1	COURT OF APPEALS
2	STATE OF NEW YORK
3	
4	CONNAUGHTON,
5	Appellant,
6	-against- No. 46
	CHIPOTLE MEXICAN GRILL, INC.,
7	Respondent.
9	20 Eagle Street
	Albany, New York
10	March 21, 2017 Before:
11	CHIEF JUDGE JANET DIFIORE
12	ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA ASSOCIATE JUDGE SHEILA ABDUS-SALAAM
13	ASSOCIATE JUDGE LESLIE E. STEIN
14	ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE M. FAHEY ASSOCIATE JUDGE ROWAN D. WILSON
15	
16	Appearances:
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	Sara Winkeljohn
2.5	Official Court Transcriber

1 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: The first matter on this 2 afternoon's calendar is appeal number 46, Connaughton v. 3 Chipotle Mexican Grill. 4 Counsel. 5 MR. KAISER: Thank you, Your Honors. 6 afternoon. May it please the court, my name is Dan Kaiser. 7 I represent the plaintiff-appellant Kyle Connaughton in 8 this - - - in this appeal. Mr. Connaughton -9 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Counsel, may I interrupt 10 for a moment? 11 MR. KAISER: Sure. 12 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Would you like some 13 rebuttal time? 14 Two minutes, Your Honor, if I may. MR. KAISER: 15 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Certainly. 16 MR. KAISER: Mr. Connaughton is - - - was -17 JUDGE RIVERA: Counsel, what are - - - what are 18 the damages that are either expressly set out - - -19 MR. KAISER: Cutting to the chase. 2.0 JUDGE RIVERA: - - - in the complaint or 21 inferable from the complaint? 22 MR. KAISER: There are - - in the nature of 23 reliance damages, which are the only category of damages 2.4 that you can get here or in any fraud claim, this is a 25 fraudulent inducement claim, there would be two principle

categories within that larger category of reliance damages, Your Honor. There is the lost business opportunities that he - - he forewent when he relied upon the concealment - - in this case, the fraudulent concealment is the - - - is the nature of the fraud - - and went to work for Chipotle.

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That lost business opportunity was addressed by the First Department's majority decision, and in that decision, the majority said - - and actually, the dissent on this narrow part of the decision agreed - - that lost business opportunity is not in the nature of the kind of damages you can get in a fraud claim. But I think what the court did, Your Honor, is they - - they confused expectation damages with reliance damages. You can have a lost business opportunity damage that is in the nature of a reliance injury or you could have a lost business opportunity that is in the nature of an expectation loss.

JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Were these damages specifically pled, though, as to what - - - what business opportunity was lost?

MR. KAISER: It -- it was, Your Honor. In the complaint -- there is reference in -- in -- in the complaint to two other restaurant organizations that he was dealing with at the same time he was dealing with the Chipotle organization. And he -- and he testifies that

they were well underway, those discussions, and then he forewent those discussions in order to take the Chipotle opportunity.

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JUDGE RIVERA: But - - - but isn't it still speculative? He - - - he doesn't know if he'd actually have ever gotten their interest?

MR. KAISER: Well, I - - - to that, Your Honor, I would say there is - - - one, I - - - I would say no. It - - - it wasn't. I think that if you were - - - if you permitted this case to proceed, I think what the discovery would demonstrate is, in fact, that the - - - that those business opportunities were real, that they would have come to fruition, and he would have been able to pursue them.

But at the point - - -

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: And how would you measure the damages, though? That's - - -

MR. KAISER: Well, if - - - if it's a business opportunity, Your Honor, if that's what we're talking about, then the measure of damages is if, in fact, he turned away from those opportunities and went because of this fraud and went - - -

JUDGE FAHEY: It's the transition from speculative to real, I guess, is - - - is what we're looking at here.

MR. KAISER: Right.

1 JUDGE FAHEY: And - - - and I - - - it's hard for 2 me to identify in the complaint that moment where it 3 actually moves from speculative to real. 4 MR. KAISER: What I would say, Your Honor, to -5 6 JUDGE FAHEY: Well, let me just say this. 7 Oh, I'm sorry. I'm sorry. MR. KAISER: 8 JUDGE FAHEY: It - - - so it's no problem. 9 - - if there's a place that you want us to look, say here's 10 where it does that Judge, tell me where that is. 11 does it transition from speculative to real? 12 MR. KAISER: Well, I - - - I think the answer - -13 - my answer to that, respectfully, Your Honor, would be that the transition would be in the information that would 14 15 be developed in a factual record that is not before this 16 So then the question is - - -17 JUDGE FAHEY: So your answer is it's a motion to 18 dismiss, Judge? 19 It's a motion to dismiss. MR. KAISER: 2.0 JUDGE FAHEY: Right. 21 And that at the point of - - - of a MR. KAISER: 22 pleading, does this plaintiff have to provide those kinds 23 of particulars that would permit a court, any court, to 24 answer the question as to whether - - -25 JUDGE STEIN: But I guess - - -

MR. KAISER: - - - it's speculative.

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JUDGE STEIN: But I guess the question is is unlike, for example, a situation where a person goes from a particular job and then goes to another opportunity and - - and has that lost opportunity, there's something that they can measure what they would have had had they not moved to this new venture. Here, you know, what could he possibly tell, you know, the - - - the jurors or the - - - or the court that would make it a nonspeculative damage award?

MR. KAISER: What - - - what he could tell the court or jury, Your Honor, one day is that - - - I think the name of the - - - one of the entities was Maverick Restaurant Group or - - - or something to that effect that look at, for example, this testimony from Maverick who says, sure, we loved the ramen noodle concept. We were prepared to make a deal with this entr - - - with - - - with Mr. Connaughton, this world-renowned chef, but then he came to us and said he was going the way of Chipotle. That is a tangible injury.

JUDGE RIVERA: Yeah. But even if they said that

- - - but even if they said that, in this case, one of the

defendants, Ells, the CEO, comes forward with an offer and

they negotiate. So even if they said that you got to have

a negotiation. There's still no certainty that there ever

is going to be an agreement that's consummated. A mere interest in the idea, the concept, sounds to me still speculative.

MR. KAISER: Well - - - well, we don't know, Your Honor, because we didn't develop a factual record, so we don't know how far down the road of consummation, as you put it, they were. He could certainly - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: Well, your client knows enough to put something in the amended complaint, right, other than I had a bunch of designs - - -

MR. KAISER: Well, he - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: - - - and I had a concept - - -

MR. KAISER: Sure.

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JUDGE RIVERA: - - - and I was shopping it around.

MR. KAISER: He may have known that, Your Honor. But then the question is at the point of a pleading, a notice pleading, did he have to plead that? There's all sorts of, for example, strategic reasons as his lawyer I may not want to put that in a pleading if I'm operating under the assumption that this is a notice pleading, that there's no particularity requirement at the point of a complaint to set forth all of the information that would - - that would go to whether or not these damages are speculative or not.

JUDGE RIVERA: So - - - so is there any other category of damages or another type of damage other than lost business opportunities?

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MR. KAISER: Well, as the - - - as the dissent did note, which I think is - - - is also in the - - - in the nature of reliance damages, would be damages to his - - - and - - - and was pled, certainly consistent with notice pleading requirements, is damages to his reputation, his professional reputation. He went - - - this was - - - he lives, in his profession, in a - - - in a rarefied space in terms of being a chef.

JUDGE STEIN: Is that based on what might have happened if they had gone forward to it?

MR. KAISER: Well, I think in - - - well, I think both, Your Honor. I think that there is - - - and the dissent noted this, as well, is that he may well have already, at this point of his departure from Chipotle, have already suffered reputational loss for having worked someplace that was destined to fail from the beginning, that here he is, this - - - this really very reputable guy going to introduce this - - - this concept of ramen cuisine to Chipotle, works two years there in this relatively small industry, and suddenly is - - - is left without having accomplished that task.

And - - - and in this small industry, people

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        understanding, potentially, and that ultimately came out,
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        that the - - - the - - - David Chang, a very - - - also
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        very well-known chef was - - - was doing this for Chipotle
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        under a nondisclosure agreement. So here he is effectively
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        having certainly the perception of having stolen this idea
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        and worked on it. I mean there is significant reputational
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        loss - -
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                  JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: I find that - - -
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                  MR. KAISER: - - - that is potentially - - -
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                  JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Counsel, I found - - - I
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        find what you just said very interesting because - - -
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                  MR. KAISER: Oh, I'm sorry, Your Honor.
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                  JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: I know. It's weird.
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                  MR. KAISER: I heard a voice, so I'm looking
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        around.
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                  JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: It's kind of weird, right?
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        Ghost voice. I find that interesting because your client
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        is also, as you pointed out, a very well-known chef, and he
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        apparently didn't know that Ells was working with Chang and
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        Momofuku on this.
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                  MR. KAISER: He didn't.
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                  JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: So how - - -
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                  MR. KAISER: But - - - but then it came out, and
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         - - - and so at some point - - - and - - - and there's
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        been, you know, lost - - -
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1 JUDGE RIVERA: No. But it came out to him. Not 2 publicly. 3 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Yeah. 4 JUDGE RIVERA: I think that's the point, right? 5 MR. KAISER: Well, then, but - - - I mean 6 certainly not in the record or pleadings, but certainly, 7 then, there's been, in - - - in his world and beyond, a 8 fair amount of press on this issue about this - - - this 9 dispute. 10 JUDGE RIVERA: Well, but he filed a complaint, so 11 now you've got that. MR. KAISER: Well, but, you know, there is - - -12 13 there is - - - there is - - -14 JUDGE RIVERA: And he hasn't presented himself in 15 a bad light in the complaint. He certainly presented Ells 16 and Chipotle in a bad light in the complaint. 17 MR. KAISER: No. He didn't present himself. 18 That's true, Your Honor. 19 JUDGE RIVERA: That's true. 2.0 MR. KAISER: But here - - -21 JUDGE RIVERA: He - - - he presents himself as 22 someone who - - -23 MR. KAISER: But - - - but here's - - -24 JUDGE RIVERA: - - - didn't know and was duped. 25 MR. KAISER: Right. But having worked -

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        - - you know, for having worked as long as he did there on
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        this concept that someone else was doing, it - - -
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                  JUDGE RIVERA: But if he's - - - but if he's an
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        at-will - - -
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                  MR. KAISER: And there's prospective loss.
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                  JUDGE RIVERA: Yes. I understand. But let - - -
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        he's an at-will employee.
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                  MR. KAISER: Yeah.
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                  JUDGE RIVERA: So let's say this wasn't the
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        problem. Ells just woke up one morning and said, you know,
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        I've decided I don't want to do this after all. I've - -
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        I've decided it's not a good idea. You're fired. You're
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        fired.
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                  MR. KAISER: No. Then - - - well, he's an
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        employee at will and - - -
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                  JUDGE RIVERA: Right.
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                  MR. KAISER: - - - certainly, he has the right to
        do that.
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                  JUDGE RIVERA: Correct.
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                  MR. KAISER: And we don't challenge - - -
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                  JUDGE RIVERA: That - - - that - - -
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                  MR. KAISER: - - - in this lawsuit his right to
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        do that, and we don't - - -
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                  JUDGE RIVERA: So the - - - all I'm saying is the
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        fact that it - - - they never launched the restaurant, in
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1 and of itself, is not necessarily a reputational hit. 2 MR. KAISER: No. No. Yes. 3 JUDGE RIVERA: Because he's an at-will employee. 4 MR. KAISER: I agree with that. 5 JUDGE RIVERA: And he could have been fired at 6 any time. 7 I agree with that, Your Honor. MR. KAISER: It's 8 not -9 JUDGE RIVERA: And he could have left at any 10 time. 11 I agree with that, Your Honor. MR. KAISER: It's 12 not - - - it's not the - - - it's not the failure to launch 13 the restaurant that is the - - - is the consequence for him 14 and his damages, but having worked - - - and it's not just 15 the reputational loss, we would argue there. And again, 16 there's no record here to know what his reputational loss 17 is. It's just pled. There is, as the dissent also, I 18 think, rightly noted, there is the prospective - - - there 19 is the prospective reputational loss going forward having 2.0 clashed in this way with another well-known chef, perhaps 21 being, you know, accused of stealing his ideas. Which, by 22 the way, would inevitably would have occurred had he 23 continued down this - - - down this road. I mean David

Chang wasn't going to sit idly by and permit this to occur.

So there was - - - there - - - I would say just

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two things on this. I - - - there was reputational loss, but, again, this is at the pleading stage. So to plead the reputational loss without, you know, then having the opportunity to say through discovery and all the - - - all the ways in which plaintiffs, litigants, prove damages, it's premature to stay at the pleading stage it's speculative or premature to say this is - - - we haven't had an opportunity to litigate these issues.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, counsel.

MR. KAISER: Thank you.

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CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Counsel.

MR. MAZZOLA: Good afternoon.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Good afternoon.

MR. MAZZOLA: Mr. Kaiser. May it please the court. In terms of reputationable damages, if my reputation's damaged in the legal community, I know it's damaged. I hear that in the courthouse. I hear it - - -

JUDGE STEIN: Yes. But how - - - how specifically do you have to plead it in the complaint?

MR. MAZZOLA: But I would at least know it was damaged so I could say my reputation has been damaged because of this. My reputation - - - it is only notice pleading, but if you look at his complaint, all the complaint says is would, coulds, shoulds. There's no definitive. I certainly know when my reputation's damaged

because it's damaged.

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JUDGE RIVERA: But isn't it inferable from the complaint he's shopping this around. He ends up in this agreement with Chipotle. They all know he's doing this.

He's - - he's in various press releases. His name is associated with Chipotle. And then - - and then he leaves or he's fired. He's gone. Isn't that a hit to his reputation?

MR. MAZZOLA: Not unless it's - - - well, not necessarily. He - - as Your Honor just pointed out earlier, he could have left for all sorts of reasons. He could have quit. He could have got fired. Mr. Ells could have woken up one day and said I - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: But isn't that the point? It's showing there's some weakness in the concept or there's a weakness in him? Otherwise, if - - if it's such a great concept, it's such a great partnership, as it has gone on for over eighteen months, they would have seen this to fruition.

MR. MAZZOLA: But that comes with every time an employee-employer relationship ends. If I leave my old firm, there could be rumors swirling around. There could be discussions about why I left. But that's not damage to my reputation that I can articulate in a pleading and get past the pleading stage before this court.

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JUDGE WILSON: So, counsel, if he - - - if he pleaded that his reputation was, in fact, hurt that would be sufficient for you?

MR. MAZZOLA: I think if he could articulate how it was hurt and why it was hurt, it would - - - might be sufficient.

JUDGE WILSON: In the complaint?

MR. MAZZOLA: In the complaint. But he can't articulate that. And he says my reputation was damaged. The one person who knows if it's damaged is the person who's pleading it, and he can't say that. And now if we look at the other allegations he talks about, he talks about loss of business opportunity. You know, a loss of business opportunity in and of itself is not damages that are recoverable here in the state of New York. I mean this court's already ruled on it in the Smalley v. Dreyfus case. That was the case involving a number of young employees that were seeking employment at the Dreyfus Fund, and they were told repeatedly that this company is not going to be sold. We're not going to be merged. That went on for four years, and then, when the company was sold, they were all fired. And they said well, hey, you know, we lost this -

JUDGE STEIN: But isn't that different from the - from the damages that are being asserted here where

1 they're - - - they're not saying because it - - - it didn't 2 pan out over here but because I could have done something 3 else? I had other opportunities that were concrete 4 opportunities. I haven't told you what the - - - all the 5 details of them are, but why shouldn't they be able to - -6 - to show that? 7 MR. MAZZOLA: Because - - - well, those are not 8 - those are not recoverable damages in New York State. 9 JUDGE STEIN: Well, what - - -10 MR. MAZZOLA: Any time you - - - I think the - -11 - the - -12 JUDGE STEIN: What about Stewart v. Jackson & 13 Nash, the Second Circuit case? 14 MR. MAZZOLA: That's - - - that's the case with 15 the - - - the young lawyer, I recall. And in that case, we 16 had an affirmative present misrepresentation. At the time 17 they hired that young lawyer, that law firm never had an environmental practice to speak of at all. So - - -18 19 JUDGE STEIN: Right. Well, here we're talking 2.0 about an omission, right? 21 MR. MAZZOLA: Okay. Okay. But so let's use - -22 - let's use that - - - let's use that case. In our case 23 over here, Chipotle was in a position to pursue a ramen 2.4 concept. They were, in fact, pursuing the concept when

they hired Mr. Connaughton and they said go explore this

1 concept. 2 JUDGE STEIN: But you agree that under certain 3 circumstances, an omission can also constitute a fraud - -4 - a fraudulent - - -5 MR. MAZZOLA: It - - - it can under certain 6 circumstances. We don't think those circumstances are 7 here. 8 JUDGE STEIN: But let's - - - let's just assume 9 that they were because right now we're talking about 10 damages. So if they were, if those circumstances were 11 present and there was a fraudulent omission that - - - that 12 induced Mr. Connaughton to forego other business 13 opportunities, why can't he recover for those business 14 opportunities - - -15 MR. MAZZOLA: Aside - - -16 JUDGE STEIN: - - - if he can prove - - - if he 17 can prove them? 18 MR. MAZZOLA: Aside from the fact that he's an 19 employee at will? 2.0 JUDGE STEIN: Yes. 21 MR. MAZZOLA: Okay. 22 JUDGE STEIN: Inclu - - -23 I mean he's an employee at will so MR. MAZZOLA: 2.4 we don't even think he - - - we get there. And even if he

could pursue them, he hasn't articulated them, and he

doesn't seem to have any of them. Because if he had the, he's in the position to plead those. And the mere fact that he gave up another opportunity is not, in and of itself, sufficient. People give up opportunities every day. I leave one firm to join another firm. I give up opportunities. I turn down one case to take another case. We all give up opportunities. But we - - we sell our time. We receive our compensation for it. And in doing that, we may have given up another opportunity. And that's what we have over here. At the end of the - - -

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JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Haven't we already decided, though, counsel, that you can pursue a fraudulent inducement claim even if you are an employee at will? In Smalley, didn't we decide that?

MR. MAZZOLA: You did not - - - in - - - in the Smalley case, that - - - that's true. They could pursue it if they established damages.

JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: That it was different than just being terminated.

MR. MAZZOLA: Well, that - - - that's right. But in the Smalley case, if anyone ever had damages, those guys had damages because they gave up numerous opportunities to work for Dreyfus. And they were misled. They were misled con - - concerning Dreyfus' plans for a merger or sale of the company. I don't remember the details on that. But in

that particular case, that was not sufficient because the court said you - - - the - - - this court said any - - - people eschew opportunities all the time. They choose every day to take one opportunity over another opportunity. And just because you forego - - -

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JUDGE STEIN: The question is is are you induced to - - - to pursue that opportunity by some fraudulent means. That's - - - that's what - - - that's what the difference is. And - - - and why - - - and whether you can recover under those circumstance. Not just any circumstance where you choose among a variety of - - - of options and - - - and you know what there is to know.

MR. MAZZOLA: If - - - I - - - I think what the court - - - I think what the - - - the opinions have said, they say if you are induced to pursue something under fraud, that's one aspect of it. But you don't get any further unless you have damages, and in this case, there just simply aren't any damages. Putting aside the question as to what the circumstances were.

JUDGE STEIN: It seems like we're going in a circle here.

MR. MAZZOLA: Yeah. We - - - we may very well be. We're going back to damages because we don't believe Chipotle or Mr. Ells was - - - fraudulently induced anyone to do anything. But that not - - -

JUDGE STEIN: But if he was and then - - - and then - - - if he could prove that he was damaged, the question is should he have an opportunity to - - -

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MR. MAZZOLA: Well, Your Honor, those are a lot of ifs. I mean if he could prove that, and if he could prove that, well, certainly then. But - - - but in this instance, there are no damages alleged, they're just simply not there. The court's very - - - this court's been very consistent throughout the years. You've got to have an out-of-pocket loss, and nominal damages just don't do it. And in this case, the pleadings all reflect - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: Can you infer that he put money into the negotiations to enter the agreement or to - - - to solicit the business of Ells? Are those damages that he could get?

MR. MAZZOLA: I - - - I think the court allows that you could establish inferred damages or inference of damages.

JUDGE RIVERA: Um-hum.

MR. MAZZOLA: But when you look at the cases that discuss inference of damages, you know, those cases, the damages sort of smack you right in the face. We're talking about the Black v. Chittenden case. That's the bowling alley case. A guy goes off and he buys a bowling alley, and the bowling alley doesn't work. You know, there's

1 something wrong with the alley itself. That's a very 2 simple, clear, obvious inference of damages. 3 JUDGE RIVERA: Um-hum. 4 MR. MAZZOLA: So what did he put into this? 5 Well, we know he hired a lawyer to negotiate it. 6 not an inference of damage. And quite frankly, Your Honor, 7 that cuts against him because he goes in with eyes wide 8 open. He hired his own counsel to negotiate this deal and 9 to - - - and to assist him as to whether or not he should 10 make this decision. So - - -11 JUDGE RIVERA: But he puts in money and time and 12 effort to producing a concept that specific to Chipotle 13 after Ells reaches out to him and says yes, I have an 14 interest. 15 MR. MAZZOLA: But he was getting paid for that. 16 So - - -17 JUDGE RIVERA: He was paid - - - I'm sorry. He's 18 paid before he enters the agreement? Is that what you're 19 saying? 2.0 MR. MAZZOLA: Well, people do it all the time. 21 They - - - they - - -22 JUDGE RIVERA: Well, no. I'm asking you. 23 MR. MAZZOLA: No. No. 2.4 JUDGE RIVERA: You're saying he's paid before he 25 entered the agreement?

1	MR. MAZZOLA: No.
2	JUDGE RIVERA: I don't remember that from the
3	amendment.
4	MR. MAZZOLA: No. He wasn't paid before he
5	entered the agreement. But
6	JUDGE RIVERA: Okay.
7	MR. MAZZOLA: people invest time and energ
8	in all sorts of things. And
9	JUDGE RIVERA: No. But I'm asking you about wha
10	might be inferred from the complaint. I'm just asking you
11	can't you infer that from the complaint?
12	MR. MAZZOLA: I don't think you can infer that.
13	JUDGE RIVERA: Why not?
14	MR. MAZZOLA: Because that's something that
15	everyone does. Everyone puts time and effort into
16	something that they go off and sell. And they go off and
17	
18	JUDGE RIVERA: Are you saying because he would
19	have to do that with anyone else?
20	MR. MAZZOLA: He had to do that with anyone else
21	JUDGE RIVERA: So he he can't get
22	reimbursed or he can't get damages for having put whatever
23	money it took to
24	MR. MAZZOLA: No. No, Your Honor, because
25	JUDGE RIVERA: Excuse me.

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                  MR. MAZZOLA: Okay.
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                  JUDGE RIVERA: To - - - to provide the kind of
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        plan that was designed specific to Chipotle?
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                  MR. MAZZOLA: No. I don't think so.
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                  JUDGE RIVERA: Chipotle, excuse me.
                  MR. MAZZOLA: I don't - - - I don't think so,
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 7
        Your Honor, because all that effort is entirely subsumed in
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        everything he's always going to do. He always does that.
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        And - - -
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                  JUDGE RIVERA: Because he was shopping around.
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                  MR. MAZZOLA: It - - - it was in the price.
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                  JUDGE RIVERA: Because this is the process he was
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        going to - - - through.
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                  MR. MAZZOLA: It was in the price. So he's - - -
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                  JUDGE RIVERA: It's not unique to your client.
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        Is that what you mean?
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                  MR. MAZZOLA: I - - - I think that's one answer,
        but I also think the better or the different answer is that
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        it's - - - it's all entirely subsumed in it. So when he -
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        - - he was paid for his services. He negotiated his
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        salary. He had negotiated the terms with Mr. - - -
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                  JUDGE RIVERA: But isn't that agreement for him
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        joining and then - - -
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                  MR. MAZZOLA: But that's right - - -
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                  JUDGE RIVERA: - - - and then working on the
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2 MR. MAZZOLA: That's right. But when he 3 negotiated that price, presumably, he - - -4 JUDGE RIVERA: I see. 5 MR. MAZZOLA: - - - considered the time and 6 effort he put into developing the concept. 7 JUDGE RIVERA: Why - - - why are you going to 8 presume that? 9 MR. MAZZOLA: Because - - -10 JUDGE RIVERA: Why can't you infer it the other way? It's a motion to dismiss. 11 12 MR. MAZZOLA: I think - - -13 JUDGE RIVERA: It's just on the complaint. 14 MR. MAZZOLA: You - - - you - - - theoretically, 15 you could, but I think the law suggests, I think logic 16 tells you, when - - - when parties negotiate a price, 17 there's a meeting of the minds as to the price, and it 18 includes those efforts that you put into the project as you go off and sell it. 19 2.0 JUDGE WILSON: I want to go back to one thing 21 that you - - - that you responded to Judge Stein when she 22 asked you hypothetically, assume that he was fraudulently 23 induced and you referred to the fact that he's an at-will 2.4 employee. If - - - if his allegation is he would never

have signed the agreement in the first place, why can you

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launch?

1 rely on the fact that the - - - the agreement says he's at 2 will? 3 MR. MAZZOLA: Because, Your Honor, he's - - -4 he's always an at-will employee. 5 JUDGE WILSON: But he was induced to - - - to 6 enter into the agreement by fraud. 7 MR. MAZZOLA: But that doesn't change anything, 8 and we don't agree that he was induced to enter into any 9 agreement. 10 JUDGE WILSON: Well, I understand you don't 11 agree. 12 MR. MAZZOLA: Yeah. 13 JUDGE WILSON: All right. 14 MR. MAZZOLA: We just simply don't agree that. 15 And - - - and even if there was some sort of inducement in 16 it, I think the law's still pretty straightforward in this 17 state that these are at-will employees. And absent - - -18 absent some special obligation or duty on behalf of Mr. 19 Ells, there was no obligation to share any information. 2.0 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, counsel. 21 MR. MAZZOLA: Okay. 22 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Mr. Kaiser. 23 Yes. Very quickly, Your Honor. MR. KAISER: 24 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Yes. 25 MR. KAISER: Counsel made the point that it was

an employee at will. And if you leave a job, any of us who are in jobs and leave, we could suffer - - - suffer reputational loss, and that's the nature of employment.

You go from one place to another, people could - - - that may be true, and we may suffer damages in leaving an employment at will.

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But the question here is is there a carve-out here from that employment at will doctrine because of the fraud alleged? So if, in fact, there is fraud, and if, in fact, it's demonstrated, then in this case, under these circumstances, it would be a category of damages where it wouldn't otherwise be recoverable damages if it was just an employment at will situation. And as far as the - - - I just wanted to very quickly talk about - -

JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Do you agree, counsel, even if this is a fraudulently induced employment that he could bring that claim as long as he does have some damages?

Even if he is an employee at will?

MR. KAISER: Yes. He can bring the claim if he has some damages, which we think he has here. Which leads me to my last, very quick point, which is we had - - - counsel had discussions about what the damages were and - - and Your Honor was asking what can you infer those out- of-pocket expenses and - - and he did - - as he mentions, he had an attorney, he did lots of things. He -

1 - - he specifically tailored this to Chipotle. So there 2 are damages there. 3 But all of this is - - - we're talking about 4 without a record as to what those damages are. Certainly, 5 from a pleading - - - a notice pleadings standard, we will 6 see if this should go forward as to exactly what the nature 7 of those damages was, including some of those out-of-pocket 8 expenses that were tailored to Chipotle to offer this up to 9 Chipotle. 10 JUDGE RIVERA: So you're arguing that's another 11 class of damages? 12 MR. KAISER: Another class. Yes. That's another 13 14 JUDGE RIVERA: What he put into it to, indeed, 15 get Ells to offer him. 16 MR. KAISER: And also, by the way, what he put 17 into some of the other specialized service platforms that he offered to some of these other alternative business 18 19 opportunities that he - - -2.0 JUDGE RIVERA: But - - - but I mean - - -21 MR. KAISER: - - - then had to walk away from. 22 JUDGE RIVERA: Post - - - post-Ells reaching out 23 to him? 2.4 MR. KAISER: Well - - -25 JUDGE RIVERA: He's doing that anyway.

1 MR. KAISER: Well, he's doing that anyway. But 2 he's - - - but then he's walking away from that, right, 3 because of the reliance on the omission. 4 JUDGE STEIN: But are - - - are you saying that 5 all a plaintiff has to do is say I have been damaged, 6 period? 7 MR. KAISER: But he doesn't say that here. No, 8 Your Honor. 9 JUDGE STEIN: Okay. 10 MR. KAISER: But what - - - what he says here, 11 there - - - I - - - I would say the notice pleadings 12 require something more than that. 13 JUDGE STEIN: How much more? Tell us what - -14 what there is more that gets us over that. 15 MR. KAISER: Specifically here - - -16 JUDGE RIVERA: For fraud. 17 MR. KAISER: - - - he identifies - - -18 JUDGE RIVERA: For fraud. 19 MR. KAISER: For fraud. Specifically here, he, 2.0 by name, identified these other business opportunities in 21 the pleadings and talked about the progress of those 22 discussions that he then walked away from to pursue 23 Chipotle. 2.4 JUDGE FAHEY: But see what the problem is, 25 though, it's the actual nature of the damages rather than

1 the identification of possible damages. In the context of 2 a tort, we're always talking actual damages, and it's hard 3 for me to identify those. That's why - - -4 MR. KAISER: Well, the actual damages that are 5 pled, meaning - - - and when I say actual - - -6 JUDGE FAHEY: By actual I mean calculable. 7 MR. KAISER: Calculable damages are the lost business opportunities that are calculable once you have a 8 9 record to calculate them. But they are pled. They are 10 clearly pled in the pleadings, and reputational loss, which 11 is pled. Now, you know, more than that, you know, would we 12 - - - we would contend would be - - - you would be going -13 - - moving from a notice pleading standard on damages to a 14 more particularized pleading standard which we do not 15 believe would be consistent with New York State Law 16 generally on pleading damages beyond, you know, in the 17 context of a fraudulent inducement - - -18 JUDGE RIVERA: So - - - so your position is these 19 other business opportunities, going to do discovery and 2.0 someone from any of these entities going to say yes, we 21 were ready and definitely - - -22 MR. KAISER: Right. 23 JUDGE RIVERA: - - - going to enter an agreement 24

And/or - - - and - -

MR. KAISER:

JUDGE RIVERA: - - - regardless of the terms? 1 2 MR. KAISER: No. And - - - and - - - well, you 3 know, these - - - these entities could come and say, yeah, 4 sure, we had - - -5 JUDGE RIVERA: So it - - - so if the discovery 6 proved that they said, well, we weren't sure, we liked it, 7 we need to talk to him more. MR. KAISER: And if we're - - -8 9 JUDGE RIVERA: Is that enough? 10 MR. KAISER: And if we're back before a court, 11 you know, on a summary judgment motion - - -12 JUDGE RIVERA: No, no. I understand that. 13 MR. KAISER: - - - you know, then maybe he 14 doesn't prove those damages. But we - - - but I - - -15 well, it's beyond the scope of this proceeding. 16 JUDGE RIVERA: Yes. 17 MR. KAISER: But, yes. I think it's certainly a 18 provable category of damages. Whether he proves it or not 19 is - - - is for another day. 20 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, counsel. 21 Thank you. Thank you, Your Honor. MR. KAISER: 22 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: You're welcome. 23 (Court is adjourned) 24

CERTIFICATION I, Sara Winkeljohn, certify that the foregoing transcript of proceedings in the Court of Appeals of Connaughton v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., No. 46 was prepared using the required transcription equipment and is a true and accurate record of the proceedings. Captaria out Signature: Agency Name: eScribers Address of Agency: 352 Seventh Avenue Suite 604 New York, NY 10001 Date: March 24, 2017

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