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1	COURT OF APPEALS
2	STATE OF NEW YORK
3	
4	FINERTY,
5	Respondent,
6	-against- No. 1
7	ABEX CORPORATION AND FORD MOTOR COMPANY,
8	
9	Appellant.
10	20 Eagle Street
11	Albany, New York 12207 March 22, 2016
12	
13	Before:  CHIEF JUDGE JANET DIFIORE
14	ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE F. PIGOTT, JR. ASSOCIATE JUDGE SHEILA ABDUS-SALAAM
15	ASSOCIATE JUDGE LESLIE E. STEIN  ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE M. FAHEY  ASSOCIATE JUDGE MICHAEL J. GARCIA
16	
17	Appearances:
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25	Meir Sabbah Official Court Transcriber

1 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Next on the calendar 2 is number 1, Finerty v. Abex Corporation and Ford 3 Motor Company. 4 MR. METLITSKY: Thank you very much, Your 5 Honor. May it please the court. I'm Anton Metlitsky for Ford Motor Company, which the parties have been 6 7 referring to as Ford U.S. And I would reserve two minutes, if I could. 8 9 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Yes, sir. 10 MR. METLITSKY: Thank you. 11 May it please the court. The Appellate Division 12 held that a jury can hold Ford U.S. directly liable for 13 products liability based on products manufactured and 14 sold, not by Ford U.S., but by a subsidiary, Ford U - - -15 JUDGE STEIN: In your view, are there any 16 circumstances in which you would agree that a parent 17 corporation could be held strictly liable for 18 products liability without the factors necessary to 19 prove - - - to pierce the corporate veil being 2.0 established? 21 MR. METLITSKY: Yes. If the - - - if the 22 parent had itself either - - -23 JUDGE STEIN: Direct involvement. 2.4 MR. METLITSKY: - - - either manufactured

or sold - - - manufactured or otherwise sold.

1 JUDGE FAHEY: What about designed? 2 MR. METLITSKY: No. JUDGE FAHEY: Why not? 3 4 MR. METLITSKY: Because this court, and no 5 New York court, has ever held a designer that is not a manufacturer or seller liable, because the strict 6 7 liability applies not by designing a product 8 incorrectly, but by selling a product that has a 9 defective design. 10 JUDGE PIGOTT: Let's assume for a minute, 11 instead of brakes, we're talking about airbags. 12 MR. METLITSKY: Uh-huh. 13 JUDGE PIGOTT: And you tell him this is how 14 you want your - - - this is how we want your airbags 15 to be; you tell Ford Ireland that. You're free, you 16 can sit at Ford headquarters in Detroit and say, and 17 by the way, you know, make them exactly the way they've been made by all these other foreign cars 18 19 because they're cheap. And you escape any liability because you say, well, you know, they made them in 20 21 Ireland; all we did is design - - - you know, design 22 them. 23 MR. METLITSKY: Well, there are - - I 2.4 just want to unpack the question a little bit. First

of all, when you say you required them to do a - - -

1 JUDGE PIGOTT: Yeah, you sent them and you 2 said, here are the specs you got to use for your 3 airbags. 4 MR. METLITSKY: But we are assuming that 5 when you say "required", we're not doing anything that would undermine the corporate form; these are 6 7 still separate corporations. So - - -8 JUDGE PIGOTT: Right. 9 MR. METLITSKY: Right. And so, in that 10 circumstance, the subsidiary would obviously be 11 liable. JUDGE PIGOTT: Uh-huh. 12 13 MR. METLITSKY: The parent would be liable indirect - - - not liable, would feel the 14 15 16 17

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indirect - - - not liable, would feel the
subsidiary's liability indirectly insofar - - - in
its capacity as a shareholder. But it wouldn't be
liable on a theory of strict products liability
because it can, again, in this state - - - and I
think the general rule is that liability for strict
products liability derives from placing the part - - the product into the market, either by
manufacturing and selling, or otherwise selling.
Otherwise, if designing the product - - - and I think
the allegations are about design approval here - - -

JUDGE PIGOTT: Uh-huh.

1 MR. METLITSKY: - - - but it doesn't 2 really matter. The designing - - - if designing the 3 product were enough, then - - - or if designing the product were the tort itself, then non-manufacturers 4 5 like distributors, wholesalers, retailers, wouldn't be held liable, but they are because what they do is 6 7 put the product out into the market. And the reason that those entities are held 8 9 liable has nothing to do with designing the product; 10 what it has to do with - - - the basic justification 11 is that a - - - an entity that sells a product puts 12 out the product to the public as though it is safe, 13 as if it is safe, and an entity that sells the 14 product has the ability to price in the cost of 15 injury into the cost of the product itself. 16 JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, so could you. Your 17 argument is, even a seller who has no notice, has no idea what's in - - - I'll stick with my airbags for a 18 19 minute - - -20 MR. METLITSKY: Right. 21 JUDGE PIGOTT: - - - because they're so -22 - - they're so in the news - - - they're liable. 23 MR. METLITSKY: The seller is liable. 2.4 JUDGE PIGOTT: You - - - you, who designed

it and told your - - - and told your Irish

subsidiary, this is what you got to use in your cars, he says, what do we know, all we did is tell him, put the metal in there because it's cheaper than putting something else in. So we can't be held liable because we designed it, but the - - but the guy that sold you the car, he's in.

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MR. METLITSKY: Right, because - - because this is - - again, this is liability
without fault. The question of who is liable - - JUDGE PIGOTT: Right.

MR. METLITSKY: - - - is - - - turns on policy considerations that this court has weighed a long time ago. As a general matter, the considerations always in strict liability cases are on the one hand, trying to afford injured parties a complete remedy, and on the other hand, not having liability stretch forever, because if you do it as a logical matter, if you think design is what counts, then you get patent holders, you get trade associations, you get individual inventors, and no court in New York, certainly, and I don't think anywhere, has ever let liability go that far.

JUDGE FAHEY: You did - - - you did address design - - - this is kind of obscure, but in the record, when I was looking into this issue at 843 in

1 your - - - I think it was in your reply brief, it was 2 843 in the record, you said - - - Ford says, 3 "Plaintiff admits that there is no feasible 4 alternative design at the time plaintiff was handling 5 the parts." I don't know if you remember that - - -6 that part. 7 MR. METLITSKY: No. 8 JUDGE FAHEY: Okay, all right. 9 MR. METLITSKY: And, I mean, that goes to -10 - - that goes to the merits. 11 JUDGE FAHEY: I don't want to - - - I don't 12 - - - it's a huge record, it's unfair, I don't want 13 to ambush you with the record. But, what that's - -14 - I don't want to do that to you, but what it says to 15 me is that there was only one design for these parts 16 worldwide. And that design with dictated to everyone 17 in the world by Ford USA. And that what happened after that - - - and to now say, and in your own 18

record, you say that there wasn't even an alternative to that design. Well, that would say to me that - -- that there is no distinction here between design and manufacturing them, in essence.

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MR. METLITSKY: Well, I'm not sure if there is - - - I'm not sure - - - that may be, but again, the question is whether - - -

JUDGE FAHEY: In other words, they weren't 1 choosing from two alternatives; I could design it 2 3 this way or design it that way. No, we had to make them this way. As it turns out, it was a defective 4 5 product that hurt people. 6 MR. METLITSKY: Right. But the question 7 whether there is a feasible alternative goes to the underlying merits of a design-defect claim. 8 9 JUDGE FAHEY: Uh-huh. 10 MR. METLITSKY: The - - - but, the question 11 12 13 14

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whether a design-defect claim could be brought against a particular party in the first place depends on whether that party put the design out into market, not whether the party actually created the design.

JUDGE STEIN: So - - - so as I look - - as I read the record, let's just take the tractor business for now. Because it seems to me that there are a lot of allegations that Ford U.S. had its - - had a hands-on involvement in the manufacture of tractors, tractor parts, whatever, in England. that was - - - if those allegations were established, would that be enough to impose strict liability on Ford U.S.?

MR. METLITSKY: Your Honor, I - - - there is no allegation that I'm aware of, and certainly

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it's not true, that Ford - - -
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                    JUDGE STEIN: But, for - - - as far as
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          truth is concerned - - -
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                    MR. METLITSKY: Right, yeah, no - - -
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                    JUDGE STEIN: - - - we don't get the right
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          now.
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                    MR. METLITSKY: - - - totally understood.
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          But I don't think that there's any dispute that the
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          parts were manufactured and sold by Ford UK, not by
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          Ford U.S.
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                    JUDGE STEIN: Yes, but - - -
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                    MR. METLITSKY: There is an allegation that
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          there was a - - - that there was like a - - -
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                    JUDGE STEIN: But they were kind of working
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          in partnership to do this.
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                    MR. METLITSKY: Not to manufacture.
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                    JUDGE STEIN: I mean, I'm using that word
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          loosely.
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                    MR. METLITSKY: Not to manufacture. There
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          was - - - there was - - - as I understand the
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          allegation, there was a department at Ford U.S. that
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          was sort of a strategic, you know, worldwide
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          department that had a goal of more product
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          standardization, and things like that. And also, for
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          sure, Ford U.S. was policing the quality of its
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	products, as every trademark licensor is required to
2	do under the Lanham Act, without losing its
3	trademark.
4	But again, the the rule in this state
5	has always been to that selling the product or
6	manufacturing and selling, or just selling, is what
7	counts for strict products liability. And to
8	collapse
9	JUDGE STEIN: So you you see the
10	allegations merely as alleging some kind of oversight
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12	MR. METLITSKY: Oversi
13	JUDGE STEIN: and collaboration in
14	design; you cut it off at design.
15	MR. METLITSKY: I do. And and not
16	just me
17	JUDGE STEIN: But if we read it
18	differently, if we read it as the actual
19	manufacturer, the actual hands-on, you know, being -
20	you know, I don't know exactly what it would
21	entail, but
22	MR. METLITSKY: Right.
23	JUDGE STEIN: that would cross over
24	the line.
25	MR. METLITSKY: Our our rule

our rule that we think that this court has already long adopted and should reaffirm, is that if you are a manufacturer yourself - - - not your subsidiary but yourself - - - or a seller, you can be held liable if the other elements of the claim are met. If you are not, you can't. So if that's the rule that the court announces, we will be happy. Certainly, we think the rule announced by the court below has to be wrong because - - -

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JUDGE STEIN: Because that would apply to every parent - - -

MR. METLITSKY: - - - every parent, of course. So that has to be wrong, and I think the right rule is if you're in the chain of distribution, which this court and every New York court to have considered the question has always read to mean manufacturing and selling - - and just to be clear, we have right now a very clear rule, you always know if you sold the product, and it already affords a complete remedy, if not in every case, in nearly every case; this case is very unique, where the manufacturer can't be sued in New York because there is no personal jurisdiction which makes sense. You have a plaintiff that lived abroad for decades and was injured by products abroad manufactured abroad.

1 But in most cases, you're always going to 2 be able to sue the seller, the wholesaler, or the 3 manufacturer. So it's ve - - - so there is no reason 4 to adopt some kind of rule that is not at all clear, 5 I'm not exactly sure if you can ask them what their rule is, but it has something to do with influence 6 over the distribution chain when you're not a 7 8 manufacturer or seller yourself. 9 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: So counsel, I don't 10 mean to interrupt, but I'm just trying to - - -11 because the allegations go to the involvement - - -12 MR. METLITSKY: Right. 13 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: - - - of Ford U.S., in the subsidiary's businesses - - -14 15 MR. METLITSKY: Right. 16 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: - - - without 17 piercing the corporate veil. 18 MR. METLITSKY: Right. 19 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: So your position would 2.0 be, unless there was some evidence that Ford either, 21 as I think Judge Stein mentioned earlier, partnered with your subsidiaries to sell or manufacture - - -22 23 MR. METLITSKY: Right. 2.4 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: - - - then Ford would 25 not be liable; Ford U.S. would not be liable.

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MR. METLITSKY: Absent either veil piercing or some other kind of derivative liability principle, maybe agency or something like that, but yes.

JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: So there is no - - - so - - - I guess, what the defendants are saying - - - what the plaintiffs are saying is that there may be something out there we need to discover about that relationship to show that Ford had a partnership or something else besides just influence design.

MR. METLITSKY: They've already had discovery; we were on the eve of trial - - - JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Right.

MR. METLITSKY: - - - before there was a stay. So I'm not sure what else they would need to discover. But - - - one other point, if I may, just - - - if the court wants to extend the rule beyond manufacturers and sellers, at the very least we would say that the level of involvement of the parent in the subsidiary has to be something extraordinary, something more than what is normally the case. And two courts have looked at - - - one court, the Pennsylvania Courts have looked at literally this production, and has said this is just the normal subsidiary - - -

JUDGE PIGOTT: Design defect doesn't enter

1 into this at all? 2 MR. METLITSKY: Excuse me? 3 JUDGE PIGOTT: A design defect, isn't that 4 part of this case? 5 MR. METLITSKY: The design defect isn't 6 part of the - - -7 JUDGE PIGOTT: Yeah, if you negligently 8 designed the brakes that we're talking about here, 9 isn't that a cause of action? 10 MR. METLITSKY: Well, so - - - so this 11 court has recently suggested or maybe even held that design - - - negligent design, and strict products 12 13 liability design defect claims are the same. Now, 14 again, it's not that it doesn't enter into it, it's 15 that you have to sue the right party. And I don't -16 - - I don't want to put a percentage on the cases, 17 but in almost every single case, you're going to be 18 able to sue somebody - - - the - - - an injured party 19 is going to be able to sue somebody that either sold 20 it, wholesaled the product, or manufactured it. The 21 only reason that they can't here is because of a 22 personal jurisdiction problem. 23 JUDGE PIGOTT: Right. But isn't there a

design defect cause of action; I mean, can't you do

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that?

1	MR. METLITSKY: There is a design-defect
2	strict liability cause of action.
3	JUDGE PIGOTT: Right.
4	MR. METLITSKY: Yes, right. But, as
5	as I
6	JUDGE PIGOTT: Aren't they saying you
7	designed this?
8	MR. METLITSKY: Right. But again, so the
9	tort of strict liability design defect is not
10	designing the product; it's putting a product that is
11	defectively designed into the market. Just as a
12	failure to warn; you know
13	JUDGE PIGOTT: Oh, I see. So I won't
14	use my airbag anymore; let's use seatbelts. So if
15	you have a negative if Ford USA designed the
16	seatbelts
17	MR. METLITSKY: Right.
18	JUDGE PIGOTT: that go into Ford
19	Ireland's cars, you're saying it's Ford Ireland's
20	- they are the ones that are going to have to respond
21	in that, not Ford USA.
22	MR. METLITSKY: In a product's liability
23	case.
24	JUDGE PIGOTT: Right.
25	MR. METLITSKY: There may be some other

theory that wasn't pled here where - - - right, where Ford - - - where the designer could be held liable to somebody. But the question is whether the designer is held liable to the end user. That depends - - -

JUDGE PIGOTT: Right.

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MR. METLITSKY: - - - not on foreseeability, as this court held in the Sukljian case, but on how far the duty runs. And the duty is determined by policy considerations, which this court has repeatedly weighed and made clear they turn on whether the seller put out the product as safe, whether the seller was able to price the cost of injury as a cost of business. Not whether the designer, not whether the trademark licensor, or and - - you know, you could go as far as you want once you get past the seller, right. And that's the whole - - that's the whole problem with strict liability cases and why the court has long ago cut the line off at sellers. Because if you try to use logic, you'll go forever.

And there is - - - and again, there is no reason to, because you have - - - plaintiffs, in the overwhelming number of cases - - - including, I think, this case, they could have sued in the UK or somewhere else where there was personal jurisdiction

- - - will have a complete remedy already. 1 2 there's no point of getting rid of the clear rule 3 that New York already has. Thank you. CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you. 4 5 Counsel. 6 MR. KRAMER: Good afternoon, Your Honors. 7 May it please the court. Jim Kramer and Robert Komitor from the Levy Konigsberg, on behalf of 8 9 respondents, the Finerty family. 10 We just heard appellant speak in terms of 11 extension of existing law, when in fact, the fact pattern 12 of this case falls squarely within this state's public 13 policy, as well as within its case law; something that the 14 First Department duly noted. 15 JUDGE GARCIA: But can you cite us a case 16 where a parent has been held - - - most of the cases, 17 I think, as I read your papers, are downstream, let's say - - - from the manufacturer down. What is the 18 19 case that's gone up the chain without piercing the 2.0 corporate veil? 21 MR. KRAMER: To - - - directly to the 22 parent and under New York law? There may not be a 23 direct case on point, and I think there is a reason 2.4 for that, which is because, as our public policy

states, every member within the chain of distribution

that puts out a defective product may be held accountable. And that's exactly what the Brumbaugh case is saying, that the Third Department ruled on. What Brumbaugh notes is, that since this court's decision in Codling v. Paglia, the judiciary has extended the liabilities beyond just market or sellers or distributors, to include, importantly, anyone involved with putting that product into the chain of distribution.

JUDGE GARCIA: But again, that goes downstream in the cases I've seen. So where is the case that we have gone upstream?

MR. KRAMER: The Godoy case, which is exactly what the First Department relied on, where, as that case - - - as the Second Department noted, that case dealt with innocent conduits in the sale, intermediary - - intermediate distributors who just had a hand on the product to tap it along down the stream. They, however, were entitled to seek indemnification from those upstream, which makes sense under our public policy because, as New York acknowledges, we want to put pressure on those who have the most control over putting the product into the stream of commerce.

JUDGE PIGOTT: Are you suggesting that you

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had a choice, you could have sued in Ireland or you can have sued here, and you chose to sue here?

MR. KRAMER: We believe that we sued both

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here. The First Department disagreed, but that wouldn't have changed the analysis under strict liability, Your Honor. If we had succeeded in the First Department in holding Ford Ireland liable here

JUDGE PIGOTT: But you need him here; you want to - - - you want to sue him in New York.

MR. KRAMER: That's correct, Your Honor.

JUDGE PIGOTT: Right.

MR. KRAMER: We brought suit here, Mr. Finerty was alive at the time in New York, as well as his family, and he was - -

it, you know, Ford is a big company and we know what's going on, but let's assume for a minute that the - - - that instead of Ford, you want to sue some German manufacturer of something; are we going to find that our plaintiffs that are citizens in New York are going to be required to sue in Germany rather than here because we have now got jurisprudence that said you sue the designer and not the manufacturer?

MR. KRAMER: Well, if it - - - if the case were along similar lines as here, where there was an instance where a New York resident was exposed to something, and due to latency period of that injury, ended up here, and it was foreseeable to the company than an injury would have manifested itself here, I believe that, under Your Honor's scenario, there would have been jurisdiction and they would've been held liable here. Especially if, under the facts we have here, there was direct involvement, and actually going beyond design, but actually manufacturing and having a hand on the product.

And to get back to one of my original points, Your Honor, I think looking at the facts is very key here, which is exactly what the First Department did, it's exactly what the trial court did, and it's exactly what other courts dealing with these issues have done.

We're dealing with two products here, the tractors that Mr. Finerty worked on as well as vehicle parts, such as brakes. What the record demonstrates is that Ford had a hand in manufacturing; they were a manufacturer of the tractors.

JUDGE STEIN: What did they do?

1 MR. KRAMER: They determined in the 1960s 2 that they were in essence competing with themselves 3 with their UK counterparts - - -4 JUDGE STEIN: No, no, but what did they 5 actually do aside from acting as a parent acts? MR. KRAMER: Certainly, Your Honor. They 6 7 actually went into a joint development with UK as the engineers and the manufacturers of tractors and 8 9 tractor components. So much so, that worldwide 10 tractor manufacture occurred under the umbrella of 11 Ford U.S. So the facts plainly create a question of 12 fact as to whether or not Ford was the manufacturer 13 of the tractors. That leads us to the vehicle parts 14 that Mr. Finerty also dealt with. 15 JUDGE PIGOTT: But you need that, right; 16 you need the manufacturer part? 17 MR. KRAMER: An actual manufacturer? 18 JUDGE PIGOTT: Uh-huh. MR. KRAMER: Rather than a distributor, 19 2.0 seller, or designer? 21 JUDGE PIGOTT: Does that - - - yeah. 22 MR. KRAMER: I don't believe so, Your 23 Honor. 2.4 JUDGE PIGOTT: If you sued this in Ireland, 25 would the standard of proof or anything be different?

MR. KRAMER: I'm not sure about Irish law, but I could say that if it were under New York law, both actors would have been part of the chain of distribution, which is what strict liability is developed for.

And to go back to what I was mentioning about the actual vehicle parts. What Ford was doing was instrumental in the design of their brake systems. They put forward a brake system - - - and that's what they called it - - - that could not have used anything else but asbestos, which they knew, as we will prove, was harmful at the time.

As late as 1987, Ford was one of the last to remove asbestos from their braking systems, and they note, and it's in the record, that they could not do it under their design specifications, and importantly, these design specifications were not unique to American cars, but went into UK variants as well, such as the Cortina, which is one of the cars that Mr. Finerty mentions that he worked on.

Beyond even the design - - -

JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: But assuming all that is true though, if it's a question of design specifications, which is what your adversary claims it is, then they are not manufacturing according to

1 them; they're just making specifications for design. 2 And that doesn't lead to strict products liability. 3 MR. KRAMER: Well, respectfully, Your 4 Honor, I don't agree with my adversary's version of 5 the facts here. Ford went beyond just design, as the record shows. Ford actually was promulgating exactly 6 7 how these products should be marketed, how they 8 should be packaged. In fact, as the record points 9 out, they were stating specifically that their 10 foreign subsidiaries had to market it - - - had to 11 package it under the Ford genuine parts logo, which 12 did not specify whether it was a Ford U.S. or Ford 13 UK. 14 JUDGE STEIN: Let me ask you then, did they 15 say this is what the package must look like in its 16 entirety and you - - - it cannot be different in any 17 way, or did it just say it has to be in a package 18 that has the Ford logo on it? 19 MR. KRAMER: The actually provide examples, 20 they say, this is - - -21 JUDGE STEIN: They provided examples - - -22 were the examples that it must be done with one of 23 these examples - - -2.4 MR. KRAMER: Indeed they - - -

JUDGE STEIN: - - - with no variations.

MR. KRAMER: Indeed they did. That is correct, Your Honor. They said that it had - - -

JUDGE STEIN: Where is that in the record?

MR. KRAMER: I believe it's 636; I will confirm. It is a memo beginning on page - - - on the record page 634, extending through to 639.

JUDGE STEIN: Okay, thank you.

MR. KRAMER: Wherein Ford specifies how their brakes or how their parts are going to be packaged, the labeling to be used, and they even go so far as to say, look, if they are manufactured in somewhere regional where there might be different types of specifications - - - and they used the example Mexico - - - then you have to say in small letters, "Made in Mexico". But for everything else, were there was uniform, common types of products - - - and they used the example, Ford UK, in that very memo - - - you don't have to specify it; you just have to include the Ford logo, which Mr. Finerty had recognized, and Ford genuine parts, which he also recognized.

JUDGE PIGOTT: How far do you go with that?

If these same - - - you know, these same brakes are used in a different - - - different manufacturer of tractors, can you get Ford?

MR. KRAMER: If these same types of brakes were specified as having to be used in Ford?

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JUDGE PIGOTT: No, they just designed that and said, this is the, you know, this is the Al best brake you can have for tractors, and so, some other factor manufacture, Farmall or John Deere or something say, hey, that's pretty good, let's use the Ford design, is Ford then responsible if there is a problem with John Deere?

MR. KRAMER: Absolutely, Your Honor. Under our state's strict liability laws and products liability, as long as they're a part of the chain of distribution, putting a defective product into the chain of commerce, then yes, they are on the hook.

JUDGE PIGOTT: I'm just talking design; I'm wondering if, you know, you're in a car accident in a Ford, can you sue Lincoln? I'm saying, you know they are all the same and, you know, they use the same brakes and they're - - obviously Lincoln must have had something to do with the design of the Ford, so I want to sue Lincoln and Ford.

MR. KRAMER: Well, you raise an interesting question, Your Honor, because as we've heard, the appellant is saying that because the incident occurred in the UK, it's really the UK's actions that

happened.

If the facts were to show that a Lincoln dealership was where Mr. Finerty worked, and where they sold and manufactured the brakes, but Lincoln acted in concert with Ford who designed the brakes, specified they had to be used in these specific Lincoln vehicles, the analysis would be the same. Both would be part of the chain of distribution, both would be responsible in entering a dangerous product into that chain. And in that scenario, Lincoln, being farther down the chain, would have the right to indemnify itself, to seek indemnification from those higher up.

JUDGE PIGOTT: Yeah, I could see them. I think if Ford Ireland wanted to sue Ford USA, they could, saying you led us down this path, and we - - - if we have to pay, then we can - - we're going to come after you.

MR. KRAMER: Well, un - - -

JUDGE PIGOTT: But you want to jump that, you want to go to the - - -

MR. KRAMER: Well, to be clear, Your Honor, we actually - - - we did sue Ford UK; the First

Department determined we didn't have - - -

JUDGE PIGOTT: Right.

MR. KRAMER: - - - personal jurisdiction

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1 over them, but if that had happened, and if Ford UK had decided, hey, look, we need to seek 2 3 indemnification from those higher up the chain who actually had control, I believe under our law, as 4 5 Godoy puts out - - - points out, they would have had 6 the ability to do so. 7 JUDGE PIGOTT: Right. Okay. 8 MR. KRAMER: Which - - -9 JUDGE STEIN: But is that the same as 10 strict lia - - - strict products liability from the 11 consumer, the indemnification cases? 12 MR. KRAMER: The indemnification, the 13 public policy behind it is, Your Honor. Because - -14 15 JUDGE STEIN: Okay. But that's not 16 necessarily the same concept. 17 MR. KRAMER: Not necessarily the same, but 18 it goes to the same fact which is that at the end of 19 the day, our state wants to be able to change a 20 manufacturer's behavior in putting out harmful 21 products. And sometimes, the way to do that is 22 economically, which is why those lower on the chain 23 can go higher up in the chain to look for

JUDGE STEIN: Would you clarify for me - -

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indemnification.

- going back to the package design, are you saying that merely designing the package and telling Ford UK, you must use one of these three or four packages, that's part of - - that's being in the chain of distribution?

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MR. KRAMER: Under the facts we have here,
Your Honor, that is one aspect of many facts showing
there are - - -

JUDGE STEIN: But would that be enough by itself?

MR. KRAMER: I believe it would be, Your Honor. That marketers, specifically, have been held in the chain in the past, like in the Brumbaugh decision, where the marketer was up a - - - a persona named El, I believe, it was the E-L, who marketed the faulty trash compactor that killed the gentleman who was injured. But they were just the marketer and they said, you know what, we were just the marketer, we shouldn't be in the chain at all.

But the court there, I believe it was the Third Department, said, no, as long as you had an intimate hand, you are involved. Which also advances our public policy, because what the courts in New York are actually saying is, we will hold those in the chain responsible as long as they're not

peripheral members.

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Which goes exactly to what this court has held in cases like Semenetz and Sukljian, where they look at the facts and they determined that, you know what, in certain instances, we're going to determine that those actors are maybe a little outside the chain. So in specific instances, they will be outside, when it looked - - - when the facts demonstrate an intimate involvement or a substantial involvement, which is the language that the First Department and Justice Heitler used, then yes, they will be in the chain.

Which is entirely consistent with how courts look at this around the country, specifically the Promaulayko case, the Supreme Court of New Jersey; the Torres case, which was the supreme Court of Arizona, which dealt with almost an exactly identical factual scenario where Goodyear U.S. was claiming, as the parent of Goodyear UK, that they should not be on the hook for defective tires. But what the Supreme Court of Arizona determined there was that based on the facts, once they delved in, it was very apparent that Goodyear U.S. had an intimate involvement with the design and how those tires were manufactured.

JUDGE STEIN: Did they have the same strict products liability law we have in New York?

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MR. KRAMER: I believe they are relying on 402-a, I don't want to be quoted on that, but that's my memory of the case.

Your Honors, I see my time is running out;
I believe that what the First Department found here
strongly adheres to both the case law in state and
our public policy; they're not in any way extending
or trying to develop any sort of aberration of our
products liability law. Therefore, the First
Department's decision should be upheld.

Thank you.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you.

Counselor.

MR. METLITSKY: Thank you, Your Honor.

Just a few points. First, the answer to the question whether anybody has ever been held upstream from the manufacturer in the state is no. In Godoy, as my friend admitted, that was a distributor; they were able to sue the manufacturer for indemnification up the stream, but if the suggestion is that a parent corporation is going to sue the manufacturer that's also its subsidiary, that seems a little bit absurd.

Second, they're saying that Ford U.S.

itself was actually the manufacturer in this case.

We don't want to have a fight on the facts about

that. We agreed that that is required. If the court

wants to announce the rule that you have to be a

manufacturer and let the lower courts sort it out,

that's fine. But just to be clear, the whole premise

of the decision below is that Ford U.S. was not the

manufacturer; otherwise the best position to exert

pressure standard makes no sense. The whole idea is

that you're not exerting pressure on yourself; you're

exerting pressure on the party that is manufacturing

the products. Third - - -

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JUDGE PIGOTT: How does that work, then, as you say, you can - - - they could - - - they could sue - - Ford Ireland can sue Ford USA for indemnification, but if you so dominate Ford Ireland, they're never going to - - - they're not going to sue you.

MR. METLITSKY: Well, if you so dominate Ford Ireland, there is no distinction between the two and you just hold the parent liable for the acts of the subsidiary.

JUDGE PIGOTT: And isn't that what the Appellate Division found?

MR. METLITSKY: No, the Appellate Division

1	expressively found that there was no veil piercing
2	here.
3	JUDGE PIGOTT: No what?
4	MR. METLITSKY: That was the whole
5	That's no veil piercing, that was the whole
6	_
7	JUDGE PIGOTT: No, no, no, I understand
8	that. But the question of how much influence Ford
9	USA had over Ford Ireland.
10	MR. METLITSKY: No, I don't think I
11	don't think the court actually found anything about
12	the level of influence. What it what it held
13	was that there was enough facts for a jury to
14	conclude
15	JUDGE PIGOTT: Okay, all right.
16	MR. METLITSKY: that Ford was in the
17	best position to exert pressure.
18	JUDGE PIGOTT: That's
19	MR. METLITSKY: And our position is, that
20	is legally irrelevant because every parent
21	corporation
22	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: What's the purpose of
23	the requirements that Ford USA put oin the sub, with
24	respect to packaging, and labeling, and what
25	was their end game there?

MR. METLITSKY: Oh, right, so that was going to be my next point. If you look at the pages in the record that my colleague is citing, those are - - - this is a - - - Ford is - - - Ford U.S. is the licensor of the trademark; this is a trademark program. All it's saying is, here is what the, you know, the label is supposed to look like. There is not a word in there about anything else on the

package like the warnings, nor could there be.

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Everybody that's been in a Duty-Free shop knows that different jurisdictions require different warnings. So there is no way that Ford U.S. is going to say, your warnings have to look like this and they can't have anything to do with asbestos or anything else. All this is about is what the FOMOCO trademark is supposed to look like.

And one further point. They say that if this is a foreign manufactured product, it's not supposed to have - - - you know, say, you know, where it is manufactured. But if it's a - - - if it's - - - on page 637, if it's a domestic manufactured product, it says, product of Ford Motor Company; Ford U.S. If it's manufactured something else, it doesn't say anything, but as the Pennsylvania courts made clear, Ford is not synonymous with Ford Motor

Company, the U.S. company. Fork UK is a huge corporation that sells - - - you know, it was nine billion pounds in revenue in 2011.

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CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Those requirements aren't geared towards sales and - - -

MR. METLITSKY: Oh no, they are - - - just like any trademark licensor is going to be able to tell people how they can use their trademark, and not just that, to police their operations; that's the Lanham Act requirement, to make sure that the products they're selling are the quality that the trademark licensor is requiring. But no - - - every court in this state to have considered the question has made clear that trademark licensors that don't sell the product.

And just on one more - - - the last point,
this - - - the Torres case in Arizona. The question
was whether that case is consistent with this state's
law. The first thing that the court did, obviously,
was reject the rule in the restatement that products
liability only applies to manufacturers and sellers.

Here is what else it said. It said,

"Certainly the brain that so competently and

thoroughly directs the entire enterprise" - - - this

is the parent company, after holding there was no veil piercing, "must be liable for the acts of its appendages." That's the whole point, for the acts of its subsidiaries. In this case, they have already admitted that they are not seeking to hold Ford U.S. liable for the acts of Ford UK. And that admission, in our view, should end the case, because the only acts that were committed that could hold an entity subject to product's liability are manufacturing and sale, which Ford U.S. did not do. CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you. MR. METLITSKY: Thank you, Your Honor. CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you. (Court is adjourned) 

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## CERTIFICATION

CERTIFICATION

I, Meir Sabbah, certify that the foregoing transcript of proceedings in the Court of Appeals of Finerty v. Abex Corporation and Ford Motor Company, No. 1 was prepared using the required transcription equipment and is a true and accurate record of the proceedings.

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