1	COURT OF APPEALS
2	STATE OF NEW YORK
3	
4	RIVERA,
5	Appellant,
6	-against-
7	No. 132 MONTEFIORE MEDICAL CENTER,
8	Respondent.
9	
10	20 Eagle Street Albany, New York 12207
11	September 07, 2016
12	Before:
13	CHIEF JUDGE JANET DIFIORE ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE F. PIGOTT, JR.
14	ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA ASSOCIATE JUDGE SHEILA ABDUS-SALAAM
15	ASSOCIATE JUDGE LESLIE E. STEIN ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE M. FAHEY
16	ASSOCIATE JUDGE MICHAEL J. GARCIA
17	Appearances:
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1 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: The first matter on 2 our calendar this afternoon is appeal number 132, 3 Rivera v. Montefiore Medical Center. 4 MR. SHOOT: May it please the court, my 5 name is Brian Shoot. I represent the plaintiff-6 appellant here. As you know from the briefs - - -7 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Excuse me, counsel. 8 Would you like to reserve any rebuttal time? 9 MR. SHOOT: Yes, I would, three minutes. 10 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Three? Please 11 proceed. 12 MR. SHOOT: As you know from the briefs, 13 this is a case in which Defendant Montefiore was 14 allowed, over the plaintiff's strenuous objection, to 15 adduce proof to the effect that the forty-four-year-16 old man, whom the medical examiner had said died of 17 bronchopneumonia, in fact, died of a heart attack. 18 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Mr. Shoot, why - - -19 Mr. Shoot why - - - why didn't plaintiff's counsel 2.0 object to the insufficiency of the 3101(d) response 21 when it was received or shortly thereafter? 22 MR. SHOOT: Your Honor, this is an 23 interesting point. And the lesson here is, I think, 2.4 from the Appellate Division majority decision, that

if you want to get down - - - the way to avoid the

medical exchange rule, the expert exchange rule, is to exchange even less. If, for example, the - - - the distinction I'm getting at is there's a distinction where a claim is made and now the recipient knows that there's detail lacking, that the - - - that, for example, the defendant violated the rules and regulations or that the defendant complied with the standards of care. And now the other side knows, okay, what rules and regulations, please tell me, and can ask for greater detail, but when the whole subject at all, there's nothing on it.

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The example I have in my brief is, for example, where the plaintiff provides a very detailed listing of what the defendant did wrong on January 1st and nothing at all as to what the defendant did wrong on January 3rd but maybe ends with and he'll testify, the expert, or she'll testify, as to negligence and causation, ends with something like that. And then the argument is well, I didn't say as, Justice Aarons pointed out, you didn't say that you would not adduce testimony as to something that occurred on January 3rd, and you left something at the end, which Mr. Simone called in the Appellate Division a noncommittal we'll talk about causation. Now if that was the rule, Judge, if that was the

party now has to move whenever you find an opening -

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JUDGE STEIN: But, counselor, what - - let's assume for the moment that this was an obvious
insufficiency. It really - - - it mentions causation
but it says nothing what the causation, what if it's
not so obvious? What if it's a closer case? Isn't
it - - isn't it up to the opposing party to say I
don't think you gave me enough detail? And then that
can be addressed, either the - - - the disclosing
party can say, oh, yes, I think I did, or, okay, I'll
give you more. I mean isn't that the whole purpose
of this so that it's not a guessing game on either
side?

MR. SHOOT: Well, it shouldn't be a guessing game on either side. I grant you, Judge, that there are no - - - there's no bright line here. We're talking about a continuum. And we could change the hypotheticals and change and change them so you give more and more notice that something's lacking.

JUDGE PIGOTT: But isn't - - - isn't - - these medical malpractice cases are - - - are a breed
unto themselves, right? Quite often the plaintiff,
and I think it happened in this case, calls att - - calls the defendant doctor or the doctor for the

defendant and the - - - the strategy is you want to freeze that testimony so that that testimony doesn't get - - get fashioned to respond to your experts. So you put him or her on first, then you have your expert testify.

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And what's why, it seems to me, when you - when the 3101(d) comes in from the defense, they
always have that catch-all in the back - - - in the
bottom that is objectionable, pardon me, from your
point of view. But what happened here, it seems to
me, and - - and I don't know if you're going to
address timeliness, is there was a timely objection
aft - - you know, after he testifies on - - on
cross-examination to his own lawyer, you know, what
happened, that caught, it seems to me, the plaintiffs
by surprise. And then - - and then they want a
more specific, and it seemed to me they were entitled
to it, but the judge said it was untimely when they
made that objection. Right? Or am I misreading the
record?

MR. SHOOT: Correct, Your Honor.

JUDGE PIGOTT: Okay.

MR. SHOOT: I - - - I agree with the thought of that - - - $\!\!\!$

JUDGE FAHEY: So listen - - -

1 MR. SHOOT: I'm sorry. 2 JUDGE FAHEY: - - - why didn't - - - why 3 didn't they just - - - why didn't plaintiff's counsel just ask for more time? Usually, that would be the 4 5 solution here. The - - - see, your abuse of 6 discretion argument, I think, would have more 7 validity and more force if the alternative was not 8 the court says it was untimely, okay. It's -9 that's a difficult point for as to argument and it's 10 also a difficult argument that there is no theory of negligence or of causation presented in the initial 11 12 disclosure. Those are two, it seemed to me, clear 13 points in the record. But why didn't they just - - -14 MR. SHOOT: Judge, let me - - -15 JUDGE FAHEY: - - - ask for more time? 16 MR. SHOOT: - - - answer that and then I 17 think Judge Stein's question, as well, because I 18 think they go together. 19 JUDGE FAHEY: The - - I want you to 2.0 answer the quest - - - this question. I want you to 21 answer - - - answer the question did they ask for 22 more time, and was that a - - - a conscious decision

MR. SHOOT: The answer to that first question is no, they did not. And the answer to the

or just one that was made in the moment?

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second question is I don't know whether it was conscious or unconscious.

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JUDGE FAHEY: Yeah, yeah, okay.

MR. SHOOT: It's not in the record. But the - - - the gist of your question why shouldn't the attorney have to ask for more time - - -

JUDGE FAHEY: Um-hum.

MR. SHOOT: - - - is I think goes along with Judge Stein's question and goes along with the purpose of the statute. One purpose of the statute, I mean back in the day, it was very fair. Ambush, that's the way we had it. Any side could ambush the other. That was fair. The idea of the statute was that, number one, the legislature thought by disclosing the expert testimony in advance of the trial each side gets a better feel for the merits of their case. That's number one.

But number two, Your Honor, and there was a second purpose, not just to move cases but also to be - - - to decide them correctly. The whole basis of our civil justice system is we think and we hope in an adversarial system that if each side gets a chance, a fair chance, the right side will win, at least enough a higher percentage of the time to make the system work.

JUDGE STEIN: But that's my point. If you had brought this to the fore when - - - when it first got to you, then the pursuit of justice would have been furthered because it either would have been corrected or somebody would have made a determination that it didn't need to be. So - - -

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MR. SHOOT: Not only, Judge, was there no reason for anyone reading through this to guess, oh, they're contesting the cause of death, much less they're claiming it's a heart attack, I suggest to you, Your Honors, that at the beginning of trial, defendant didn't even start with that theory.

JUDGE GARCIA: But, counsel, the notice actually says "possible causes of the decedent's injuries and contributing factors", right? I mean doesn't that put you on some notice that they're not agreeing with your cause of death or at least it's vague enough that they might leave themselves room not to?

MR. SHOOT: No, Your Honor.

JUDGE GARCIA: They're going to testify on the "issue of proximate causation", on the "issue of causation" and "the possible causes of injuries."

MR. SHOOT: What one expects from that is exactly what happened in the defense opening - - -

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JUDGE GARCIA: Oh, I know you're going to say you expect him to agree with the autopsy, but I don't - - - that doesn't say that.

MR. SHOOT: No, what - - - what I'm getting at, what one expects from that caveat, we're going to talk about causation, is exactly what you have at page 103 of the - - - the defense opening. "They tried to bring him back, they couldn't bring him back. Tragedy, terrible tragedy. It can happen with patients that have pneumonia. Yes, ninety percent of", he meant nine, "percent of someone dying with patients that have pneumonia. Sometimes you do all the right things and they may not respond." Now that's an attorney talking about causation. We had no objection to that, and that was encompassed by their notice.

But how can one possibly know - - - in a case where someone is admitted to a hospital with a diagnosis of pneumonia, they can't breathe, even with oxygen, they're repeatedly throughout the night noted to have shortness of breath, and then they die, according to the medical examiner, of bronchopneumonia, how could one suspect that this is their theory or know that something's being withheld?

JUDGE GARCIA: Well, okay. We can - - - I

get your - - - I take your point on that causation issue. But to go back to what Judge Fahey said earlier, isn't our standard of review abuse of discretion here? So the judge would have been perfectly okay to say they were precluding this testimony and we would have reviewed that on abuse of discretion, but they didn't. So aren't we reviewing that decision also on an abuse of discretion standard given what had happened in the course of this trial, namely the testimony that had already come out at the point, the fact that there is no request for an adjournment, and we're looking back now and saying it was an abuse of discretion as a matter of law to let this testimony in?

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MR. SHOOT: Three points on that, Your

Honor. This court has never interpreted this

statute. There is no Court of Appeals decision for

the lower courts to look for guidance. It doesn't

exist. Number two - - -

JUDGE GARCIA: On what point?

MR. SHOOT: On construing 301(d) (sic) and what kind of - - of specificity need be given and what to do in a situation like this. This court has never construed the statute.

JUDGE GARCIA: Is that the issue here? Is

1 the issue here was the notice sufficient, or is the 2 issue here whether or not the judge should have let 3 the testimony in? 4 MR. SHOOT: Well, yes. The issue is 5 whether the judge should have let the testimony, but understand in this case there is no claim that we did 6 7 provide notice. There is no claim that this is 8 something the plaintiff could have gotten from some 9 other record in the case, should have known. 10 no thing about a heart attack in any record one 11 couldn't have looked - - - could have looked at. And 12 the - - -13 JUDGE FAHEY: So - - - so the rule should 14 be that when you disclose, you have to tell us what 15 your theory of causation is then? 16 MR. SHOOT: The rule is you should disclose 17 such an amount of evidence so that the other party is 18 not - - - is not surprised or taken by ambush. 19 20 JUDGE STEIN: Well, the question, to me, is 21 not whether that should be the rule. I think that is 22 the rule. The question is who - - - who has to do what when if - - - if that isn't fulfilled to - - -23 2.4 to the other side's satisfaction?

MR. SHOOT: As to those two points, in my

brief I quote Professor Pat Connors, his commentary on the statute where he says all this case law, there's ton of case law, just none from this court, suffers from, he says Corpus Juris Secundum syndrome. You can find a case for anything, according to him, from the Appellate Division cases to which this court has never spoken. And what we don't want to do, I'm suggesting, Judge Stein, is end up in a system where a process that was supposed to streamline cases and make them move faster, as well as end better, the --- the side that deserves to win wins more often than not.

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What we don't want to do is have that created a volume of motion practice, because I suggest to you that if you have to make a motion whenever there's a cause which can later be claimed a reservation of rights, that's every case and that's every time. It will be the fifth time they come back. There will always be some phrase which can later be said to be a reservation of rights and why did you accept this last version, the fourth version, the fifth version? And motion practice is not what you want to create, I'm suggesting.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, Mr. Shoot.
MR. SHOOT: Thank you.

1 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Counsel. 2 MR. SIMONE: Good afternoon; Christopher 3 Simone for the - - - for the respondents. I think that the - - - the issue here is - - - the 4 5 overarching issue here is whether the trial court abused its discretion as a matter of law. 6 7 think it's important to understand how the 8 plaintiff's argument has somewhat shifted from an 9 insufficiency argument to a misleading argument 10 because they're two different - - - two different 11 ways to look at it. JUDGE STEIN: Well, do you concede that it 12 13 - - - it was insufficient? MR. SIMONE: I don't think it was 14 15 insufficient to the extent of - - - I mean - - -16 JUDGE STEIN: If you - - - if you were on -17 - - on the other side of the fence here, you - - -18 you wouldn't say what, you're telling me you're going 19 to discuss causation, what causation? 2.0 MR. SIMONE: Well, I think the point was 21 made before that it says, you know, causes of death 22 and contributing factors. That, to me, says they're 23 obviously not agreeing with the autopsy, which every 2.4 attorney should know is not.

JUDGE STEIN: But if you're trying to

1 prepare your case, don't you want to know and don't 2 you think that the statute requires - - -3 MR. SIMONE: Yes. 4 JUDGE STEIN: - - - that you tell me what 5 your expert is going to tell - - -MR. SIMONE: Yes, and if I - - - and if I 6 7 received one that I thought was insufficient, I would 8 immediately make an objection. They did that in this 9 case with respect to Dr. Silberman's qualifications, 10 and that was remedied. That - - -11 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Does that have to be a 12 motion? 13 MR. SIMONE: No. It doesn't have to be a motion. 14 15 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: No. It could be - - -16 MR. SIMONE: Attorneys get - - -17 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: - - - a conference, 18 right? 19 MR. SIMONE: Yes, you can just write a 20 letter. And most of the time, I think collegiality, 21 I think attorneys, they provide that information, 22 because, you know, as long as you make the objection, 23 I think you preserved your - - - your complaint about 2.4 it. Then it becomes the onus on the other party. 25 They might be risking - - -

JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Where you come into 1 2 the trial part on conference day - - -3 MR. SIMONE: And then get it - - -4 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: - - - and you raise 5 it. 6 MR. SIMONE: And then get it precluded on 7 that basis. But it's not uncommon for an attorney to 8 get a document, whatever it is, 3101(d) or whatever, 9 and see that it's insufficient. Say, you know, I 10 better - - - I'm going to lodge an objection. 11 JUDGE PIGOTT: Yeah, but this is different. 12 The - - - the key here, it seemed to me, as Judge 13 Gonzalez said in his dissent, was you got a doctor 14 who says I don't know what he died of, I think it was 15 probably, you know, something, but I don't know what. 16 And miracle of miracles, two months later when he's, 17 I'm going to suggest, prepared for trial, he then on 18 cross-examination says he died of a heart attack, and 19 that wasn't made clear to anybody at any time. It 20 wasn't in the disclosure. And I get the - - - I get 21 the cowcatcher wording at - - - at the bottom of 22 these because you - - - you honestly don't know 23 everything that's - - - that's going to come out. 2.4 But when it's there, I mean, didn't - - - didn't you

have an obligation to say that the - - - the ER

1 doctor is going to testify that he died of a heart attack because that's what he told us? 2 3 MR. SIMONE: Well, everybody - - - I think the - - - it's the sudden - - - the sudden 4 5 arrhythmia, to be specific, is the issue. But - - -6 but that's what you talk to your expert about. I 7 mean - - -8 JUDGE PIGOTT: No, no. This is a fact 9 witness, as Gonzalez said. And you knew, or should 10 have known, I - - - I realize these things - - -11 MR. SIMONE: Right. You could say that. 12 JUDGE PIGOTT: - - - are tough sometimes, 13 that he was going to testify that the death was not 14 as a result of the pneumonia but was a result of, let 15 me stick with my heart attack it's easier to say - -16 17 MR. SIMONE: Right. 18 JUDGE PIGOTT: - - - than arrhythmia. 19 you didn't disclose that and they had no way of 20 knowing that that could have been a part. They - - -21 they could have been satisfied with your disclosure 22 because of what - - - what you said, but you had 23 knowledge that you, the argument is, should have put 2.4 in a 3101(d) or a supplemental, that you did not.

And then when they found out about it and made an

application to the court, the court said, well, you're untimely.

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MR. SIMONE: Well, I think they did have notice, and I'll tell you why. And the other - - - the other argument - - - the other argument that is - - - it's not only the insufficiency but it's also the speculation, okay, of the theory. And just - - - just so it's clear what plaintiff's objection was, on page 762 he summed it up to the court, two points, "One is the 3101(d) - - is the 3101(d) wasn't specific enough and two, that it's an improper question to ask an expert 'Do you have an opinion as to what the possible cause of death was other than what's stated in the objective autopsy?'" Well, it's not improper to ask an expert whether he - - -

JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, I don't know - - -

MR. SIMONE: No, but the reason that - -
JUDGE PIGOTT: Pardon me. Let me finish my
thought. I - - - I don't know what 762 is. Is this
after the ER doctor testifies that he died of
arrhythmia or is it before that? Because I - - - my
sense of the record was this was a surprise, and it
was a surprise brought on by the defendants who had
been called in the plaintiff's case in these things.

MR. SIMONE: Well, it - - - it - - -

1 JUDGE PIGOTT: Cross-examination. 2 MR. SIMONE: One, Dr. Mukherji, who was an 3 ER doctor - - -4 JUDGE PIGOTT: Yeah. 5 MR. SIMONE: - - - the plaintiff called, 6 the next witness on this subject was their expert, 7 Dr. Schiffer - - -8 JUDGE PIGOTT: Right. 9 MR. SIMONE: - - - the objection was made 10 after those two witness - - -11 JUDGE PIGOTT: Right. 12 MR. SIMONE: - - - after plaintiff's expert 13 conceded it's possible. JUDGE PIGOTT: But in the middle - - - but 14 15 in the middle of trial is my point. And - - -16 MR. SIMONE: Right, but - - -17 JUDGE PIGOTT: - - - the doctor said - - -18 or, excuse me, the judge said that's untimely. I'm 19 not sure that's untimely. That's what I'm kind of 20 driving at. 21 MR. SIMONE: Well - - - well, I'll tell you 22 why it's untimely, and it's important to understand 23 that the issue is insufficiency, not misleading. We 2.4 didn't say theory A and then present theory B. If 25 it's insufficient - - - well, it - - - it goes back

to your earlier questions weren't - - - were they on 1 2 notice? Yes. And the reason they were on notice is 3 the court also found that the testimony by Silberman 4 was not speculative because there was a clinical 5 presentation here. You know, a pathology report on 6 an autopsy is a gross pathology of whatever they're 7 examining. JUDGE FAHEY: But doesn't the notice - - -8 9 MR. SIMONE: It's clinical. 10 JUDGE FAHEY: - - - issue goes back to the 11 3101(d) notice, not the notice of what - - - what 12 testimony was given at trial? 13 MR. SIMONE: Well, it said contributing 14 factors so you're on notice that, okay, what was the 15 clinical presentation here because - - -JUDGE PIGOTT: No, but see what you're - -16 17 18 MR. SIMONE: - - - could the autopsy have 19 been wrong. 2.0 JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, I hate to you 21 interrupt you on that, but let's - - - let's forget 22 what - - - or you can include what the autopsy said. 23 You're saying, you know, it says various things. 2.4 MR. SIMONE: Right.

JUDGE PIGOTT: Right. But you've got a

legal requirement to disclose what your experts are going to say, and your experts ultimately said heart attack and that was not in the 3101(d). And they objected and they said it was untimely. I keep going back to this untimely because I think in the middle of a trial, depending on the facts, it may not be untimely. And whether this one is one or not, I don't know.

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MR. SIMONE: Well, I don't think it was untimely - - - I think it was untimely in the sense that you could have examined what contributing factors could have caused this with your own expert who ultimately agreed with us.

 $\label{eq:JUDGE PIGOTT: You've got to disclose.}$ This is - - - this is my point.

MR. SIMONE: Right. But that's what the notice was.

JUDGE PIGOTT: I'm not - - - I'm not going to talk to anybody. I am just going to go in and wing it. I can do that as a lawyer, right. But you have an obligation as a defense lawyer, and one of them is to say he died from a car accident, he didn't die from a gunshot. And you can't go in the middle of the trial and say it wasn't a gunshot, it was a car accident

1 and then say, well, even though we didn't disclose 2 that it's untimely for him to now complain about 3 that. 4 MR. SIMONE: But we didn't - - - that's - -5 - that's a misleading theory. JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, I know, but - - -6 7 MR. SIMONE: This is an insufficiency 8 theory. That's - - - that's why I was trying to make 9 a distinction. It's different. If it's 10 insufficient, object to it. Otherwise, presumably, 11 you've done your homework and you know what those theories can be because we elicited this information 12 13 from their own expert. 14 JUDGE STEIN: But - - -15 MR. SIMONE: Why didn't they elicit this 16 information - - -17 JUDGE STEIN: But the statute says 18 reasonable detail, right? 19 MR. SIMONE: Right. 2.0 JUDGE STEIN: Okay. So let's assume for 21 the moment that - - - that what your expert said here 22 was not reasonable detail. So doesn't that sort of 23 encourage gamesmanship for you to do that and require 2.4 the other side to come back every time and say, well,

we don't think this is reasonable?

1	MR. SIMONE: I think I think
2	reasonable minds can differ on what's reasonable.
3	JUDGE STEIN: But
4	MR. SIMONE: No pun intended but
5	JUDGE PIGOTT: That's for sure.
6	JUDGE STEIN: I agree.
7	MR. SIMONE: But the issue here is still it
8	was the court's decision
9	JUDGE RIVERA: Well, is is
10	MR. SIMONE: that it was untimely and
11	abuse of discretion.
12	JUDGE RIVERA: your position if he
13	had raised an issue about this you would have said I
14	don't have to give any more detail?
15	MR. SIMONE: Well
16	JUDGE RIVERA: When you say reasonable
17	minds can differ, is it your position that you would
18	not have had to have given more detail if he had
19	requested it?
20	MR. SIMONE: You know, I don't know what we
21	would have done but we addressed the other objection
22	and and we addressed it to the plaintiff's
23	satisfaction. So if somebody had requested it, I
24	- I think generally we do provide more information.
25	So I my answer to that would be if somebody

1 requested it we - - - we would have done it. I mean 2 we don't generally engage in a lot of this motion 3 practice. We generally do it - - - you know, it's -4 - - it is an adversarial system but it doesn't mean 5 there's not - - -6 JUDGE RIVERA: And is it your position that 7 your expert really did not know what causation theory 8 he was going to give until he heard the other - - -9 or until the other testimony from Dr., I can't 10 remember how his name is pronounced, Mukarate - - -11 MR. SIMONE: Mukherji. 12 JUDGE RIVERA: - - - testify? 13 MR. SIMONE: And then Dr. Schiffer is the 14 plaintiff's expert. 15 JUDGE RIVERA: Yeah. Yeah. 16 MR. SIMONE: I don't know what - - - I 17 don't know what Dr. Silberman knew, but I know that -18 19 JUDGE RIVERA: You - - - you were going to 2.0 have him as an expert and you didn't know? 21 MR. SIMONE: Well - - - I - - - I 22 personally, I don't know. I - - - I don't know what 23 he knew. But that doesn't answ - - - that doesn't 2.4 mean that it wasn't reasonable detail in 3101(d), but 25

in any event, we certainly have the right to question

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          - - - to explore an issue with our expert that was
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          addressed by - - - by plaintiff. Remember, they
 3
          never objected to the testimony or moved to strike
 4
          the testimony from the other two witnesses, and this
 5
          whole - - - this whole appeal has been - - -
                    JUDGE RIVERA: Well, their witness - - -
 6
                    MR. SIMONE: - - - bobbing around the - - -
 7
8
                    JUDGE RIVERA: Their witness you're - - -
9
          you're not quite presenting accurately that
10
          testimony, right? Because their - - - their other
11
          expert witness says well, any - - - anything's
12
          possible. But then - - -
13
                    MR. SIMONE: He - - - he also - - -
14
                    JUDGE RIVERA: But then goes on to say that
15
          the record, the medical records and so forth, did not
16
          support that this was caused - - - death was caused
17
          by an arrhythmia, right?
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                    MR. SIMONE: He - - - he agreed with - - -
19
                    JUDGE RIVERA: No, no. Is that true?
2.0
                    MR. SIMONE: No, that's not true. Because
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22
                    JUDGE RIVERA: That's not true?
23
                    MR. SIMONE: - - - any - - -
2.4
                    JUDGE RIVERA: Why is it not true?
25
                    MR. SIMONE: Because he didn't say anything
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1	is poss he said that one place, but it's a long
2	exchange and a long questioning. And he ultimately
3	agreed that if he had all these symptoms, these
4	this clinical presentation, that he could have died
5	of a sudden arrhythmia. He agreed with that.
6	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Counsel counsel,
7	was
8	MR. SIMONE: So it wasn't just that one
9	phrase anything is possible.
10	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Counsel, is
11	MR. SIMONE: It was more than that.
12	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Was Dr. Muk
13	MR. SIMONE: Mukherji.
14	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Mukherji, was he
15	the plaintiff's witness or was he defendant's
16	witness?
17	MR. SIMONE: He was the plaintiff's
18	witness.
19	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: He was plaintiff's
20	witness.
21	MR. SIMONE: He was the ER doctor.
22	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: He was the ER doc.
23	And so you're the defense defendant
24	didn't object to him opining on how the decedent died
25	because the issue was whether he was a fact witness

1	or not.
2	MR. SIMONE: Right.
3	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: So they called him as
4	a fact witness, but somehow he made an opinion about
5	causation of death.
6	MR. SIMONE: Right, he was asked
7	asked
8	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: And you didn't object
9	to it.
10	MR. SIMONE: Well, we didn't object to it.
11	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Right.
12	MR. SIMONE: No, he he
13	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Because it was
14	favorable to you and you wanted to use it. And you
15	said in your 3101(d) that you could your expert
16	would opine on trial testimony.
17	MR. SIMONE: Right, and also contributing
18	factors to causes of the death.
19	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: So it was the
20	plaintiff who elicited that opinion
21	MR. SIMONE: Right.
22	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: from Dr.
23	Mukherji?
24	MR. SIMONE: That's correct.
25	JUDGE PIGOTT: Or no, didn't it come out on

1 cross? 2 JUDGE RIVERA: It was cross. 3 MR. SIMONE: Pardon? 4 JUDGE PIGOTT: Didn't that come out on 5 cross? It started on - - - on direct 6 MR. SIMONE: 7 and then it went right into the cross. He - - - he 8 agreed that it could happen. 9 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, Mr. 10 Simone. 11 MR. SIMONE: Thank you. CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Mr. Shoot. 12 13 MR. SHOOT: Let me get to Judge Pigott's 14 point about malpractice cases being a special breed and how this came about. Yes, they are special. 15 16 way they're special is that all the facts come from 17 the defendant's employees or the records they made. That's why the doctor is called first. He's a fact 18 19 witness. 2.0 During the opening address at 103 of the 21 record, defense counsel says what we're expecting, 22 people die of pneumonia, sometimes there's nothing 23 you can do. During the direct examination of Dr. 2.4 Mukherji, plaintiff's counsel asks him at page 174 to

175 of the record do you agree with the medical

examiner that the number one cause of death is bronchopneumonia? And the answer is yes. Later, he's had a change of heart later in the case. And on cross-examination he tells his counsel, well, I meant it was contributory in the sense it put him in the hospital where he got the heart attack. That's what I meant by being the number one cause of death.

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Malpractice cases, this is what you deal with. You have a fourth-year resident who sees the patient at 6:00 p.m. who writes patient is very hypoxic, and who takes the stand and says I didn't mean very hypoxic then, I meant very hypoxic earlier.

JUDGE GARCIA: Counsel, these - - - this all was in front of the jury, right?

MR. SHOOT: No, but the point - - -

JUDGE GARCIA: All these arguments about this story changing and this coming out then and these people, those are jury arguments. But what we're really concerned about here is when this judge makes this determination that they're going to allow this testimony, is it an abuse of discretion?

MR. SHOOT: What I'm talking about, Judge, it's a level playing field. That this is the way we start, and we have a rule about disclosure. And if we have an interpretation of that rule that penalizes

1	those who play by the rules and rewards those who
2	withhold information, then the playing field
3	JUDGE RIVERA: What
4	MR. SHOOT: becomes even more unlevel
5	than you start with.
6	JUDGE RIVERA: What should they what
7	should they have included? What should this exchange
8	have said?
9	MR. SHOOT: It should have had reasonable
10	detail as to the theory, reasonable detail. Now in -
11	
12	JUDGE GARCIA: And if it didn't, shouldn't
13	you have objected to that?
14	MR. SHOOT: Your if if there's
15	I think there's a theory there and there's not
16	reasonable detail, I know to object. But if the
17	theory's not even there, how do I object to that?
18	JUDGE RIVERA: What would have been
19	JUDGE STEIN: You wouldn't have had an
20	objection
21	JUDGE GARCIA: Right.
22	JUDGE STEIN: if you got the
23	objection that there's no theory there.
24	MR. SHOOT: Well, that's what I mean. That
25	was the objection.

JUDGE STEIN: You concede that. You concede that.

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MR. SHOOT: At page 7, the - - - it's seven pages of discussion, the colloquy, and it's at pages 757 to 764 of the record, where it - - - the record doesn't show if counsel's being apoplectic or foaming at the mouth at the time. But he's pretty upset, and what he keeps on saying is I had no idea.

JUDGE RIVERA: Okay.

MR. SHOOT: Nothing about a heart attack until - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: Well, you didn't ask. But let me ask you a different question. When you say reasonable detail, does that mean that they have to say here the - - causation depends on X, Y, Z, and then specifically say an arrhythmia? Or do they have to say causation testimony may not be limited to what the autopsy report concludes?

MR. SHOOT: I think in this case it would certainly have to be heart attack and/or arrhythmia. And I think if the tables were turned and we were looking at the reasonable detail of the plaintiff's exchange and the plaintiff's exchange said, well, they've committed malpractice in some way or another, we'll let you know - - -

1 JUDGE FAHEY: Mr. Shoot, listen, my own 2 personal Judge Fahey view is their - - - their 3 response was inadequate to begin with. You had a chance to bring a motion, and you didn't bring the 4 5 motion. It goes back to Judge Pigott's point, which is that the issue for us is that their response is 6 7 clearly inadequate. You weren't timely. Can an 8 untimely motion in this context be required or is it 9 an abuse of discretion? I think it really boils down 10 to that. 11 MR. SHOOT: Your Honor, I would commend to you the article by David Horowitz which was cited in 12 13 my - - -14 JUDGE FAHEY: I'm glad you didn't give me 15 one of your articles, anyway. That's good. 16 good. Go ahead. 17 MR. SHOOT: Who advises everyone now in 18 every case you get in an exchange, to throw it back 19 at them and that's so you don't have a waiver. 2.0 May I have one second to address the second 21 issue in the case? 22 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thirty seconds, sir. 23 MR. SHOOT: Thank you, Your Honor. Mr. 2.4 Simone said a couple of times that our expert could

have also gotten the quote "information" that there

was a heart attack. There's no information there was a heart attack. At page 804 to 805 of the record, their expert said there's nothing in the record about a heart attack. The proof that there was a heart attack was that their expert said there was a heart attack, and that should not be sufficient. It certainly isn't sufficient in Doomes and all those cases, I'm an expert, I'm going to tell you what the cause is, and that's sufficient?

There were specific reasons here to think it was not a heart attack. The medical examiner said bronchopneumonia. One lung weighs twice as much as the other. And he's been on a heart machine, a heart monitor for 12 hours in the emergency room without any sign of arrhythmia, and the medical examiner finds nothing on autopsy even though our expert said at pages 427 to 428 of the record you find it in the autopsy. Now how could something be more conclusory than I'm an expert so I'm telling you it's a heart attack? Thank you, Your Honors.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: You're very welcome. Thank you, sir.

(Court is adjourned)

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CERTIFICATION

I, Sara Winkeljohn, certify that the foregoing transcript of proceedings in the Court of Appeals of Rivera v. Montefiore Medical Center, No. 132 was prepared using the required transcription equipment and is a true and accurate record of the proceedings.

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