1	COURT OF APPEALS
2	STATE OF NEW YORK
3	
4	PEOPLE,
5	Respondent,
6	-against-
7	No. 157 ROY S. KANGAS,
8	Appellant.
9	
10	20 Eagle Street Albany, New York 12207
11	September 14, 2016
12	Before:
13	CHIEF JUDGE JANET DIFIORE ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE F. PIGOTT, JR.
14	ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA ASSOCIATE JUDGE SHEILA ABDUS-SALAAM
15	ASSOCIATE JUDGE LESLIE E. STEIN ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE M. FAHEY
16	ASSOCIATE JUDGE MICHAEL J. GARCIA
17	Appearances:
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23	Utica, NY 13501
24	
25	Sara Winkeljohn Official Court Transcriber

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Number 157 on the calendar, People v. Roy Kangas.

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MR. CURLEY: May it please the court, I'm

Mark Curley. I'm here for Appellant Roy Kangas, and

I'd like to reserve two minutes - - -

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Two minutes, sir?

MR. CURLEY: - - - for rebuttal. Thank

you. Your Honors, this case presented competing

claims or sponsorship and certification of some

business records. There were two separate exhibits.

One was from the New York Forensic Investigation

Center, simulator solutions. And one was for

calibration and maintenance records, and that was

from the Division of Criminal Justice Services.

JUDGE STEIN: Can we - - - can we ignore

the ones from the - - - from the county and - - - and

just go based - - - if there's an appropriate

certification based on the state agencies, then why

isn't that okay?

MR. CURLEY: Well, it depends on how they're put into evidence, Judge. They were put in under 4518(a) and not 4518(c), and I would say that there's no discussion of certification. Proper analysis for a business record is 4518(a), generally. And that requires an analysis of are they made in the

- - in the regular course of business by someone who has a duty in a close type of proximity, et cetera.

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And then you get to the second part of that paragraph that says is it an electronic record, and if it's an electronic record, then you have to go State Technology Law 306. 306 will direct you to C.P.L.R. 4439 to ask whether it's a reproduction or not. Certification only comes in under 4518(c), which are records that are produced in response to a subpoena, and there's a good reason for that. A subpoena catches someone's attention. It's too easy for a certification to be a road officer certification, and this case is a - - - is a good example of that. The sheriff's office may have thought that those were business records of their own and they certified them. Said the - - -

JUDGE STEIN: But I'm saying if we ignore what the sheriff's did and we just do what the state did.

MR. CURLEY: If you ignore it, then the certification has to be made under 4518(c), and those have to be subpoenaed records. 4518(c) says they're either 2306 - - -

JUDGE STEIN: Is that because you say that

4518(a) doesn't apply or doesn't apply to the - - - to the government? Is that - - -

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MR. CURLEY: 4518(a) doesn't mention certification at all. I would say that certification is not enough under 4518(a). And I would suggest to you, Judge, that, no, the - - - I heard the first case here talk about decisions that were 150 years old, and I'll say to you that when electronic technology is involved, ten years is 150 years.

JUDGE RIVERA: Agree with that. So what would should have been submitted?

MR. CURLEY: I think - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: What would have been appropriate in this case?

MR. CURLEY: To subpoen the records in from either the Forensic Investigation Center or from the - - - the Department - - - Division of Criminal Justice Services. When they're subpoenaed in, whoever is signing in response to that subpoena is alerted to the gravity of - - - of the request. And they know that they could be pulled into court to answer it. If not, you're going to get subpoenas - - - or - - or let me use the certification that they provided. It says these records are made and kept by us, and they're properly protected.

1 JUDGE FAHEY: Now you're talking about the 2 Ontario County Sheriff's Department first? So you're 3 talking about - - - no, that's not Limoges, that's 4 Felshaw, right? 5 MR. CURLEY: Pardon me? JUDGE FAHEY: The Ontario County Sheriff's 6 7 Department is Felshaw, right? MR. CURLEY: Yes, that's Katie Felshaw. 8 9 JUDGE FAHEY: All right. All right. 10 let's - - - I think if I understood correctly what 11 Judge Stein was saying, let's assume that her 12 certification to comply with the business records 13 exception was wrong because they were not records 14 that were ordinar - - - kept in the ordinary course 15 of business by the sheriff's department. There may 16 have been a way for her to certify them, but the way 17 she certified them doesn't meet the requirement of 4518(a), right. 18 19 MR. CURLEY: Okay. 2.0 JUDGE FAHEY: All right, so assuming that, 21 so then we have Exhibit 7 and Exhibit 8. Now one was 22 preserved and one wasn't, but - - - in my mind,

anyway. But leaving that aside, does - - - County

Court, as I understand it, concluded that 4539

doesn't apply to documents that are originally

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created in electronic form. And here we're talking 1 about the electronic simulator solution record which 2 3 is what was contained in Exhibit 7. We've got the data calibrations, 8, simulator solution, 7, right? 4 5 MR. CURLEY: Yes. 6 JUDGE FAHEY: So - - - so County says that 7 it wasn't - - - County Court seems to say, and they -8 - - they make a good argument, that those records 9 were originally created in electronic form and that -10 - - and this is where 4539, we - - - I suppose we 11 need to talk about that, comes into play because 4539 12 req - - really, we're talking about PDF-type 13 context - - -14 MR. CURLEY: Yes. 15 JUDGE FAHEY: - - - documents. 16 MR. CURLEY: Yes. 17 JUDGE FAHEY: And so they - - - it wasn't created electronically so therefore, it doesn't 18 19 apply. 2.0 MR. CURLEY: Well, Your Honor, the County 21 Court concluded that all the records that were 22 submitted were originally created in electronic form 23 and were never in any sort of hard copy, but that's 2.4 not true. The certification from DCJS by John Digman

says these are photocopies. There is no way to

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          photocopy - - -
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                    JUDGE FAHEY: Um-hum.
 3
                    MR. CURLEY: - - - a purely electronic.
                    JUDGE STEIN: And there's no electronic
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          signature. He - - - he has an actual - - -
                    MR. CURLEY: He actually signed it, yes.
 6
 7
                    JUDGE FAHEY: Yeah.
 8
                    JUDGE STEIN: But is - - - was the copy
 9
          that was received in evidence, was that an orig - - -
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          was that his - - - did that have his original
11
          signature on it?
                    MR. CURLEY: No. There was no original
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13
          document - - -
                    JUDGE STEIN: Do we - - - how do we know
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          that?
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                    MR. CURLEY: Because they came out of the
17
          prosecutor's briefcase. They're faxes. They're not
          - - - there's no pen and ink involved.
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19
                    JUDGE FAHEY: Well, it's funny when you
20
          look at them. Digman's signature on one looks like a
21
          photocopy but then another one it looks like a - - -
22
          it may be Limoges, it looks like electronically
23
          created - - -
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                    MR. CURLEY: It does.
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                    JUDGE FAHEY: - - - signature. Is that
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fair to say?

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MR. CURLEY: Yes.

JUDGE FAHEY: Yeah, okay.

MR. CURLEY: Yes. But there's - - there's no way to challenge any of that at trial, and that's - - - if you look at the testimony of Sean McVicar, who was just the poor breath test operator, you know, John Leonard asked him have you ever seen these records before? He says, no. Do you know anything about them? Do you know if they're kept in the ordinary course of business? And - - - and he says no, I - - - I don't know anything about that. So there's a problem with a certification being conclusory with a certification saying this - - these records are - - - are protected, these records are not subject to tampering or degradation, or even these records are business records. Who - - - who knows that? So I would submit that there was no proper analysis in this trial of whether they were business records and certainly no analysis of whether they were electronic records, how they should be protected, even if they should be accepted.

JUDGE FAHEY: So - - -

MR. CURLEY: And their admission was error.

JUDGE FAHEY: How does 4540 come into play

1 here? 2 MR. CURLEY: 4540, Your Honor, is - - -3 comes into play with public records. 4 JUDGE FAHEY: Um-hum. 5 MR. CURLEY: Okay, and these are not public I - - - I had a hard time even getting 6 records. 7 these records, so I would say that public records are 8 a product. They're not something that's kept in the 9 ordinary course of business. And I'll use the 10 analogy of if I publish a newspaper, the actual 11 newspaper is not a business record. Okay. It's - -12 - it's what I'm publishing. It's my publication. 13 But my business records as a newspaper publisher are my invoices and my checks and my bills. So there is 14 15 a separate section for public documents, and I don't 16 think it has no application here. 17 JUDGE STEIN: Where does it say "public documents"? It says - - - as I look at 4540, it 18 talks about an official record. 19 2.0 MR. CURLEY: It says - - -21 JUDGE STEIN: An official record, not a 22 public document. 23 MR. CURLEY: Well, it says "Copies 2.4 permitted and official publication." And that's - -

- that's what I meant to say.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, counsel. 1 2 Counsel. 3 MR. COX: Good afternoon. May it please 4 the court, I'm Steve Cox for the People. 5 exhibits, first, I'll touch on the easiest. As Judge 6 Fahey mentioned, the Exhibit 7 is a digitally created 7 and digitally record exhibit. That's where we're 8 going from now on. That's pretty much how all 9 exhibits in these DWY - - - DWI trials will be. 10 There aren't any more handwritten and signed 11 exhibits. It means that it was never - - - it never 12 existed on paper. The analyst makes the report on 13 the computer as she's complete - - - he or she is 14 completing the work and has a process that's - - -15 you know, it involves a number of steps to secure the 16 work once it's completed. 17 JUDGE RIVERA: How can - - - how can Felshaw certify it as a business record? How is she 18 19 authorized to do that? 2.0 MR. COX: That's the - - - the first 21 question is whether that would go back to if - - - if 22 that argument is feasible that could only happen 23 under this court's decision in Cratsley and some of 2.4 its progeny that the sheriff's department - - -

JUDGE STEIN: Is there any evidence to

support a Cratsley analysis here?

MR. COX: I believe so. I mean the
sheriff's department gathered these - - - the

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sheriff's department gathered these - - - the records from the state for purposes of ensuring that their Datamaster machine operated properly. They kept all these records, and what - - what happened is rather than give an original to the ADA; they've formed the policy of certifying a copy of the original they had to give to the ADA. So - - -

JUDGE STEIN: We don't know if they - - - they shared procedures or anything like that, right?

MR. COX: I'm sorry?

JUDGE STEIN: Doesn't Cratsley say that they have to have shared procedures or adopted - - -

MR. COX: Not shared procedures, but what - - what they called - - -

JUDGE FAHEY: So you - - -

MR. COX: - - - circumstantial familiarity with the documents. In other words, if the sheriff's department as entity B is so familiar with and relies regularly upon the records of DCJS or the state police in the course of their business of maintaining the Datamaster instrument to be sure that it's operating properly, then they can reasonably rely upon those records and create their own records of

1	them. And
2	JUDGE RIVERA: Who keeps the original?
3	MR. COX: I'm sorry?
4	JUDGE RIVERA: Who keeps the original?
5	What what they are referring to as an original.
6	MR. COX: What
7	JUDGE RIVERA: Who's got that?
8	MR. COX: What Katie Felshaw referred to as
9	an original, she kept. She has it on file
LO	JUDGE RIVERA: And what does she what
L1	
L2	MR. COX: and she made a copy and
L3	certified it.
L4	JUDGE RIVERA: Okay. You say well, she
L5	referred to, what what is the original she's
L6	referring to?
L7	MR. COX: It would have been the original
L8	copy she'd received from
L9	JUDGE RIVERA: So it's a copy.
20	JUDGE RIVERA: Jennifer Limoges and
21	John Digman.
22	JUDGE RIVERA: So it's a copy?
23	MR. COX: Well, no, it's an original.
24	JUDGE RIVERA: You're saying an original
25	copy?

1	MR. COX: She received an original from the
2	state.
3	JUDGE RIVERA: That's what I'm asking.
4	MR. COX: She keeps that and makes a copy
5	of it
6	JUDGE RIVERA: Okay.
7	MR. COX: with a certification.
8	JUDGE RIVERA: So then even though
9	Jennifer, I'm not sure how it's pronounced Lim
10	MR. COX: I'd I'd say it's [Lym'
11	mose], yeah.
12	JUDGE RIVERA: Limoges?
13	MR. COX: Yeah.
14	JUDGE RIVERA: Thank you. Says that she
15	has in her possession the original, that she's turned
16	over the original. Is it
17	MR. COX: You're there are two
18	JUDGE RIVERA: Am I reading the wrong
19	thing?
20	MR. COX: And that's the difference. They
21	are a secondary certification. What happened here,
22	and the reason I don't rely on the Cratsley argument
23	as much, is I think the trial court, if you read the
24	transcript, effectively said, eh, I'm disregarding
25	Katie Felshaw's certification because don't you have

1	the state certification here.
2	JUDGE FAHEY: You're talking about City
3	Court said that in in the record?
4	MR. COX: Yes.
5	JUDGE FAHEY: They apparently did of
6	course, which preserves the argument also.
7	MR. COX: Yes. So I think
8	JUDGE RIVERA: I'm again
9	MR. COX: County Court said City Court was
LO	okay doing that.
L1	JUDGE RIVERA: It's just a straightforward
L2	question. Who has the original?
L3	MR. COX: Exhibit 1, the one I'm talking
L4	about right now, Jennifer Limoges'
L5	JUDGE RIVERA: Is it 7?
L6	MR. COX: is a digital, a digital
L7	document.
L8	JUDGE RIVERA: Okay.
L9	MR. COX: So in a Zen kind of world, the
20	original is on a hard drive in Albany, okay.
21	JUDGE RIVERA: On the hard drive. Got it.
22	MR. COX: Okay. When you print one, it
23	becomes an original
24	JUDGE RIVERA: A copy.
25	MR COX: under the State Electronic

1 Records Act. 2 JUDGE RIVERA: I got it. Okay. 3 MR. COX: Jennifer Limoges had one, and 4 normally, we have one. Whoever prints one has an 5 original. That's the - - - the concept under the Electronic Records Act. They're all - - - to me, 6 7 they're copies but under the - - - the Act, every 8 time you create one it's an original. 9 JUDGE PIGOTT: Who can you cross-examine as 10 to the accuracy of it? 11 MR. COX: They're self-authenticating 12 documents. The - - - they're - - - under 4518(c), so 13 long as you meet the requirements of that 14 certification, they're admissible as prima facie 15 evidence of the matter asserted in them. 16 JUDGE PIGOTT: I'm not suggesting that this 17 happens but there are mistakes sometimes. And if - -18 - is there - - - if there's a mistake, no one's going 19 to know it, right? 2.0 MR. COX: Mistake as to the underl - - -21 what - - - no, that's a difference under a business 22 record under 4518(a) you'd have to have a keeper of 23 the record. 2.4 JUDGE PIGOTT: Right.

MR. COX: For instance, offer that in.

1 that keeper of the record, you - - - you could cross-2 examine them as to, you know, you sure you kept this 3 record. But they wouldn't know about the - - -4 JUDGE PIGOTT: Quite - - - quite often 5 these days they basically - - -MR. COX: - - - the underlying matter. 6 7 JUDGE PIGOTT: I'm sorry? 8 MR. COX: They wouldn't know about the 9 underlying matter. 10 JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, that's the - - -11 MR. COX: Defense counsel in a DWI trial is 12 always free to subpoena the chemist, if they want to 13 cross-examine the chemist, about the process they use to test the chemicals. 14 15 JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, I - - - I always think 16 who's got the burden of proof. But it's - - - the 17 only reason I ask is that we get - - - we get pretty loose sometimes, and if there's an inaccurate reading 18 19 but we say, well, it's electronic so you can't cross-2.0 examine. That's too bad. It's inaccurate, tough. 21 You know, and that's not what we want to say. 22 want to say somebody can say why do we believe that 23 this is true. 2.4 MR. COX: Well, because that's exactly what

they are is calibration records. The requirement for

1 entering - - - the People have to show the 2 instrument's in proper working order, right, under 3 Mertz. And you do this in these DWI trials by we take the most recent calibration record before and 4 5 after arrest, certified copies of them, so that 6 you've got probative evidence that if it was working 7 before arrest and after arrest, it was working at the time of arrest. As well as the simulator solution 8 9 record because they have to use the simulator 10 solution record to get a plus or minus 1 - - - 0.01 11 result after they conduct the test. 12 JUDGE STEIN: Your adversary - - -13 MR. COX: All these things - - -14 JUDGE STEIN: - - - says that this was - -15 - these were admitted under subdivision (a), 4518(a), 16 not (c). 17 MR. COX: I don't think so. 18 JUDGE STEIN: You don't agree with that? MR. COX: No, I think the trial court 19 2.0 clearly recognized this - - - this 4518(c), that the 21 - - - in effect, I think they said it had met all the requirements of 4518(c) in adm - - - in admitting 22 23 them into evidence - - -2.4 JUDGE STEIN: And do you - - - do you - - -

MR. COX: - - - because it admitted it

1	without a keeper of the record and admitted it as a
2	self-authenticating document.
3	JUDGE STEIN: Do you do you also
4	agree that Mr. Digman's signature is not was
5	not an original on the on the exhibit?
6	MR. COX: I disagree that an original
7	signature is required.
8	JUDGE STEIN: But you agree that his wasn't
9	an original?
LO	MR. COX: On the document well, you -
L1	well, first of all, you have the exhibits, so
L2	feel free to examine them.
L3	JUDGE STEIN: Well
L4	MR. COX: The signature
L5	JUDGE STEIN: we have copies of the
L6	exhibit. But we do have the originals here.
L7	MR. COX: Right.
L8	JUDGE STEIN: And I actually looked at the
L9	at the originals.
20	MR. COX: Yes. Now
21	JUDGE STEIN: And and they looked to
22	me like copied signatures but I just wanted to
23	confirm it if
24	MR. COX: Right. But that's, you know, the
25	question that pulls us to the court is, you know, in

today's technology, it's awful hard to tell the 1 2 difference between a copy and an original sometimes. 3 Before I did appeals, I did counterfeit cases. And, 4 you know, you can make money look pretty good so you 5 can make signatures look pretty good. I don't find in the law where 4518(c) requires an original 6 7 signature. It requires a signature, a notarization, 8 part of your certification requirement, and it 9 requires an attestation, those three prongs from 10 Kennedy that say, you know, you keep this in the 11 normal course of business and so on. All that is 12 present here. 13 JUDGE GARCIA: Counsel, is - - -14 MR. COX: It's just a copy. It's not an 15 original, but I don't think that matters. JUDGE GARCIA: Now this isn't a 16 17 confrontation clause case, right? I mean there's 18 really no question of crossing the witness here. I 19 mean it's not confrontation. 2.0 MR. COX: No. 21 It's civil procedure, right? JUDGE GARCIA: 22 MR. COX: No, it's not a confrontation at 23 all - - -2.4 JUDGE GARCIA: So why can't we just - - -

MR. COX: - - - because it's self-

authenticated.

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JUDGE GARCIA: Why - - - and this aspirational, why can't we just say this goes to weight?

MR. COX: It - - - once it's admitted, certainly it does. That's why I say once the court received that exhibit, defense counsel was free to introduce evidence to try to - - - to diminish the weight of it. It's free to - - - to question the fact that it's a copy in front of the jury. But all I'm saying is that it was properly received and admitted by the court because from all I can find, it had a signature, it had a notarization, it had the proper attestation to make it a 4518(c) certification attached to it. And so long as the court was okay with ignoring Jennifer - - - I'm sorry, ignoring the sheriff's department certification and just saying, hey, I've got the - - - the same state certification I always have here, then it was acc - - - it accepted it properly.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, counsel.

MR. COX: Thank you.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Mr. Curley.

MR. CURLEY: Yes. Judge Stein, you have an original, according to Mr. Cox. He just told you

that any copy that's made becomes an original as soon as you take possession of it, which loses sight of -

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JUDGE STEIN: Well, if it was originally electronically created. I think that was his - - - that what his argument. But a separate question was whether you need an original of a signature on a certification of - - of a hard - - hard copy document.

MR. CURLEY: Well, you need - - - you need it for 4518(c). 4518(c) says other records; it references 2306, which is only treatment records, medical treatment records, and 2307, which references books, papers, and other things of a department or agency. 2307 merely excuses the personal appearance of the - - of the witness that's going to - - - that the proponent's going to put on to put the evidence in. So I think the subpoena aspect of 4518(c), again, is important because it's an additional guarantee that we need. Otherwise, anybody can come in and certify that - - make the decision for the judge this is a good business record. This is - - -

JUDGE STEIN: So you're saying a certification signed pursuant to a subpoena carries

1	more weight than a certification signed
2	MR. CURLEY: Yes.
3	JUDGE STEIN: under sworn
4	MR. CURLEY: I don't know if it's fine but
5	it's it's much better.
6	JUDGE STEIN: Makes a difference?
7	MR. CURLEY: Yes. And also, I would just
8	like to say that there's no record of this anywhere
9	in the in the trial record. So any analysis -
10	
11	JUDGE FAHEY: When you say "this", what do
12	you mean? No record of what?
13	MR. CURLEY: Of any analysis that we've
14	just gone through. Of anybody asking a question how
15	do I know this is a good business record. The
16	witness they put on, he said I've I've never
17	seen it before today, and that can't be enough.
18	Can I say one more thing?
19	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Yes, sir. Please.
20	MR. CURLEY: As a practical matter, in City
21	Court, if I try and subpoena in any of these
22	technicians, any of these chemists, technicians, the
23	state police would be there in a minute in County
24	Court, Supreme Court, with a motion to quash.
25	They'll come in and argue that we can't bring these

1	technicians down for every DWI court trial in City
2	Court, and I'll be out the door.
3	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, Mr. Cox.
4	(Court is adjourned)
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CERTIFICATION

I, Sara Winkeljohn, certify that the

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