1	COURT OF APPEALS
2	STATE OF NEW YORK
3	
4	BECK CHEVROLET CORP., INC.,
5	Appellant,
6	-against-
7	No. 48 GENERAL MOTORS,
8	Respondent.
9	
10	20 Eagle Street Albany, New York 12207 March 22, 2016
11	rateil 22, 2010
12	Before:
13	CHIEF JUDGE JANET DIFIORE ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE F. PIGOTT, JR.
14	ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA ASSOCIATE JUDGE SHEILA ABDUS-SALAAM
15	ASSOCIATE JUDGE LESLIE E. STEIN ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE M. FAHEY
16	Appearances:
17	RUSSELL P. MCRORY, ESQ.
18	ARENT FOX LLP Attorneys for Appellant
19	1675 Broadway, 34th Floor New York, NY 10019
20	JAMES C. MCGRATH, ESQ.
21	SEYFARTH SHAW LLP Attorneys for Respondent
22	World Trade Center East Two Seaport Lane, Suite 300
23	Boston, MA 02210
24	Meir Sabbah
25	Official Court Transcriber

1 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Okay. Good 2 afternoon, everyone. Our first matter on the 3 calendar is Beck v. General Motors. 4 Counsel. 5 MR. MCRORY: Good afternoon, Your Honors, 6 and may it please the court. My name is Russell 7 McRory from Arent Fox and I represent the plaintiffappellant, Beck Chevrolet. 8 9 The statistics in this case are quite 10 striking. 11 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Excuse me, would you like to reserve some rebuttal? 12 13 MR. MCRORY: Yes, Your Honor. I would 14 respectfully request the right to reserve three 15 minutes for rebuttal. 16 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Certainly. 17 MR. MCRORY: Thank you. The statistics in this case are quite striking. 18 19 At any given time, fifty percent of all New York Chevrolet 20 dealers are out of compliance and in breach of their 21 dealer agreement with - - - with General Motors. 22 JUDGE PIGOTT: I liked your Lake Wobegon 23 reference, with respect of that that everyone is 2.4 above average. But is your complaint with the

contracts that you signed with GM? Is - - - if you

read the VNT, it reads like the UCC for - - - for car dealerships; you know, you got to be fair, you can't be arbitrary, you can't do this and that. And where does this fit in? I - - are you saying that the law - - excuse me, that the contracts you signed are wrong, that they can't be used in the state of New York?

2.4

MR. MCRORY: Well, Your Honor, in those areas where the New York legislature chose to regulate the franchisor-franchisee relationship, the statute governs and not - - - and not the contract.

In the - - - in the - - -

JUDGE PIGOTT: But they can't - - - but
they - - - I wasn't very articulate, but I'm saying,
the VNT says you got to be fair. It's about - - it's about what it's - - - you know, you read through
all of that, including (ff), and it's just saying you
can't be arbitrary. All of it seems to me to be just
logical. And - - - so what are we - - - what's the
problem here? I mean, you're saying it's arbitrary
because half of you are out of compliance?

MR. MCRORY: Well, Your Honor, I think -
- there are several cases cited in our brief where

they - - where the courts take exactly that

position, is that any standard that relegates half

the dealer body to a situation where they are in breach of their - - - of their dealer agreements - -

2.4

JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, are you referring to the out-of-state cases that you just put in your compendium?

MR. MCRORY: Yes, yes, Your Honor.

JUDGE PIGOTT: Yeah. Most of those, though, had to deal with moving dealerships or denying an assignment of a dealership. I mean, it was, you know, the whole enchilada was being discussed, not just the number of cars you were selling.

MR. MCRORY: Yes, Your Honor. I mean, the issue of using a statewide average or a regional average comes up in a variety of contexts. Some of the ones Your Honor mentioned, relocating a dealer, adding a new dealer to a network. But it all - - - but obviously, in this case, what it dealt with was ultimately the termination or the attempted termination of Beck Chevrolet.

JUDGE RIVERA: Also, are you arguing that in order for a standard to meet the requirements of not being unreasonable or arbitrary or unfair, excuse the double negative, that all of the dealerships have

1	to have complied? Is the fact that some can't comply
2	the reason that it's unfair, or unreasonable, or
3	arbitrary?
4	MR. MCRORY: Well, Your Honor, what I've -
5	the situation here is not whether they can or
6	can't; the situation here is that fifty percent can't
7	will not, cannot, shall not comply with the
8	- with the
9	JUDGE RIVERA: Because it's marked as a
10	"average"?
11	MR. MCRORY: Because it's marked as an
12	average and the
13	JUDGE RIVERA: Someone always has to be
14	below the average?
15	MR. MCRORY: And right, it's not just
16	some
17	JUDGE RIVERA: So then is your challenge
18	that what GM should be applying is a floor as opposed
19	to an average?
20	MR. MCRORY: Your Honor, I
21	JUDGE RIVERA: A baseline.
22	MR. MCRORY: Your Honor, what I think what
23	we're talking about here is is a sales
24	performance standard, and what and what I would
25	argue, and I think other courts have looked at, is

that when you have a large average, a regional average or a statewide average, and you adjust only for a small piece of consumer preferences and local market conditions, that is unreasonable and unfair. Which you - - - what the courts have recognized consistently, again and again, is that where the consumer preferences and market situations in the local market differ dramatically from the larger state or regional markets, that you have to look at things on a more local basis. You have - - -

2.4

JUDGE STEIN: If we agree with you, does that mean that virtually all of the car manufacturers in the country are going to have to change their standards?

MR. MCRORY: No, Your Honor; I don't think that's the case. Well, I mean, first of all we're dealing with New York, which is a very - - - it's a state onto itself, if I - - - if I could say that. The metro New York area downstate is significantly different than areas of upstate New York.

JUDGE STEIN: Let me - - - that may be true, but if we were to agree that - - - that a local factor has to be factored in here, how do you determine what's the appropriate locality? I mean, isn't that in itself sui generis?

MR. MCRORY: Well, Your Honor, for example,

General Motors doesn't organize itself by states; it

organizes itself by regions, and zones, and

districts. So, if General Motors itself can organize

itself on more local geographies, there's no reason

why those same local geographies can't also be used

to evaluate New York's.

2.4

JUDGE PIGOTT: So under that standard - - - under the standard you want, what happens?

MR. MCRORY: Well, in this case, Your

Honor, if you'll - - - and if you're looking at

individual dealers and comparing them not against -
not only - - - I'm not saying necessarily that you

have to completely throw out state averages or

regional averages; they may be useful for some

purposes, they may be useful for some large scale

purposes. But when you are - - - when you're

evaluating dealer performance, what you have to get

at is how are dealers comparing to other like-kind

dealers that face similar market conditions and

similar barriers to success, I think is the phrase

the Second Circuit used.

JUDGE STEIN: Are you arguing that these standards are all three of the things that are prohibited - - - they are unreasonable, they are

arbitrary, and they are unfair - - or are you arguing only some of those?

2.4

MR. MCRORY: Your Honor, I think a state - a state or regional average, again, just adjusted
for a small slice of consumer preferences, is unfair
and unreasonable. I think the arbitrariness comes in
more in the application. For example, obviously we
have in this case - - - and this was an issue brought
up by a Judge Zulkosky in the DMV proceeding is, GM
was not able to articulate why Beck was called from
the herd and subjected to a termination proceeding
when there were a lot more dealers below it.

JUDGE RIVERA: Is it - - - isn't part of a problem though, with your argument - - - and you'll correct me if I'm wrong, that - - - that what GM's position is that what you are calling brand preference is in part driven by the inability of a dealer to actually persuade the potential purchasing public of the strengths of that brand; that it's not that it's inherent to the brand, it's the dealer.

MR. MCRORY: Your Honor, I think there are two factors at issue here; there's not just in the - - in this case in the DMV level, but also in other cases involving GM. I've - - we reference the Landmark case and the Northshore case, that they have

found that - - - that Chevrolet in particular, and GM in general, have issues - - - have market issues in the metro markets.

JUDGE RIVERA: Uh-huh.

2.4

MR. MCRORY: And numerous cases have found that. The testimony in this case, in the Federal Court, that was admitted. GM's own expert said that GM - - Chevrolet faces challenges in metro markets around the country. New York is the biggest metro market of them all.

JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Would you have - - then would you have GM adopt some sort of metromarket standard to apply to those areas where they
are - - the dealers are particularly having
trouble, and how would that relate to a nationwide
standard?

MR. MCRORY: Well, Your Honor, I think - - for example, I think that's - - that's a point
that I touched on briefly before. General Motors
organizes itself along localized geographies. For
example, the New York City zone, which is basically
the tristate area around Manhattan, and that is in
fact a benchmark that Beck's expert used below. And
Beck performs much more - - its sales performance
goes up much higher when it's compared again like-

1 kind dealers, dealers facing the same market 2 conditions in metro New York. 3 JUDGE PIGOTT: But doesn't that argument 4 take you to the point you were saying earlier that 5 you were being terminated when those that have done 6 worse than you are not? 7 MR. MCRORY: Correct. 8 JUDGE FAHEY: How do you account - - -9 JUDGE PIGOTT: I was halfway through the 10 sentence. 11 JUDGE FAHEY: Oh, I'm sorry, Judge, I'm 12 sorry. 13 JUDGE PIGOTT: I was just going to - - - I 14 was just saying, so are you making the argument that 15 they can only fire the worst, the one who sells the 16 least vehicles, because that's the one that can't say 17 - - - and somebody else that's worse is still a franchisee? 18 19 MR. MCRORY: Well, Your Honor, I think this 20 goes exactly to the cases that GM cited, is when - -21 - when you have a dealer that is - - - that is poorly 22 performing under a state average, under a local 23 average, under every different metric that can

possibly be thrown at the dealer, those are the

dealers that have been subject to termination.

2.4

1 And those are the cases that GM decided where that has occurred; and that shouldn't be 2 3 surprising. Any metric where you're looking at the 4 bottom fifty percent, that's going to capture the 5 badly performing dealers. The problem here is that it's also capturing the dealers that are not 6 7 performing badly, that are facing market conditions 8 that are very different than a state or regional 9 average. So it's - - - it's creating false 10 positives, or false negatives is probably the better 11 way to put it. JUDGE FAHEY: What - - - what - - -12 13 JUDGE RIVERA: If - - - if they just impose 14 a floor, as opposed to the average, getting back to 15 my other question, would that comply with the 16 statute? 17 MR. MCRORY: Your Honor - - -JUDGE RIVERA: If they just said we want -18 19 - - we expect every dealer in York State to sell a 20 minimum X. We're not basing - - - we're not 21 comparing; we just say that's the minimum, you want 22 our dealership, that's the minimum. 23 MR. MCRORY: Your Honor, it dep - - - I

think the answer is it depends how X is calculated.

In this case, how X is calculated is based on state-

2.4

1 average market share adjusted only for segment 2 popularity. So any time you're saying sell X, you 3 have to figure out how you're going to sell X. JUDGE RIVERA: But under the RSI with that 4 5 average they do, GM does go and look at something 6 else, right, they don't automatically terminate. Or 7 do they automatically terminate, whereas a floor 8 would say, that's - - - that's the benchmark; you 9 don't hit it, we're terminating this franchise. 10 MR. MCRORY: Well, Your Honor, in this 11 case, and this is something that Judge Zulkosky 12 specifically found, is GM offered no other reasons 13 except for the failure to meet RSI and state-average standards; so that - - - that's the facts of this 14 15 And the - - - and in fact I think that goes to the arbitrariness issue, and I think that also was 16 17 raised in the DMV decision. 18 JUDGE STEIN: But - - - but - - -19 JUDGE FAHEY: Before you get - - - before 20 you get to that, Curry, the Curry dealership - - -21 MR. MCRORY: Uh-huh. 22 JUDGE FAHEY: That's in Yonkers also, isn't 23 it? 2.4 It's further to the north; MR. MCRORY:

25

it's in Scarsdale.

1 JUDGE FAHEY: How do you account for the difference in the numbers? 2 3 MR. MCRORY: Your Honor, there is - - -4 first of all, Cur - - - let's put this in 5 perspective; Curry's RSI scores, I think, were around 6 eighty, so - - - they weren't considered - - -7 JUDGE FAHEY: They weren't over a hundred 8 either, I recognize that. 9 MR. MCRORY: I would also think it's - - -10 there were several issues with - - - with Curry's. 11 What you saw generally in the market is, as you went 12 south to north, the performance, you know, changed. 13 I think the worst dealer were in Brooklyn and 14 Manhattan, then the Yonkers - - - then the Bronx, 15 then Yonkers, then Curry in Scarsdale. So there was definitely a south - - - sort of a south-to-north 16 17 increase in the popularity of Chevrolet vehicles. JUDGE FAHEY: And you would attribute that 18 19 to going from the more urban to the more suburban? 20 MR. MCRORY: Yes, that would - - - that 21 would be one factor. One - - - and one issue for 22 example, why Curry - - - that was an issue, I think, 23 Judge Hellerstein raised in his decision at the district court level, is - - - and we had said, the 2.4

road network accounted for a lot of it, is that a lot

of Beck's territory was, for example, right along the Bronx River Parkway, which actually - - - it's diff - - - it's much easier for those customers to go north to Scarsdale than they are to go south to Yonkers.

So even though Beck was assigned territory that was as the crow flies, closer to it, it was actually more convenient for those customers to go north.

2.4

JUDGE PIGOTT: But isn't that kind of a point? I mean, how do we decide this one is arbitrary and that one is not, and set a standard? I mean, obviously at some point, that's what the court's asking us about, is how does this - - - how does this apply.

I couldn't help but think that in Vermont you must own a Subaru. Nobody owns a car other than a Subaru in Vermont. So I mean, if you have a Chevy dealer in Montpelier, you may not be doing very well, right? But that's not your fault. But if you're losing money, can't they say, time to stop?

MR. MCRORY: Well, Your Honor, again, I think the issue is - - - is - - - what I think is happening here is that when you are applying this type of a state standard and applying it at the state average, and the state marketplace is very different than the local marketplace, it's generating the false

1 positives or false negatives that I talked about If it's not - - -2 before. 3 JUDGE STEIN: Are all the - - -4 MR. MCRORY: Sorry. 5 JUDGE STEIN: Are all the franchise 6 agreements for the same length of time? 7 MR. MCRORY: Your Honor, I think - - -8 there is really two answers to that question; I think 9 technically, the General Motors franchise agreements 10 are five-year agreements, but under one of the 11 provisions of New York law is that they're 12 effectively evergreen; you cannot manufacture - - -13 you cannot refuse to renew a franchise agreement. JUDGE STEIN: So how - - - so then how does 14 15 the manufacturer, if it decides that it just isn't -16 - - it isn't productive, you know, to have a 17 dealership in that particular location anymore, you know, no matter who it is, because of the 18 19 demographics or the lo - - - you know, where it is 20 along the highway or, you know, whatever the case may 21 be, what does the manufacturer have to do? MR. MCRORY: Well, if the manufacturer can 22 23 establish that the dealer is poorly performing, and 2.4 we see from the cases from General Motors that they

are able to do that on occasion when they can

actually prove the case, then the dealership can be - - can be terminated. If what you're asking, Your

Honor, is if - - - I see my time is expired, if you
want me to finish the question, if is - - -

2.4

JUDGE STEIN: Let me just clarify the question a little bit. Rather than just poorly performing, but just more in general. So, poorly performing, it's circular, because poorly performing depends on what the standard is. But if in the - - - in the mind or the eye of GM, this is just not a profitable place to have a dealership.

MR. MCRORY: Your Honor, I believe there is

New York legi - - - law on that particular issue; I

believe it's passed in the last couple of years,

maybe at around the time of the bankruptcies, where

there are limitations on, essentially, an exit from

the marketplace. I think it maybe came out at the

time when Oldsmobile was - - - was removed as a

brand. So there are limitations on that place in the

Dealer Act. That's not the issue here, of course,

but the Dealer Act I think does address that issue.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Counsel, what is the impact on this case of the fact that the statewide standard was in place and known to Beck at the time that they entered into the participation agreement

with GM? Anything?

2.0

2.4

MR. MCRORY: Your Honor, I think what - - - what that, I mean, the - - - ultimately, the statute always prevails; there are numerous provisions in the dealer agreement and in the participation agreement that are at odds with what's in the statute. And dealers sign and renew their dealer agreements every year or every several years. And simply because you signed those documents, the Dealer Act always prevails over the dealer agreement.

The - - - the legislative history behind this makes it clear that these are basically adhesive contracts. They are - - - they are generated of undue and imbalanced bargaining power between the manufacturer and the dealer. And so I think that the legislature spoke clearly on that.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, counsel.

MR. MCRORY: Thank you, Your Honor.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Counsel.

MR. MCGRATH: Good afternoon and may it please the court. I'm James McGrath, I'm together with Katherine Moskop; we represent General Motors.

Answering yes to either of the certified questions - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: But why don't you just

include the local challenges, why not? 1 2 MR. MCGRATH: Well, Your Honor, we do 3 consider local conditions and we consider them in a 4 number of ways, and Judge Hellerstein made specific 5 findings in this regard. The first way we do it is 6 through the segmentation process. 7 JUDGE RIVERA: Uh-huh. MR. MCGRATH: And I think that's being 8 9 underestimated in the analysis here because - - -10 JUDGE RIVERA: The SUV versus the pickup 11 truck, this kind of thing? MR. MCGRATH: Correct. And Chevrolet does 12 13 very well in pickup trucks, but pickup trucks aren't 14 particularly popular in Yonkers. 15 JUDGE RIVERA: Well, I thought their 16 argument was, well, yes, Chevrolet does better in 17 pickup trucks, but the pickup trucks for that other brand still do better because it's the brand. 18 MR. MCGRATH: Well, first of all - - -19 20 well, first of all, the segmentation process makes a 21 significant adjustment. So Beck is not being asked 22 to meet state average; it's being asked to meet 23 seventy-five percent of state average as a result of 2.4 just that process alone.

Judge Hellerstein then found that in

addition to that localization, GM looks at a variety 1 of other indices to corroborate the reasonableness of 2 3 that calculation. And in this case, there were 4 multiple; there was the fact that Curry outsells Beck 5 in Beck's own market area, even though it's less convenient to customers located in that area. 6 7 There's the - - -8 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: What do you attribute 9 that to? 10 MR. MCGRATH: Operator performance. 11 JUDGE PIGOTT: What does that mean? 12 MR. MCGRATH: That means the dealer is not 13 aggressively marketing vehicles in its market area so 14 15 JUDGE PIGOTT: What does that mean? 16 thinking about it; are you saying they're not 17 spending enough on advertising, are you saying that -- - I don't know what else they're supposed to do. 18 19 MR. MCGRATH: Not spending enough on 20 advertising, not having nice facilities, not pricing 21 their vehicles properly, not having inventory in 22 stock. 23 JUDGE RIVERA: I'm sorry for the pun, is 2.4 that where the rubber hits the road, that they argue,

there in not much - - - there is nothing else we can

do, we've gone as far as we can; and your argument is, you're just not a good dealer, if you'd did better, you'd get better numbers.

2.0

2.4

MR. MCGRATH: If we were looking solely at RSI, maybe that would be a valid criticism. But we looked well beyond RSI in determining Beck's compliance with its franchise obligations. And Judge Hellerstein found that evidence compelling; it found the fact that Curry was able to improve, that Major in Long Island City was able to improve dramatically, that Ford and Chrysler in the same market were able to easily exceed state average, compelling.

JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Counsel, your - - your client worked with this Beck dealership,
correct? You, I think, made some suggestions to
them; are you saying they didn't follow the
suggestions that you made to improve their dealership
performance?

MR. MCGRATH: We are, Your Honor. And I think the allocation issue is - - is the most - - - the easiest example of that. We offered Beck hundreds of additional cars in order to help it meet its sales performance obligations. It turned almost virtually every one of them down.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Was the timing of

that right?

2.4

MR. MCGRATH: Well, the evidence in the record was that as soon as the program ended, still in the winter months in New York, Beck started ordering significant amounts of additional vehicle - - vehicles during the same time period. Beck challenged that on appeal, Judge Hellerstein rejected its allocation claim, and the Second Circuit affirmed

JUDGE STEIN: On a more general basis, though, how - - - how can a standard be fair if at any one time, half of the people or the businesses fall below the standard; how can that be fair - - -

MR. MCGRATH: Evaluating performance against average is very common. And the most - - - the most readily known example of that is grading students on a curve. You're grading students against an average where, necessarily, approximately half will be above average and half will be below the average. But the question is what do you do with that result.

JUDGE RIVERA: Yeah, but their argument - - I get your point about that, but I think their
argument is without taking into consideration these
local challenges that - - you're really not doing

the kind of assessment you're talking about; you're not really applying an average that way because in your example, the students always have the opportunity to be above the average. And their argument is, these challenges, if you don't take them into consideration, I mean, we will never be able to meet that mark.

2.0

2.4

MR. MCGRATH: Well, we do take those local

- - - I don't agree that we don't take the local

considerations into performance; we do it through the

segmentation process and we look it - - - do it

through looking at other indices and we look - - - do

it by looking - - -

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Why not brand preference?

MR. MCGRATH: Well, brand preference,
that's an in - - - that's a very interesting issue
because I don't think - - - GM doesn't want to adjust
for brand preference; they want to know why a
particular dealer is not able to sell as many Chevy
Malibus in a particular market as the adjusted
average would suggest it could. If you - - if you
take brand preference out of the occasion - - of
the equation, you're not evaluating performance.
That's what is - - - the metric is designed to do.

JUDGE RIVERA: You would say it's a resistance from a business model perspective of admitting there is something inherently wrong with the brand; because that's what you would have to do, no?

2.4

MR. MCGRATH: Exactly. And there is nothing in this case to suggest that there is somehow something wrong with the Chevrolet brand. And I think the best evidence of that, we typically see the claim that there's an import bias in this market. GM specifically looked at this issue, it looked at how its domestic competitors, Ford and Chrysler were doing, located on the same street as Beck, within a mile of its dealership. And it found that they were performing well above state average. That - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: But it could - - - it could be the metric hits GM harder, right? And that's their point.

MR. MCGRATH: If it was only the metric, if GM wasn't considering all these other factors, maybe - - - maybe that would be true. But the fact that GM looks beyond the metric, and its contract says it will look beyond the metric before claiming that the dealer is in breach, that - - - that makes the standard fair and reasonable.

JUDGE FAHEY: But for them to get on your radar, I thought his argument was for them to get on your radar, in the sense that you're concerned about them, you identified them as a problem dealer, you'll only look at these numbers, and that's where they say they are put in a very difficult position, right? They're always on the defensive.

MR. MCGRATH: Well, I think it's a continuum, and I go back to my grading on the curve analogy. If there is a student that is getting an F, you're going to pay more attention to that student and try to help that student improve. And GM's rating process is designed to do that. If a dealer is below average, it's ranked either needs improvement, needs significant improvement - - - it's only those dealers that are on the bottom fifteen percent of the state, like Beck, that are rated unsatisfactory.

And then GM doesn't move to terminate them, as we heard at trial. Termination is extremely rare. What it does is it focuses resources and it provides information to the dealers to help them identify and take advantage of the opportunity in the marketplace.

JUDGE RIVERA: But that would still be in violation. If it really was unreasonable or

1 arbitrarily unfair, that would still be in violation 2 of the statute, right? The statute doesn't talk 3 about termination, per se. 4 MR. MCGRATH: Correct, correct. And this 5 case wasn't about termination, that issue wasn't before Judge Hellerstein, and it's not what the 6 7 Second Circuit needs to decide on appeal. 8 JUDGE FAHEY: I thought Beck's expert, 9 Rosner (ph.), said that eighty-three percent of the 10 dealers would fail under this standard. 11 MR. MCGRATH: And Judge Hellerstein took 12 that testimony into account in evaluating whether the 13 standard properly takes into account local variations. 14 15 JUDGE FAHEY: But you see why it's not a 16 If eighty-three percent of you are failing, 17 there really isn't a curve from any sense that I know of. 18 19 MR. MCGRATH: Well, it's a curve when you 2.0 look at the state as a whole. And Judge Hellerstein 21 recognized that simply because the dealers in the 22 downstate area needed to improve - - -23 JUDGE FAHEY: I accept that - - - I accept 2.4 your argument there. Then we get back to object - -25 - can an objectively be drawn - - - standard be drawn

geographically that isn't reflected on urban lines versus rural lines, because obviously Westchester

County is a great deal different from Niagara County.

Chevys sell great in Niagara County, they don't in

Westchester County; that's just a reality. And there is obviously a big difference in the urban area here, in the urban area Herkimer County.

2.0

2.4

So those obvious factors come into play, and you say, well, all right, then what would be the objective standard by which you would draw those lines?

MR. MCGRATH: And none was offered by Beck's expert.

JUDGE FAHEY: And what about what plaintiff says, the company itself doesn't?

MR. MCGRATH: The company organizes itself into - - into zones, which are very large areas, for purposes of deploying its field staff. It's for an entirely different purpose than evaluating dealer performance.

JUDGE FAHEY: Well, but you assume that there is an economic rationality to the way that they draw those lines. And the lines of states are drawn on historical realities that have very little to do with economic realities. So the economic reality

would seem to be more objective in your basis, and the line should then comport to that.

2.4

MR. MCGRATH: I think Judge Hellerstein recognized there was some economic reality to applying states. Not only did it provide predictability and uniformity and objectivity, but dealers in a particular state are subject to the same tax laws, the same franchise regulations, the same document fees; so there is some economic correlation between using state as a measure and the atmosphere within the state, just as this court decides cases for the entire state of New York.

What the Second Circuit and Judge

Hellerstein recognized was that no standard is going

to be perfect. But this standard has tremendous

attributes and virtues. And it takes into account

local variations in a way that makes it reasonable

and fair.

JUDGE STEIN: Well, what's so difficult

about just adding this - - - this extra variable?

MR. MCGRATH: Because then you're going to

- - - then you're going to inject a whole great deal

of subjectivity into the analysis. And Beck's expert

conceded this at trial. That these - - -

JUDGE STEIN: But you already do that with

the segmentation, why can't you just do it with the brand?

2.4

MR. MCGRATH: Any - - - any area that you draw is going to have to be evaluated on a segment basis. But as Beck - - - Beck's expert conceded at trial, the arbitrary areas that he drew, that Judge Hellerstein found were gerrymandered, have to be evaluated every year, they have to be redrawn, they're going to be different for every dealer, they're going to - - - they're going to inject uncertainty and subjectivity into the process.

And I don't think that's what a statute that is akin to the UCC, that's designed to prohibit conduct that transcends the bounds of commercial norms, which is what this language indicates, requires.

JUDGE STEIN: But again, don't you already do that with other factors, like the segmentation?

MR. MCGRATH: We take the standard, the objective standard that's based on state, and then we segment adjust that. So you get into the lo - - - you account for the local variations.

JUDGE STEIN: Okay, so why couldn't you use the same areas, or draw the same lines with segmentation or with brand that you do with

1 segmentation? 2 MR. MCGRATH: You could, but what you would 3 have to decide is where exactly do you draw the 4 different geographic area. 5 JUDGE STEIN: What I'm saying is that you 6 already do that, don't you? 7 MR. MCGRATH: We - - - we don't, Your 8 Honor. We do segmentation based on the state average 9 benchmark. We come up with the benchmark; that's 10 step one. Then we segment adjust that benchmark for 11 the local market area. I think - - -12 JUDGE STEIN: So that's what I'm talking 13 about, so you - - - you're saying you're using the term "local market area". 14 15 MR. MCGRATH: Correct. 16 JUDGE STEIN: Okay. So - - - so you've 17 defined, for the purpose of the segmentation issue, 18 what the local market area is. Why can't you use 19 that very same local market area to look at brand 20 preference? 21 MR. MCGRATH: You could. 22 JUDGE STEIN: Okay. 23 MR. MCGRATH: You could, but the - - - but 2.4 drawing the geographic benchmark and taking the first

step would be inherently subjective under the

approaches that Beck suggests. You're going to have to debate which areas should be included on an annual basis, and the dealers would never know which area they were going to be evaluated against.

2.0

2.4

JUDGE RIVERA: So you're saying the brand preference, these metrics over this brand preference, and the segmentation, are not coterminous. So they may not - - - there may not be overlap.

MR. MCGRATH: The segmentation is designed to adjust based on available registration data, and this is unique in this industry, for what kind of custom - - - what kind of vehicles do customers living in the Yonkers market prefer. And the availability of that data is - - - is quite powerful, because you don't have to speculate as to what kind of vehicles they'll buy based on their income levels or other demographics; we have the actual data. And that's what we're doing.

JUDGE STEIN: Doesn't that data show you what brand - - -

MR. MCGRATH: Well, what the resulting performance metric shows is how the particular brand is performing in that market. So we want to know how the Chevy Malibu is performing versus the Toyota Camry and the Honda Accord. That's precisely what a

1 metric is designed to evaluate, because we want - - -

2.4

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Are you suggesting that the sales efforts of your dealers can overcome some geographic preference for a brand?

MR. MCGRATH: Well, yes - - - yes, I am.

Because the only way we can sell cars to customers in

New York is through our dealers. So we are

completely beholden to their marketing efforts to do

that. And it's all about marketing, and advertising,

and inventory, and beating the competition in the

particular market.

Being more aggressive than Toyota, and Honda, and Ford, and Chrysler; that's what the performance metric is designed to do. And it's not designed as a club to bludgeon the dealers; it's designed as a tool. And there is a sales performance evaluation that's twenty or so pages in the record. It identifies by model where there is opportunity.

JUDGE STEIN: So you want the downstate dealers, for example, to work harder than the upstate dealers, because the upstate dealers don't need to.

MR. MCGRATH: In fact, we don't. We want the upstate dealers to work - - - downstate dealers to simply work as hard as the customers prefer those vehicles in the area, only seventy-five percent of

state average here.

2.0

2.4

JUDGE PIGOTT: How often do you - - - do you find yourself in a situation where you're terminating a dealership?

MR. MCGRATH: As the evidence - - - Judge Hellerstein found below, it's extremely rare. This is not used as a tool for termination. My time is running short; I'd like to touch on the second question, if I may.

And that's - - - the issue, with respect to the second question, is whether a manufacturer's exercise of a discretionary contract right somehow modifies or changes the franchise relationship with the dealer. And this was done - - - alleged with respect to GM's modification of Beck's market area, its AGSSA. And AGSSAs change all the time for a variety of reasons, the most basic of which is the United States redoes the census every year and the census tracts change.

JUDGE STEIN: Is that a change to the franchise agreement?

MR. MCGRATH: It is not, because in the franchise agreement, GM recognizes that all the dealers' AGSSAs are going to need to be reevaluated from time to time. And GM has to, for the entire

1 network, do that, so the dealers agree that GM has the right to do that in the sole - - - its sole 2 3 discretion. So where GM - - -JUDGE FAHEY: So assuming it conflicts with 4 5 463(2)(gg), who trumps? MR. MCGRATH: Well, 4 - - -6 7 JUDGE FAHEY: I don't like that word, but I 8 mean, which one would - - -9 MR. MCGRATH: 463 would trump, but it 10 doesn't conflict with 463. 11 JUDGE FAHEY: Okay. 12 MR. MCGRATH: The legislature here has 13 chosen to curtail some discretionary rights. For 14 instance, GM reserves the right to add or relocate 15 dealers in its dealer agreement. The legislature 16 enacted a specific provision curtailing that right in 17 463(2)(cc). 18 JUDGE STEIN: So unless it's specifically curtailed by the legislature, you could have a 19 20 franchise agreement that leaves anything else and 21 everything else to the sole discretion of the 22 manufacturer, and then you could do whatever you 23 wanted. 2.4 MR. MCGRATH: For purposes of the business

relationship, this ongoing business relationship,

both parties have significant discretionary rights under the franchise agreement. Beck reserves the right to determine how much inventory to stock, how much advertising to conduct, and the like. The legislature here, and - - -

2.0

2.4

JUDGE RIVERA: How isn't that against the language itself, it's unlawful for a franchisor notwithstanding the terms of any franchise contract. So you can't write into your contract, we don't care what the statute says, we keep the discretion, do whatever we want - - I'm paraphrasing obviously, that's not the way you've written the agreement - - -

MR. MCGRATH: Right.

JUDGE RIVERA: - - - but you get my point.

MR. MCGRATH: Well, I think the legislature was concerned with changing defined obligations in the franchise agreement. For instance, if you say, you will have ninety days' notice if we decide to terminate you, and then all of a sudden we say, you'll only have sixty days, that's a modification. And I think what the legislature was worried about, was as Mr. McRory said, these are evergreen agreements; they expire every five years, but were we not - - required to renew them unless we showed due cause and good faith for not doing that.

1 So what the legislature was concerned about 2 was, when these come up for a renewal, we shouldn't 3 be able to modify all sorts of definite provisions. 4 JUDGE RIVERA: Are you not able to modify, 5 or you just have to modify pursuant to the 6 requirements of the statute - - -7 MR. MCGRATH: Pursuant to the - - -8 JUDGE RIVERA: - - - isn't that slightly 9 different? 10 MR. MCGRATH: Correct. You're - - -11 JUDGE RIVERA: Doesn't prohibit the modification, necessarily. 12 13 MR. MCGRATH: Thank you, Your Honor. 14 must give notice and demonstrate good cause for the 15 modification. The legislature here, and you can look 16 at 463, has been very precise and has regulated very 17 minute aspects of this relationship. Other states have passed APR modification statutes that require 18 19 notice and - - - and a showing of good cause in order 20 to modify a dealer's market area. 21 New York has not done that. And I would encourage that - - - the court to resist Beck's 22 23 invitation to add requirements to this statute either 2.4 on a performance standard or the mod - - - the APR

revisions that the legislature chose not to enact in

2008.

2.4

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, counsel.

MR. MCGRATH: Thank you.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Counsel.

MR. MCRORY: Your Honor, the North Shore case, I think, from out of Illinois, that went all the way to the Illinois Supreme Court, illustrates the fundamental flow with using the statewide averages adjusted only for the segment popularity.

JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, they added a new dealership there, didn't they?

MR. MCRORY: They were adding a dealership, but they were - - - they were addressing whether the use of a statewide average adjusted for segment popularity is a useful tool, an accurate tool, a fair and reasonable tool.

JUDGE PIGOTT: One thing that strikes me in this whole business is, we don't know a darn thing about the automobile business, and frankly, a whole lot about franchising; you know, we've got these two questions to address. I think of, you know, a new dea - - - a new owner of a franchise. Besides, I'm going to spend a million dollars advertising, and I'm going to get every darn customer I can out of this, and the dealer next to him, you know, however close

or far, suffers as a result of that. And I don't know - - - you know, who are we to say, oh, this is unfair that this is going on? I don't know how, you know, all of these permutations can get sorted out by us.

2.4

MR. MCRORY: Well, I mean, Your Honor, the legislature sort of kicked it into the court's, you know, bailiwick to handle this. So - - -

JUDGE PIGOTT: But isn't it always a question of fact? I mean, you did have a, you know, a trial in the Southern District, and I think one of the points that was made was that the RSI did not seem to be, you know, determinative in any fashion; am I misreading that?

MR. MCRORY: Well, Your Honor, it is - - - it is determinative. Because, I mean, what - - - always at issue - - - even though this was not the termination case, that was the DMV case, termination was always an issue here. The - - - the issue that precipitated the case was the letter from GM in April of 2011 saying, if you don't meet your performance requirements, we will not renew you at the end of this term.

JUDGE RIVERA: Can any - - - can any dealer
- - - since he's saying the point of the average is

always to keep someone below - - - excuse me, is it 1 2 possible for a dealer to consistently be below that 3 one hundred RSI mark, and nevertheless not be terminated? 4 5 MR. MCRORY: Yes, Your Honor. I mean, that's something that the - - - that the Judge 6 7 Zulkosky addressed. And he couldn't fig - - - he said there was no - - - basically no credible 8 9 explanation offered by GM why Beck was selected out 10 of all these dealers below a hundred, below fifty. 11 JUDGE RIVERA: The others didn't get terminated. 12 13 MR. MCRORY: It - - - it was, I mean, I 14 think he felt it was basically arbitrary why Beck was 15 culled from the herd in this - - - in this regard. 16 The state average - - - the state average standard 17 adjusted - - -18 JUDGE STEIN: Could you just talk for a 19 minute, though, about the APR changing - - -20 MR. MCRORY: Yes. 21 JUDGE STEIN: - - - and whether it - - - if 22 your agreement - - - if your franchise agreement says 23 that it's at the sole discretion, so there is no APR 2.4 built into that agreement, how is a change then a 25

change - - -

MR. MCRORY: Your Honor, and I think that the Second Circuit may have misread the agreement.

The APR is part of the agreement; there is an APR addendum that is part of the franchise agreement.

2.4

It is - - - I'll give you the exact cite in a second, but the - - - it's an addendum to the franchise agreement, just like the standard provisions are an addendum to the franchise agreement.

JUDGE STEIN: But do they have discretion to modify that - - - contract - - -

MR. MCRORY: Under the contract, they have discretion to modify the APR, and presumably the AGSSA as well.

The - - - but it is part of the contract, the APR addendum says, under a dealer's sales and service agreement as part of it. The letter that was sent by GM to Beck Chevrolet said, keep - - - you know, this is your APR addendum, keep it with your dealer sales and service agreement. At oral argument, there was - - - counsel admitted that - - - or GM was not arguing that it was not part of the dealer agreement; this is part of the dealer agreement. And it's not just any part of the dealer agreement, it's one that affects sales performance, it goes into the denominator of the RSI calculation, it

affects a whole host of other things that affect the
operational performance of the dealer.
CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, counsel.
MR. MCRORY: Thank you.
CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you.
(Court is adjourned)

CERTIFICATION

I, Meir Sabbah, certify that the foregoing transcript of proceedings in the Court of Appeals of Beck Chevrolet Corp., Inc. v. General Motors, No. 48 was prepared using the required transcription equipment and is a true and accurate record of the proceedings.

h. Sall

Signature: _____

Agency Name: eScribers

Address of Agency: 700 West 192nd Street

Suite # 607

New York, NY 10040

Date: March 24, 2016