| 1  | COURT OF APPEALS   |
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| 2  | STATE OF NEW YORK  |
| 3  |  |
| 4  | MATTER OF YOGA VIDA NYC, INC.,   |
| 5  | Appellant,   |
| 6  | -against-  |
| 7  | No. 130<br>COMMISSIONER OF LABOR,  |
| 8  | Respondent.  |
| 9  |  |
| 10 | 20 Eagle Street Albany, New York 12207   |
| 11 | September 06, 2016   |
| 12 | Before:  |
| 13 | CHIEF JUDGE JANET DIFIORE  ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE F. PIGOTT, JR.                                 |
| 14 | ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA ASSOCIATE JUDGE SHEILA ABDUS-SALAAM ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE M. FAHEY |
| 15 | ASSOCIATE JUDGE MICHAEL J. GARCIA  |
| 16 | Appearances:   |
| 17 | ELIZABETH A. HARLAN, ESQ.  |
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| 20 |  |
| 21 | VALERIE FIGUEREDO, ESQ.  NEW YORK STATE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL  Attorneys for Respondent |
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1 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Next on the calendar 2 is number 130, Matter of Yoga Vida New York City v. 3 Commissioner of Labor. MS. HARLAN: Your Honor, I'd like to 4 5 reserve three minutes for rebuttal. 6 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Yes, you may. 7 MS. HARLAN: Thank you. 8 May it please the court. 9 Elizabeth Harlan on behalf of the appellant, 10 Yoga Vida NYC, Inc. 11 The issue on this appeal is whether there is 12 substantial evidence in the record to support the 13 Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board's finding of an 14 employer/employee relationship in this case. 15 As this court is well aware, substantial 16 evidence means taking a look at the record as a whole, and 17 when that's done, the answer is that there is not substantial evidence on the record. And this is true 18 19 whether the court applies the results produced, or means 2.0 used test on the one hand, or whether it applies the 21 overall control test on the other hand. 22 JUDGE FAHEY: So you think either that it 23 applies - - - you're correct whether we apply the 2.4 traditional test or the overall test. The overall

test, I thought the generally applied to

professionals, you know, lawyers, doctors, people like that.

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MS. HARLAN: Right. I absolutely agree with you, Your Honor, and I would urge the court to apply the results produced from means used test.

JUDGE FAHEY: So that - - - that's a traditional test. So let's assume that we apply that test then. Then we're really into what's substantial evidence here, aren't we? Because - - -

MS. HARLAN: Right.

JUDGE FAHEY: - - - for us, the facts are the facts, and we don't really get into that. So substantial evidence, as I understand it here, is less than a preponderance of the evidence, so that means it would be less then it if we had a scale of fifty percent, but it could still be substantial evidence; that's the way I read Gramatan and those cases.

MS. HARLAN: Um-hum.

JUDGE FAHEY: And I can see that there are facts on both sides here; I think that that's a very reasonable argument. A violation of substantial evidence becomes much tougher though in that circumstance, because there is proof that supports the Commissioner of Labor here.

MS. HARLAN: Well, Your Honor, I would like to just point out a few of the facts that the Commissioner of Labor relied upon that - - - that we believe are either incorrect or incorrectly interpreted.

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JUDGE FAHEY: So let me ask you this, and this is a hard question in cases like this. Is there anything you can argue here that doesn't imply - - - it doesn't require us to reinterpret the facts for the Department?

MS. HARLAN: Absolutely. Absolutely.

There's also a slew of facts that were not considered at all. And under Gramatan, we should be - - - or the court should be "reviewing the proof within the whole record and find that it has to be of such quality and quantity as to generate a conviction in and persuade a fair and detached fact finder."

And so if you look at the record as a whole, and consider the facts that I'll discuss in a moment about what was just not considered at all by the Board or by the Appellate Division. It's enough to shift the scale over, to find these non-staff yoga instructors to be independent contractors.

JUDGE FAHEY: You know, in Supreme Court, the kind of the way I viewed these cases is I'd say,

1 should this question go to a jury. And if the 2 question went to a jury, then I'd say, well, they 3 decided that it's a factual question; it's not for me to decide it. It seems to me that that's kind of the 4 5 position we're in right now. MS. HARLAN: That it's a factual question. 6 It is - - - it can be considered as a matter of law 7 8 when the facts are clear enough - - -9 JUDGE FAHEY: Um-hum. 10 MS. HARLAN: - - - to - - - to meet the 11 burdens, but - - - and I believe, or we believe it is 12 - - - it is clear enough in this case. 13 JUDGE FAHEY: Go ahead. Go ahead. 14 MS. HARLAN: So the - - - the - - - I guess 15 I'll focus on the factors that were not considered. 16 The first one, which we think is the largest, is that 17 the non-staff instructors are free to work elsewhere. 18 They're free to work for competitors, direct 19 competitors. They are free to tell their students 20 who are in the yoga class, tomorrow I'm going to be 21 teaching down the street at this other yoga studio; 22 you can come to my class there. 23 JUDGE FAHEY: Well, how is it different

then someone who works in a part-time job at 7-

Eleven, then they get another part-time job at

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## McDonald's?

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MS. HARLAN: Because these - - - I think it has to do with what these individuals do. They are building and - - - they're entrepreneurs. They are building a business for themselves, and they want a following to go from place to place.

JUDGE PIGOTT: Is there any testimony from those type of instructors in this case?

MS. HARLAN: There's no testimony on the record from the instructors; there is - - - there are websites and there are business cards that show - - -

JUDGE PIGOTT: No, but it was enlightening to me. I think there were two letters from whoever was running Yoga Vida, but the one in direct response to the - - - to the Commissioner I thought was nowhere near as enlightening as the second one after - - after the ruling went against him. Because it seems to me that kind of what the point you're making now was not as clear. That it's the instructors who don't want to be employed.

I mean, they, you know, they want a space, but, you know, maybe they don't want to work other than Saturday's, or maybe, you know - - - and they have - - - they have the following; the gym doesn't, the space doesn't have the following, right?

MS. HARLAN: Right. Exactly, the instructors have the following. I believe that Michael Patton did give a - - - provide testimony to that effect to the administrative law judge. It's - - you're correct, it does not appear in his initial letter in answering the Department.

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JUDGE RIVERA: Well - - - well, these students are people who go to Yoga Vida, correct?

MS. HARLAN: Among other places.

JUDGE RIVERA: Yoga Vida has to permit them on the space, do they not? So they're not really students in the way you're suggesting "clients" of the instructor. Because if Yoga Vida won't let them in the door, that student is not going to be in front

MS. HARLAN: You're correct, Your Honor.

They are not clients, but they are - - - they are people who want to take the class of this individual instructor. And the website will say who the instructors are.

of that instructor, correct?

JUDGE RIVERA: But it's not like in - - - what you're sort of suggesting, I think, is that these instructors have this business going, and they have a following of students, and the students just go wherever the instructor finds - - - finds a space.

1 But that's not - - - that's not this 2 These are people who go to Yoga Vida - - -3 MS. HARLAN: Well, the record - - -4 JUDGE RIVERA: - - - for yoga classes. 5 The record reflects that the MS. HARLAN: 6 judge - - - sorry, I apologize - - - that the 7 instructors do teach at multiple locations. 8 JUDGE RIVERA: Um-hum. 9 MS. HARLAN: And that they are - - - and 10 that they do choose to do that. 11 JUDGE RIVERA: Um-hum. 12 MS. HARLAN: It's important to note that 13 there are instructors at Yoga Vida who are employees. 14 Approximately seventy-five percent of them are 15 employees; twenty-five are these independent 16 contractors who've chosen not to be employees, and 17 instead to be free to teach at the United Nations, 18 and to teach at companies, and to teach at Yoga Vida, 19 and to teach at, you know, other yoga studios all 2.0 kind of at the same time. 21 That's - - - and that's - - - they are not 22 downtrodden individuals; they're - - - they are 23 entrepreneurs building their own business, and their 2.4 websites do reflect this.

25 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Does - - - do we or

1 did the Commissioner or the ALJ consider that Yoga 2 Vida is in the business of giving yoga classes? 3 4 MS. HARLAN: Yes. 5 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Is that - - - so that's their business. And so wouldn't that have 6 7 something to do with whether these folks are 8 considered independent contractors or not? 9 I agree it does have something MS. HARLAN: 10 to do with it, but to make that the end-all be-all factor would destroy the ability to have independent 11 contractors in certain industries as a matter of 12 13 course, and that wouldn't be beneficial. 14 JUDGE FAHEY: Well, you see the policy 15 implications though - - -16 MS. HARLAN: There's a - - -17 JUDGE FAHEY: - - - of the question. 18 MS. HARLAN: There are policy implications on the flip side. I'm sure we'll hear from the 19 2.0 Commissioner of Labor about the policy on the one 21 hand, but on the other hand, there are a lot of 22 people who benefit from being able to be independent 23 contractors and go from place to place. 2.4 There are industries like dentistry and,

you know, gardening, and yoga, and places - - -

| 1  | people that do benefit from being able to, to             |
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| 2  | while they do with the core work of the business,         |
| 3  | they want to do this in an independent contractor         |
| 4  | capacity.   |
| 5  | JUDGE RIVERA: What's what's the                           |
| 6  | benefit?  |
| 7  | MS. HARLAN: The benefit to them is that -                 |
| 8  |   |
| 9  | JUDGE RIVERA: Of the freedom, I get your                  |
| 10 | point there, freedom but financially, what's              |
| 11 | the benefit?  |
| 12 | MS. HARLAN: Well, they can they can                       |
| 13 | grow their business, they can make more money going       |
| 14 | to more places than they could working in                 |
| 15 | JUDGE RIVERA: Because they work more                      |
| 16 | hours, or what what's the                                 |
| 17 | MS. HARLAN: More hours, more diversity,                   |
| 18 | they could be a dancer, they could be an actor, they      |
| 19 | can choose to do sort of, design their life the           |
| 20 | way they want to.   |
| 21 | If you look at the websites if you look at                |
| 22 | the Yoga Vida website, you'll see that there are a number |
| 23 | of these individuals who have blogs, who are they         |
| 24 | are creative individuals, and and                         |

JUDGE RIVERA: Isn't any of this dependent

on the expertise of the Commissioner, with respect to what the market looks like, and what trends there are in labor; is that anything that needs to be considered in this case?

The deference in that way, not just on the substantial evidence standard, but deference to the Commissioner with respect to the way the Commissioner views the market and these labor trends and employment trends?

MS. HARLAN: Well, Your Honor, I would say that the facts of this case, if these individuals are considered to be employees, it will shut down a lot of - - - it will potentially cause individuals to lose their jobs; that's the flipside of the argument.

Because they - - - this yoga studio cannot afford to employ this many people, and they are - - they have their core employees, and then they have these individuals who come in to teach two weeks or teacher one - - - one workshop, and they won't be able to employ them, so those people won't have a job anymore. So it's - - - I don't think it's a one-sided "independent contractors are always bad" type of argument.

> CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, counsel. MS. HARLAN: Thank you.

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CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Counsel. 1 2 MS. FIGUEREDO: May it please the court. 3 Valerie Figueredo for the Commissioner of Labor. 4 The Board properly concluded that Yoga Vida's 5 non-staff instructors were employees of Yoga Vida for payment of unemployment insurance contributions. 6 The Board's determination was based on its 7 finding that Yoga Vida - - -8 9 JUDGE RIVERA: Could a yoga instructor ever 10 be an independent contractor? 11 MS. FIGUEREDO: In the context of a school 12 that provides yoga instruction to that school's 13 clients, we believe that it would be highly unlikely for the yoga instructor that furthers that core 14 15 function to ever be an independent contractor. 16 JUDGE RIVERA: So that's what makes a 17 difference, that this is a yoga studio and nothing else. 18 19 MS. FIGUEREDO: It is - - - the fact that 2.0 this is a yoga studio, and Patton testified that 21 providing yoga instruction is an integral function, 22 it's the sole basis for the school's revenue in a 23 compelling - - -2.4 JUDGE RIVERA: So if it was, let's say, a -25 - - a gymnasium that had weights, has other classes,

| 1  | yoga is one of those classes that they offer, would   |
|----|---|
| 2  | those yoga instructors then be independent            |
| 3  | contractors as opposed to employees?                  |
| 4  | MS. FIGUEREDO: Certainly where the gym                |
| 5  | exercises the level of control that Patton exercised  |
| 6  | here, you would find that they would be employees.    |
| 7  | The rea   |
| 8  | JUDGE PIGOTT: But they can work for                   |
| 9  | they can work for competitors, right?                 |
| 10 | MS. FIGUEREDO: The non-staff and the staff            |
| 11 | instructors can                                       |
| 12 | JUDGE PIGOTT: No, no, no. The ones that -             |
| 13 | the ones that we're talking about; the ones that      |
| 14 | they say are independent contractors, and you say are |
| 15 | employees, up until the time you make that            |
| 16 | determination, they can work for a competitor of Yoga |
| 17 | Vida.   |
| 18 | MS. FIGUEREDO: Yes.                                   |
| 19 | JUDGE PIGOTT: Right?                                  |
| 20 | MS. FIGUEREDO: The non-staff instructors              |
| 21 | can work  |
| 22 | JUDGE PIGOTT: And yet, you're saying,                 |
| 23 | well, you're still an employee even though you can    |
| 24 | work for an opponent a competitor.                    |
| 25 | MS. FIGUEREDO: There is there are                     |

MS. FIGUEREDO: There is - - - there are

certainly lots of industries where you have people entering to multiple employment relationships.

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We cite one example in our brief where you have the lawyer who's an employee of the law firm, and then also an employee of the university where he might teach as an adjunct professor.

JUDGE PIGOTT: They're not competitors.

You can't - - - you can't come to my law firm and work for - - - for let's say - - - let's say a plaintiff's law firm who is suing somebody who's insured by State Farm, and then go, you know, on their weekends and work for State Farm's law firm.

MS. FIGUEREDO: Sure. That - - - that may be an ethical problem. In this con - - -

JUDGE PIGOTT: It's not an ethical problem;

I mean, it is, but it's a problem that no one is

going to counter. And - - - and what my

understanding of this is that you have people, as

your opponent is pointing out, who, for a variety of

reasons, only want to work certain times, I don't

know if they're actors or, you know, whatever else

they're doing, but they can do this, they can do it

the evenings, they can do it on the weekends, and

they want to be able to do that.

And if - - - and if one gym can provide

1 Saturday's and another one can provide Sundays, they 2 want to do both of those. 3 You're saying they can't do that; that they are 4 an employee of Yoga Vida, that they - - - that - - -5 that's it, and they can't work for a competitor. 6 MS. FIGUEREDO: We're not saying that they 7 can't work for competitor. Certainly you can enter 8 into multiple employment relationships, even with a 9 competitor where the employer permits you to do that. 10 The flexibility of the fact that you can 11 work for multiple competing businesses is just 12 dictated in that - - - in the confines of that 13 relationship. It's not required; it's not something 14 that we're saying is part of the rule. 15 What we're saying here is that where you 16 have a gym or where you have a business whose 17 function is to instruct students, such as in this 18 case yoga, but another context such as music 19 instruction or gym - - -2.0 JUDGE PIGOTT: No, but if - - - if a person 21 is working at Yoga Vida and then working for a 22 competitor, who is paying the unemployment insurance, 23 and who is paying, you know, all of the - - -2.4 MS. FIGUEREDO: Right.

JUDGE PIGOTT: - - - things that you say.

1 All three of them - - -2 MS. FIGUEREDO: Yes. So - - -3 JUDGE PIGOTT: - - - If there's three, all five of them if there are five? 4 5 MS. FIGUEREDO: Yeah, that - - - that is 6 correct. The threshold for payment of unemployment 7 insurance contributions by the employer is low; it's 8 set by the legislature at 300 dollars in a calendar 9 quarter. So once the employer pays 300 dollars in 10 wages, he is required - - - or it's required to make 11 those contributions. 12 If you are seeking benefits once you are 13 unemployed, it is your prior employer's in a four - -14 - in a four-quarter period, in the preceding four-15 quarters, that would be required to pay out or from 16 whose funds those employment - - - unemployment 17 benefits would be paid. 18 JUDGE GARCIA: Counsel, I'd like to go back 19 to this integral to the core business argument. 2.0 that's something that the Appellate Division 21 mentioned, and they cite this Appellate Division 22 You have a substantial point in your brief on 23 - - - we've never held that, right? 2.4 MS. FIGUEREDO: Right.

JUDGE GARCIA: So how much is it your core

argument that we need to find that? I mean, it seems like if we do that, that kinds of swallows up the rest of the test, right? Because you would say, hey, this is integral to the core business of a yoga studio, they have to be employees. And we've never done that.

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MS. FIGUEREDO: It's correct that the court has never specifically held that the integral function is one of the elements. It is elements that, as we cite in our brief at pages 28 to 29, various courts have considered, we think it is a compelling indicator of employment.

You certainly are not going to be - - it's unlikely that business will seek control over
its core functions to an independent contractor,
because as we explained in the brief, it is upon that
core function upon which the business relies. So
it's certainly a compelling, if not, determinative
factor of employment.

Here, you don't have to decide. You don't have to just look at the core function because we know that Yoga Vida exercises meaningful control over other elements of its relationship with its instructors. So your - - -

JUDGE PIGOTT: But Ms. Harlan makes a point, I guess, that there is a three quarters of

1 them are employees, and a quarter of them are not. 2 MS. FIGUEREDO: The testimony we have is 3 from 2011. At that time, Patton testified that 4 twenty-five percent of its instructors are 5 independent contractors. They were offering 6 approximately 95 to 90 - - -7 JUDGE PIGOTT: But - - - so the answer is 8 yes. 9 MS. FIGUEREDO: Yes. 10 JUDGE PIGOTT: My - - - my - - - because I 11 was going to - - - follow-up question was, did - - -12 did the one quarter, did they complain, are they 13 upset about this? MS. FIGUEREDO: We do have - - - it's not 14 15 in the record, there are - - -16 JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, in the record, I found 17 no one complaining. And in fact, I thought the 18 testimony was that they want to be free to advertise, 19 to do, as Ms. Harlan was saying, to blog, to solicit, 20 to do what they do, in terms of what they determine 21 is yoga, and they don't want to be an employee. 22 MS. FIGUEREDO: There's no evidence in the 23 record about what the individual supposed independent 2.4 contractors want; the only testimony we have is from 25 Patton. What we have in the record are printouts

from websites and business cards showing that these independent contractors had outside businesses.

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It is not - - - it does not prevent them from having - - - you can be in an employment relationship with Yoga Vida and nonetheless run your own yoga business on the side.

JUDGE PIGOTT: I know. But my point was no one is complaining.

MS. FIGUEREDO: We - - - we - - - no one is complaining in this particular context because this arose out of Yoga Vida's registration for un - - - through the Department of Labor. We do know - - - it's not in the record, but we do know that there are yoga teachers in the industry seeking unemployment benefits.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: To Ms. Harlan's point about Yoga Vida being in a position to perhaps want to have a few independent contractors, what would the structure have to be in order for Yoga Vida to do that?

MS. FIGUEREDO: You could certainly imagine a situation where Patton did not monitor the quality of the instruction. So for instance, we know here that Patton - - Yoga Vida itself is the one that takes the student's complaints, and Yoga Vida is then

1 - - - then investigates those complaints. 2 could see a scenario where Yoga Vida doesn't accept 3 complaints; it's given directly to the instructor. 4 You could have a potential - - - a potential 5 scenario where the instructor itself - - - himself or 6 herself sets the class fee and collects the payment, so 7 provides the administrative responsibilities that Yoga 8 Vida was taking on. 9 Here, we know that it's Yoga Vida who sets the 10 fee, and Yoga Vida collects that from the students. You 11 could potentially see a scenario where Yoga Vida just 12 rents out a space and collects a flat fee from the 13 instructor; we don't have that here. 14 JUDGE RIVERA: So these are Yoga Vida 15 students or Yoga Vida clients. 16 MS. FIGUEREDO: That's correct, and we - -17 These are not individuals 18 JUDGE RIVERA: 19 who are students of that particular instructor; is 2.0 that what you're trying to say? I mean, it is 21 possible that - - - she's argued that someone follows 22 that instructor knowing, oh, they're going to be at 23 Yoga Vida Monday at 8 a.m.; I want to do that class.

 $\hbox{MS. FIGUEREDO:} \quad \hbox{It is --- it is possible,} \\ \\ \hbox{but what we have here is Patton's testimony}$ 

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explaining that it was Yoga Vida, for instance, who provides a substitute when the instructor cannot teach. And why does Yoga Vida do that? Because it is a Yoga Vida's interest to not have the class canceled, because it is Yoga Vida's business and brand that they're trying to protect.

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It was Yoga Vida who monitored the quality of those instructors and set the fee for the classes.

JUDGE RIVERA: And - - - and if I'm one of these Yoga Vida non-staff instructors, and I have Monday at 8 a.m., I can't tell Yoga Vida, I have two students who are coming and those are my students; I don't want anyone you want in here coming into my room.

MS. FIGUEREDO: That's - - - that's - - that's correct. Patton testi - - - Patton - - Patton was not asked that hypothetical in the
testimony, but it is clear that the way they
advertise for classes, which is by posting the weekly
schedule on Yoga Vida's website is to try to attract
people who are looking to go to Yoga Vida and not
necessarily a particular instructor.

JUDGE RIVERA: Um-hum.

JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Counsel, how is this different from the building industry, for example?

You have a lot of independent contractors, you have plumbers, and carpenters, but the, you know, the basic idea is to build something. And those are independent contractors. Why is this different than that?

MS. FIGUEREDO: Putting aside the fair play act which I - - - which creates a presumption of employment for certain - - - in the construction industry for certain types of individuals. Here, this is different, because in the construction industry when you're bringing in a plumber, that's your classic independent instruct - - - independent contractor situation, where they're providing their specialized expertise to deal with a particular problem.

Here, you have a business whose sole function is to provide yoga instruction, and they are trying to delegate that sole function to people they claim are independent contractors, without ceding the necessary control to really give those people true independence.

If there are no further questions, we believe the Board's determination should be affirmed.

Thank you.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you.

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Ms. Harlan.

MS. HARLAN: I'd like to clarify that Yoga

Vida, in addition to yoga instruction, also trains

teachers to become yoga instructors, and they also

lead trips that take retreats and take students on

retreats. So yoga is not their sole form - - 
source of income.

Also, Mr. Patton does not monitor the quality of the classes. He doesn't sit in classes and watch the instruction; he doesn't tell the yoga instructors how to instruct a class.

JUDGE RIVERA: Yes, but if I'm one of the non-staff yoga instructors, and I have a student who is, as you are - - follows me and looks for my classes, Yoga Vida could choose not to let them take the class, correct? Because they make the choice about who walks into their studio and stays, correct?

MS. HARLAN: That's correct. Yes.

I'd like to clarify the issue about the substitutes. Yoga Vida asks the independent contractor to find their own substitute, and that is, in fact, a sign of freedom, not a sign of control. And it's - - - they - - - they find their own substitute, they don't have to tell - - - they tell - - - the only reason that they tell Yoga Vida is so that the website can be correct.

| 1  | JUDGE RIVERA: If they don't find an                        |
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| 2  | instructor, what happens; the class is canceled?           |
| 3  | MS. HARLAN: That's a good question. My                     |
| 4  | understanding of the record is that if it's right          |
| 5  | before class   |
| 6  | JUDGE RIVERA: Um-hum.                                      |
| 7  | MS. HARLAN: like thirty minutes                            |
| 8  | before class, that's when the staff will come in and       |
| 9  | teach the class. Otherwise, my understanding is the        |
| 10 | class would be canceled. And that testimony is at A-       |
| 11 | 132 in the record.   |
| 12 | JUDGE RIVERA: And could a non-staff                        |
| 13 | instructor persuade a staff instructor to be the           |
| 14 | substitute, or does it have to be someone else?            |
| 15 | MS. HARLAN: It could be a staff                            |
| 16 | instructor; I'm sure that would be fine.                   |
| 17 | With respect to the the I think                            |
| 18 | - I think the court has already discussed this, but this - |
| 19 | this core  |
| 20 | JUDGE RIVERA: So let me just ask                           |
| 21 | MS. HARLAN: Sure.  |
| 22 | JUDGE RIVERA: so the substitute,                           |
| 23 | when they come in  |
| 24 | MS. HARLAN: Yes.   |
| 25 | JUDGE RIVERA: need not teach in the                        |

| 1  | same way that the non-staff teaches, right?           |
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| 2  | MS. HARLAN: That's right. They would                  |
| 3  | -   |
| 4  | JUDGE RIVERA: So then a non-staff could be            |
| 5  | whatever, I'll make one up, Bikram, but that's        |
| 6  | not what the substitute's going to teach.             |
| 7  | MS. HARLAN: Well, Your Honor, I think                 |
| 8  | -   |
| 9  | JUDGE RIVERA: Is that correct?                        |
| 10 | MS. HARLAN: I think that the substitute               |
| 11 | needs to teach the class the students are expecting   |
| 12 | to receive, whatever type of class                    |
| 13 | JUDGE RIVERA: So if it was listed so                  |
| 14 | then Yoga Vida chooses the type of yoga that gets     |
| 15 | taught at a particular hour?                          |
| 16 | MS. HARLAN: No. The instructor chooses                |
| 17 | what they're going to teach. There is a discussion    |
| 18 | at the beginning of the relationship for the          |
| 19 | where the instructor says, I teach this and that, I   |
| 20 | need approximately this much time to teach my class.  |
| 21 | JUDGE RIVERA: So Yoga Vida doesn't say,               |
| 22 | well, you know what, I want a few instructors who are |
| 23 | doing Bikram; I'll hire you.                          |
| 24 | MS. HARLAN: Though that may be the case,              |

as long as they really do Bikram.

| 1  | JUDGE RIVERA: Okay.                                   |
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| 2  | CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Your opponent makes a            |
| 3  | compelling argument on the core function issue; do    |
| 4  | you care to   |
| 5  | MS. HARLAN: I would like                              |
| 6  | CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: assess further?                  |
| 7  | MS. HARLAN: to speak to that. The                     |
| 8  | core function argument has never as the court         |
| 9  | says, has never been adopted by this court. It seems  |
| 10 | to have been taken out of the federal standard, the   |
| 11 | FLSA Standard, without the other factors being        |
| 12 | brought in at the same time to sort of balance it     |
| 13 | out, and if it's adopted by the court, it would       |
| 14 | largely swallow up the analysis.                      |
| 15 | JUDGE RIVERA: Is your position that the -             |
| 16 | the approach they've taken is a single-factor         |
| 17 | test?   |
| 18 | MS. HARLAN: I don't think they're                     |
| 19 | they're saying it's a single-factor test, but they're |
| 20 | saying it's a very important factor.                  |
| 21 | JUDGE RIVERA: So in but in the                        |
| 22 | federal approach, it's a multi-factor test.           |
| 23 | MS. HARLAN: It's a multifactor test,                  |
| 24 | absolutely.   |
| 25 | JUDGE RIVERA: And that seems to have                  |

| 1  | worked, right?                           |
|----|--|
| 2  | MS. HARLAN: In federal setting, but it   |
| 3  | hasn't been applied by this court.       |
| 4  | I think my time is up.                   |
| 5  | CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, counsel. |
| 6  | MS. HARLAN: Thank you.                   |
| 7  | (Court is adjourned)                     |
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## CERTIFICATION

I, Meir Sabbah, certify that the foregoing transcript of proceedings in the Court of Appeals of Matter of Yoga Vida NYC, Inc. v. Commissioner of Labor, No. 130 was prepared using the required transcription equipment and is a true and accurate record of the proceedings.

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