1	COURT OF APPEALS
2	STATE OF NEW YORK
3	DEODI E
4	PEOPLE,
5	Respondent,
6	-against- No. 86
7	MARTESHA DAVIDSON,
8	Defendant-Appellant.
9	20 Eagle Street
LO	Albany, New York 12207 April 26, 2016
	Before:
L1	ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE F. PIGOTT, JR. ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA
L2	ASSOCIATE JUDGE SHEILA ABDUS-SALAAM ASSOCIATE JUDGE LESLIE E. STEIN
L3	ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE M. FAHEY ASSOCIATE JUDGE MICHAEL J. GARCIA
L4	Appearances:
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JUDGE PIGOTT: Chief Judge DiFiore is 1 2 recused in this particular case, People v. Martesha 3 Davidson. Mr. Lalonde, welcome. 4 5 MR. LALONDE: Thank you, Judge. Good afternoon. Robert Lalonde for Martesha Davidson. 6 7 This case is about the power of the special prosecutor that was created - - -8 9 JUDGE PIGOTT: Would you like any rebuttal 10 times? 11 MR. LALONDE: I'm sorry - - - no. Thank 12 you. 13 Special prosecutor which was created by the 14 Protection of People with Special Needs Act - - - yes. 15 JUDGE RIVERA: So counsel, did - - - did 16 defense counsel relow - - - excuse me, below attack 17 the Constitutionality of the statute? MR. LALONDE: Well, Your Honor, I think he 18 19 did. He filed a letter of motion to dismiss, and in 20 that letter of motion, he did cite three points. 21 point 1 was that it was only the locally elected DA 22 who's got the power under the New York Constitution 23 to prosecute. 2.4 And then he went on to make two other

points, one was there is no probable cause to arrest,

1 and then the third point was challenging the power of 2 the special prosecutor to appear in the local court. 3 And it was - - - it was that - - -JUDGE RIVERA: Yeah, I looked at that 4 5 That probable cause in the same paragraph, it's sort of the closing statement after that first 6 7 sentence that you are correct, where it says, under 8 the Constitution, only the DA has the authority to 9 prosecute. I agree with you, that is what that said. The rest of the paragraph doesn't seem to really go 10 11 any further than that. 12 Can he just say it's unconstitutional, or 13 the DA is the only one who under the Constitution has the authority; is that enough for - - -14 15 MR. LALONDE: Well, I think it is. 16 JUDGE RIVERA: - - - the town court to know 17 the nature - - -18 MR. LALONDE: I - - -19 JUDGE RIVERA: - - - of this Constitutional 20 argument? 21 MR. LALONDE: I think it is. I mean, he -- - he's clearly saying it's only the local DA who, 22 23 under the New York State Constitution, I mean, that -2.4 - - that phrase - - -25 JUDGE RIVERA: Is that a separation of

1 powers argument, or is that some other argument? What's the nature of the Constitutional 2 3 argument? MR. LALONDE: Well, that's not clear. 4 5 JUDGE RIVERA: Um-hum. At the hearing - -6 7 MR. LALONDE: But - - -8 JUDGE RIVERA: At the hearing on this, did 9 they ever talk about the Constitution, and the nature 10 of this Constitutional argument, and the theory? 11 MR. LALONDE: What I am - - - what I am 12 arguing, in terms of preservation, is that sentence; 13 that's what's there. 14 JUDGE RIVERA: Um-hum. 15 MR. LALONDE: You know, there was not - - -16 JUDGE FAHEY: You know what, I'm a little 17 confused on that because it seems - - - I think you 18 can argue that it was - - - the issue was preserved, 19 but it seems like this issue was waived. 20 In the brief - - - I got Appellate Brief 21 Page 4, "The Appellant is not arguing that Article 20 of the Executive Law is unconstitutional," and it 22 23 goes on to say only the foregoing analysis. Can you 2.4 tell us what - - - it seems to me like you've waived

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this issue.

MR. LALONDE: Sure. Well, Your Honor - - -1 2 JUDGE FAHEY: Expressly waived this issue. 3 MR. LALONDE: At the Intermediate Appellate Court, I did raise a direct Constitutional argument. 4 5 I said, hey, this statute is not Constitutional. I 6 did not make that argument here. But - - -7 JUDGE FAHEY: So - - - so my reading of the 8 Appellate Brief is correct, it is expressly waived -9 10 MR. LALONDE: Well - - -11 JUDGE FAHEY: - - - you see it - - - let me 12 just finish the thought. 13 MR. LALONDE: I'm sorry. 14 JUDGE FAHEY: It creates a problem because 15 the AG is only here - - - is - - - in an amicus 16 brief, and if you've expressly be waived it, then I 17 don't see how they can argue on the Constitutionality issue also. 18 19 MR. LALONDE: Your Honor, I disagree that I 20 have waived it, and it was not my intent to waive the 21 Constitutional issue. I raised it in the way I did, because I thought that that would probably be - - -22 23 that that would have the most chances of success. 2.4 JUDGE FAHEY: Well, we will have to decide 25 it, but I don't want to make it - - - not let you

1 make your argument, but I'm just saying, I just 2 wanted do point it out. 3 JUDGE STEIN: If the Constitutionality is doubtful, as - - - if we ascribe some arguable merit 4 5 to the AG's argument, would that be relevant to our 6 analysis of the statutory interpretation? 7 MR. LALONDE: Yes, I think it would. 8 - - - what I am saying is that the special prosecutor 9 is only authorized to appear before grand jury or in 10 county court, that that's the plain text of the 11 statute, and that to interpret the statute otherwise, 12 to allow them to prosecute as they have in this 13 particular case - - -JUDGE STEIN: Could create Constitutional 14 15 problems. 16 MR. LALONDE: - - - creates a 17 Constitutional problem; that's - - - that's the 18 that's the Constitutional argument I am making here. 19 JUDGE RIVERA: Well, you see, even with 20 what you acknowledge is the statement in the brief, 21 that you're not challenging the Constitutionality, it 22 is true that other than the reference to the statute, 23 you are talking about the Constitutional powers - - -2.4 MR. LALONDE: Exactly. 25 JUDGE RIVERA: - - - that are at play in

this case.

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MR. LALONDE: That is exactly the argument I am making. To interpret the statute in the way I am asking court to interpret the statute, does not render the statute unconstitutional. However - - -

JUDGE FAHEY: Doesn't it - - - doesn't that make - - isn't it inconsistent though with the whole purpose of the statute? I mean, this statute created 260.24, right, it was created at the same time and specifically to prosecute the crimes that the special prosecutor was appointed to do in. That was the whole purpose of the statute.

So I - - - it seems inconsistent for - - - if we're going to say that a special prosecutor only could prosecute felonies but not misdemeanors, and yet we create - - - I guess it was an A misdemeanor 260.24, it doesn't make any sense; the statutory history doesn't support it. That inconsistency seems difficult to reconcile.

MR. LALONDE: Judge, I might not be understanding the question, but - - -

JUDGE FAHEY: The special prosecutor, your argument is, could only prosecute felonies, not misdemeanors.

MR. LALONDE: What - - -

1	JUDGE FAHEY: Right. We're we're on
2	the same page on that one.
3	MR. LALONDE: Judge, we are not on the same
4	page on that.
5	JUDGE FAHEY: Okay, go ahead.
6	MR. LALONDE: I believe the special
7	prosecutor can prosecute misdemeanor cases
8	JUDGE FAHEY: Okay. All right.
9	MR. LALONDE: What I am saying is that in
10	order to do that, to prosecute any case, they must
11	present the case to a grand jury.
12	JUDGE FAHEY: I see. Okay.
13	MR. LALONDE: And that the issue or the
14	problem, you've got the special prosecutor, governor
15	appointed, in no way elected, and they can, at least
16	in this case, unilaterally make the decision to come
17	in and file charges, and that's without any
18	really any port of any sort of input from
19	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: What if
20	JUDGE STEIN: Wouldn't they need the
21	consent of the DA though?
22	MR. LALONDE: I'm not opposed to this court
23	interpreting the statute that way, that's not what
24	I'm asking the court to do. I

JUDGE STEIN: Was there consent here? Or

do we know - - -

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MR. LALONDE: There is no - - - but I guess I had some personal beliefs based on talking to the prior attorneys, but I don't think there is a record regarding that. And I - - - I'm not opposed to this court, you know, laying out some sort of framework where, you know, consultation, consent, permission from the local DA - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: Well, let's go down that rabbit hole for a moment, and I certainly will be asking the other lawyers. What's the nature of this consent? Does it mean, yes, go right ahead and prosecute, or does it mean, I have to supervise, the DA has to be aware of every strategic choice, and approve every strategic choice?

What does that mean "consent"?

MR. LALONDE: Well, I think it means - - - I think - - - I think it does mean approval. You know - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: To pursue a prosecution.

MR. LALONDE: Yes. And it - - -

JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: But what if - - - what if the DA doesn't respond - - - what if the special prosecutor request, and the DA doesn't respond, how do we interpret that? Is that consent or is that,

you know, just ignoring?

MR. LALONDE: Well, I think there has to at least be some - - - at the outset, there's got to be some kind of request or contact from, you know, the one prosecutor to the other. I - - -

JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Doesn't the statute say that the special prosecutor must consult with the DA, or give notice to the DA?

MR. LALONDE: It certainly does. I mean,
Section B, if they are applying for warrants, they
have to - - - they have give notice. Section - - Section C, if they are appearing front of, you know,
grand jury, they have to - - - they have to consult.

I - - - I guess I didn't come prepared to, you know, suggest the framework for what that really means. What I - - - what I'm concerned about is what happened in this case, which is, you know, I think there was - - - there was a New York State trooper who went out and investigated this case, and met with the Tomkins County District Attorney, and the decision was made not to file charges, and then it was the Justice Center's investigator who, you know, reinvestigated, and then it was the special prosecutor who went ahead and filed charges.

JUDGE GARCIA: Isn't that exactly what the

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1 statute is designed to do, because people weren't 2 prosecuting these cases? 3 MR. LALONDE: Well, I - - - I don't 4 disagree that that's what the statute is designed to 5 do. What I am saying is that, if under those 6 circumstances, the special prosecutor wants to bring 7 a case, they have to present it to a grand jury. 8 Because at least that gives a defendant, you know, 9 some sort of - - - some sort of protection from this 10 - - - this non-elected, governor appointed only prosecutor. That at least under, you know, that kind 11 of situation, there is - - - there is grand jury 12 13 protection. 14 JUDGE RIVERA: So the legislative history 15 about concurrent authority then doesn't really matter 16 under your grand jury argument, right? 17 MR. LALONDE: Well, I think that's right. I mean, if - - - if they truly are allowed to have 18 19 concurrent authority, I think that - - - I think that 20 begins to raise the Constitutional concerns. 21 JUDGE FAHEY: You waived that. Yeah. 22 Okay. 23 MR. LALONDE: Okay. Thank you. 2.4 JUDGE PIGOTT: Thank you. 25 Ms. Underwood, good afternoon.

MS. UNDERWOOD: The New York Constitution 1 recognizes only two officers with prosecutorial 2 3 power. The county DAs and the attorney general, both elected officers. 4 5 This is the first time the legislature has ever 6 purported to create a new special-purpose prosecutor who 7 is not accountable to either the district attorney, or the attorney general. If this court were to endorse the 8 9 practice, there well may be many more. The renew - - -10 JUDGE RIVERA: If the statute requires 11 consultation or consent, does that address the 12 concern? 13 MS. UNDERWOOD: No, it doesn't require 14 consent unless you read that into it. I think the 15 plainest under - - - we would suggest that you could 16 read that into the statute, but the language is 17 consultation, and not con - - -JUDGE RIVERA: So what would that mean 18 19 under the statute? 2.0 MS. UNDERWOOD: Pardon me? 21 JUDGE RIVERA: To the extent that you say that the statute is therefore unconstitutional, what 22 23 - - - what is the statute anticipating as 2.4 consultation?

MS. UNDERWOOD: Well - - -

1 JUDGE RIVERA: I'd assume you mean less 2 than approval. 3 MS. UNDERWOOD: Yes. I understand consultation to be a different word from consent, and 4 5 to be deliberately chose - - - chosen that way. Were you to construe it to mean the same thing, I think 6 7 that would take care of the Constitutional - - -8 JUDGE FAHEY: That would be tough because 9 people consult with me all the time, and disagree 10 with me right after that, so it's pretty common. 11 MS. UNDERWOOD: Well - - -12 JUDGE RIVERA: Maybe I can follow up on the 13 question I was asking before. So what would be - - what would be the scope of consent? Is it 14 15 supervision by the DA, is it that the DA must approve 16 strategic choices; what does consent mean - - -17 MS. UNDERWOOD: Well - - -18 JUDGE RIVERA: - - - to survive the 19 Constitutional question? 2.0 MS. UNDERWOOD: Yes. I'd like to take that 21 question into two parts if I could. Because as to 22 misdemeanors, we have this common-law tradition of 23 prosecution by non-prosecutors, by police officers, 2.4 by complainants, by victims in some circumstances. 25 And even as to that, this court has said there needs

1 to be approval by the district attorney, an ultimate 2 responsibility. But it seems for that, that it might be sufficient for the district attorney to approve 3 4 the general practice, as distinguished from close 5 monitoring of every case. JUDGE RIVERA: Is that Soddano? 6 7 MS. UNDERWOOD: Yes. 8 JUDGE RIVERA: Um-hum. 9 JUDGE PIGOTT: Without - - - without - - -10 are you saying that the statute is poorly drafted? 11 MS. UNDERWOOD: Well, I'm saying it wasn't 12 drafted to deal with the problem I'm talking about 13 here. And one of the reasons we're here, I think, is 14 that perhaps - - - is to bring this - - - the 15 Constitutional issue to this court's attention, and 16 to try to find a solution to it. 17 Because I - - - there is no doubt that the 18 - - - that the Justice Center is a useful, important 19 way of bringing resources, and expertise, and so 20 forth, to bear on a problem; it could easily have 21 been - - - it could - - - altered slightly to deal

And if this court approves this arrangement, there is nothing, no distinction analytically between this and a special, unelected,

with a Constitutional problem.

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1 unaccountable prosecutor for any crime du jour for -2 3 JUDGE PIGOTT: Isn't it - - - isn't it a 4 bit of a stretch to say the legislature left to the 5 common law misdemeanor prosecutions in a - - - in a 6 statute such as this? 7 MS. UNDERWOOD: I don't think the 8 legislature intended to do that, I'm suggesting two 9 different wit - - - the - - - analytical ways to 10 approve the prosecution, even though not alluded to 11 directly in the statute. 12 JUDGE PIGOTT: But that - - - that would -13 - - so in a way, I know I'm putting words in your 14 mouth, you're agreeing with Mr. Lalonde that there is 15 no statutory provision allowing the Justice Center to 16 - - - to bring misdemeanors in local village courts 17 or town courts. MS. UNDERWOOD: Well, our argument overlaps 18 19 his to a considerable degree. It's not - - - it's 20 not identical, that is to say, our position is that 21 under the statute - - - the statutory construct, 22 which doesn't distinguish between misdemeanors and 23 felonies, seems to - - - seems unconstitutional in

the sense that it creates a prosecutor who is not

accountable in any way, either to the district

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1 attorneys or to the attorney general. Where - - -2 JUDGE STEIN: And requiring that 3 misdemeanors be brought to the grand jury doesn't 4 solve your problem. 5 MS. UNDERWOOD: Correct. Correct, I don't 6 think the grand jury has - - - is a substitute for 7 the attorney general or the district attorneys. But 8 I do think that this prosecution, which is a 9 misdemeanor prosecution, could stand if it were 10 understood to be - - - if the prosecutor understood to be authorized not by the statue alone, but by the 11 12 common law authority of law enforcement officers to 13 bring misdemeanor prosecutions. Now, that doesn't 14 solve the situation for felony prosecutions, but this 15 is not a felony prosecution. 16 JUDGE GARCIA: Counsel. 17 JUDGE RIVERA: And so let's talk about the 18 felony. So that would be resolved either saying it's 19 unconstitutional, or that we somehow read into the 20 statue, consent - - -21 MS. UNDERWOOD: That's correct. 22 JUDGE RIVERA: - - - yes, and now we're 23 back to my question of consent. 2.4 MS. UNDERWOOD: And what would - - -25 JUDGE RIVERA: You've sort of answered it

1 on the common law side. MS. UNDERWOOD: Right. And what would the 2 3 - what would the consent mean? Well, I think the consent would have to be that the district attorney 4 5 is ultimately responsible for the decisions that are It is not the case that that means the 6 7 district attorney personally has to be intimately 8 involved in every strategic decision. 9 What it means is - - - for example, in this 10 case, if you - - - if you imagine this was a felony, the record can be read, I believe the defendant reads 11 12 it to say that the district attorney didn't want 13 there to be a prosecution. JUDGE GARCIA: Or it can be read that - - -14 15 MS. UNDERWOOD: Or - - -JUDGE GARCIA: - - - he really didn't care. 16 17 MS. UNDERWOOD: That's correct. 18 JUDGE GARCIA: But here is my - - -19 MS. UNDERWOOD: But those are two different 2.0 21 JUDGE GARCIA: - - - but here is my 22 concern, and I raised it before. There were a series 23 of horrific reports that led to this legislation. 2.4 Right? We can all agree those were terrible events,

nobody was - - - legislature felt nobody was

1	prosecuting them, in this case, the DA wasn't going
2	to prosecute. You're asking us to declare this
3	statute, at least in your first point,
4	unconstitutional. Is there any plan by the attorney
5	general, if we agree with you, to take over in some
6	way, or to coordinate some response to address that
7	issue?
8	MS. UNDERWOOD: Is there a plan, well, we
9	have proposed a plan. If you don't read into the
10	statute
11	JUDGE GARCIA: No, but let's say we go with
12	your point one, it's unconstitutional, do you have
13	any plan then to take over, or to somehow coordinate
14	this? Is that
15	MS. UNDERWOOD: Our recommendation would be
16	that the dis that the Justice Center get
17	consent from the they could just
18	JUDGE GARCIA: But let's say we don't go,
19	let's say we believe your first argument
20	MS. UNDERWOOD: No, but even if you don't -
21	
22	JUDGE GARCIA: it's unconstitutional.
23	MS. UNDERWOOD: Even if you don't go with
24	that even if you don't go with that, there is
25	nothing to stop

1 JUDGE GARCIA: So the answer is, no, right? 2 I mean, if we declare the statute unconstitutional, 3 there is nothing then. So we're back to square one 4 in terms of this population. 5 MS. UNDERWOOD: I think what we need is a 6 minor adjustment to the statutory scheme. It can be 7 accomplished in one of several different ways. 8 can be accomplished by reading the requirement into 9 the statute, it can be accomplished by your saying 10 that that is required, and the adjust - - -11 JUDGE GARCIA: But your first point is, 12 "The New York Constitution does not permit the 13 legislature to create a special prosecutor for class 14 of cases independent of a county district attorney or 15 the attorney general." That doesn't say or read 16 something into the statute to me. 17 MS. UNDERWOOD: Well, what we've said in points 2 and 3 is, here is how you can solve the 18 19 problem. 20 JUDGE GARCIA: An alternative. But if I -21 - - the way I read it, if we find what we want - - -22 MS. UNDERWOOD: They're not - - - they're 23 not alternatives. 2.4 JUDGE RIVERA: Based on our precedent of

trying to read this particular statute, or any

1 statute in a way that would make it Constitutional, 2 that this is your suggestion of how this court could 3 do so based on the language and the text - - -MS. UNDERWOOD: That is correct. We have 4 5 no interest in dissolving the operation of the Justice Center. 6 7 JUDGE GARCIA: I believe that. But if we 8 decline to read the language in - - - then your 9 position is it's unconstitutional. 10 MS. UNDERWOOD: My position then would be 11 that the legislature should amend the statute - - -JUDGE GARCIA: Okay. 12 13 MS. UNDERWOOD: - - - to put the 14 requirement in that - - - of ultimately - - - of 15 district attorney consent. 16 And the Justice Center's final point in 17 their brief, in response to our amicus brief says 18 that, that's not so hard to - - it's not what they 19 want, but that that could be accomplished; I don't 20 want to speak for them. 21 JUDGE RIVERA: But I thought they conceded 22 that this is what they do in practice. 23 MS. UNDERWOOD: Well, what they concede is 2.4 that they - - - they consult, they notify, I don't 25 believe they have said - - -

1 JUDGE RIVERA: The consent, right. 2 MS. UNDERWOOD: - - - that they get 3 consent. 4 JUDGE RIVERA: Can I ask - - - just go back 5 to, I think something that Judge Garcia mentioned before. 6 7 Let's say the DA either, as I think he 8 suggested, is not interested, takes no position on 9 it, or, as perhaps counsel was suggesting before, has 10 done an investigation and decided that's not probable 11 cause, I wish not to deploy my resources from my 12 office to this particular prosecution. Can the 13 Justice Center then go ahead; is that consent? MS. UNDERWOOD: Well, it depends on - - - I 14 15 mean, we discussed several possibilities. 16 district attorney had decided that he doesn't want to 17 deploy his re - - - or she doesn't want to deploy her 18 resources, and consents to the special prosecutor 19 proceeding, that would be fine. If on the other 20 hand, she has concluded that this defendant - - -21 that there is no evidence and this defendant 22 shouldn't be prosecuted, that isn't consent. 23 And I would think that on - - - that a remand to determine that on the facts of this case 2.4

might be an appropriate way of resolving this case,

depending - - -

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JUDGE RIVERA: So under your approach, a DA either has to, on their own, decide that they are going to pursue this prosecution because they find probable cause, or decide, I think this is probable cause, I'm willing to consent to the special prosecutor to do it.

But if they've actually done an investigation and decided there is no probable cause, they cannot choose to either sit back and take no position on it, or delegate and say, if you want to prosecute, that's your business, but I'm not going to spend the resources, because I don't think there's probable cause.

MS. UNDERWOOD: Well, when it's a resource question, they would presumably consent. When it's a judgment about the validity of the prosecution, I think that's not consent, and that then should bar the special prosecutor from moving forward.

JUDGE RIVERA: And --- I know your light has gone off, and so if I may.

MS. UNDERWOOD: I'm happy to - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: So if - - - if they are just overburdened, because - - -

MS. UNDERWOOD: Yes.

1 JUDGE RIVERA: - - - if they can part the 2 legislation, the history suggesting it's - - - the 3 demand is on the DA office, the lack of perhaps 4 resources - - -5 MS. UNDERWOOD: Or expertise, or whatever, 6 yeah. 7 JUDGE RIVERA: - - - to do all these 8 cases, or expertise, yes. And so they haven't made a 9 decision either way. Under your approach, they can 10 consent to allow someone else to make this decision. 11 Why isn't that a delegation of a core essential duty 12 and obligation of the district attorney? 13 MS. UNDERWOOD: I think they ultimately 14 have responsibility under that construct, and that 15 when you delegate to somebody else under your - - -16 under the cases of this court, you ultimately have 17 the authority to overrule them, but you can still 18 appoint somebody that you think is wise, and expert 19 and, you know, who will - - - or in the ordinary 20 course be making these decisions and consent to that 21 arrangement. 22 JUDGE RIVERA: So you see it as an 23 appointment, when you say this consent? 2.4 MS. UNDERWOOD: Well, they're very - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: I'm allowing you to do this

1 part of what I would ordinarily do under the 2 circumstances, and you must come back to me so that I 3 can decide whether or not - - -4 MS. UNDERWOOD: Well, you must make some 5 sort of report to me, I can make - - - I can - - -6 some of these are in small places, there are various 7 ways that a relationship between the district 8 attorney and the special prosecutor could - - -9 JUDGE RIVERA: Um-hum. 10 MS. UNDERWOOD: - - - be manifest. 11 JUDGE RIVERA: But a special prosecutor 12 thinks, I think that's probable cause here, we need 13 to move forward, and the DA says, no, I don't agree. 14 MS. UNDERWOOD: Well, I - - -15 JUDGE RIVERA: The DA has the ultimate 16 responsibility, correct? 17 MS. UNDERWOOD: I think the DA has the 18 ultimate responsibility, that's right. I - - - it 19 seems unlikely on the evidence of how this particular 20 statute came into being, but one could imagine other 21 special prosecutor statutes, more high visibility 22 matters, whether it would be a profound difference of 23 opinion, and somebody has to have the authority. And that's really why - - - why we're here. 2.4

JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: How does that work,

1 counsel, when there is overlapping authority, or for 2 example, you know, Martin Act prosecutions - - -3 MS. UNDERWOOD: Um-hum. JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: - - - where the DA has 4 5 the authority to do it and - - -6 MS. UNDERWOOD: There's concurrent - - -7 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: - - - it's concurrent 8 jurisdiction; how does that work? 9 MS. UNDERWOOD: Well - - -10 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Does the DA have to 11 get the AG's consent? MS. UNDERWOOD: No, when there is 12 13 concurrent jurisdiction, either prosecutor can move 14 forward, and doesn't have to consult - - - doesn't 15 have to consult the other. And there are sometimes, 16 rarely, but sometimes conflicts about this. But the 17 Constitution contemplated two prosecutors; it didn't 18 contemplate three, or four, or five, or ten. 19 And all those problems of concurrent 2.0 jurisdiction are proliferated when there are more 21 prosecutors. And I think - - - I think that's the difference if there is a Constitutional choice that's 22 23 been made here. 2.4 If I can just say one thing, and that's that the 25 attorney general here is here to protect the

Constitutional limitation on multiplying prosecutors, and to try to save this statute, this prosecution, and future prosecutions, by invoking the authority of the Constitutional prosecutors, the district attorneys, and or the attorney general.

JUDGE PIGOTT: Thank you, Ms. Underwood.

Ms. Forshaw, good afternoon.

MS. FORSHAW: Good afternoon.

Before I begin, I do believe that there are some preservation issues in this case. There's some issues with respect to whether or not these Constitutional claims are preserved. Certainly there was a sentence in the defendant's motion in the trial court, claiming that only county DAs have the authority to prosecute.

That's certainly not the argument that the attorney general is making. The attorney general is making the argument that county DAs and the attorney general have the authority to prosecute. And in fact, the attorney general is not a Constitutionally created prosecutor. This court has said on numerous occasions that the attorney general only has the authority to prosecute that's given by the legislature.

So I think this case presents a really simple question. And that $\ensuremath{\text{-}}$ - $\ensuremath{\text{-}}$

JUDGE RIVERA: The ADA is an elected

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1 official. 2 MS. FORSHAW: He is an elected official, 3 absolutely. But the question is, is the legislature, which has been given by this court, exclusive 4 5 authority to determine who should prosecute in a particular case? 6 7 JUDGE STEIN: Or is that just a question of 8 dividing up the responsibilities, rather than 9 choosing what entities, among any, can actually 10 prosecute? 11 MS. FORSHAW: Well, this court has said 12 that the legislature can choose to give prosecutorial 13 authority to the governor, the attorney general, or 14 DAs. And that was People v. Johnson. 15 JUDGE STEIN: And they are all elected - -- they are all elected officials. 16 17 MS. FORSHAW: They are all elected officials, right? And it was an elected official, 18 19 the governor, that was given the authority to appoint 20 the special prosecutor in this case. 21 JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, do you - - - do you 22 agree with Ms. Underwood that you need consent, or 23 are you arguing that you only need to consult?

MS. FORSHAW: I don't believe that the

statute can be read to require consent.

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JUDGE PIGOTT: Okay. And that leads to what I gleaned from the attorney general's brief. If the legislature tomorrow said, you know, we think guns are a problem. We are going to - - - we're going to appoint a special office, special prosecutor on guns.

And not only that, we think drugs are a problem, and so we're going to - - - we're going to appoint a special office, and a special prosecutor on that.

And we also think domestic violence is a problem, so we're going to appoint a special prosecutor, and set up a special office on that.

Are all those okay? And do they - - - and one - - - and assuming for a minute that we have those, does the DA have any say in who's going to get prosecuted and who is not going to get prosecuted in their respective counties?

MS. FORSHAW: I believe that under this court's case law, and consistent with the Constitution, the legislature could do that. I believe that what the check is on the legislature of course, is the political process. Legis - - - the legislature is unlikely to do something like that, which may be presumably wildly unpopular with the

1 citizens - - -JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, that's - - - that's 2 3 somebody else's problem. 4 MS. FORSHAW: - - - who elect them. Right. 5 JUDGE PIGOTT: I'm just - - - I'm just 6 thinking legally, because they make the argument that 7 you're, you know, you're really cutting into the 8 elected officials' authority. 9 And I can - - - I can see consult, but if 10 this - - - this new prosecutor says to the district 11 attorney in, let's say, Erie County, I don't care 12 what you do, I want a grand jury, I'm going after 13 these people, and by the way, you better set aside 14 some office space for me, because I'm bringing thirty 15 prosecutors, forty investigators, and we're going 16 after him; can you do that? 17 MS. FORSHAW: Well, I think the legislature 18 in this case prevented that from happening, because 19 there is specific language in the statute that 20 indicates that the Justice Center's special 21 prosecutor shall not interfere with the ability of 22 district attorneys to investigate and prosecute

JUDGE PIGOTT: Oh no, I'm - - - make me the prosecutor up in Erie County, I'm not going to

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crimes.

1	interfere with DA at all. In fact, he can go on
2	vacation, let me know when he gets back, because I
3	need his office, and I need the I need the
4	grand jury room, and I need his investigators. I'm
5	not interfering at all; I'm I'm just going to
6	go after people.
7	MS. FORSHAW: No. But I think that that
8	would be interfering with the choice of the district
9	attorney in that case.
10	JUDGE PIGOTT: To do what?
11	MS. FORSHAW: To decide on how certain
12	cases will be prosecuted.
13	JUDGE PIGOTT: So do you need his consent
14	before you go ahead with those cases?
15	MS. FORSHAW: No. I think you need
16	consultation
17	JUDGE PIGOTT: So even though even
18	though, wait, even though you say he has an interest
19	in getting that done, you can do it without his
20	without his consent.
21	MS. FORSHAW: We can. Absolutely. I think
22	it would be foolish.
23	JUDGE RIVERA: It would be completely
24	independent.
25	MS. FORSHAW: I think we are independent

1	only to the extent that there are a number of
2	provisions that require the Justice Center to give
3	notice to district attorneys, and to consult with
4	district attorneys.
5	JUDGE RIVERA: Okay. So let's let's
6	parse that out. What's the difference, in your mind,
7	under the statute, between notice and consult?
8	Because the independents you just described sounds to
9	me like it's only notice. So what how
10	what has ratcheted up
11	MS. FORSHAW: Um-hum.
12	JUDGE RIVERA: What what is
13	consultation
14	MS. FORSHAW: Right.
15	JUDGE RIVERA: as you read the
16	statute?
17	MS. FORSHAW: Well, with respect to notice,
18	notice is, here is this case that we that we
19	believe alleges criminal conduct. Okay.
20	JUDGE PIGOTT: Can I stop you there?
21	MS. FORSHAW: Yes.
22	JUDGE PIGOTT: Say, here is this
23	investigation?
24	MS. FORSHAW: We we could say here is
25	this investigation.

1	JUDGE PIGOTT: Okay.
2	MS. FORSHAW: The way the statute is
3	written, when the Justice Cen
4	JUDGE PIGOTT: We're we're
5	investigating the thirty nursing homes in Wayne
6	County.
7	MS. FORSHAW: Um-hum.
8	JUDGE PIGOTT: Notice, Done.
9	MS. FORSHAW: Right.
10	JUDGE PIGOTT: Right. That's and
11	that's all you need.
12	MS. FORSHAW: Right.
13	JUDGE PIGOTT: And now you could and
14	now you're in, and out you go.
15	MS. FORSHAW: Right. Well, no. And then
16	before appearing in a grand jury or in the county
17	court, we have to consult with the district attorney
18	
19	JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, that's because you
20	-
21	MS. FORSHAW: with respect to
22	scheduling.
23	JUDGE PIGOTT: Don't you need him
24	JUDGE RIVERA: Okay. So what does that
25	mean; what's the consultation?

1	JUDGE PIGOTT: Don't
2	Excuse me, Judge. I just
3	Don't you don't you need him to impanel
4	it, or do you have the power to impanel it?
5	MS. FORSHAW: We don't have the power. And
6	that's why the consultation is important. It's
7	limited to those kinds of scheduling matters for
8	which
9	JUDGE PIGOTT: Is it scheduling, or is it
10	consent? I mean, if the DA says, I'm not letting you
11	in my grand jury, can you get in?
12	MS. FORSHAW: Probably not.
13	JUDGE PIGOTT: So you really need his
14	consent.
15	MS. FORSHAW: Well, no. The statute talks
16	about consultation. I think that if they what
17	you're talking about is an objection, not consent.
18	And I think that's very different.
19	JUDGE PIGOTT: No. You can call it an
20	objection, but if he says you're not coming into my
21	grand jury, you're not coming in. You're going to
22	sue him, and say under our statute all we have to do
23	is ask him, it's an unreasonable denial, and we
24	we're entitled to his grand jury.

MS. FORSHAW: Our - - - our policy is to

consult, and to collaborate, and to seek cooperation.

JUDGE PIGOTT: I think you are

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misunderstanding. I understand. You people are cloaked in gold. You are pure as the driven snow, you're only going to do what's right. Someone else might disagree. And if there is a disagreement, my question is not, of course we'll never do that. If you're going to do it, I mean, do you need the DA to say - - to consent to your use of his grand jury?

And you're saying, no. And so if he says, well, you're not using it, then isn't there a conflict here?

MS. FORSHAW: We haven't faced that situation.

JUDGE PIGOTT: Oh.

MS. FORSHAW: So I don't really know the answer to that. Typically, we obtain the acquiescence; we don't obtain affirmative consent or affirmative approval. And I think the legislature was very clear not to read those requirements into the statute. And I - - -

JUDGE STEIN: What if they did object. You say that objection isn't the same as consent, what if - - what if the DA said, I don't - - I don't want you to do this. What if that happened after the

1 grand jury was impaneled? 2 MS. FORSHAW: I think at that point, it 3 would probably be too late, because at that point, 4 the grand jury has acted. 5 JUDGE STEIN: Well, no. What if the grand jury hasn't acted? It's been impaneled, so you have 6 7 what you need from the DA to move forward, and then 8 the DA says, you know what, no, I don't think so. 9 Then what happens? So there is - - - there is an 10 outright objection, the grand jury hasn't met, you 11 know, nothing has commenced, but there you have it. 12 Then what do you do? 13 MS. FORSHAW: Probably at that point, the Justice Center would walk away and hope that the - -14 15 - that the DA does the right thing. 16 JUDGE STEIN: But you don't think that you 17 would have to walk away; that would be a choice. MS. FORSHAW: I don't think we would have 18 19 to; I think that what we would do is we would try to 20 persuade the district attorney to review the case and 21 to permit us, or to - - -22 JUDGE PIGOTT: Doesn't that imply consent? 23 MS. FORSHAW: I don't think so. I think 2.4 that, you know, there is no obligation for

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affirmative consent.

JUDGE PIGOTT: What are you trying to 1 2 persuade him to do? 3 MS. FORSHAW: We would be trying to persuade him to either present the case himself to 4 5 the grand jury, or to allow the Justice Center. JUDGE PIGOTT: Doesn't that sound like 6 7 consent? 8 MS. FORSHAW: Not - - - not at all. 9 JUDGE PIGOTT: Okay. 10 MS. FORSHAW: Not at all. 11 JUDGE PIGOTT: Can ask you the flip side? 12 Suppose the district attorney in some county wants 13 you. Can you - - - do you have to come? MS. FORSHAW: We don't have to come, we 14 15 typically do come, and that's been a rarer situation. I mean, what we do often is we provide assistance, 16 17 sometimes we jointly prosecute cases, sometimes we prosecute by ourselves, and sometimes we hand the 18 19 investigation over to the district attorney so that 20 the district attorney can pursue it. 21 I mean, district attorneys know their counties 22 more than we do. 23 JUDGE RIVERA: Yes. If you're pursuing - -2.4 - I just want to clarify. Your position is that - -25 - and the DA has felt comfortable with you pursuing

1 it, is your position that you do not have to seek 2 further consultation with respect to strategic 3 choices, you don't have to report to the DA, your 4 position is once the DA approves you to pursue a 5 prosecution, then you're independent, you run that 6 prosecution the way you believe it should be run; is 7 that - - - is that your position - - -8 MS. FORSHAW: Absolutely. 9 JUDGE RIVERA: - - - the way the statute 10 should be read? 11 MS. FORSHAW: Absolutely. I mean, it would be foolish of us not to talk to the district 12 13 attorney, because as I said, the district attorney 14 knows their county, knows jurors in their county, so 15 it would be foolish, as a prosecutor, not to engage in conversations, and we certainly do. 16 17 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Counsel, could I go back to something you said earlier about - - -18 19 MS. FORSHAW: Sure. 20 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: - - - which elected 21 officials have prosecutorial authority, and you 22 mentioned the governor. When does governor have 23 prosecutorial authority? 2.4 MS. FORSHAW: The governor doesn't have

direct prosecutorial authority, but what this court

has said is the legislature can delegate law enforcement functions to the governor, the attorney general, or the district attorney.

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The legislature has not directly given prosecutorial authority to the governor, but there are a number of statutes in which the governor can appoint, or create, or activate legislative authority - - - prosecutorial authority, including activating the attorney general to have prosecutorial authority.

JUDGE PIGOTT: Back to this case, in

Tompkins County here, the DA apparently decided that
there was no reason to prosecute this case.

MS. FORSHAW: Right.

JUDGE PIGOTT: You apparently decided there was. How does that get resolved if - - - obviously, if you don't need his consent or her consent, you're fine.

MS. FORSHAW: Right.

JUDGE PIGOTT: But if you do, then you're out of luck, right?

MS. FORSHAW: As Mr. Lalonde indicated, after an initial state police investigation, the district attorney decided not to bring criminal charges. There was an additional investigation, and certainly, just because the state police investigate

and might not find enough evidence for the DA to feel comfortable prosecuting, doesn't preclude the Justice Center from conducting additional investigation. And in fact, we would be obligated to. Because even if we are not pursuing a case criminally, we also conduct an administrative investigation so that we can take action against caregivers who are accused of abusing or neglecting vulnerable people.

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JUDGE FAHEY: You know, one of the things we haven't gotten to is the core of the home rule argument that the attorney general made. And it seems to be, let's say it's a home rule argument, that this is a general law, so it applies to every county in the state, so as we move down the list on the home rule question. Then we want to turn to the Constitutional challenge that asserts that - - - by the AG that the state legislature is barred from transfer essential functions of elected

Constitutional officers to officers that are selected by appointment. That's the way I understand that - - I'm quoting directly from their argument.

But that's not really what we're talking about. Here, what we're talking about, prescribing the powers of the district attorney, and I want you to speak to that, because it seems that the

Constitution doesn't set out, or in one way or the other, the duties of the district attorney, and doesn't describe their essential functions. And it seems that the legislature has been left with that task.

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And as quoting from county law, "All prosecutions for crimes or offenses cognizable by the courts which he or she should be elected or appointed." And that is a legislative function, to designate what those particular laws and functions are. And that includes prescribing the essential functions of the district attorney.

MS. FORSHAW: Absolutely. The - - - there is nothing in the Constitution that explains exactly what the district attorney's powers are. That choice of what those powers are has been left to the legislature, and the legislature passed the statute. The County Law 700, that sets forth what the duties are of the district attorney.

And just as the legislature can grant powers to the district attorney, it can also take those powers away. That has to be the only construction that can be given to the fact that, as this court has recognized, the legislature is the exclusive body that has the ability to determine who

1 should prosecute. JUDGE FAHEY: Well, the biggest example I 2 3 think of that is a superseder power of the governor, under Executive Law 63, whatever. 4 5 MS. FORSHAW: (2). 6 JUDGE FAHEY: (2), okay. And then other 7 examples are County Law 701. 8 MS. FORSHAW: Correct. 9 JUDGE FAHEY: It seems that in those 10 instances, that the DA doesn't - - - it does not 11 really have exclusive authority to prosecute crimes within the state. Clearly, they have authority to do 12 13 so. So the question then becomes, is the - - - is a grant of concurrent jurisdiction valid? 14 15 MS. FORSHAW: Absolutely. There are a 16 number of situations in which different prosecutors 17 have concurrent jurisdiction. One example that was mentioned was the Martin Act. Under the Martin Act, 18 19 the district attorneys can bring security fraud 20 cases, so can the attorney general. 21 JUDGE RIVERA: But they're both elected 22 officials. 23 MS. FORSHAW: That's correct. But the - -2.4

JUDGE RIVERA: Why isn't that - - -

1 MS. FORSHAW: But the attorney general, as 2 an elected official, the only reason the attorney 3 general has the authority to prosecute in certain 4 instances is because either the governor activated 5 that power, or the legislature specifically gave him 6 that power. 7 JUDGE RIVERA: But isn't the Constitutional argument not - - - not solely about the nature of the 8 9 duties and obligations, but also how the person is 10 selected, who they are accountable to. And in these 11 examples, the AG and the DA, they are accountable to 12 the elector, right? JC here, the special prosecutors 13 are accountable to the governor only. 14 MS. FORSHAW: The governor who is an 15 elected official. And so I do think it's exactly 16 analogous. And I think that these types of 17 distinctions are really more form over substance. And I think substantively, it's not unique for - - -18 19 JUDGE RIVERA: No, no, no. What is 20 analogous is the ADAs, right, to the DA. DA is 21 elected, ADAs are not. 22 MS. FORSHAW: Um-hum. 23 JUDGE RIVERA: That's - - - that's the 2.4 analogy, but not - - -

MS. FORSHAW: Right.

1	JUDGE RIVERA: the special
2	prosecutor to the governor; I don't think that's
3	making your argument.
4	MS. FORSHAW: Yeah, I do I do think
5	that it is, with all due respect. I do think that it
6	is analogous.
7	JUDGE RIVERA: But the essential nature of
8	the governor's job is not to prosecute.
9	MS. FORSHAW: And the essential nature of
10	the attorney general's job is also not to prosecute.
11	The attorney general has been given
12	JUDGE RIVERA: But the DA, for certain it
13	is
14	MS. FORSHAW: limited authority.
15	JUDGE RIVERA: and the special
16	prosecutors are defined as DAs, right?
17	MS. FORSHAW: The special prosecutor is
18	defined as a district attorney, absolutely.
19	JUDGE RIVERA: The point of that job is to
20	prosecute, right? Investigate and prosecute.
21	MS. FORSHAW: That's correct.
22	JUDGE RIVERA: Not not these other
23	responsibilities of and so forth of the
24	governor, right?
25	MS. FORSHAW: That's correct. That's

1 correct, but the - - - but that person is only 2 activated by having the governor actually appoint 3 them. Just like the governor has the authority to activate the attorney general's authority by making a 4 5 request pursuant to Executive Law 63(3) or 63(2). I would also like to point out, if I could 6 7 just have one second, that in fact, the record shows that the Justice Center did notify the district 8 9 attorney in this case of our prosecution. 10 record, in the appendix at 15, that set forth in - -11 12 JUDGE STEIN: But we don't know what if any 13 response there was. 14 MS. FORSHAW: Exactly. 15 JUDGE RIVERA: I'm sorry, what was the 16 number? 17 MS. FORSHAW: In the appendix, at page 15. 18 JUDGE RIVERA: 15, thank you. 19 MS. FORSHAW: The prosecutor notes in 20 response to the defendant's motion that the DA was 21 notified of our appearance. 22 JUDGE PIGOTT: Thank you, Ms. Forshaw. 23 MS. FORSHAW: Thank you. 2.4 (Court is adjourned)

1	CERTIFICATION
2	
3	I, Meir Sabbah, certify that the foregoing
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5	People v. Martesha Davidson, No. 86 was prepared
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