1	COURT OF APPEALS
2	STATE OF NEW YORK
3	
4	PEOPLE,
5	Respondent,
6	-against- No. 19
7	RICHARD M. LEONARD, 20
8	Appellant.
9	20 Eagle Street
10	Albany, New York February 8, 2017
11	Before:
	CHIEF JUDGE JANET DIFIORE
12	ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA ASSOCIATE JUDGE SHEILA ABDUS-SALAAM
13	ASSOCIATE JUDGE LESLIE E. STEIN ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE M. FAHEY
14	ASSOCIATE JUDGE MICHAEL J. GARCIA ASSOCIATE JUDGE ROWAN D. WILSON
15	
16	Appearances:
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CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: The first matters on this afternoon's calendar are appeals numbers 19 and 20, the People of the State of New York v. Richard Leonard.

Counsel.

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MR. SHIFFRIN: May - - - may it please the court, if I may - - - can I have two minutes reserved for rebuttal?

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Yes. You may, sir.

MR. SHIFFRIN: Thank you, Your Honor. There was no legitimate, strategic reason for counsel to fail to have the jury learn that the only trial witness who claimed to have observed the charged sexual crime on the day of the event told the police that he had not seen anything specific but merely believed that my client had done something inappropriate. By contrast, two-and-a-half years later at trial, the witness testified that he had seen my client's hand, in his word, on her wet vagina with his fingers down there. Could not be more - - -

JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Counsel, I'm - - - I'm - - - could I just stop you because I'm a little confused about what the basis of your ineffective assistance of counsel claim is. Is it that trial counsel failed to get the police report admitted into evidence or that trial counsel failed to confront the star witness, if you will, with statements that he made in the police report or elsewhere?

MR. SHIFFRIN: The - - - my contention - - - our contention below and - - - and here is that the ineffectiveness was the failure to attempt to impeach the witness with respect to the statement, first by asking questions to the witness about the fact that at the day of the charged event he said he had not seen anything specific, and then if - - - if the witness didn't acknowledge that, then to fail to try to get the report into evidence. This court, back in December of this - - - of last year in People v. Patterson, cited with approval two cases for the proposition that a police report can be used for purposes of impeachment even though the - - - the person who gave the statement did - - - was not under a business duty.

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JUDGE STEIN: But could - - - could counsel have thought that perhaps the fact that he even reported it immediately like that might have worked to - - - to the disadvantage of the defense - -

MR. SHIFFRIN: Not in the facts of this case.

JUDGE STEIN: - - - being raised.

MR. SHIFFRIN: In this case, he didn't report it.

What happened, and this is the - - - the key, is he was

questioned because this witness assaulted my client on that

day, and - - - and on the day he had the greatest motive to

justify his assault by saying I assaulted Mr. Leonard

because I observed him, and with specificity, sexually touching his girlfriend. He did not say that. Instead, he said I didn't see anything specific.

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JUDGE STEIN: No. But he - - - but he did say he saw something.

MR. SHIFFRIN: He - - - he said he thought - - - he said, in his words at page 91 in the record, is I did not see anything specific. I believed that Mr. Leonard was in - - did something - - - was doing something inappropriate. That's extremely different than his - - -

JUDGE WILSON: Well, that - - - how different is it, though, right? He's a seventeen-year-old at the time, right, and he says I didn't see anything specifically. And then later, his trial testimony is I saw her hand but I didn't see whether there was penetration or what was really going on. I mean isn't there some chance you do that cross-examination and what the jury concludes is that it's somewhat consistent given that he's seventeen years old? And you beat up on a seventeen-year-old on the stand too much and the jury is sympathetic?

MR. SHIFFRIN: Again, two - - - two different things. First of all, respectfully, the - - - the trial testimony that I - - - I saw a wet vagina, his hand on and his fingers down there could not be more inconsistent than - - than a general statement I didn't see anything

1	specific, I just believed he was doing something
2	inappropriate. But more importantly, what counsel did was
3	not merely fail to try to impeach this witness with respect
4	to his prior inconsistent statement. He made a false state
5	argument not supported by the record that the
6	that the witness had made a prior consistent statement.
7	And the and he argued in his summation that the
8	witness tried to ten days after this event tried to
9	justify his assault on my client by saying that he had
10	- he had seen something specific. The this argument
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12	JUDGE GARCIA: That I'm sorry, counsel.
13	That came out at the trial, the assault?
14	MR. SHIFFRIN: The
15	JUDGE GARCIA: The facts of the assault?
16	MR. SHIFFRIN: Yes. The facts of the assault
17	came out at trial. The by arguing that there's a
18	prior consistent statement, which is not true, as opposed
19	to making the argument there was a prior inconsistent
20	statement, the counsel doubly hurt my client. Because
21	_
22	JUDGE FAHEY: Can can I just clarify though
23	
24	MR. SHIFFRIN: Sure.

JUDGE FAHEY: - - - just Mr. Shapiro, you know

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the record better than I am. Did - - - or, yeah, Mr. Shiffrin, you know the record better than I am. Did Valle actually use the words in this - - - the police report, in the incident report, that he didn't see anything specific?

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MR. SHIFFRIN: He - - - the report - - - the report is unsworn just so it's - - - just so it's clear.

The - - - that's the language in the report on page 91 recorded by the officer is that he said he didn't see anything specific. The - - -

JUDGE FAHEY: Right. The - - - the signed statement, you know, the voluntary statement that he made, did he actually use those words?

MR. SHIFFRIN: There - - -

JUDGE FAHEY: I'm a little unclear on that.

MR. SHIFFRIN: There's not a signed statement by Mr. - - - there's not a signed statement that day by Mr. Valle, just so it's clear. Mr. - - - Mr. Valle's statement to the police officers recorded in a - - in a police report that the officer had a duty - - - a business duty to - - - to record that report accurately. Mr. Valle was not under a duty but that was - - - that's how that report came down. There was not a sworn - - - there was not any statement by Mr. Valle that day with respect to what he observed.

JUDGE FAHEY: Let - - - let me back up. 10/7/07

1 2 MR. SHIFFRIN: Correct. 3 JUDGE FAHEY: - - - Valle signs a statement, right? You're right. And in that statement did he use the 4 5 words he didn't see anything specific - - -6 MR. SHIFFRIN: He - - - he - - -JUDGE FAHEY: - - - that he could have been then 7 impeached with later? 8 9 MR. SHIFFRIN: He didn't sign a statement on 10 10/7/07 with respect to what he observed. There's nothing 11 - - nothing on - - - in that statement on 10/7 about what 12 he observed. Okay. That - - -13 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: I'm sorry. You're saying in 14 the voluntary statement there was nothing about what he 15 observed? 16 MR. SHIFFRIN: In terms of specificity? 17 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: No. 18 MR. SHIFFRIN: The - - -19 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: It - - - but he did say I 2.0 saw the - - - "I saw Rich standing over and doing 21 something." 22 MR. SHIFFRIN: Doing something. Nothing about -23 - - again, going back to the - - -2.4 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: But that was consistent with 25 what he - - - the police - - -

MR. SHIFFRIN: That's consistent with what my client testified. My client's version from day one on 10/7 was - - - was that he was - - - he was up there but she - - - she had - - - in his state - - - in the police report had got sick and was cleaning up. Again, up there doing something, nothing - - - nothing specific inappropriate is very, very different, respectfully, than saying I saw a hand on a wet - - - on a wet vagina with a finger down there. The - - - that would discredit - - - at the time he made that statement on 10/7, this witness was charged with assault. He had every reason to try to justify his assault by saying he saw - - - saw a lot, he saw something very bad happen.

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CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: But isn't it possible that defense counsel was just trying to avoid highlighting the consistencies here?

MR. SHIFFRIN: Highlighting the consistencies, that's the argument by the - - - by the People. The consistencies are basically irrelevant. And there was no argument that she was upstair - - - upstairs passed out and he was down - - - down below. There's nothing in the - - - in the consistencies that in any way would support a crime. There's nothing in the - - - either the statement made by Mr. Valle on 10/7 or on the police report which would justify even charging Mr. Leonard with - - - with a sexual

assault on a - - -

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JUDGE WILSON: Well, the consistency that she was passed out with her underwear and pants down, I mean, that seems consistent with an assault. I don't want to take up your time on that, though. I think you might want to move to the Molineux.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Yes.

MR. SHIFFRIN: Yeah. With - - - with respect to Molineux, I want to deal with the failure of counsel to seek a limiting instruction because the - - - the key with Molineux, of course, is that evidence of prior crimes cannot come in for propensity. But the jury doesn't know that unless they're told that. The - - - the failure of counsel to seek a limiting charge - - - charge both when the witness testified and in the closing instructions combined with the failure to object to the use by the DA in summation of the prior event creates the real danger that the jury was considering - - - considering that prior - - - the prior uncharged crime for propensity especially given the similarity.

JUDGE FAHEY: So - - - so you're going after Molineux on an ineffective assistance of counsel?

MR. SHIFFRIN: That's raised - - - that's raised in point 3D is that - - -

JUDGE GARCIA: But also you're going on the

1 Molineux substantive ruling, as well? 2 MR. SHIFFRIN: I - - - raised that, also. But -3 - - but I'm focusing now - - - because the totality of the 4 representation between the failure to have the jury ever 5 learn of the prior inconsistent statement, the failure to 6 have any - - -7 JUDGE STEIN: Can I ask you just quickly about 8 whether the - - - the People ever advanced a specific 9 purpose for using that Molineux evidence? 10 MR. SHIFFRIN: Yes. They did. They talked about 11 showing intent, motive - - -JUDGE STEIN: Motive - - - motive to get her 12 13 drunk, intent - - -14 MR. SHIFFRIN: Yes. Yes. But - - -15 JUDGE STEIN: Okay. And is there - - - is there 16 really any distinction between what they were saying that 17 they're - - - maybe I should ask them. Never mind. 18 MR. SHIFFRIN: Okay. 19 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, Mr. Shiffrin. 2.0 MR. SHIFFRIN: Thank you. 21 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Counsel. 22 MR. SHOEMAKER: Good afternoon. May it please 23 the court, Robert Shoemaker for the People. This is not a case of ineffectiveness. This is a case of disagreement 2.4 25

with counsel's trial strategy, and the definition has not

established that trial counsel's failure to utilize these prior statements from the witness demonstrated a lack of strategy.

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JUDGE STEIN: What about the Molineux failure to ask for a limiting instruction?

MR. SHOEMAKER: So that could also have been part of his strategy. His strategy, essentially, what we see in the opening and the closing, the opening at page 229 of the appendix, the closing at 362 to 363, is that the victim and her then-boyfriend were locked into these allegations. He - - he wanted to show the whole thing - - defense counsel wanted to show the whole thing was a fabrication. So as for - - looking at the Molineux in the context of an ineffectiveness claim, defense counsel didn't want to draw attention to these 2005 allegations because, again, his defense strategy was that these 2005 events could never have occurred. The defendant actually took the stand and said he wasn't even living there at the time. So I think - - -

JUDGE STEIN: But don't you think that those two

- - - or her - - - her testimony about the prior events was

like the elephant in the room in this whole case? I mean

no - - you know, she - - - she doesn't remember anything.

And - - and, you know, he - - - he's got some credibility

issues. So how could that not have been, you know, a

serious issue?

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MR. SHOEMAKER: Well, it's very strong Molineux evidence that we sought to use and that I argue was properly used. Defense counsel had the choice to address it in his summation or - - or address it by asking the court to give a limiting instruction. Or defense counsel had the option to not address it and just argue that it's - - this is all a fabrication. So the - - - I - - -

JUDGE FAHEY: Well, let's take a step back.

Let's go to the substantive issue itself. Forget about ineffective assistance of counsel.

MR. SHOEMAKER: Sure.

JUDGE FAHEY: For Molineux to go in there you - - it has to be linked up with some material issue that's
relevant in the case. Not - - - not in the 2005 case, but
in the present case. What material issue is it relevant to
in this case?

MR. SHOEMAKER: Sure. So it's material because it shows the motive for serving or overserving the alcohol, the unlawful dealing, the motive behind that why did defendant want to get the victim drunk.

JUDGE FAHEY: I can't say - - -

JUDGE STEIN: Isn't that - - -

JUDGE FAHEY: - - - that I see that at all. I would have thought maybe - - - I thought you really relied

on background on completing the narrative, and I thought
that's what the court relied on.

MR. SHOEMAKER: Well, there's three - - - there's
three reasons. So one is the motive, this - - - and this

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is what Fourth Department decided, motive, what I just said; intent as far as the sexual gratification, why is he actually doing this and then sexual gratification was something that we had to prove at trial; and the background

9 the - - - to completing the narrative. And those are the three reasons - - -

JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: But doesn't the crime itself suggest both the first two, the motive and the intent?

MR. SHOEMAKER: The crime itself can suggest those. Defendant's, I guess his defense, was that this was a mistake where he was placed and everything. His defense was that he was cleaning up vomit. So our burden to prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt, in order to do that, we can use any evidence that is admissible. In this case, the Molineux evidence was - - -

JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: A mistake, I'm sorry, that he was cleaning up vomit? What - - - what mistake was that? That he - - he never said. His - - - his position was I didn't touch her. I - - I had - - - I never did anything. So what - - what's the mistake?

MR. SHOEMAKER: I guess the mistake in

1 interpreting where he's located. Like the fact that he is 2 kneeling beside her while she's passed out on the couch. 3 The Molineux evidence helps to show - - - from the People's 4 perspective, the Molineux evidence shows that he wasn't 5 there cleaning up vomit. He was there - - - his intent was 6 for sexual gratification. He had gotten her drunk - - -7 JUDGE FAHEY: It seems to be - - -8 JUDGE RIVERA: But isn't that the whole point? 9 All you're arguing is, look, he did that before so it must 10 be why he's doing it now. That's - - - that's exactly what 11 Molineux is set up not to allow you to do. MR. SHOEMAKER: It - - - well, when it's relevant 12 13 for those reasons, that is what it allows you to do. It -- - it's relevant to show his motive. It's relevant to 14 15 show his intent especially - - -16 JUDGE FAHEY: He committed the same crime before. 17 You're saying that it's showing his intent to commit the same crime again. That's not allowed under Molineux. 18 19

MR. SHOEMAKER: If it's - - - if it's the intent - - - within his intent is that he's doing this for sexual gratification.

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JUDGE FAHEY: See, I - - - if - - - these are always difficult, you know, these - - - the Molineux issues are difficult and they're - - - they're complicated. I - - I recognize that. But what I'm concerned with sometimes

is that it - - - it appears like pure propensity and then quite often the People then rely on completing the narrative or background. And most times that makes some sense, but I'm - - - I'm struggling with it here because it seems if it applies here without an identifiable element in this crime, as opposed to some other action that it links up to, then the - - - the exception would swallow the rule. That's why I'm - - - I'm addressing the questions that way to you.

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MR. SHOEMAKER: And I just think in this case the Fourth Department correctly held that their - - - I mean they - - - they explained that in their view, and in my view, I agree with the Fourth Department decision, that the - - - the motive was there. This helps to show motive for the alcohol. It helps to show the intent as far as sexual gratification. And it helps to show completing the narrative background, the relationship between these two individuals.

JUDGE STEIN: What is it about their relationship that relates to this crime? Can - - - can you articulate that? Because I just don't really understand it. It's been said, but I - - - I just don't understand what it is. I mean, yeah, go ahead.

MR. SHOEMAKER: In my - - - in my view, it's the sexual gratification. It's the fact that he is touching

1 her for his own sexual gratification. In 2005 - - -2 JUDGE STEIN: Again, doesn't that just say he did 3 it in 2005, therefore, he must also be doing it now? 4 MR. SHOEMAKER: For - - -5 JUDGE STEIN: To me - - - I don't understand how 6 that relates to their relationship, exactly. 7 MR. SHOEMAKER: For purposes of sexual 8 gratification that - - -9 JUDGE STEIN: I understand. 10 MR. SHOEMAKER: - - - he was - - - he was 11 breathing - - - in 2005, the testimony is that he was 12 breathing heavily and - - - and in this particular case, I 13 - - - I guess don't know another way to put it. 14 JUDGE STEIN: So you're saying that the - - -15 that the completing the narrative or explaining the 16 relationship is the same thing as - - - as showing intent? 17 It seems to me you're conflating those two. 18 MR. SHOEMAKER: I think they're - - - the facts 19 of the case are what conflate the two. The - - - his 2.0 relationship with her going back to 2005 also shows his 21 intent in this particular case, which was sexual 22 gratification - - -23 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Counsel, did - - - did the 2.4 trial court do any balancing here? Did - - - did the - - -25 I didn't see anything in the trial court's decision that

said that it weighed whether the probative value of this evidence outweighed the prejudicial value of this evidence.

And that's - - - that's part of the Molineux equation, isn't it?

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MR. SHOEMAKER: So you can see the court did.

Even if it didn't explicitly use those words, you can see because the People originally asked for three - - - to get into three areas on Molineux. The court only allowed one of the three, the most recent of the three. That there, I would argue, is an exercise of discretion. And as we're looking at this case for an abuse of discretion, the fact that the court only allowed one out of the three shows that the court exercised its discretion but did not abuse its discretion.

JUDGE STEIN: But does that show that the court analyzed this particular prior act in terms of its probative versus prejudicial value or it just said - - - you know, how does that tell us what the court considered?

MR. SHOEMAKER: I think it does show that the court considered that. And we also have - - - there's a question-and-answer between the court and the prosecutor about kind of what I'm saying right now, well, why she needs to get into this prior event. And the prosecutor says to show sexual gratification.

JUDGE RIVERA: It sounds like - - - you know, it

sounds like - - -

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MR. SHOEMAKER: And the court - - - I think the court took overnight to - - - $\!\!\!$

MR. SHOEMAKER: But it sounds like your - - - your rule is basically anytime there's a prior sexual bad act it gets in to show sexual gratification. I don't - - - I share some of the uncertainty, I think, is - - - is being demonstrated by my colleagues' questioning.

MR. SHOEMAKER: Well - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: Where is this line because

Molineux has a line, and I'm not seeing much of a line in - in what you're promoting here as the rule?

MR. SHOEMAKER: Well, the line - - - I mean the line is, first it has to be relevant, and then it has to be more probative than prejudicial. The line as we are looking at it now is did the court abuse its discretion in this particular case in deciding those two factors in favor of the People to use this evidence.

JUDGE RIVERA: Yes. But you're saying it - - - it shows sexual gratification because he's touched her in the past to sexually gratify himself so he's touching her here to sexually gratifying himself. Again, that sounds like propensity. What - - it then sounds like it always gets in.

MR. SHOEMAKER: I - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: It doesn't sound like an exception. It sounds like you've made it the rule.

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MR. SHOEMAKER: Well, I mean, that - - it wouldn't always get in. It would - - it would get in if it were more probative than prejudicial in the eyes of the trial court and if it did show any of the Molineux exceptions.

JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: I'm - - - I'm struggling still with how it's more probative than prejudicial when these are the exact same charges that were presented to the grand jury. And am I correct in reading the record that no true bill was found on these two charges in 2005?

MR. SHOEMAKER: So we don't - - - they weren't asked to indict a sex abuse charge for 2005. You are correct that there was no true bill, but they weren't asked. I don't know if you have that part of the grand jury notes, but they were not asked. They were only asked to indict endangering the welfare, which I think they did but was later dismissed because of the age of the victim, and then the - - - the two charges that are in this indictment.

I would - - - unless there are more questions on Molineux, I'd like to briefly just touch on the general ineffectiveness. I know there was a question about the consistency or inconsistency of the statements. I would

argue they're actually a lot more consistent, the prior statement and the testimony at trial. The prior statement at page 91 of the appendix is that E.V. "didn't see anything specific." At trial, he actually testified at page 249, "I can just see his hand, like, touching her, couldn't specifically see his fingers." So he - - - the same word is used couldn't specifically see where things were.

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And as I said before, defense counsel's strategy was that the victim and her then-boyfriend were locked in - almost as a retaliation they were locked into this testimony because of the assault charges. His strategy was made clear in his opening and his closing, and this was a manager - - matter of strategy, not a matter of ineffective assistance. Thank you.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, counsel.
Mr. Shiffrin.

MR. SHIFFRIN: Very briefly, with respect to the Molineux issue, first of all, People v. Hudy this court held that prior - - - that prior sex acts of a similar nature generally don't come in unless it fits within an exception. But what I was arguing before and argue again, to the extent that the court below might have been correct with respect to this Molineux holding, it would only be correct if the jury was specifically instructed that they

couldn't consider it for purposes of propensity. That was the duty of defense counsel. The respondent's arguments today is that counsel didn't want to emphasize or draw attention to the 2005 charge, which is odd since the majority of counsel's summation dealt with the uncharged 2005 event not the charged 2007 event.

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In any event, having a - - - a judge instruct a jury of limits of the testimony is not - - - is in no way inconsistent with a defense attorney arguing that the - - - the uncharged events didn't occur. There are two ways to benefit. And finally - - - by the way, the confusion is created, as best evidenced by the certificate of conviction, which - - - on page 18 in the record which shows a conviction for a 2005 sex assault. Even the court clerk thought this was case about the 2005 assault, not the 2007 assault.

With resp - - - with respect to the argument that - - - that counsel made he was locked in, again, that was an argument that there was a prior consistent statement, which isn't true. And - - - and it was weaker than the correct argument that when he - - - when he could have and should have had his best chance to explain his behavior, he didn't. And only now years later, which is why - - - in answer to the question that was asked, my client was not charged in 2007 with this crime. It was only in 2009, two

years later, for the first time did this witness ever come forward and make the allegations that he observed that in 2007. That was the - - - and that when was - - - he was indicted two years after that event. There was never a formal complaint or any other charge of a 2007 sex offense because it was insufficient evidence because what he told the police in 2007 was not sufficient to support the charge which is why counsel needed to have the jury learn that. Thank you.

(Court is adjourned)

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CERTIFICATION I, Sara Winkeljohn, certify that the foregoing transcript of proceedings in the Court of Appeals of People v. Richard M. Leonard, No. 19, 20 was prepared using the required transcription equipment and is a true and accurate record of the proceedings. Congleric Good Signature: Agency Name: eScribers Address of Agency: 352 Seventh Avenue Suite 604 New York, NY 10001 Date: February 14, 2017

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