, when you know what

one requires and you know what two requires?

MS. RENO: Well, what they could have - - -1 one of the things they could have decided is that 2 3 this razor, in this - - - the way it was used, wasn't 4 a dangerous instrument. That was a factual 5 determination to be made by the jury. The razor was in evidence. It was a dull - - -6 7 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: The razor wasn't a 8 dangerous instrument? 9 MS. RENO: It - - -10 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: In this particular 11 context? MS. RENO: Yes, there was testimony from 12 13 Nunez saying that it was against her ne - - it was being held against her neck. When defendant was 14 15 punched, she didn't even sustain a scratch. And - -16 17 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: If I had a razor against my neck, I might think that that's a 18 dangerous instrument. 19 20 MS. RENO: Sure, but they - - - the jury 21 heard testament - - - testimony otherwise, and in 22 summations, defense counsel again said, oh, it's 23 miraculous that she had this - - - this supposed 2.4 razor to her neck and yet she doesn't have a scratch,

25

that sort of a thing.

	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Well, let's assume
2	it's a razor, not a supposed razor.
3	MS. RENO: And exactly, but it
4	she didn't even have a scratch; therefore it's very
5	plausible that the jury thought that this wasn't
6	actually
7	JUDGE RIVERA: Isn't it plausible they
8	don't they don't believe that Mr I
9	forgot his name Valenzuela went at
10	at the defendant, while the razor's at her neck, and
11	that's why you don't have what you call the "nick".
12	MS. RENO: That's possible. I mean, there
13	are
14	JUDGE RIVERA: They don't have to believe
15	everything they say, right?
16	MS. RENO: No.
17	JUDGE RIVERA: They can take whatever
18	the can believe whatever part they want to believe -
19	
20	MS. RENO: Exactly, the point being that it
21	that defendant hasn't I isn't able
22	to show that they wouldn't they necessarily
23	decided this. If it's
24	JUDGE RIVERA: But your whole wasn't
25	vour whole wasn't your whole theory that he was

1 using a dangerous weapon? That's your entire theory 2 of that case. 3 MS. RENO: That he was using a weapon and 4 that was how he gained entry. But that is for the 5 jury to decide whether this was an actual dangerous instrument. Unlike in - - - in - - - excuse me, in 6 7 O'Toole, where there was an element of a firearm 8 being displayed, it just had - - - the jury just had 9 to find that something resembling a firearm or that 10 appeared to be a firearm was displayed, not that it 11 actually was a firearm. 12 Here, one of the elements was that this 13 razor actually constituted a dangerous instrument. 14 And looking at the court's instructions of what a 15 dangerous instrument was, something readily capable 16 of causing death or serious physical injury in the -17 - - in the manner it's used. JUDGE RIVERA: So how - - - how? Cutting 18 your vein or - - - how was - - -19 20 MS. RENO: It's - - - it is pos - - - of 21 course, it's possible, but it is also very possible that this jury - - -22 23 JUDGE FAHEY: So it's more credible say 2.4

that it couldn't have been a dangerous gun than it

could have been a razor that wasn't sharp enough to -

1 - - to hurt you? MS. RENO: Well, the element is - - - it -2 3 - - it was different. It was just display of - - -4 of something that appeared to be a firearm versus 5 that this razor actually constituted a dangerous 6 instrument. 7 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So then how would you use the razor blade in the - - - in the next trial? 8 9 MS. RENO: I - - -10 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: In other words, what 11 would be the - - - the contentions after the - - -12 the burglary one is - - - is thrown out. What's - -13 - what's the contention about the razor blade that 14 makes any sense, given what you're saying that it's 15 not a dangerous instrument? 16 MS. RENO: Well, the People are - - - would 17 be unable to prove their case and their - - - the witness' story without the razor blade is - - - is 18 19 It's laughable that some guy comes into an 20 apartment building midday in an open lobby, grabs a 21 woman with one hand, and she's - - -CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: And with the - - -22 23 and with the razor blade? 2.4 MS. RENO: And with the razor blade it 25 makes a lot of sense, because these people are

1 terrified. This woman has a very traumatic 2 experience of having a blade against her throat, that's how defendant is able to push his way into the 3 4 apartment with absolutely no resistance. 5 JUDGE RIVERA: So why does Valenzuela lunge at her? 6 7 MS. RENO: I'm sorry? JUDGE RIVERA: What - - - what makes that 8 9 credible? Why is Valenzuela lunging at her if 10 there's a blade to her throat? 11 MS. RENO: Because he's - - -12 JUDGE RIVERA: He's going to kill her. 13 MS. RENO: He's - - - he's scared for the -14 - - you know, his wife. He's trying to protect her. 15 It's his gut reaction. JUDGE RIVERA: How is that when she's got a 16 17 razor blade - - - your theory of the case, razor blade right at her throat; she's - - - she testified 18 19 I'm scared to death. 20 MS. RENO: Right, and that was his gut 21 reaction was, I'm - - - I'm scared that he's going to 22 kill this - - - the woman who I love, and so that was 23 his gut reaction was - - - was punching. It doesn't 2.4 - - - that's - - - that was his testimony.

JUDGE RIVERA: Well, one could potentially

1 say, I mean, he'll slip - - - and slip - - -2 JUDGE FAHEY: Can we - - -3 JUDGE RIVERA: - - - slip and slit her 4 throat, it doesn't really make that must sense, does 5 it? 6 MS. RENO: That was his testimony. 7 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counsel, what about the - - - the other issue with the - - - the counsel 8 9 as a witness? 10 MS. RENO: This was completely appropriate 11 in this case. The - - - under - - -JUDGE FAHEY: Yeah, can we talk a little 12 13 bit about this, because just let me - - - counsel 14 comes in. You arraign thirty people in - - - in an 15 I don't know. Let's say, you're - - - you're 16 arraigning thirty people. Someone you've never 17 talked to before. You talk to him for two seconds. You come up and you give a version of events that is 18 inaccurate. It's not under oath. It's not been the 19 20 product of any stipulation before by anyone else. 21 It's not the product of any sworn statement. You may 22 not even have the papers in front of you. 23 Yet, you want to use that as if it's a 2.4 prior sworn statement or testimonial evidence to

impeach a - - - a defendant. Doesn't that seem to be

-- well, first off, it's a little unfair. My --- my friend Judge Lippman is - - - is one of the few of us up here who always talks about fairness, and this really does seem to be a bit unfair. I think he's right on that point. MS. RENO: Well, counsel there - - -defense counsel was speaking as an officer of the court, and she made very clear that this was based on

her conversation with defendant only.

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JUDGE STEIN: Talking about unfair, why wasn't this raised before the trial began, that you were going to bring this in?

MS. RENO: The People didn't have the minutes yet. The People, as soon as they received the minutes, disclosed them to the court.

JUDGE PIGOTT: Which is the third leg of this thing. I - - I'm surprised, as - - as professionals and as lawyers, you wouldn't say to her, you know, by the way, we're going to bring up the fact that - - that your client told you at arraignment what he said. I mean, why wouldn't you tip him off?

MS. RENO: It's - - - it's my understanding that - - - that the prosecutor in this case hadn't ever ordered the arraignment minutes, and then this

1	similar situation happened in a trial that his
2	colleague was handling, and he thought, oh, I should
3	check out the arraignment minutes in this case.
4	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So once this
5	MS. RENO: So he ordered them
6	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Once once this
7	happened, the horse is out the barn. Why not a
8	mistrial?
9	MS. RENO: Well, first of all there was no
LO	need for a mistrial. The stipulation was able to
L1	solve any any problems here.
L2	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: The stipulation cured
L3	the problem?
L4	MS. RENO: Yes.
L5	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: You say this and I
L6	say that
L7	JUDGE FAHEY: Oh, don't
L8	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: and that's it.
L9	JUDGE FAHEY: It couldn't have. All it did
20	was reiterate the statement that was in the record.
21	So you stipulate to the record, but that doesn't take
22	away the unfairness of the of what's being
23	offered in proof.
24	MS. RENO: It's it's not unfair. His
25	his coun his counsel made clear that she

1	was representing what he had told her. She said, my						
2	understanding from Mr. Ortiz is. She didn't say I						
3	have						
4	JUDGE STEIN: She didn't give an						
5	explanation for that, and her her whole						
6	credibility, even with the stipulation and the way it						
7	was used and the way it was referred to by the						
8	People, left her credibility about her her						
9	reasoning wide open for the jury.						
10	MS. RENO: Her credibility wasn't at issue						
11	here.						
12	JUDGE PIGOTT: Yes, it was.						
13	JUDGE STEIN: Yeah, it was.						
14	JUDGE RIVERA: How could it be?						
15	MS. RENO: That's what the trial court						
16	found.						
17	JUDGE RIVERA: She says she says, I						
18	am incorrect; that's not what he told me. I made a						
19	mistake. And then you go and attack well, not						
20	you, the the prosecutor at the trial goes and						
21	attacks her, suggests she's perjuring herself.						
22	MS. RENO: She's not perjuring herself,						
23	this is it's up to the jury to decide. And						
24	- and the trial was right						
25	JUDGE RIVERA: Decide what? She says I was						

wrong. That is not what he told me. And then the 1 People at - - at trial say, well, it's up to you to 2 3 decide whether or not that's true or - - or false. 4 MS. RENO: Well, the People didn't have to 5 agree that she made a mistake. There's absolutely no conclusive evidence that she made a mistake. 6 7 JUDGE RIVERA: Exactly. You're putting her 8 credibility at issue when you do that. 9 MS. RENO: It was not - - -10 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Why wasn't counsel 11 relieved? Why wasn't relieved at that point? MS. RENO: She wasn't relieved because she 12 didn't need to be relieved. It was - - - it wasn't a 13 big - - - she - - -14 15 JUDGE FAHEY: Someone's statement is in 16 evidence and they - - - they cannot be called to 17 testify, because she's ongoing counsel. Didn't she have to be relieved? 18 19 MS. RENO: No. She didn't have to be 2.0 relieved. The stipulation protected her credibility 21 in the sense that she wasn't - - - she wasn't 22 subjected to cross-examination. She didn't have to 23 explain why she made a mistake - - -2.4 JUDGE PIGOTT: If halfway - - -25 MS. RENO: - - - or how she remembered

this.

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JUDGE PIGOTT: II haliway through the
the trial, the the People were going to put on
a police officer and for some reason he got the date
wrong or he came in late. And the DA said to the
defense lawyer, yeah, Bonehead, you know, got the
wrong courtroom. Can can the defense then,
when the police officer gets on, he says, isn't it
true that your nickname is Bonehead? I mean,
wouldn't that be unfair?

MS. RENO: I - - - I suppose in that situation it would be unfair, but here, counsel was making this representation to gain a favorable ruling. Saying that the understanding comes from defendant himself gives it a certain gravitas, and he - - counsel was trying to get a favorable bail ruling here. So I think that's very different - - -

JUDGE FAHEY: So let's say that's true.

MS. RENO: - - - in this context.

JUDGE FAHEY: Then it's argument. And sometimes arguments aren't entirely accurate. Some - - - that happens all the time, right? We all - - - MS. RENO: Sure.

JUDGE FAHEY: It happens all the time in the profession. So that being the case, it's not a

1	factual assertion. Once again, it's simply a form of
2	advocacy. If we punish advocacy, how are people
3	going to be able to effectively do their job?
4	MS. RENO: Here, it was the the
5	stipulation allowed
6	JUDGE FAHEY: Do you see the dangers of
7	this rule that that you're pushing? The danger
8	of the rule is, is that we take when people
9	- when advocates come in and push the limits of what
10	the truth is or what the facts are, and we start
11	punishing them in in a situation where they're
12	advocating, not where they're signing a statement or
13	giving something under oath, we we're creating
14	a really dangerous precedent.
15	MS. RENO: Well, the otherwise,
16	defense attorneys will be able to misrepresent or lie
17	to the courts to get a favorable
18	JUDGE PIGOTT: Oh, stop. You know, I
19	I have it on a pretty good authority that defense
20	attorneys are about as honorable as district
21	attorneys.
22	MS. RENO: Okay, well, then, I'll end on -
23	
24	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: You agree to that,
25	don't you agree to that, counsel?

1	JUDGE PIGOTT: Yeah, can we can we
2	concede that?
3	MS. RENO: Oh, sure, certainly.
4	JUDGE FAHEY: She can concede that.
5	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay.
6	MS. RENO: Absolutely, but I if I can
7	just make
8	JUDGE RIVERA: Well, as a general
9	proposition, you're just questioning you're
10	impugning her in this case. That's all.
11	MS. RENO: Just if I can make one final
12	point.
13	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: One quick point,
14	counsel.
15	MS. RENO: This all of this that she
16	made a mistake was presented to the jury. And it was
17	up to the jury to decide
18	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: We we
19	understand that that's your position.
20	MS. RENO: whether or not this even
21	mattered. Okay.
22	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, we get it.
23	MS. RENO: Thank you, Your Honor.
24	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Thank you.
25	Counselor, rebuttal?

1 MR. KUMAR: Yes, Your Honor. No one disputed at the first trial that the razor was a 2 3 dangerous instrument. You can look at the summations. You can look at - - -4 5 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Your adversary says that it's near the throat but it did - - -6 7 miraculously there's no damage, so not a dangerous instrument. 8 9 JUDGE PIGOTT: Your Honor, the judge 10 basically instructed the jury that this involved use of a dangerous instrument, in this case, a razor. 11 12 JUDGE PIGOTT: But you're not going to get 13 14 MR. KUMAR: No one - - -15 JUDGE PIGOTT: You're not going to get convicted of rob one or burglary first or whatever 16 17 there's - - - in the second trial. MR. KUMAR: It's not just about the - - -18 19 the pure double jeopardy concerns. It's - - -20 collateral estoppel is recognized because there is 21 unfairness in forcing a defendant - - -22 JUDGE PIGOTT: You can argue prejudice, but 23 I - - - I - - - yeah, I don't get the collateral 2.4 estoppel on a - - - on a simple issue of fact like 25 this. I - - -

1	MR. KUMAR: Well, Your Honor, O'Toole					
2	controls here. And					
3	JUDGE PIGOTT: Regrettably.					
4	MR. KUMAR: And this court has established					
5	since Acevedo					
6	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Your argument is they					
7	throw out the burglary one, that's the end of the					
8	razor blade, period?					
9	MR. KUMAR: Correct. And in addition, the					
10	the rob					
11	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: The robbery, yeah.					
12	JUDGE PIGOTT: I don't I don't					
13	remember whether they had did they have the					
14	razor blade at the first trial?					
15	MR. KUMAR: Yes.					
16	JUDGE PIGOTT: Okay. Because because					
17	I was thinking of a scenario where they they					
18	find the weapon afterwards or there are facts that					
19	now become known that were not known at the time of					
20	the first trial. Are they nevertheless precluded					
21	from introducing that evidence?					
22	MR. KUMAR: That would be a very difficult					
23	and and complicated case. I think that'd be a					
24	very specific case-by-case evaluation.					
25	JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, it wouldn't be					

1	collateral estoppel is my point. You you'd
2	- if they did not have the razor at the first trial
3	and nevertheless tried to argue dangerous instrument
4	and they lost, and then they said, we found the
5	instrument, and it's it turns out it's a
6	straight razor and it is pretty dangerous, and we
7	want to we want to use that even though we
8	can't convict of robbery first. Could they do it?
9	MR. KUMAR: Perhaps, because the first
10	jury's verdict wouldn't stand as a definitive
11	rejection of that version of events.
12	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counsel.
13	MR. KUMAR: Thank you, Your Honor.
14	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Thank you both.
15	Appreciate it.
16	(Court is adjourned)
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CERTIFICATION

I, Karen Schiffmiller, certify that the foregoing transcript of proceedings in the Court of Appeals of People v. Luis Ortiz, No. 201, was prepared using the required transcription equipment and is a true and accurate record of the proceedings.

Hour Laboffmille.

Signature:		

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