1	COURT OF APPEALS
2	STATE OF NEW YORK
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4	PEOPLE,
5	Respondent,
6	-against-
7	No. 51 BOBBY WALLACE,
8	Appellant.
9	
10	20 Eagle Street Albany, New York 12207
11	March 22, 2016
12	Before:
13	CHIEF JUDGE JANET DIFIORE ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE F. PIGOTT, JR.
14	ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA ASSOCIATE JUDGE SHEILA ABDUS-SALAAM
15	ASSOCIATE JUDGE LESLIE E. STEIN ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE M. FAHEY
16	ASSOCIATE JUDGE MICHAEL J. GARCIA
17	Appearances:
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25	Official Court Transcriber

1 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Number 51 on the 2 calendar, People v. Bobby Wallace. 3 Counsel. 4 MS. FELL: Good afternoon, Your Honors, and 5 may it please the court. My name is Katherine Kelly Fell from the law firm of Paul Weiss, and I represent 6 defendant-appellant Bobby Wallace. I would like to 7 reserve two minutes for rebuttal. 8 9 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Certainly. 10 MS. FELL: I'd like to address our custody, 11 public safety and O'Rama issues today, time 12 permitting, but I'll start with the custody argument. 13 We are asking the court to formally recognize that a 14 person who admits to police that they have committed 15 criminal wrongdoing does not feel free to leave that 16 encounter with police. 17 JUDGE RIVERA: Was that argument presented 18 to the judge? Was that particular argument 19 presented? 2.0 MS. FELL: At the suppression court? 21 JUDGE RIVERA: Yes. 22 MS. FELL: The argument at the suppression 23 court - - - trial counsel's argument was slightly 2.4 different, but it was about custody, and the relevant

facts were referenced in the argument, and

importantly the trial court, also in making its decision on custody, found the relevant facts here are the statements that are at issue.

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JUDGE GARCIA: But are you asking for a different rule than all the facts and circumstances to determine if a reasonable person believes they are free to leave or, you know, the standard, or, you know - - - and this is one factor, which then I think your preservation argument has more merit, but - - - or are you asking for a different rule, that once you confess to a crime, it's over.

MS. FELL: It's about an acknowledgement that a confession specifically rises above. So if - if a defendant confesses criminal wrongdoing to an officer, it doesn't matter whether that defendant is in the street or in the police station; if he confesses criminal wrongdoing, he's not going to feel free to leave.

JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Is that - - -

JUDGE GARCIA: It's per se rule that you're not - - a reasonable person would not feel free to leave at that point.

MS. FELL: That's right. And you do see
Appellate Divisions applying this rule in Ripic, in
the Third Department, and Davis and Paulman - - -

JUDGE GARCIA: But is it - - - would it be, again going to the reasonable person standard, who is making the decision on whether you confessed to a crime? In some places it may be clear, but in some you may be thinking, this is a great story, I'm out of here. But technically, you have confessed to a crime; so how would you apply your rule in that case?

MS. FELL: I think it has to be in the - - at the view of the officer, if an officer believes
- - reasonably believes that the person confessed
to a crime, and then he would have to then and
thereafter administer Miranda warnings.

JUDGE GARCIA: So it would not have anything to do with what the person making the subsequent statements reasonably believed.

MS. FELL: Well, this is an interesting situation with confession here. Because here, you don't really have a question; in some other circumstances you say, well, the defendant might suspect that there is evidence against him, but that's not necessarily enough. Here, you have the defendant supplying a significant piece of evidence; the defendant knows what they've told the officer and the officer knows what the defendant is telling them, so it's a unique set of circumstances.

1	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Who is the "they" that
2	you are
3	MS. FELL: I'm sorry?
4	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: You just said that the
5	defendant knows what they told the officer.
6	MS. FELL: Right.
7	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Who is the "they" that
8	you are referring to?
9	MS. FELL: Himself.
10	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Oh.
11	MS. FELL: So if you take this for example,
12	Mr. Wallace said, I hit him with my hand. At that
13	point, Mr. Wallace is confessing to a criminal
14	wrongdoing; there is a
15	JUDGE PIGOTT: What's the crime?
16	MS. FELL: Well, that he hit the victim. I
17	mean, in context
18	JUDGE PIGOTT: Is that a crime?
19	MS. FELL: In context here, I think it's
20	clear that it is.
21	JUDGE PIGOTT: That's what I don't know.
22	The context, you know, as I looked at it, you know,
23	you got two people fighting over empty cans
24	MS. FELL: Sure.
25	JUDGE PIGOTT: and putting them in,

1 you know - - - it's conceivable the police officer 2 could say, you know, this is similar to a domestic 3 dispute - - - I don't know who is right who is wrong 4 here, who was trying to put what where, you know, I'm 5 just trying to get to the bottom of this. And if we 6 then say, well, once somebody says something, 7 everything else stops, and somebody has got to go to 8 jail, it seems to me you're defeating what the police 9 sometimes try to do, which is to ameliorate 10 situations. 11 MS. FELL: Sure. Well, in context here, 12 the police had some information about the crime 13 before they arrived. They are questioning Mr.

Wallace on the block just four or five buildings from where - - -

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JUDGE PIGOTT: But you said - - - you said it depends - - -

MS. FELL: - - - this victim is being treated for injuries.

JUDGE PIGOTT: I'm sorry, you said your rule was it should be looked at from the point of view of the officer.

MS. FELL: Well, that's what the officer is going to look at when he's looking to administer Miranda warnings; that was my point there.

JUDGE PIGOTT: But if you look at it from the point of view of the officer, didn't he do what he thought was right here?

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MS. FELL: Well, I mean, officers assumedly try to do the right thing. That question, it has to be the point of the officer, that's about when to apply the Miranda warnings. When an average person says, you know, to an officer, I hit him, or, yes, I shot him, that sort of thing, they know that they are confessing to criminal wrongdoing.

know, you've got the situation, he makes a judgment with respect to the two complainants here. All he knows is, you know, somebody has got a stick, somebody has got something, I'm going to remove it from the scene, and then I don't care what they do with their cans or what - - where they go after that, I certainly don't intend to arrest anybody. But wait a minute, the Court of Appeals just said if I do this, if I just take away the weapon, I've got to take somebody downtown, I've got to get - - I've got to Mirandize him, and I've got to ship him.

MS. FELL: Well, the important - - - the important question for custody is when does the suspect - - - does the suspect feel free to leave.

1 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: So counsel, are you 2 suggesting that when the police respond to a street 3 encounter, as in this case, the first question out of 4 the box converts this on-the-scene quest for 5 knowledge about what's happening immediately into a 6 custodial police-dominated situation? 7 MS. FELL: Not in every instance. CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: In this case. 8 9 MS. FELL: In this case, the custody 10 occurred when Mr. Wallace incomla - - - said that he 11 hit Mr. Flores (ph.). 12 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Was that at the - - -13 was that at the first question? Was that in response 14 to the very first question? 15 MS. FELL: That was not the response to the first question. They were couple of initial 16 17 questions, what happened up the block, that kind of 18 thing. Then they said, where is the weapon, and in 19 response he said, I hit him with my hand. 20 JUDGE STEIN: Didn't we - - - didn't we 21 implicitly reject the rule that you're asking us to 22 make in - - - I can't pronounce it - - - Bongarzone-23 Suarrcy? I mean, isn't that some - - - where 2.4 somebody walks into a police station and says, I

killed my husband, and we didn't hold that she had to

be Mirandized then. 1 2 MS. FELL: If I'm - - - if I'm remembering 3 that case correctly, I think that the issue was whether or not it was permissible to ask a few 4 5 follow-up questions to determine the veracity of the 6 confession and place it into context. 7 JUDGE STEIN: Well, but under your theory, 8 as soon as she said that, she was in custody. So - -9 10 MS. FELL: There - - -11 JUDGE STEIN: - - - no further questions without Miranda. 12 13 MS. FELL: There may be room for follow-up 14 questions to determine, you know, what is - - - are 15 you confessing. 16 JUDGE STEIN: So it's not a - - - it's not 17 MS. FELL: That kind of thing. Well, it 18 19 would be aimed at determining whether the person had 2.0 just confessed. But what happened here was 21 different; they continued to interrogate about the 22 location of the weapon until they found the weapon. 23 JUDGE RIVERA: You mean the question about 2.4 the weapon itself assumes that there has been some

kind of action, that - - - that's a criminal action;

is that what you're trying to say? Or is just the point in where you say - - - where he says, the defendant says, I hit him, that that's the point?

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MS. FELL: That is the point that we're arguing where custody occurs.

JUDGE RIVERA: And then the question about the weapon is, I think you're arguing, the officer's recognition that that is an incriminating statement because they are going further in asking about a weapon involved in this assault; is that what you are trying to say?

MS. FELL: No, I am saying that when he said I hit him with my hand, that that was the thing created custody because he was admitting to an officer that he committed a crime.

JUDGE PIGOTT: But switch it around a little, let's assume - - let's assume it's a domestic, it's a husband and wife situation, they are arguing in the car because they were at some Stop & Shop - - this all happened at a grocery store - - - and she gets mad, gets out of the car, does everything that happened here, and the officer says to her, what happened. She goes, well, I slapped the son of a - - well, the guy. Now she is in custody. There's an assumption that because she hit him, that

she is not the victim, she is now the defendant in a criminal case, and is entitled to Miranda warnings.

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MS. FELL: There would have to be an assessment based on all the circumstances there to determine whether that statement was a - - - can be reasonably viewed as a confession to criminal wrongdoing.

And here, it's more clear because the defendant was on the block being treated for injuries, the officer had some knowledge about this crime already, so it was clear that he was confessing to criminal wrongdoing.

JUDGE FAHEY: Well, you can see, though,
the - - in your case, it might work, but there are
all these variations that the court's pointed out to
you that for a mandatory arrest rule would create
enormous problems and eliminate any basic
investigatory questions that the officers could make,
that nine times out of ten in police work, result in
some - - nobody being arrested.

MS. FELL: Well, there may - - - in each circumstance, there may have to be some judgment applied to determine whether or not there was a confession to criminal wrongdoing, but what we are arguing here is, this is separate and apart from the

totality of the circumstances analysis, because it was in fact a confession to wrongdoing, it doesn't matter if it's made on the street or in police stations; the person would not reasonably feel free to leave.

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JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Don't the police have to do something or say something that suggests that the defendant doesn't feel free to leave? It's not the defendant's subjective belief about whether he can walk away or not, right?

MS. FELL: Well, it's a reasonable person standard, but I disagree that it's limited to just what the police do. You do see Appellate Divisions applying this rule in finding that just a confession is enough, even where there are indicia of custody, so those - - - those are the Ripic, Davis, and Paulman cases, where the circumstances were notably non-confrontational; it was confession in the home, confession in a hospital but with - - - under very non-confrontational circumstances.

JUDGE STEIN: Isn't that under the totality of the circumstances rule rather than based just on the initial - - - $\!\!\!$

MS. FELL: Well, in those cases, those courts were applying totality of the circumstances,

1 but the confession was the only factor. And what you 2 don't see in the cases is you don't see courts 3 saying, yes, there was a confession to criminal 4 wrongdoing but they were on the street, or they 5 weren't handcuffed, so there's no custody here; 6 that's why this rises above. 7 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you. 8 MS. FELL: Thank you. 9 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Counsel. 10 MS. FRIEDMAN: May it please the court. Му name is Ellen Friedman, representing the People. 11 12 Your Honors, to begin, this case presents a 13 classic mixed question of law and fact. To start with 14 15 at the totality of the circumstances in every case. 16 to get around that, the defense tries to recast that

custody, whether a situation is custodial requires looking question as some kind of legal threshold, whether in any situation, any kind of inculpatory statement transforms by itself necessarily a non-custodial situation to a custodial one.

JUDGE STEIN: But you agree that it could, in and of itself.

MS. FRIEDMAN: I do not agree with that.

JUDGE STEIN: Never.

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MS. FRIEDMAN: You have to look at the

circumstances in the context - - -

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JUDGE STEIN: Well, you know, what if - - - what if they - - - you know, instead of the person, the call being somebody just hit somebody with a pipe, okay, somebody just shot somebody, and the police show up and the witness says, that's the guy right over there, and they walked over to him and he says, I confess, I killed her.

MS. FRIEDMAN: I see what you're saying.

JUDGE STEIN: Okay. At - - - that in itself, in that situation, would you agree would be enough to say once he said that, he's - - a reasonable person isn't going to think that they're free to leave.

MS. FRIEDMAN: That in - - not that in itself; that in itself, in its context, and looking at all the other circumstances, might be the case. But it's not the case that any kind of inculpatory statement automatically transforms a situation to a custodial one; you have to look at the circumstances when the crime occurred, where the officer is, what the officer said, what the person he's - - or she is speaking to said, the timing of all that, and of course, the fair inferences that you can draw. And again, all of that is a mixed question of law and

1 fact, and there is ample support for this carrying 2 court's ruling. 3 In this case, the context is really important because the officer said, seeking to - - - looking for 4 5 safe - - - public safety, where is the weapon? And it was in that context that Mr. Wallace said, I hit him with my 6 7 hand. That was not a confession to the crime. JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, then he said these 8 9 Mexicans keep coming over here - - -10 MS. FRIEDMAN: Then he said, these Mexicans 11 keep coming over here and taking our jobs. 12 JUDGE PIGOTT: You finished my sentence for 13 me. 14 MS. FRIEDMAN: I'm sorry. 15 JUDGE PIGOTT: And at some point, doesn't -16 - - doesn't it reach where it's kind of obvious that, 17 you know, something has got to be done here; I mean, 18 it's not because they were fighting over the bottle, 19 it's because, you know, you got one party who is 2.0 anti-immigrant, or anti-Mexican, and at that point, 21 doesn't - - - shouldn't the officer do something? MS. FRIEDMAN: The officer said - - -22 23 JUDGE RIVERA: We have a witness who 2.4 identified him.

MS. FRIEDMAN: He didn't know who the

witness was at that point, he hadn't spoken - - - he hadn't seen - - - even seen the victim, much less spoken to the victim, and he was getting mixed information when he - - - the defendant was minimizing his conducts.

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JUDGE RIVERA: I'm sorry, what's the mixed information? You got a 911, two different calls, one says there is a weapon - - -

MS. FRIEDMAN: One call.

JUDGE RIVERA: - - - you got the ID from a witness on the street, he goes up exactly to the person the witness has ID'd - - - what's mixed, what did I miss? And then he asked, what happened, and eventually the guy says, I hit him - - - admits to being involved in, obviously, some kind of altercation.

MS. FRIEDMAN: The police officer was taking a very measured approach. He didn't jump the gun, he was trying to keep the situation calm, he wanted to - - he hadn't seen or spoken to the victim, he was trying to see or speak to this person to see what happened, and Mr. Wallace was trying to minimize his conduct. His statement, "I hit him with my hand" was - - even the defense counsel at the suppression hearing seemed to categorize that as a

denial. He was trying to get himself out of being 1 2 arrested with that statement. 3 JUDGE GARCIA: Counsel, let's say the 4 police officer does all these things, goes up to talk 5 to this person, but before he gets to the person, he has enough on his own mind to arrest him. 6 7 MS. FRIEDMAN: Uh-huh. JUDGE GARCIA: He doesn't want to do that 8 9 yet, so he just approaches this defendant on the 10 street and says, what happened? 11 MS. FRIEDMAN: Right. 12 JUDGE GARCIA: Can he do that? 13 MS. FRIEDMAN: He can, yeah. This court has held for decades and decades that just because -14 15 - - that there can be probable cause to arrest but that doesn't create a custodial situation in terms of 16 17 Miranda, unless the officer conveys that. 18 JUDGE STEIN: But he didn't say, what 19 happened; he said, where's the weapon. 2.0 MS. FRIEDMAN: The first thing he said was 21 what happened. The second thing he said was where is the weapon. But that itself doesn't transform a 22 23 situation to a custodial one. 2.4 JUDGE RIVERA: But isn't that eliciting

exactly the kind of incriminating information that -

- - that - - - if there is some doubt - - -1 2 MS. FRIEDMAN: Right. 3 JUDGE RIVERA: - - - about someone saying 4 I hit him, once you ask, where is the weapon, you 5 must have in your mind that this person has committed 6 some kind of act, and now you are soliciting, 7 eliciting, trying to get him to tell you where is 8 that weapon that's going to connect him to this 9 crime. 10 MS. FRIEDMAN: Well, I have two answers to 11 that; the first has more to do with custody, and the 12 second gets a little bit more into the interrogation 13 prong of the question. 14 JUDGE RIVERA: Either way, how about an 15 answer? Go ahead. 16 MS. FRIEDMAN: The first answer is that, 17 this court has held time and time again that just 18 because a police officer suspects that somebody has 19 committed a crime, does not create a custodial 2.0 situation. The question is whether a reasonable 21 person, in the defendant's situation, would believe that he is in a situation akin to a formal arrest. 22

So treating somebody as a suspect does not create a custodial situation, and actually, the defendant has abandoned that argument here claiming

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that custody didn't attach until after - - - not when the officer said where is the weapon, after that, when - - what Mr. Wallace said, I hit him with my hand.

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JUDGE RIVERA: But he kept asking him about the weapon after that; you agree, right?

MS. FRIEDMAN: He did ask again. And so, that brings me into the interog - - into the interrogation prong.

Of course, the defendant has to show not only that he was in custody, but also that the police questions about the location of the weapon constituted interrogation requiring Miranda warnings. And custodial questions prompted - - - even if it was custody - - - prompted by a concern for public safety or for his or her own safety, don't require Miranda warnings. That's the classic case of a question that does not require a Miranda warning, you know, in - - - when the question is just minutes after a just-reported crime with that weapon.

JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Well, this weapon, counsel, you know, isn't the typical gun, knife or other kind of weapon, you know, a piece of glass, or something like that, that would be - - one would consider a dangerous weapon, right. We don't know

exactly - - - I couldn't figure out exactly whether 1 2 it was a pipe or something else, it seemed like - - -3 MS. FRIEDMAN: Uh-huh. 4 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: - - - it might have 5 been a piece of aluminum or something. 6 MS. FRIEDMAN: Right. 7 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Why would that be 8 considered a dangerous weapon? 9 MS. FRIEDMAN: Well, it's what the police 10 didn't know at the time. They knew that it was an 11 assault with a metal stick; they didn't know the 12 dimensions, they didn't know how sharp it was, they 13 didn't know it was a size that the defendant could be hiding that could be within his reach. 14 15 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Has the court ever 16 accepted - - - expanded, excuse me - - - the narrow 17 public safety exception to a pipe? 18 MS. FRIEDMAN: No, but - - - it hasn't. 19 But the question isn't whether a pipe falls under the public safety exception. The question is, in this 2.0 21 case, did the questions - - - did the questions 22 constitute public safety questions. And for all this 23 police officer - - - all he knew was that there was 2.4 an assault with a metal stick. For all he knew, it

was a sharp stick that the defendant could still

1	reach, that an accomplice could reach and use
2	JUDGE RIVERA: Did he take any ac
3	MS. FRIEDMAN: he knew that this
4	defendant was still very agitated.
5	JUDGE RIVERA: Did he take any action to
6	try and contain the situation then, other than to ask
7	where is it?
8	MS. FRIEDMAN: He tried to keep the
9	defendant calm. I think that that was one of his
10	main goals.
11	JUDGE RIVERA: By continuing to ask him
12	where is it, when the defendant seems to be
13	particularly incensed about the person he just
14	attacked taking all the jobs?
15	MS. FRIEDMAN: Well, he did want to find
16	it, he did he thought it was very important to
17	find the weapon that was just used as quickly as
18	possible.
19	JUDGE RIVERA: Yes, so then where so
20	let me ask you about the public safety and security.
21	Then why allow the defendant to go get this weapon?
22	MS. FRIEDMAN: They didn't just allow the
23	defendant to go and get it; it was a very controlled
24	situation.
25	JUDGE RIVERA: They followed him and they

1 let him go down several steps, did they not? 2 MS. FRIEDMAN: They did, and they were 3 right there, in control the entire time. 4 JUDGE RIVERA: Would they not be worried 5 maybe he's got a gun or something else, and he's 6 going to kill us or someone else? 7 MS. FRIEDMAN: They were in control of the 8 situation. I'm sure that they had many ways that 9 they would deal with that situation. The fact that 10 they didn't automatically handcuff him, arrest him, I 11 think is commendable in this situation. They took 12 the reason - - - a reasonable measured approach that 13 we want police officers to take. They kept control 14 over the situation, they were looking to keep the 15 public and themselves safe. That's - - - the kind of 16 questions they asked were the kinds of questions that 17 this court has ruled are not - - -18 JUDGE RIVERA: I understand your point - -19 2.0 MS. FRIEDMAN: - - - the kind that require 21 Miranda warnings. 22 JUDGE RIVERA: I think there's much to be 23 said about your point. I'm just - - - I'm not 2.4 understanding the response to my last question about 25 basically letting the defendant go on his own - - -

1 granted, I agree - - - of course the record 2 establishes the police officers are with him and 3 following him, but basically let him reach down and 4 didn't know what he was reaching for until he came up 5 with the stick. 6 MS. FRIEDMAN: Your Honor, I don't think 7 the record is very clear exactly what safety measures 8 they themselves took to keep themselves safe. But -9 10 JUDGE RIVERA: Was that the People's burden 11 to establish that at the hearing? MS. FRIEDMAN: I don't believe so. 12 13 it was the defendant's burden to establish that they 14 were the kind of questions that need to have Miranda 15 warnings given. But what the police officers - - -16 there is ample support in the record that what the 17 police officers did they - - - was investigating when 18 they said what happened, they were determining 19 whether there was probable cause, and they were 2.0 looking out for the public safety and for their own 21 safety. 22 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, counsel. 23 Thank you. MS. FRIEDMAN: 2.4 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Counsel.

MS. FELL: Thank you. I'd like to address

the public safety argument that we were just discussing. Put simply, as this court noted, this is the broadest application of the public safety exception that an Appellate Division has ever applied. The People would like this court to immunize every question about the location of the weapon, but that's not the exception; there has to be a reasonable concern for the public safety as a result of the missing weapon, and here, there is no such concern about a pipe because it's - - like many other objects, it doesn't pose a particular danger.

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JUDGE STEIN: Did they actually know that it was a pipe? They didn't really know what it was.

They - - I mean, it could have been - - it could have been - - it could have been - - it could?

MS. FELL: Well, they received information about a metal stick or a pipe over the radio call, and there is nothing on the record to indicate that they thought it was anything else or anything unusually dangerous, as this court said - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: But what - - is it not possible that in this kind of street encounter, that a police officer certainly might - - - not knowing exactly, as Judge Stein has pointed out, really what

is the nature of this weapon, just that there is a weapon; you have some idea, but you really don't know much more than the little bit about it, it's got some metal aspect to it - - - that that indeed might establish that this is a dangerous situation?

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MS. FELL: Well, the case law says that you have to look to whether or not there was a reasonable concern. And when you look at the entire encounter here, you see that the officers were not concerned, and a reasonable officer wouldn't be concerned.

They continued to question him, and then, as this court noted, they escorted him to pick up the weapon, they let him go and retrieve it himself; they were clearly not concerned that this was a gun or some sort of object, they were not concerned that he had it on his person, they didn't frisk him, that kind of thing.

JUDGE RIVERA: Was he cuffed when they - -

MS. FELL: No, he was not, he was not cuffed, he was - - - and this was all said in the suppression hearing, no pepper spray, batons weren't produced, no weapon of any sort. The - - - he was permitted to, escorted by police, collect the weapon himself, which suggests no reasonable concern for the

public safety.

JUDGE GARCIA: But doesn't it also suggest he was free to leave in his own mind? I mean, if they had such a high suspicion of this person that it's near arrest, why would they let him do that?

Doesn't your argument on this undercut your - - you know, your custody argument?

MS. FELL: Well, to be clear, when they had him go collect the weapon, he was escorted, he was not free to leave; that's clear from the testimony.

But the custody was created when Mr. Wallace admitted to the criminal wrongdoing, which, you know, as we discussed, is very persuasive, that the psychological effect of someone confessing to an officer is not going to render that person - - they're not going to feel that they can just go and leave after telling someone they committed a crime, go get a cup of coffee, that kind of thing.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, counsel.

MS. FELL: Thank you.

(Court is adjourned)

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CERTIFICATION

I, Meir Sabbah, certify that the foregoing transcript of proceedings in the Court of Appeals of People v. Bobby Wallace, No. 51 was prepared using the required transcription equipment and is a true and accurate record of the proceedings.

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