1	COURT OF APPEALS					
2	STATE OF NEW YORK					
3						
4	SADEK,					
5	Appellant,					
6	-against-					
7	No. 30 WESLEY,					
8	Respondent.					
9						
10	20 Eagle Street Albany, New York 12207					
11	March 23, 2016					
12	Before:					
13	CHIEF JUDGE JANET DIFIORE ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE F. PIGOTT, JR.					
14	ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA ASSOCIATE JUDGE SHEILA ABDUS-SALAAM					
15	ASSOCIATE JUDGE LESLIE E. STEIN ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE M. FAHEY					
16	ASSOCIATE JUDGE MICHAEL J. GARCIA					
17	Appearances:					
18	GERALD T. FORD, ESQ. LANDMAN CORSI BALLAINE & FORD P.C.					
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21	ROBERT A. SKOBLAR, ESQ.					
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24						
25	Meir Sabbah Official Court Transcriber					

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: This is number 30 on this afternoon's calendar, Sadek v. Wesley.

Counsel.

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MR. FORD: Good afternoon, Your Honors, may it please the court. My name is Gerald Ford, I represent Mr. Jenkins and his employer, Greyhound Lines, and I would like to reserve three minutes for rebuttal.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: You have your three minutes, sir.

MR. FORD: Thank you.

I would like to start with the issue that bothered the First Department the most, which is namely that the stroke occurred five minutes after the accident, and the First Department says, well, plaintiff's theory that the accident caused the stroke is really an unremarkable premise.

And I think it's clear from this record that it's actually a fairly sophisticated medical issue. And the court properly decided to hold a Frye hearing on that issue, and she heard the testimony of our expert, Dr. Segal, one of the leading stroke experts in the greater New York City metropolitan area. And by the way, the First Department actually made a mistake in its opinion. It said that Dr. Yazgi was the director of the stroke

center at New York Presbyterian hospital; actually it's 1 our doctor, Dr. Segal, who is the director. 2 3 She heard a Dr. Segal's testimony, and Dr. Segal 4 said, in essence, that the plaintiff's causation theory is 5 junk science. JUDGE PIGOTT: One of the most troubling 6 7 things to me was how late all of this happened, you I've tried enough cases to know that when 8 know. 9 you're ready for trial, you're ready for trial, and 10 you've probably spent a lot of money on, among other 11 things, experts, and you filed seven, if I remember 12 right, motions in limine challenging every single one 13 of their experts. 14 MR. FORD: Right. 15 JUDGE PIGOTT: Was there a reason why they 16 were on the eve of trial as opposed to being almost 17 any other time? MR. FORD: Well, first of all, there was no 18 19 liability expert reports on this causation until two 20 years after the note of issue expired. With respect 21 to the other experts - - -22 JUDGE PIGOTT: But when you say two years 23 after, how long before trial was that? 2.4 MR. FORD: The - - - it was - - - well,

there's - - - Dr. Yazgi's second report was - - -

JUDGE PIGOTT: No, how long was it - - - I 1 2 mean, when you got the first report - - - what I'm 3 trying to pick on you about is that I don't think you 4 were particularly expeditious in challenging the 5 expert disclosures that the plaintiff had. incorrect on that, I would like to - - -6 7 MR. FORD: Well, the Dr. Yazgi disclosure, the second disclosure was in July of 2011. 8 That was 9 a few months before the scheduled trial date in 10 September. Now, the - - -11 JUDGE FAHEY: Yeah, but you had the initial 12 report almost a year before, right? 13 MR. FORD: We did, Your Honor. 14 JUDGE FAHEY: Right, and then - - - so 15 normally what you do is, just like Judge Pigott said, 16 put had a fair amount of negligence and if he had a 17 problem with it, you would make a motion to expand it 18 or - - - you didn't do any of that. 19 MR. FORD: Your Honor, I don't think there 20 is an obligation on the defendant to file this motion 21 to amplify that the First Department talked about. 22 JUDGE PIGOTT: I don't know if it is or 23 not, but I'm just thinking, professionally, when you 2.4 read this, it leaves you cold. I mean, you got

somebody who is injured, they have a cause of action,

1 they have a doctor that says the competent producing 2 cause of this is this, and everybody is fine. And 3 then we're going to pick a jury, we've picked the 4 jury, and now somebody says, wait a minute, you know, 5 every single one of your experts has to be precluded. MR. FORD: All right, well, if - - - I 6 7 mean, with respect to the damage experts, which 8 really aren't at issue here, you have to remember 9 that nine days before the trial, he served 10 supplemental disclosures for the damages experts, 11 which added about 3.2 million dollars in damages. Ιf 12 I - - -13 JUDGE PIGOTT: So did you ask - - - did you 14 ask for an adjournment at that point? 15 MR. FORD: No, Your Honor, we did not. 16 asked - - - we filed a motion in limine. Look, the 17 motion in limine - - - there is no rules - - - maybe there should be rules on motions in limine - - -18 19 JUDGE PIGOTT: Maybe there will be one. 20 MR. FORD: Maybe there should be, but there 21 are no rules on the time limit and - - -22 JUDGE STEIN: There is a rule, on the other 23 hand, that would require you to wait to make these 2.4 motions until you got before the trial judge, right -

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- correct?

1 | MR. FORD: I beg your pardon, Your Honor.

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JUDGE STEIN: There is no rule conversely that would require you to wait to make these motions until you get to the trial judge.

MR. FORD: You are correct, Your Honor.

JUDGE STEIN: Okay.

MR. FORD: Yes, yes.

But when we filed the motions in limine, the trial judge has the responsibility of making sure that everyone has a fair opportunity to be heard on that.

JUDGE PIGOTT: Your doctor said that what their doctor said is not true.

MR. FORD: Correct.

In other words, it seemed to me that what juries do?

In other words, it seemed to me that what you did is

- - - you didn't object to this doctor saying that

you - - - than an embolism can travel based upon a

traumatic event. Until - - - then you say, my doctor

says that's not true, so let's preclude that one.

Well, why don't we just let the jury decide which one

they are going to - - - because this isn't - - - this

is not a moonshot. I mean, this isn't new, you know,

that somebody suffers a traumatic brain injury, or

that, in this particular case, an embolism. And I

understand your point with respect to whether there

1 was one or not, but it just seems to me, you got to 2 move. I mean, you've tied up a judge, you've tied up 3 a jury, you've tied up all of these experts, and then 4 you come into court and say, oh, by the way, we are 5 challenging every single thing that's going on in 6 this case and we want - - - we want a Frye hearing. 7 And why are we doing it now? Because we want to. 8 MR. FORD: But no, Your Honor - - - well, 9 first of all, the damage issues really aren't - - -10 experts aren't at issue on the case. But with 11 respect to Dr. Yazgi, in July of 2011, he submits 12 this - - - according to Justice Tom, his words - - -13 incomprehensible second report. That was the cornerstone of our motion in limine. 14 15 JUDGE PIGOTT: So in July of 2011, you 16 moved to - - - for a better report, right? 17 MR. FORD: No, Your Honor, not in July, 18 later. 19 JUDGE PIGOTT: I know, well, I think I made 20 my point. 21 MR. FORD: Sure. 22 JUDGE PIGOTT: I'll leave you alone. 23 MR. FORD: Yeah. But I - - - but I also 2.4 want to address Your Honor's point that isn't this

for the jury. Before the jury is allowed to hear

this expert testimony, there has to be a determination whether the plaintiff's theory is generally accepted.

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JUDGE PIGOTT: Let's assume this. Why don't they move to preclude your guy because your guy says that what his guy says is untrue, and he can say, I want to preclude the defense expert because they are saying that what I'm saying is untrue, and that's nonsense.

MR. FORD: Well, I mean, I suppose he could have done that if he wanted to, but he - - - he did not. What we - - - the generally accepted principle of Frye I think is fully appropriate here when the leading stroke doctor of New York City says, I've never heard of this stuff, it's imaginary, it's made up, no one in my community would believe this. That, to me, calls for a Frye hearing.

And she heard - - - the trial judge heard the testimony of Dr. Segal, he says it's junk science, she chose to credit him over Dr. Oh and his two expert - - -

JUDGE STEIN: Is your argument that there has to be studies based on motor vehicle accidents and strokes in order to allow Dr. Oh's opinion to be presented?

1 MR. FORD: Well, it's a couple of things. 2 First of all, the articles that he relied on don't 3 show causation. They show an association, which under Cornell - - -4 5 JUDGE STEIN: Okay. That's not my 6 question. 7 MR. FORD: Okay. 8 JUDGE STEIN: My question - - - it seems to 9 me that the argument is being made, well, there's no 10 studies about the relationship of motor vehicle 11 accidents and strokes. And to me, there are a lot of other things that could produce the same kind of 12 13 situation as a motor vehicle accident. So that's my 14 question; is it really - - - is the Frye inquiry that 15 narrow? MR. FORD: Your Honor, I think it - - -16 17 there has to be at least some discussion of trauma, 18 it has to be a showing that it's generally accepted, 19 that - - -20 JUDGE FAHEY: Well, but that's - - - didn't 21 Judge - - - was a Judge Moskowitz who did a 22 concurrence? 23 MR. FORD: Yes, Your Honor. 2.4 JUDGE FAHEY: Yeah. I thought Judge 25 Moskowitz's concurrences picked up on Judge Stein's

point which is really, this would've been - - - it shouldn't have been a Frye hearing. You are relying on the Frye hearing standard. You may have an argument on the Frye hearing standard, but if it's not the Frye hearing that should've been applied - - - like Judge Moskowitz said, it should have been either a Parker or a simple evidentiary hearing to see if there was sufficient foundation presented for him to offer the opinion that he was offering, not whether or not it was generally accepted in the scientific community, but whether a foundation had been laid for him to offer an opinion in and of itself. Her argument seemed to me to be more on point.

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MR. FORD: Well, Your Honor, I think it's definitely generally accepted, I think that's an issue in the case, I think it's a big issue in the case, given our experts' testimony. With respect to Parker and specific causation, I think Justice Tom got it right below in terms of the lack of proper showing specific causation, specifically, the differential diagnosis that Dr. Oh tried to do here.

Under Cornell, we know that if you're going to do differential diagnosis, you can't just rule in the cause that you like, you have to rule out the

1 other causes. The articles that Dr. Oh relies on 2 show that there is a two hour - - - purports to show 3 that there is a - - - there can be a two-hour onset 4 period. Dr. Oh made no attempt to rule out the 5 possibility that this stroke had nothing to do with 6 the accident, he made no attempt to rule out the 7 possibility of some other sudden body movement. 8 JUDGE FAHEY: Well, each point you're 9 making seems to go to weight, not to admissibility. 10 MR. FORD: Well, I think under - - - well, 11 first of all, generally accepted, that issue, I think 12 is - - - does not go to the weight, that is a 13 question for the court. 14 JUDGE FAHEY: That's why I asked you about 15 Judge Moskowitz's distinction. 16 MR. FORD: Right. Right. 17 JUDGE PIGOTT: Because if Frye doesn't apply, but an evidentiary hearing was required, then 18 19 we're in a different posture. 20 MR. FORD: Right. But - - - but - - -21 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Could I back up, counsel, because I see your other - - - your white 22 23 light is on, do you consider Judge - - - I mean, Dr. 2.4 Oh's theories, were they new theories or were they

expansions of Dr. Yazgi's theories, what - - - what

do you consider them to be?

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MR. FORD: We consider them new theories,
Your Honor, because they were not mentioned in either
of Dr. Yazgi's two reports. They weren't mentioned
in Dr. Oh's expert disclosure report either.

And if you look at the Israeli article - - - I see my time is up, I'll just try to finish this. If you look at the Israeli study that Dr. Oh relies on, when they talk about sudden body movement, they're not talking - - - first of all, they're not talking about motor vehicle accidents, Dr. Oh admitted that, but they're also not even talking about physical trauma. They're talking about, for example, you're sitting at your chair and the doorbell rings, and you stand up, that type of sudden body movement.

The other example is, if you read the article that was actually published, is a grandparent is lying in bed, they hear a grandchild cry or fall down, they get up from that sitting - - - from that supine position. No mention of physical trauma anywhere.

JUDGE PIGOTT: But that's how - - - I think that shows how easy it is, you know, to have this condition occur. I mean, compared to what happened here, or what's alleged to have happened here, those are, you know, you think, if that can do it, why

1 can't an auto accident do it? 2 MR. FORD: Well, Your Honor, because our 3 expert says it can't happen and - - - and the trial 4 judge chose to credit that testimony. 5 JUDGE PIGOTT: All right, okay. 6 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you. 7 MR. FORD: Thank you. CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Counsel. 8 9 MR. SKOBLAR: Good afternoon. My name is 10 Robert Skoblar and I represent Kamal Sadek in this 11 case. The dissent stated twice in the lower court that 12 13 this was merely fortuitous that this stroke had happened 14 to occur right after the accident, and that it was merely 15 coincidence. That's found at CA24-25 and CA34. 16 I did the math on that, that this happened a few 17 minutes after the accident, and the math comes out to 24,177,600 to 1. 18 19 JUDGE PIGOTT: The problem, didn't - - -20 didn't one of the courts question you on the fact 21 that you had done the research that the doctor then 22 adopted? 23 MR. SKOBLAR: When I found out - - -2.4 JUDGE PIGOTT: But should we pick on you 25 for now doing - - - now testifying with respect to

certain - -
MR.

take judicial

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MR. SKOBLAR: Well, I'd ask the court to take judicial notice that there are sixty minutes in an hour - - -

JUDGE PIGOTT: We can do that.

MR. SKOBLAR: There are seven days - - -

JUDGE PIGOTT: I think you understand my point, I'm just - - -

MR. SKOBLAR: All right.

JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: And counsel, to the point I asked your adversary, do you - - - do you agree that these are - - - your - - - I guess your position is these are not new theories, that this is some - - - that - - - but I don't recall in Dr.

Yazgi's - - - either of his reports that he mentioned that a change of position or spiking blood pressure would cause a stroke or an embolic stroke.

MR. SKOBLAR: It was not that specific.

And the thing that - - - Dr. Yazgi basically said it was the trauma of the accident that led to the stroke. And really what I think the proper practice ought to be is that if you find that report deficient in any way - - whether you're a plaintiff or a defendant, you serve a report, you identify a Frye issue or you identify a Parker issue, speak up.

You know, I'm a Jersey guy and I've heard

it said many times on that side of the river that,

what's your problem? You got a problem, speak up,

tell me what it is.

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JUDGE STEIN: Well, that - - - that seems like it would be the civil thing to do. But is there any rule that requires that it be done that way?

MR. SKOBLAR: Well, the way it should - - the way it happened - - - I mean, other than the
total chaos that it created, the way that it happened
was that it's a summary judgment motion, a
dispositive motion, made when I'm ready to open to
the jury, and I stick out my arms and I get seven
motions in limine, and twenty-four hours in which to
respond - - -

JUDGE PIGOTT: But as I just - - - as I understand their position, they - - - they weren't really that concerned about Dr. Yazgi until the second report came out. And that was what, you know, lead to everything else that happened. So while it certainly wasn't expeditious, it wasn't, you know, quite as lackadaisical as it might appear.

MR. SKOBLAR: Well, first of all, in the bill of particulars that was served two years before the note of issue, the first thing where it says

1 injuries, it says stroke. You can't pretend - - -2 they cannot pretend the depositions, all the 3 discovery, the medical evidence that was exchanged, the authorizations - - - I have a Redweld filled with 4 5 authorizations - - - they can't pretend that they didn't know that this case was about a stroke. 6 7 JUDGE PIGOTT: Yeah, but did the doctor - -8 - I know he went to the hospital, he wasn't - - - was 9 he - - - how long was he in the hospital? 10 MR. SKOBLAR: I want to say ten days, 11 perhaps. 12 JUDGE PIGOTT: Was there a discharge 13 diagnosis? MR. SKOBLAR: Yes, it was stroke. 14 15 JUDGE PIGOTT: Did they tie it to the accident? 16 17 MR. SKOBLAR: Yeah - - - well, I don't know that it - - - it said motor vehicle accident and CVA, 18 19 so does that mean that the doctor at the hospital was 20 associating the two? It was just - - - at the scene 21 of the accident - - - Kamal suffered the stroke a few minutes after the accident. EMT was called, they 22 23 took his blood pressure - - - and that's what I find 2.4 really interesting about this. He had no history of

hypertension; they took his blood pressure at the

1	accident scene, it was 198 over 120. The doctors at			
2	the Frye hearing, both sides said, that's well within			
3	the stroke danger zone.			
4	JUDGE PIGOTT: Right. But that that			
5	followed the argument too, right?			
6	MR. SKOBLAR: I'm sorry?			
7	JUDGE PIGOTT: That followed the exchange			
8	of words between the bus driver and he?			
9	MR. SKOBLAR: Yes, that too, yes. There			
10	was, you know well, both doctors also testified			
11	that they would expect that in the trauma of the			
12	accident and the resultant argument, that they would			
13	expect a person's blood pressure to rise.			
14	JUDGE PIGOTT: Did that treating did			
15	you were you going to call the treating			
16	physician?			
17	MR. SKOBLAR: Yes.			
18	JUDGE PIGOTT: And what was his what			
19	was his			
20	MR. SKOBLAR: Dr. Yazgi.			
21	JUDGE PIGOTT: Okay. he treated he			
22	was the treater at the at the			
23	MR. SKOBLAR: Every month he saw Kamal.			
24	JUDGE FAHEY: Can I ask a question? Going			
25	to Frye for a second.			

1 MR. SKOBLAR: Yes. 2 JUDGE FAHEY: So the Appellate Division 3 seemed to say that Frye was met. At least two of the 4 three in the majority said that Frye was met and that 5 MR. SKOBLAR: Yes. 6 7 JUDGE FAHEY: - - - as I asked your 8 opponent in the other side, I thought Judge Moskowitz 9 was saying something else, that general liability may 10 have been met and that Frye shouldn't have been - - -11 shouldn't have even been an issue. What's your 12 position on that? 13 MR. SKOBLAR: I think what Judge Moskowitz said is that perhaps a Parker hearing would have been 14 15 more appropriate. 16 JUDGE FAHEY: Well, I was thinking even 17 more fundamentally, like Richardson's rules on general reliability, but go ahead anyway. 18 19 MR. SKOBLAR: I'm sorry, sir, the question 20 being - -21 JUDGE FAHEY: So the question being, where 22 are you - - - do you think that the Appellate 23 Division's determination on Frye is correct or Judge 2.4 Moskowitz is correct? Which would you say would

apply here? You see what I'm saying?

MR. SKOBLAR: Yeah.

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JUDGE FAHEY: Okay. The reason I ask is because - - let me tell you what I'm thinking, it might help you are little bit. The reason I ask is because I am having a difficulty seeing general acceptance in the scientific community when you get to the counting scientific votes questions on whether the Israeli study applies and the Finnish study, okay. That isn't the same as general reliability. And that's a separate question.

And it seems that there is a stronger argument to be made there than the Appellate Division's analysis of the application of Frye because it seems like they really didn't apply Frye, it seems like they more applied Daubert, and using the Zito case, the Second Department case, and the principles that were enunciated there. And in other words, a confidence in the scientific confusion - - conclusion, rather than a general acceptance in the scientific community. That's why I asked the question.

MR. SKOBLAR: Well, the Finnish - -
JUDGE FAHEY: Because what I am worried

about is, not just your case, but if somehow we make a decision here that upholds this decis - - - the

Appellate Division, it would seem that we may be in danger of undermining our own standard because it seems to be imposing new rules, and maybe the wrong standard was applied to begin with. That's why I'm asking.

MR. SKOBLAR: Well, if a Parker hearing was

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MR. SKOBLAR: Well, if a Parker hearing was necessary, that's really what should have happened here. The Finnish study, at least for our case, I think was exactly on point and had a lot of reliability to it. And that is, in the Finnish study, from 1990 to 2001, 2,303 Finnish men were followed. And the conclusion of that study was that they tested the people originally, and some people had their systolic blood pressure rise really quickly, and other people in the stress test, their systolic did not move much.

JUDGE STEIN: Did that study establish causation or just a correlation?

MR. SKOBLAR: I think it was more of a correlation, but - - -

JUDGE STEIN: Is that enough?

MR. SKOBLAR: I think it's enough. And the reason being is that Kamal's - - - who had no history of hypertension, and seventy-two percent of those whose systolic blood pressure rose - - -

JUDGE STEIN: Over a long period - - - it was over a long period of time.

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MR. SKOBLAR: Well, the study was conducted over eleven years. And during that time, 130 people had strokes. But in this situation, where there is such a rise in his systolic blood pressure, and at the scene, within minutes after the accident, he suffers a stroke.

JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: So where - - - where is the study - - - I mean, maybe it's too basic because it's a car accident, but where is the study that says a car accident causes a spike in blood pressure immediately, such as what happened here, and that leads to a stroke?

MR. SKOBLAR: Well, you know, I mean, if we were going to have absolute certainty, Kamal would have been connected to TEE machine as he was driving the fare back to New Jersey. But in the real world, that is not going to happen. We know that there is no history of any hypertension, we know that within minutes after the accident, EMT comes and they read his blood pressure at 198 over 120.

We know that the Finnish study, which Dr.

Segal, the defense expert, described, is an excellent study. We showed that people that had a rise in

their systolic blood pressure, they were seventy-two percent more likely to suffer a stroke. I do believe that it was reliable, perhaps it was a Parker hearing that could have been held, but I think that all four - - I mean, four of the five judges in the First Department thought that the issue should have gone to the jury even after the Frye hearing.

Thank you.

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CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you.

Mr. Ford.

MR. FORD: A couple of things, Your Honor.

First of all, the record shows that the plaintiff did have hypertension and other risk factors.

At page 224 of the record, it's indicated that he has a smoking history of one pack per day. Dr. Oh said, at page 478 of the record, that he had hypertension. At page 510 of the record - - -

JUDGE STEIN: But going back to Judge
Pigott's earlier comment or question; isn't that a
causation question that's for the jury?

MR. FORD: No, Your Honor, I don't. I do think that the whole point of Parker is if there is an issue as to specific causation, then it shouldn't go to the jur - - it should not go to the jury if the plaintiff hasn't laid a proper factual

foundation. And I don't think that there was a 1 proper factual foundation in this case because of the 2 3 way Dr. Oh rules in the - - - he says, the stress from the accident, five minutes before the stroke, 4 5 caused the stroke. He doesn't address the possibility of, what about the stress from the fight 6 7 with the bus driver three minutes before the accident? 8 9 JUDGE PIGOTT: Isn't that - - - isn't that 10 cross-examination? 11 MR. FORD: No, Your Honor, I think it's - -12 - I think it's proper factual foundation for an 13 expert to even go to the jury on. JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, because if you're - -14 15 16 MR. FORD: That's what - - - that's what 17 Cornell says. 18 JUDGE PIGOTT: If you're going to say that, 19 I mean, he's forty-six years old; he says, well, he's 20 forty-six, you know, you don't have strokes when 21 you're forty-six unless there is something, then you 22 point out that he weighed - - - whatever he weighed, 23 I don't remember, and he says, well, there is no

possibility, you know, that that's the possibility

why he had a stroke - - - that's why you have trials.

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It seems to me, you got a doctor, a very competent doctor who says this accident did not cause or this - - - cause this injury. They got a doctor who says this accident caused this injury.

MR. FORD: Right.

JUDGE PIGOTT: What's the basis of your findings? And the jury has to decide.

MR. FORD: But how can they get around "generally accepted", though, Your Honor. If there isn't proof in the record that the theory is generally accepted - - -

JUDGE PIGOTT: I don't understand generally accepted. I mean, you got an accident and you got an injury. You got a doctor who says the injury was caused by the accident. Well, that's not generally accepted. Well, maybe it is.

I picture this happening every single accident. Because he broke his - - - he broke his arm when he was in an automobile accident. Well, how do we know that he didn't break his arm before the accident, how do we know that it's because he left a bottle in the middle of his - - - and that's what caused the accident. I mean, it just can go on and on.

MR. FORD: Your Honor, it's not going to be

1 every accident. It's not going to happen - - - if 2 the plaintiff had a broken wrist, we wouldn't be 3 here. 4 JUDGE PIGOTT: Oh, I'm not so sure. How 5 can you say that colliding with the bus in the way 6 this happened would cause a broken wrist? 7 MR. FORD: Well, but it's - - - I think 8 it's generally accepted that trauma can cause a 9 broken bone. We're talking here about a very unusual 10 11 JUDGE PIGOTT: How's this; there is a - - -12 a guy goes in for a back operation and comes out 13 blind. Can that happen? That's ridiculous, you're 14 working on - - - you're working on the back. It 15 actually happens. 16 MR. FORD: Right. 17 JUDGE PIGOTT: I mean, so you bring a motion in limine and say, well, that's - - - that's 18 19 absolutely impossible, and I'm the judge and I say, 20 well, I've got to have a hearing on it; no, I'm going 21 to let the jury hear that this doctor says that 22 there's five major nerves in the back and one of them 23 leads to the - - - leads to the eyes - - -2.4 MR. FORD: Right.

JUDGE PIGOTT: - - - and that's what could

1 be - - - I just don't know where it ends. 2 MR. FORD: Your Honor, my time is just 3 about up. 4 JUDGE PIGOTT: Right. 5 MR. FORD: I just want to make one - - one last - - - well, actually two final points. 6 7 One, I'm just concerned that what's lost here is a little bit of the - - - of the trial 8 9 judge's discretion. Does the trial judge have any 10 discretion? This was an awfully hard-working trial 11 judge, she heard four days of hearings, she heard the 12 experts, she read the articles; I don't think he can 13 say on this record she abused her discretion. 14 The last point is, the - - - in Cornell, 15 this court talked about - - - look, our tort system 16 calls for the transfer of money from one person to 17 another because of an injury. But the message, I 18 think, from Parker, from Cornell, from Sean R., is 19 that before that transfer can occur, a party cannot 20 take any shortcuts when it comes to proving expert 21 causation. And I would submit on this record, with 22 23 these articles that the plaintiff relied on, that this is not the case to retreat from that position. 2.4

25 JUDGE PIGOTT: Yeah.

1	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE:	Thank you, sir.
2	MR. FORD: Thank you.	
3	(Court is adjourned)	
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CERTIFICATION

I, Meir Sabbah, certify that the foregoing transcript of proceedings in the Court of Appeals of Sadek v. Wesley, No. 30 was prepared using the required transcription equipment and is a true and

accurate record of the proceedings.

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Date: March 28, 2016