1	COURT OF APPEALS
2	STATE OF NEW YORK
3	
4	PEOPLE,
5	Respondent,
6	-against-
7	No. 76 LEROY CARVER,
8	Appellant.
9	
10	20 Eagle Street Albany, New York 12207
11	April 26, 2016
12	Before:
13	CHIEF JUDGE JANET DIFIORE ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE F. PIGOTT, JR.
14	ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA ASSOCIATE JUDGE SHEILA ABDUS-SALAAM
15	ASSOCIATE JUDGE LESLIE E. STEIN ASSOCIATE JUDGE MICHAEL J. GARCIA
16	Appearances:
17	JANET C. SOMES, ESQ.
18	MONROE COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER'S OFFICE Attorneys for Appellant
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20	SCOTT M. MYLES, ADA
21	MONROE COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE Attorneys for Respondent
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24	
25	Meir Sabbah Official Court Transcriber

1 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Number 76 on the 2 calendar, People v. Leroy Carver. 3 MS. SOMES: Good afternoon. May I please have three minutes for rebuttal? 4 5 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Certainly. 6 MS. SOMES: May it please the court, Janet 7 Somes on behalf of Leroy Carver. 8 The most sig - - - among the most significant of 9 the errors by counsel in this case, is his failure to move 10 for suppression of key evidence taken from Mr. Carver's 11 pockets and his person after what the rec - - - trial 12 record shows was an unlawful arrest. 13 JUDGE STEIN: Would that have helped him with - - - with the - - - the evidence that was found 14 15 in the vehicle? 16 MS. SOMES: Would that - - - I think what 17 we have is two - - - we have two things. We have the search of him after the arrest, and then we have the 18 19 evidence in the vehicle. 20 JUDGE STEIN: We do, but if he had 21 succeeded, theoretically, in having the items found 22 on his person suppressed, would that have helped him 23 in any way with the items in the vehicle? MS. SOMES: I think at trial, it would have 2.4

helped him, but I can't say that it would help him -

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JUDGE STEIN: How would that have helped him?

MS. SOMES: Because the items that were taken from his - - - the camera and the Avon lip balm were items that were taken specifically and directly from him. That was the direct link to Mr. Carver in the burglary. Other - - -

JUDGE STEIN: If you believe his story, it was no more connected to him than the other - - - the other things in the vehicle.

MS. SOMES: Well, I think that when you put it that way, if you believed his story, the having those items on his person, that gave an additional hurdle that he had to clear with the jury. There is an - - you know, they had to not only believe that he wasn't in the car or that he wasn't there, but he had to explain away this really devastating evidence that was found in his pocket, and that - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: Undermining his defense, his version of what occurred.

MS. SOMES: Yes. Yes, exactly.

JUDGE GARCIA: Counsel, and just to Judge Stein's point, there seemed to be some confusion at the Appellate Division over what your argument was.

Whether it was failure to make a motion to contest 1 2 the legality of the vehicle stop, that Judge Stein 3 was talking about, or was it the stop, the frisk, and the personal items recovered. So what is the 4 5 position here? MS. SOMES: Our position below was that 6 7 they - - - the attorney was ineffective for not making a suppression motion. What I did was I took 8 9 the strongest argument I thought, which was the 10 unlawful arrest, and really focused on that. What 11 the dissent then saw, they saw my argument globally; 12 and that is what I am arguing here today. 13 The arrest part of it, the unlawful arrest, I think on this trial record, we - - - it's not a 14 15 close issue. I think it's indisputable that this was 16 an unlawful arrest. 17 JUDGE GARCIA: So to go back, just - - you are arguing ineffective for failure to move to 18 19 suppress on - - -2.0 MS. SOMES: Absolute - - -21 JUDGE GARCIA: - - - based on a vehicle 22 stop. 23 MS. SOMES: Yes, absolutely.

JUDGE GARCIA: Okay. So what in this
record indicates that anything was missed, with the

respect to the vehicle stop? I mean, there is - - for example in another case we had, there was an
inventory saying there was no crack in the
windshield, or not noting it, or - - is there
anything here that would indicate that there was a
reason that this stop would be suspect?

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MS. SOMES: Absolutely. There is a - - - there is a colorable basis on this record to show that there is - - - that a suppression motion should have been asked for, and would have been granted.

What we have was, the officer had testified that the - - - he was in a park - - - he was in a parking lot, and - - - or he was on the road when a car came out of the parking lot. And it was - - - came out of the parking lot in the dark, and it is actually in back of him. He then pulls over and lets the car go around him, and then he follows the car for almost a mile.

During that time, it's dark, and the cars are moving, and it seems to me that there is a good basis to really challenge, did the officer see what he contended that he saw. Also, there is a basis to look at what the officer actually testified to at the trial. He said that there was a sticker on the windshield, and that there was something hanging from

the rearview mirror. Those are not - - -

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JUDGE STEIN: But is there any evidence that that wasn't the case, if there wasn't a sticker on the windshield, and that there was nothing hanging from the mirror?

MS. SOMES: No, because we didn't have a hearing. And that wasn't - - - that would not have been the focus of the trial; that would have been the focus of a hearing. But when you look at what the officer said, he said that, you know, these things were hanging there.

That doesn't - - - that's not a vehicle and traffic violation unless there is a little bit more about what's hanging there. First of all, it has to be obscuring the view of the driver. And then there is also, you know, stickers can be on the windshield in certain places.

So we don't have any of that, we just have the officer's conclusory belief that there may have been a vehicle and traffic violation. We don't have specifics that show that it was. It's not like the cracked windshield in the last case where, yes, it's a cracked windshield or it's not. Here, he did not give enough information to really be able to determine.

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record. 587 of the record is a photograph, People's Exhibit number 1, which shows the car. And the car - - - that photograph does - - - it shows a little something hanging from the rearview mirror, maybe, but it doesn't show any stickers; it doesn't show anything else.

But I would point you to page 587 of the

So I think on this record, we can't conclude that the officer was correct when he says he stopped for a vehicle and traffic violation, because we don't know that the windsh - - - that the driver's - - - from his perspective, that the - - - his view was obstructed.

JUDGE GARCIA: So then going to the stop.

The officer could make an investigatory stop, right,
you don't have to have probable cause to arrest.

Let's say he makes an investigatory stop, does a patdown, finds these items. What in the record
indicates - - I mean, he sees these items in the

car - - I mean, assuming the stop is okay, he sees
the items in the car, they're acting very nervously,
they give him a false name, they give him a false
story about they were, and one guy takes off with a
bag.

And this door is open when he goes there,

1	and the seat belt is off on your client's side of the
2	car. What is there any indication he didn't have the
3	basis at that point to do a stop and frisk?
4	MS. SOMES: Because at that point, he
5	first of all, he had no report of a crime whatsoever.
6	The he knows that the driver has just fled, and
7	the driver could flee for a bunch of reasons.
8	JUDGE GARCIA: But let's say he's covered
9	in blood, but you don't have a report of a murder.
10	MS. SOMES: And there was a case, and I
11	can't remember what that case was, but we don't have
12	that, because that was kind of, this is an exigency,
13	you know, there is something going on here, and
14	somebody might be in we don't have that.
15	JUDGE GARCIA: Like a bag full of stuff
16	with gloves on top, and somebody taking off from the
17	car.
18	MS. SOMES: That's not that's not
19	probable cause to arrest, and what we had here was -
20	
21	JUDGE GARCIA: But is it probable is
22	it enough to be able to stop him and take him in for
23	investigatory an investigatory stop?
24	MS. SOMES: No. No, it's not. Because

what we know from People vs. Battaglia is that you

cannot look at - - - you know, some things that might kind of be suspicious, or just a messy car, we can't look at that and then hold the defendant - - - arrest him, hold him, while you go off and look for a crime.

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Here what we had, we had an - - - almost an hour between the time of the traffic stop and when the burglary was actually discovered by the homeowner. So under Battaglia, you know, this is just - - this is so far outside the bounds of what this court has held - - -

JUDGE GARCIA: So given all these facts in this case, the officer should have let him go.

MS. SOMES: I'm not saying the officer should have let him go. I'm saying that there was enough on this trial record to show an unlawful arrest, and that that should have resulted in a suppression motion being made by counsel.

JUDGE RIVERA: If he says the coat is not his, nothing in the coat is his, why does he have standing to argue about this?

MS. SOMES: Because it's the fruit of an unlawful arrest. If you look at - - and then to go back to Hicks, I just wanted to kind of clarify that in Hicks, you know, that was a investigatory detention which was lawful, where they knew a crime

had occurred, they knew the witnesses were right around the corner, and they could dispel or confirm their suspicion quickly.

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We don't have any of that. What we've got is, Mr. Carver being handcuffed, put in the back of a police car, and sitting there, and then taken to the station, while we still don't have a crime.

JUDGE STEIN: Another question, if he had - if he was successful in suppressing the coat and
its contents, couldn't the People have used that to
impeach him if he testified?

MS. SOMES: I don't believe so. I think that possibly his testimony could have opened the door to that, but I don't believe that the - - - that the - - - that it could have been otherwise used.

JUDGE STEIN: Well, if his testimony is as it was, and it appears to be the only real defense he could - - he could mount, was, you know, I didn't know what was going on, I just woke up and, you know, there I was, then why wouldn't that open the door to saying, well, jeez, we're wearing the coat, and it had - - it had the camera and the lip balm in it.

MS. SOMES: I think when you look at - - - I think it's U.S. v. Havens, Supreme Court case where this issue was - - - was decided. And what the

1 Supreme Court did in that case was they really looked 2 at what the testimony was. And the testimony had to 3 be pretty specific to, you know, find that the door had been open. And I don't think that with such 4 5 general denial of, you know, I woke up in the car, I don't know what happens; I don't think it gets to 6 7 that point. 8 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, counsel. 9 MS. SOMES: Thank you. 10 MR. MYLES: Good afternoon, Your Honors. 11 Scott Myles for the People. The defendant in this case did receive 12 13 meaningful representation, and although defense counsel 14 did make some errors, his representation did not fall 15 below the standard of reasonable competence. 16 The suppression motion in this case had little 17 to no chance of success. Therefore, the defense counsel 18 is not - - -19 JUDGE PIGOTT: Why is that? What was - - -20 what was his - - - what was his reason for stopping 21 the car? 22 MR. MYLES: Your Honor, based on the very 23 little amount that is in the record - - - there is

nothing in the record to indicate that there would

have been any grounds for challenging the actual stop

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1	of the vehicle.
2	JUDGE PIGOTT: Do do you know why he
3	stopped him?
4	MR. MYLES: He's testified that he saw an
5	object, a sticker in the windshield, and also an
6	object hanging from the rearview mirror, obstructing
7	
8	JUDGE PIGOTT: It's not like a pretextual
9	stop to you?
10	MR. MYLES: Potentially, Your Honor, but -
11	
12	JUDGE PIGOTT: So if it was potentially,
13	wouldn't it be a good idea to maybe bring a motion
14	and see if the court would agree?
15	MR. MYLES: If possibly, Your Honor;
16	but that's not the standard that we need to look at.
17	The standard is whether or not that motion would have
18	had a chance of success.
19	JUDGE PIGOTT: And if someone says, you
20	know, the whatever was hanging was
21	inconsequential, and the sticker was not within the
22	range of the driver, it gets suppressed, right?
23	MR. MYLES: It again, there the
24	testimony of the officer leads gives no
25	indication that that would have been the case that

1 it would have resulted in suppression. JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Is that the standard 2 3 that this court has articulated, counsel, little chance of success, or is it that there has to be 4 5 colorable claim? MR. MYLES: Well, the standard is that 6 7 attorney is not ineffective if the motion would have had little to no chance of success. I - - - it's - -8 9 - in this case, at least - - at least as it applies 10 to this case, the distinction between that and 11 whether or not it's a colorable claim is really a distinction without a difference. In this case, the 12 13 suppression motion would not have had - - - or excuse me, would have had little to no chance of success, 14 15 therefore the failure - - -JUDGE PIGOTT: Why is that? 16 17 MR. MYLES: I'm sorry, Your Honor? JUDGE PIGOTT: Why - - - why would it have 18 19 had little or no chance of success? 2.0 MR. MYLES: Because based on the 21 information that is in the record, the stop was a 22 lawful stop. 23 JUDGE PIGOTT: In what - - - what sense? 2.4 Was there testimony as to the size of the thing that

was dangling, and the - - - and where the sticker

was?

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MR. MYLES: There was not, but there was testimony that there were objects obscuring the driver's view, and that that would constitute a violation of the vehicle and traffic law.

JUDGE PIGOTT: I just think that ought to be challenge. I - - - I'm not judging this case right now, you know, we've had so many seatbelt violation stops, you know, and I - - - which is fine, but I mean, then - - - then all kinds of things are found in cars, and I get that.

And then someone has got a rosary hanging from their rearview mirror, and that's okay to stop; you can stop somebody for that. And I don't know, it just seems to me at some point there ought to be somebody challenging this stuff and saying, it's not obstructing the driver; stop doing this. And this may have the case, that's all I'm saying.

MR. MYLES: Potentially, Your Honor.

But I would also note, Your Honor, that that argument was essentially unargued at the Fourth Department. Appellant's argument at the Fourth Department focused almost exclusively on the property that was found as a result of the detention and the search of the defendant.

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And as was thoroughly argued in that case at the court below, the property that was recovered was not recovered as the result of an arrest; it was simply detention. And based on the facts as they

JUDGE STEIN: Well, don't - - - don't you think they had a pretty good argument that it was arrest? I mean, he testified that they ordered him out of the car at gunpoint, that, you know, that he was handcuffed, he was - - - he was put into the police car, and - - - and then there was testimony that the other officer was writing up what they would normally right up after an arrest. I mean, that's -

MR. MYLES: There was - - -

JUDGE STEIN: That's some evidence, isn't it?

MR. MYLES: There was testimony about the prisoner data report that was being collected in the car. But the testimony as to when that occurred was not clear. And again, we have - - - that officer, who was taking a prisoner data report, did testify that there was a number of things that were going on in the investigation prior to him doing that.

There was the search for the driver of the

vehicle who had fled, there was the tow of the 1 2 vehicle, there were a number of things going on. 3 at some point during that, there was the 9-1-1 call 4 from the home owner reporting that a crime had 5 occurred. 6 JUDGE RIVERA: But when it gets stopped for 7 the VTL - - - supposed VTL violation, could - - -8 he's the passenger, could he walk away? He's not the 9 driver, it's not his car; could he walk away? 10 MR. MYLES: At the - - - at the point that 11 he was stopped? 12 JUDGE RIVERA: Car stopped, yeah. 13 MR. MYLES: Without any other information, 14 potentially. 15 JUDGE RIVERA: Correct. 16 MR. MYLES: Potentially, yes. However, 17 that's not what occurred. What did occur prior to 18 him - - - prior to the driver fleeing, was both the 19 defendant and the driver gave, what the officer knew 20 was false statements. They lied to him regarding 21 where they were coming from and what they had been 22 doing. They give false names, the officer - - -23 JUDGE RIVERA: And then that's connected to the VTL violation how? 2.4

MR. MYLES: I - - -

1 JUDGE RIVERA: With respect to him as the 2 passenger. 3 MR. MYLES: Well, it's leading the officer to a reasonable suspicion that the defendant was 4 5 involved in a crime. JUDGE PIGOTT: If that was true, and then 6 7 they pulled a gun, put him in the back of the car in 8 handcuffs, when - - - when were they going to arrest 9 him? 10 MR. MYLES: When they knew that a crime had 11 in fact occurred. When that - - -12 JUDGE PIGOTT: So he hadn't been arrested, 13 he - - - you know, at that point he was free to leave. He could say, take these handcuffs off, I've 14 15 got to go to a meeting. 16 MR. MYLES: He was not free to leave at 17 that point, Your Honor. He was being detained; he was being detained so the officer could further his 18 19 investigation. 20 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: But how long could 21 they detain him? How - - - this was about an hour, I 22 think, before there was a report of a crime. Could 23 they have detained him for more than an hour, less 2.4 than an hour; how long could they detain him before

we would consider or you would consider that an

1	arrest?
2	MR. MYLES: That is not clear. I think
3	more than an hour is a reasonable amount of time.
4	Given
5	JUDGE PIGOTT: If it's unclear, shouldn't
6	there have been a motion of some sort maybe addressed
7	to that issue?
8	MR. MYLES: Again, Your Honor, we have to
9	look at whether or not that motion would've had any
10	chance of success.
11	JUDGE PIGOTT: It sound like you're saying
12	it might have been
13	MR. MYLES: Well, what
14	JUDGE PIGOTT: we don't know the
15	answer to a lot of questions.
16	MR. MYLES: What I what I was going
17	to say, Your Honor
18	JUDGE PIGOTT: I'm sorry.
19	MR. MYLES: is that I don't think an
20	hour would fall within any risky amount of time. And
21	again
22	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: You say more than an
23	hour.
24	MR. MYLES: I I would say more than
25	given I think you would have to look at the

specific facts and circumstances in each individual cache - - - in each individual case. And in this case, the officer had a great deal of suspicion that a crime had been committed.

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JUDGE RIVERA: Well, what's the crime, he as the passenger, has committed? What - - - what's the suspicion about his - - - his possible criminal act?

MR. MYLES: That he had the same connection as the driver to the property that was in the car.

JUDGE RIVERA: I'm the cop, I looked in the back of the car, the driver and the passenger have given me wrong information about their names, they are little bit nervous and agitated, the driver just ran out; that's enough for me to stop the passenger at that point.

 $$\operatorname{MR}.$$ MYLES: Well, again Your Honor, the driver did run away and - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: (Indiscernible).

MR. MYLES: When the officer got back to the car, in his view, the passenger was in the process of also attempting to run. His seat belt was off, he was in the process of opening the door; he was in the process of attempting to flee just like the driver had. So at that point, both the driver

1 and the passenger have equal culpability as far as 2 the property that's been - - -3 JUDGE RIVERA: So if the driver had lied, 4 and the defendant, the passenger refused to answer, 5 could he have gotten up and walked away, or is there now suspicion also? 6 7 MR. MYLES: At - - -JUDGE RIVERA: Or refuses to answer; he has 8 9 a right not to answer, yeah? 10 MR. MYLES: Refuses to answer the officer 11 as to who he is? JUDGE RIVERA: Correct. 12 13 MR. MYLES: Again, at the point that the 14 officer looks in the car and sees the property, sees 15 the screwdriver, the gloves, the other property, I 16 think at that point - - -17 JUDGE RIVERA: Assumes it's not theirs because they've lied; is that why? 18 19 MR. MYLES: Given - - -20 JUDGE RIVERA: People never put things in 21 the back seat? MR. MYLES: Given the location of the 22 23 vehicle, the time of day, the other property that he 2.4 sees, the gloves, the screwdriver, the items that - -25

1 JUDGE RIVERA: Where's the screwdriver? 2 MR. MYLES: I'm sorry, Your Honor. 3 JUDGE RIVERA: Where's the screwdriver? MR. MYLES: I believe the screwdriver was -4 5 - - I apologize; I believe the screwdriver wasn't found until after the defendant was detained. 6 7 JUDGE RIVERA: All right. Okay. MR. MYLES: I believe it was in the front 8 9 seat by his feet. But the duffel bag with the gloves 10 and the laptop were in plain view, and again, given 11 the time of day and the location, the officer was 12 reasonable in his further inquiries. 13 And at the point that he did take the defendant - - - that he detained the defendant, 14 15 whether or not the detention at some point would have become a de facto arrest, without the 9-1-1 call 16 17 reporting the actual crime, the property that was recovered from the defendant was recovered 18 19 immediately. It was recovered as soon as he was 20 taken out of the car and the officer frisked the 21 defendant. 22 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: But it looks like 23 there was, you know, there was some suspicion of a 2.4 crime, and you were looking for a suspect or

something to attach to a crime. So you were - - -

there was a - - - you were waiting for a crime to 1 2 happen. 3 MR. MYLES: I think actually, Your Honor, 4 the opposite is true. Is that they had a suspect, 5 and they were looking for the crime. JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: That's what I'm 6 7 saying, you're looking for a crime. 8 MR. MYLES: Yes. They were - - - the 9 officer was trying to determine what the situation 10 was and what was going on. And given the 11 circumstances, given the fact that he - - - the defendant had lied to him, had no identification, had 12 13 in fact given him a false name, it would have been unreasonable for the officer, given that - - - the 14 15 facts as he knew them, to simply let the defendant 16 walk away. 17 JUDGE RIVERA: Because he has a duffel bag and a laptop in the back seat of the car, it's not 18 19 his. 20 MR. MYLES: And was - - - and had lied to 21 the officer, and was attempting to flee. 22 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, counsel. 23 MR. MYLES: Thank you, Your Honors. 2.4 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Counsel. 25 MS. SOMES: Thank you.

1 In People vs. Ryan, this court said thirteen 2 minutes was too long for a lawful investigatory detention. 3 Here, we have far more time - - -4 JUDGE GARCIA: Counsel - - -5 MS. SOMES: - - - and we have circumstances 6 JUDGE GARCIA: Counsel, I'm sorry, excuse 7 8 On that point, on how long, right, isn't the 9 issue here the pat-down? So if they can stop this 10 defendant, and pat him down, and they find this, 11 isn't how long they detain him - - - doesn't that go 12 to whether he makes statements, or what happened 13 subsequent to that? Why would the length of detention after a 14 15 lawful pat-down search affect that issue? 16 MS. SOMES: I guess, I would disagree that 17 it was a lawful pat-down search right away. He - - the - - -18 19 JUDGE GARCIA: But the timing though - - -20 okay. Assume we can argue lawful or not, but don't 21 you go by what the facts are at the time that's done? 22 How would, how long he's detained after, affect the 23 legality of the pat-down? 2.4 MS. SOMES: Because I think when you look

at what happened here in total, it's an unlawful

arrest from the very beginning. The officer said that when he took him into custody, he pat-frisked him. He said that the minute he was starting to open the door, he ordered him out of the car, and at that point he secured him. So what we've got is a full blown arrest, right from the minute that Mr. Carver was ordered out of the car.

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The pat-fr - - - you know, the officer didn't pat-frisk him first and then kind of, you know, talk about things, and eventually decide he was going to handcuff him, and throw him in the back of the car; this was a full blown arrest right from the beginning.

Hicks is the - - - is permissible - - - investigatory detention is permissible because it is so quick to confirm or dispel suspicion. And it is minimal, minimal intrusion; here, we have the maximum intrusion.

Hicks, you had - - - the defendant was allowed to park his car. Defendant was told, you know what, if these people don't identify you, you're going to be released, and so there was an expectation of a release. So Hicks, there wasn't a - - - an arrest by any means; here, this was a full-blown arrest. And so this is far outside the circumstances

of Hicks.

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And I'd just like to point out, or say - - respond to one of Judge Pigott's questions. You know,
this is an adversarial process, and my client is entitled
to challenge the evidence. If we are in a position where
every time the police say, jeez, you know, I stopped him
for a V & T because, you know, I thought he was going too
fast, and, you know - - - does that take the ability to
def - - to challenge the evidence away from the
defendant?

And here, what we have, we have, clearly this record shows that there was a basis to make the motion, and I don't think that, you know, we have to show that we would win the motion, but there was certainly a basis to make it, and if the attorney here had made the motion, we're not sure what would happen. And that's why I think in Bilal, what we've got is, you know - - - waiting for the Bilal decision to come out, because I thought maybe that would give me a little bit of guidance here. But I think what the court in Bilal did was, it recognized that without a hearing, we don't know, and there is a lot - - -

JUDGE STEIN: Yeah, but in Bilal, the officer's testimony, there was something on the record that cast out as to, you know, what the circumstances were. Here, there, you know, there is

just nothing on the record that would cast any doubt to the legality of the stop. MS. SOMES: To the le - - I - - and I think that when you look at the photograph - - - and there is an argument that could have been made here. And I think when you look at the photograph, you consider that this wasn't in the dark. You know, we shouldn't always have to just take the officer's word for that, especially here when his word doesn't exactly constitute a vehicle and traffic violation. And just one, if I could just mention the sentencing here, my client was - - - had years of his life on the line, and the attorney did not say anything on his behalf. He basically said, Judge, you heard the evidence and, you know, you know where we stood on it. CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, counsel. (Court is adjourned)

1	CERTIFICATION
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3	I, Meir Sabbah, certify that the foregoing
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