1	COURT OF APPEALS
2	STATE OF NEW YORK
3	
4	MATTER OF SOARES,
5	Respondent,
6	-against- No. 198
7	HERRICK,
	Appellant.
9	20 Eagle Street Albany, New York 12207 October 16, 2012
10	Before:
11	
12	CHIEF JUDGE JONATHAN LIPPMAN ASSOCIATE JUDGE CARMEN BEAUCHAMP CIPARICK
13	ASSOCIATE JUDGE VICTORIA A. GRAFFEO ASSOCIATE JUDGE SUSAN PHILLIPS READ
14	ASSOCIATE JUDGE ROBERT S. SMITH ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE F. PIGOTT, JR.
15	ASSOCIATE JUDGE THEODORE T. JONES
16	Appearances:
17	JAMES C. KNOX, ESQ.
18	Attorneys for Appellants E. Stewart Jones Law Firm, PLLC
19	The Jones Building 28 Second Street
20	Troy, NY 12180
21	CHRISTOPHER D. HORN, ESQ. ALBANY COUNTY ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY
	Attorneys for Respondent Soares
22	6 Lodge Street Albany, NY 12207
23	
24	
25	Sharona Shapiro Official Court Transcriber

1	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: 198, Soares v.
2	Herrick.
3	Counselor, would you like any rebuttal
4	time?
5	MR. KNOX: Two minutes, please, Your Honor.
6	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Two minutes, sure.
7	Go ahead.
8	MR. KNOX: Good afternoon. James Knox, on
9	behalf of all appellants in this matter.
10	Your Honors, I'd like to begin with what
11	this case is not about, and this case is not about a
12	meritless lawsuit commenced for the purpose of
13	frustrating a prosecution or for the purpose of
14	generating a "Get Out of Jail Free" card, as it has
15	been characterized.
16	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Why don't you start
17	with the writ of prohibition? Why does it lie or not
18	lie?
19	MR. KNOX: It does not lie, Your Honor,
20	because
21	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Why?
22	MR. KNOX: It doesn't lie because none of
23	the things that would cause it to lie in this case
24	are present. We have a judge who acted within the
25	statutorily granted authority in County Law 701. No

1	one's disputing that he didn't have jurisdiction to
2	do what he did. What DA Soares is arguing is that he
3	exceeded
4	JUDGE CIPARICK: Exceeded his jurisdiction?
5	MR. KNOX: Yes, he exceeded his well,
6	I believe that there are
7	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What about the cases
8	that say that it doesn't lie in similar
9	circumstances? What cases do you rely on to say that
10	it doesn't lie?
11	MR. KNOX: We rely on Kavanagh v. Vogt,
12	Your Honor, namely. I think that that's the
13	and State v. King.
14	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What about Schumer
15	and the other case?
16	MR. KNOX: Well, those cases have slight
17	variations that are different. I mean, Schumer v.
18	Hol Schumer/Holtzman saying that article 78 is
19	appropriate, but there you had a DA appointing
20	exercising essentially the same sort of power to
21	appoint a special prosecutor. They don't have that
22	statutory authority, so they were clearly acting in
23	excess of jurisdiction
24	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yeah, but the
25	departments have a different really have a

1	different view on it, you know what I mean, that it's
2	not just a slightly different circumstance. Did the
3	Third Department have a different position from the
4	First and Second on this?
5	MR. KNOX: Heretofore
6	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yes.
7	MR. KNOX: Your Honor. But I think
8	that those decisions in the First and Second
9	Department, if you actually look at
10	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Are colored by
11	different circumstances?
12	JUDGE CIPARICK: So how would
13	MR. KNOX: They are, but they're also very
14	brief. It's hard to really tell exactly what was
15	going on.
16	JUDGE SMITH: And is
17	JUDGE CIPARICK: How would this be
18	reviewable? There'd have to be a conviction and then
19	on review
20	MR. KNOX: Well
21	JUDGE CIPARICK: on appeal from that
22	conviction then this issue could be reviewed?
23	MR. KNOX: Well, Judge, I think that the
24	way the legislature has crafted both the county law
25	and the criminal procedure law is they've foreclosed

1 a review of this. And that's not to say that - - - I 2 mean, there are some times when review is not to be 3 They've rested the discretion - - had. 4 JUDGE SMITH: That's a very - - - I mean I 5 suppose - - - you start out by saying this was not -6 - - and I assume you're right, this was not some meritless case that was just thought up to get the DA 7 8 disqualified. But suppose it were and suppose the 9 judge had bought it, you could make exactly the same 10 jurisdictional argument, couldn't you? 11 MR. KNOX: You could, but the boundaries 12 that have been set by the legislature rest that 13 discretion with the county court - - -14 JUDGE SMITH: So - - -15 MR. KNOX: - - - or Supreme Court judge. 16 JUDGE SMITH: So you not only - - - you're 17 saying not only can you make that argument, that 18 argument should prevail, even in the hypothetical 19 case of a totally spurious lawsuit and the judge is 20 so bewildered by it that he disqualifies the DA? 21 MR. KNOX: It should, unless it was to 22 taint the entire proceedings, which might have been 23 the case had, in this case, leave to re-present then 2.4 not been granted. But here - - -

JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, if you switch Kavanagh

1	v. Vogt around I mean, let's assume that the
2	judge said I'm not going to disqualify the DA even
3	though defense counsel has now joined the DA's
4	office; aren't you just opening up I mean, the
5	argument would then be we now have twelve acquittals
6	because there's a clear conflict of interest and they
7	reversed every single conviction because we couldn't
8	touch the judge who decided that this was not a
9	conflict of interest to have defense counsel join the
10	other team. That would make no sense.
11	MR. KNOX: If Kavanagh v. Vogt had come out
12	the other way, is that what you're saying, Your
13	Honor?
14	JUDGE PIGOTT: Right. Right.
15	MR. KNOX: Well, I agree.
16	JUDGE PIGOTT: If the situation were
17	reversed.
18	JUDGE SMITH: As well, you know, if the
19	- if it were the defendant complaining in Kavanagh v.
20	Vogt rather than the prosecutor. If the DA had been
21	improperly left on the case instead of
22	MR. KNOX: Yes.
23	JUDGE SMITH: left off, that's the
24	question.

MR. KNOX: But that DA could have chosen to

recuse himself in that case had he not been - - -1 2 JUDGE CIPARICK: You concede that there are 3 times when there should be a disqualification, 4 correct? 5 MR. KNOX: Yes, when there should be - - -6 when a DA should be disqualified. 7 JUDGE CIPARICK: Right. 8 MR. KNOX: Absolutely, that's our position. 9 And our position is that there was a conflict of 10 interest here that merited that disqualification and 11 warranted it. JUDGE GRAFFEO: Why is the rule that you're 12 13 proposing here the better way for us to go? I mean, 14 clearly the Appellate Division was concerned that 15 this could lead to gamesmanship in the future. 16 why is - - -17 MR. KNOX: And Your Honor, I think it was 18 that motivating concern that - - -19 JUDGE GRAFFEO: Why is your argument the 20 better argument? 21 MR. KNOX: I think that drove their 22 decision, but I think that it was wrong because - - -23 I think it also relied on the separation-of-powers 2.4 argument that by prohibiting review there's a - - -

the judiciary encroaches upon the domain of the

1 executive and their ability to prosecute cases. 2 the legislature has set the boundaries with County 3 Law 701. They've vested the discretion in when to 4 disqualify a prosecutor with the judge sitting on the 5 case and the - - -6 JUDGE READ: So what, is it up to the judge 7 to determine if there's gamesmanship? 8 MR. KNOX: It is, Your Honor, and I think 9 that the paucity of case law on this demonstrates 10 that the slippery slope argument that they're making 11 that there's going to be an avalanche of these type 12 of lawsuits - - -13 JUDGE SMITH: It doesn't happen every day but it's a big deal when it does happen, isn't it? 14 15 He didn't just disqualify an assistant; he 16 disqualified the whole office. That's a rather major 17 interference with the normal course of law 18 enforcement. 19 MR. KNOX: It is, but the conflict - - -20 the nature of the conflict was such that the entire 21 office and the DA himself and some of his staff were 22 all and are all defendants in the civil lawsuit. 23

25 MR. KNOX: I've provided the court - - -

suit at this point?

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JUDGE CIPARICK: What's the status of that

1	JUDGE CIPARICK: Yeah, I know.
2	MR. KNOX: We've provided the court with a
3	couple of orders recent orders setting it down
4	for trial near the end of February 2013.
5	JUDGE GRAFFEO: What did the Eleventh
6	Circuit do?
7	MR. KNOX: It dismissed some of the
8	it dismissed the federal claims, but dependent
9	JUDGE GRAFFEO: So what's left?
10	JUDGE CIPARICK: State claims?
11	MR. KNOX: State claims
12	JUDGE CIPARICK: Defamation?
13	MR. KNOX: for defamation and
14	injurious falsehood that are going to be heard in the
15	federal court, nonetheless, even though they're state
16	court.
17	JUDGE SMITH: Has there been in the
18	federal court?
19	MR. KNOX: Yes, the middle district.
20	JUDGE SMITH: How come?
21	JUDGE CIPARICK: In Florida.
22	MR. KNOX: In Florida.
23	JUDGE SMITH: Just out of curiosity, how do
24	you get in federal court when you have no federal
25	claims?

1 MR. KNOX: Well, they got into federal 2 court with the federal claims, and then once federal 3 court dismisses the federal claims they have the discretion to maintain jurisdiction over - - -4 5 JUDGE SMITH: Okay. MR. KNOX: - - - the state law claims and 6 7 that is what has happened in this case. 8 JUDGE GRAFFEO: To some extent, I see this 9 as kind of the chicken-and-the-egg dilemma. How do 10 you know if the judge exceeded his or her authority 11 if you don't allow review of whether they exceeded 12 their authority? 13 MR. KNOX: Well, I think that if - - - if 14 what I'm saying is correct and that there is no - - -15 the writ does not lie to review, then you will never 16 know except to the - - -17 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: The court could be 18 acting so outside their purview that there could be 19 review, couldn't it? 20 MR. KNOX: Well, Your Honor, that would be 21 a case where, say, he would disqualify the office and 22 dismiss the indictment without leave to re-present. 23 That would be - - - and then it would trigger - - -2.4 JUDGE SMITH: But would that be in excess

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of his jurisdiction?

MR. KNOX: That would taint the whole 1 2 proceedings and then you could make the argument that 3 that would - - -JUDGE SMITH: Well, I don't - - -4 5 MR. KNOX: - - - exceed his jurisdiction. JUDGE SMITH: I don't see how his 6 7 jurisdiction is any different. I mean, his 8 jurisdiction to deny leave to re-present, that's a 9 discretionary decision. Presumably what would happen 10 in that case is he'd eventually appoint some other DA 11 and that DA could appeal from the denial without 12 leave to re-present. 13 MR. KNOX: Well - - -14 JUDGE SMITH: What's the problem? 15 MR. KNOX: Well, what I'm getting at, Your 16 Honor, is that there are those cases where this court 17 has said that even if the judge is acting within his 18 jurisdiction there may be circumstances that - - -19 JUDGE SMITH: Where he's just gone too far. 20 MR. KNOX: - - - the writ does lie. Yes. 21 JUDGE SMITH: You're saying if there is a 22 "gone too far", this isn't gone too far. 23 MR. KNOX: But jurisdiction is the larger 2.4 question. Then you look to see whether the judge had 25 statutory authority to do what he did, and here he

1 did. The legislature has not seen fit to provide a 2 level of review for it. 3 JUDGE SMITH: I mean, it does. It does - -4 - just intuitively, if you were designing a system, 5 when a judge does something as unusual as this, you would think there ought to be at least one level of 6 7 appellate review. MR. KNOX: But I think that that's a 8 9 question left for the legislature, just as they've 10 determined that there is no appeal by the People when 11 an indictment is dismissed with leave to re-present. CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But isn't there a 12 13 fine line here when you're acknowledging that it can 14 be so out of whack that the whole proceeding is 15 tainted and - - - you know what I'm saying? Where do 16 you draw the line if no one's available to look at 17 what happened, if there's no real appeals process? 18 MR. KNOX: Well, that would be the 19 question, is whether the proceedings have been so tainted - - -20 21 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: It's what Judge 22 Graffeo said, what comes first, you know? 23 MR. KNOX: Well, I think that I don't know 2.4 if we can set a bright line rule in these

circumstances but - - -

1 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Well, how about - - -2 well, what rule should we do? What should our 3 position be? MR. KNOX: Well, I think you've set forth 4 5 the position in your prior cases to say when it taints the whole proceeding such that it imperils the 6 7 fundamental administration of justice. That would be the case if somehow that this ruling by Judge Herrick 8 9 had ended the prosecution, but it didn't end the 10 prosecution; it just vested the authority to prosecute the case with a special prosecutor who is 11 12 not, like DA Soares is, now personally liable to pay 13 the attorney fees - - -14 JUDGE SMITH: And a ruling - - -15 MR. KNOX: - - - to each client - - -16 JUDGE SMITH: - - - ending the prosecution 17 is appealable, right? 18 MR. KNOX: It is. It is. 19 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: All right, counselor, 20 anything else? 21 MR. KNOX: I would like to go a little 22 further, Your Honor - - -CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Sure, go ahead. 23 2.4 MR. KNOX: - - - and mention to you that 25 one of the problems, I think, that demonstrates the

problematic nature of the Third Department's decision is that they chose to vacate the entire order of Judge Herrick. Now, Judge Herrick had already - - - in part of that order he dismissed the indictment with leave to re-present. The People attempted to appeal that dismissal at the Third Department and that appeal was dismissed because, under the CPL, there is no appeal authorized in those circumstances.

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The Third Department has reinstated the indictment by vacating Judge Herrick's entire order, which means that they've allowed the People to achieve an alternate means of collateral review that this court has said many times is simply not prohibited - - - is simply not allowed, is prohibited. And they've achieved a level of appeal that's not allowed in the - - -

JUDGE SMITH: Could we solve that problem by modifying the order to leave the dismissal with leave to re-present in place but to vacate the disqualification?

MR. KNOX: You could solve it that way,
Your Honor, but in doing so you would ignore the time
line with which this case began, which was that at
the time the civil lawsuit was filed the indictment
against my clients had been dismissed without leave

1 to re-present. And at that time an appeal had been 2 noticed but not perfected, and it wasn't until almost 3 a year later that that appeal was actually decided. And in that interim time, as the statute of 4 5 limitations was running out on my clients, they filed their civil lawsuit at a time when no indictment was 6 7 pending against them and leave to re-present had been denied. 8 9 JUDGE SMITH: So you're now making the 10 point that the lawsuit was not gamesmanship; it was a 11 legitimate lawsuit? MR. KNOX: Absolutely, Your Honor. And I 12 13 think that while things have changed in the interim -14 15 JUDGE SMITH: But how can the outcome of 16 this case turn on that? I mean, he can't have 17 jurisdiction to disqualify only for illegitimate 18 lawsuits but not legitimate ones or the other way 19 around. 2.0 MR. KNOX: The basis for him to disqualify 21 is whether he foresees a conflict that is so severe 22 as to create what I call an appearance of impropriety 23 plus: not simply the appearance of impropriety but 2.4 actual conflict of interest - - -

25 | JUDGE SMITH: I guess what I'm saying - - -

1 MR. KNOX: - - - that precludes - - -2 JUDGE SMITH: - - - is aren't you now 3 arguing the merits of Judge Herrick's decision, and isn't that exactly what you're saying we have no 4 5 jurisdiction to look at? MR. KNOX: I think it's a two-fold 6 7 analysis, Your Honor, and I, standing here today, 8 don't know if you will stop and decide that the writ 9 simply didn't lie, or if you'll get to that second 10 question, which is was the merit - - -11 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But let's say the writ does lie. 12 13 MR. KNOX: - - - properly decided? 14 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Let's say the writ 15 does lie. Is there actual prejudice here? 16 MR. KNOX: There is actual prejudice, and I 17 can explain this in the way that I - - -18 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What is it? Why is 19 there actual prejudice? 20 MR. KNOX: Because District Attorney Soares 21 can march down to a conference room in Florida and 22 say I can drop this case, make this prosecution go 23 away, or affect it in a way that's to be favorable to 2.4 you in Albany if you drop the civil lawsuit against

me in Florida or if you forgive my obligation to pay

1 your attorneys' fees for my misconduct during my 2 deposition or I - - -3 JUDGE CIPARICK: If at trial it's found that there is no viable cause of action here, et 4 5 cetera, and your clients lose in the federal case, 6 would that change this at all? 7 MR. KNOX: It changes it, Your Honor, but 8 it doesn't necessarily end it because even if there 9 was a no case or a verdict in favor of District 10 Attorney Soares, one, it could be appealed, but also, 11 his reputation has been affected by the situation, by 12 his conduct - - -13 JUDGE CIPARICK: So because along the way because there have been attorneys' fees charged to 14 15 him and sanctions, et cetera, so there's no way of 16 salvaging this at this point - - -17 MR. KNOX: I don't think so, Your Honor. 18 JUDGE CIPARICK: - - - other than - - -19 MR. KNOX: I don't think so. You can't 20 leave the courthouse with a victory and pick up your 21 reputation at the clerk's office on your way out the 22 door. 23 JUDGE CIPARICK: So this demonstrable 2.4 conflict of interest is there, regardless of the 25 outcome of the civil action?

1 MR. KNOX: Yes, Your Honor. 2 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay. Anything else, 3 sir? 4 JUDGE PIGOTT: Let me take - - -5 JUDGE SMITH: Is the - - -6 JUDGE PIGOTT: Can I take it one step 7 further? I just - - -8 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Judge Pigott then 9 Judge Smith - - - yeah. 10 JUDGE PIGOTT: I just wanted to ask you, 11 let's assume for a minute that we disagree with you 12 and the Albany District Attorney's Office prosecutes 13 your case, I mean, haven't you won? I mean, you now 14 have every argument that you're now making as part of 15 your argument on appeal that this thing was wrong 16 from the beginning, that there was a use of civil 17 testimony in a Florida court as part of a grand jury 18 presentation in which the presenter had a personal 19 stake. You can't lose today. 20 MR. KNOX: That may be correct, Your Honor. 21 JUDGE PIGOTT: Okay. Okay. 22 MR. KNOX: I hope so. 23 JUDGE SMITH: Okay. 2.4 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Judge Smith, want to 25

add anything? No? Okay.

1 Thank you, counselor. 2 MR. KNOX: Thank you. 3 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: You'll have rebuttal. 4 Counsel? 5 JUDGE CIPARICK: Just picking up on what 6 Judge Pigott said, I think it's related to my 7 question of your adversary earlier, assuming in the 8 criminal prosecution that it goes forward, et cetera, 9 and there's a conviction, when they appeal their 10 conviction, can this whole issue be revisited as 11 error by the court, error by the district attorney, 12 prosecutorial misconduct or - - - all these issues 13 can be reviewed, I suppose. 14 MR. HORN: Absolutely, Your Honor, and I 15 believe that's the correct order. 16 JUDGE CIPARICK: After a defendant's 17 conviction, but your claim is that the People have no 18 remedy here - - -MR. HORN: Yes, Your Honor. 19 2.0 JUDGE CIPARICK: - - - to review. 21 MR. HORN: And review after the fact is how 22 it's supposed to actually take place. That way the 23 judiciary gets to do what the judiciary does, which 2.4 is decide whether errors were committed, and we get

to do what we're supposed to do, which is decide who

1	is going to be prosecuted, how they're going to be
2	prosecuted
3	JUDGE SMITH: Well, but if a judge, in the
4	ordinary course are you saying that every
5	disqualification of a district attorney is reviewable
6	before is reviewable by interlocutory appeal or
7	by mandamus?
8	MR. HORN: I believe it is, unless of
9	course we've requested the disqualification, which is
LO	the most common way the disqualification occurs.
L1	JUDGE SMITH: So Kavanagh against Vogt is
L2	just plain wrong?
L3	MR. HORN: Yes, not for that exact reason,
L4	but the way I read Holtzman v. Goldman and Schumer v.
L5	Holtzman, read together, I believe those two cases
L6	indicate that Kavanagh v. Vogt is no longer good law.
L7	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Isn't the
L8	weren't there different circumstance in that case, in
L9	Schumer
20	MR. HORN: In Kavanagh v oh,
21	Schumer?
22	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Isn't it a little
23	different circumstance than you have here?
24	MR. HORN: The circumstances are very
25	different there. They're not as different in People

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CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: I mean, there she actually - - - the DA herself gave the case to somebody else. That's really - - - when we're talking about going beyond the norm, that would seem to be very different than the case here.

MR. HORN: It is very unusual. What was helpful from that case was really the clarification that this court made with regard to Shinkle and Zimmer and how they were being applied by appellate courts, particularly in Kavanagh v. Vogt and then - - and this court affirmed Kavanagh v. Vogt. But in Schumer v. Holtzman, the court clarified that prohibition is a proper remedy to void the improper appointment of a prosecutor when made by a court, and that has been relied on by the Appellate - - -

JUDGE SMITH: Well, an appointment's different from a disqualification, isn't it?

MR. HORN: It is, Your Honor, and actually that's one of my points, is that Section 701 of the County Law does not actually authorize the judiciary to disqualify the district attorney. There's no language - - -

JUDGE PIGOTT: It just says when they're disqualified; it doesn't say who does the

1	disqualification.
2	MR. HORN: Correct, Your Honor, and
3	JUDGE PIGOTT: I was going to say I
4	was going to put
5	JUDGE SMITH: Are you saying that no judge
6	can ever disqualify a DA?
7	MR. HORN: I wouldn't want to use quite so
8	blanket a statement; it could be so egregious at some
9	point that the judge would have to
10	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So then how does the
11	DA get disqualified in the appropriate case, never?
12	MR. HORN: In 99.9
13	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: The governor
14	disqualifies the DA? What's the remedy?
15	MR. HORN: The governor under
16	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: If the DA is out of
17	control, what do you do?
18	MR. HORN: The governor if we're out
19	of control, the governor can actually remove us from
20	office for misconduct.
21	JUDGE SMITH: Well, what if you just had a
22	plain old ordinary conflict of interest, the sort
23	that would disqualify any other lawyer? You're
24	immune?
25	MR. HORN: We're not immune because there's

1	always a remedy for that. If we decide to go ahead -
2	we decide we don't have a conflict, there is no
3	actual prejudice here, we go ahead and we prosecute
4	the case, they make a record, they object to it,
5	you've got a conflict and you ought to recuse
6	yourself, if we then go ahead and we win at trial,
7	just as Judge Pigott was indicating
8	JUDGE SMITH: So then
9	MR. HORN: we just raise that on
10	appeal.
11	JUDGE SMITH: Then it can't move to
12	you can move to disqualify his lawyer, but he can't
13	move to disqualify you?
14	MR. HORN: Well, the difference is that
15	we're a Constitutional officer and we have to be
16	-
17	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So the only remedy is
18	on appeal to challenge your refusal to
19	MR. HORN: We can absolutely
20	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: get off the
21	case.
22	MR. HORN: raise that on appeal under
23	those cir
24	JUDGE SMITH: You would admit that they
25	could disqualify an individual assistant, just not

the whole office? 1 2 MR. HORN: Yes, Your Honor, just because 3 the DA is a Constitutional officer, he's charged with 4 the responsibility for prosecuting all crimes within 5 the county. JUDGE SMITH: So in a community where - - -6 7 I mean if - - - yeah, presumably, if you're in Bronx 8 County and an Assistant DA has a conflict, the judge 9 can disqualify him. But if you're in a county where 10 there's only - - - where the DA - - - maybe there 11 still are some where there's one DA and he doesn't 12 have any assistants and he's got that conflict, it's 13 up to him whether he gets off or stays on? MR. HORN: Yes, Your Honor. 14 15 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Until appeal. 16 MR. HORN: Until appeal, and then you can 17 always raise it and you'll get a new trial, and at 18 that point I would think, obviously, the court would 19 20 JUDGE CIPARICK: Unless the governor sets 21

it and does it. We had that - - - we saw that in the capital punishment cases where the governor disqualified the District Attorney of Bronx County.

MR. HORN: And because he's in the same branch of government, it's undeniable - - -

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JUDGE CIPARICK: I see. 1 2 MR. HORN: - - - that he has the authority 3 to step in and he can - - I mean, for misconduct we 4 can actually be removed from office. The DA himself 5 can be removed from office by the governor under the Constitution. But under 63(2) of the Executive Law, 6 7 for any reason, if he thinks the law is not being 8 applied appropriately or enforced appropriately - - -9 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But if you're a 10 Constitutional officer, the court has no power over 11 you in terms of you doing your job - - -12 MR. HORN: Yes, Your Honor. 13 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - is your 14 position. 15 MR. HORN: The decision whether to go 16 forward and prosecute someone is inherently an 17 executive decision, so that falls within the 18 executive branch. And - - -19 JUDGE PIGOTT: All right. You've sued a 20 judge and you're - - - let's - - - I'm trying to 21 figure out who's going to win here today. So you sue

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Herrick.

MR. HORN: Well, that's a little bit of a

Judge Herrick and you say he can't do this and you

lose. Now you're going down in front of Judge

1 problem. I'd like it to be assigned to a different 2 judge. 3 JUDGE CIPARICK: You should move to 4 disqualify. 5 JUDGE PIGOTT: That was going to be my next question. 6 7 MR. HORN: Yes. JUDGE PIGOTT: You can ask for recusal, but 8 9 it's solely at his discretion. 10 MR. HORN: Correct. JUDGE PIGOTT: And you can't - - - I mean, 11 you can't say, Judge, if you don't recuse yourself 12 13 we're going to appeal. 14 MR. HORN: That is true, but again, 15 deciding whether or not he - - - whether he can be 16 the judge is a judicial function, so I'm okay with 17 that. 18 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So you determine who 19 the DA is; he determines who the judge is. 20 MR. HORN: Exactly. 21 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay. 22 MR. HORN: And the way I would phrase it 23 is, the bigger question here is whether the judicial 2.4 branch of our government can reach into another 25 coordinate, equal branch of government and remove a

Constitutional officer, replace that officer with an attorney of his own choosing and then - - -

JUDGE PIGOTT: But let's assume for a minute - - -

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MR. HORN: - - have that branch of government tell you you have no review of that decision.

JUDGE PIGOTT: Let's assume for a minute that all you say is true, but here's a judge who's watching a clear conflict, a different case than this, but a clear conflict, and he said here is a really, really bad guy, mass murderer or something. Here's a DA that has such conflicts I can't believe it, and if I don't do something about this, this really, really bad guy is going to get acquitted. And so he says I'm disqualifying you and I'm going to appoint somebody that can prosecute this case. You're saying you have absolutely no right to interfere in this justice system and prevent me from making sure my brother-in-law gets off, the mass murderer, because I'm going to put in a bad case and I'm going to let him off and that's too bad, Judge, because no one can appeal from that.

MR. HORN: I'm saying at the very least, statutorily, there's no authority for that. At some

1	point if there are just enormous Constitutional
2	violations going on, could the court's inherent
3	authority kick in? I mean, I leave that possibility
4	open
5	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: How do you know
6	MR. HORN: But certainly if it does
7	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: How do you know that,
8	if it's such an unusual situation or the average
9	situation? I'd assume anything in this area,
10	removing a DA, is relatively unusual. So how do you
11	determine between just unusual and wildly beyond it?
12	MR. HORN: Well, that's what judges do.
13	JUDGE PIGOTT: But suppose you're right
14	_
15	MR. HORN: When it's really severe, judges
16	know that they've got to jump in
17	JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, suppose
18	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But what about if the
19	judge in this case
20	MR. HORN: This is not that case.
21	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: felt it was
22	really severe?
23	MR. HORN: In this case?
24	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yeah.
25	MR HORN: He didn't seem to find it was

1 particularly severe because he applied the wrong 2 standard here. 3 JUDGE PIGOTT: No, but what I'm saying, Mr. 4 Horn, is suppose he has your best interests at heart. 5 He says these guys and gals, whoever, really deserve to be convicted, and this DA is so blind to the fact 6 7 that he's getting sued by these people and it's such 8 a clear conflict, at least an appearance of 9 impropriety, I'm going to do something about it, and 10 he does it. You're saying he's wrong, he can't do 11 it? 12 MR. HORN: I am. I'm leaving the door open 13 to really extreme Constitutional violations - - -14 JUDGE SMITH: Suppose - - -15 MR. HORN: - - - but - - -16 JUDGE SMITH: Would an example of an 17 extreme case be suppose it became known that the DA 18 had a movie deal, a deal to sell the case to the 19 movies, contingent on conviction, could the judge 20 disqualify that DA? 21 MR. HORN: I think that is sufficiently 22 egregious for the judge to - - -23 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So aren't we just 2.4 talking about different in degree though? I mean - -

1	MR. HORN: I think we are talking
2	difference in degree, however, I also think that
3	- I mean, it's not like there's no other options.
4	The court can say that on the record. I mean, if the
5	court becomes aware of a movie deal contingent on
6	conviction, you'd raise that on the record and say
7	are you seriously considering going forward with this
8	case under these circumstances.
9	JUDGE GRAFFEO: But what rationale are you
10	suggesting that we adopt? That the writ doesn't lie
11	in most cases but only in really egregious cases?
12	MR. HORN: I think the writ does lie
13	JUDGE GRAFFEO: It's not
14	MR. HORN: in most cases.
15	JUDGE GRAFFEO: there's no dismissal?
16	MR. HORN: I think the writ lies in almost
17	all cases.
18	JUDGE SMITH: You
19	MR. HORN: There's an occasional circ
20	well, no, I think the writ will still lie and you'll
21	still be able to challenge it, but it's just that
22	-
23	JUDGE SMITH: You want to
24	MR. HORN: the court could jump in
25	and say you're out but you need to give us permission

1	to come up here and challenge it by writ of
2	prohibition.
3	JUDGE SMITH: You want to say
4	MR. HORN: And then everybody's rights
5	_
6	JUDGE SMITH: that would overrule
7	Kavanagh.
8	MR. HORN: Excuse me, Your Honor?
9	JUDGE SMITH: You want to say it would
10	overrule Kavanagh or say it's already been overruled.
11	MR. HORN: Yes, I do, Your Honor. And I
12	really do think the court between Holtzman
13	_
14	JUDGE GRAFFEO: Tell me the
15	MR. HORN: v. Goldman
16	JUDGE GRAFFEO: Tell me the rule that you
17	want us to adopt, just so we're clear.
18	MR. HORN: On Kavanagh v. Vogt and Schumer
19	v. Holtzman?
20	JUDGE GRAFFEO: In this case.
21	MR. HORN: In this case. Because there
22	- where there's an abuse of power that affects the
23	entire proceeding, as distinguished from a procedural
24	error, it's going to be jurisdictional and
25	prohibition should lie. The removal of a duly

elected Constitutional officer is not just a procedural error and it impacts upon the entire proceeding, so prohibition should always lie.

Regardless of whether the courts might jump in in some particular case because they think there's been an egregious violation doesn't really go to whether or not prohibition should lie. Prohibition should always lie because it is jurisdictional because - - -

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CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So your basic position is usually a county court judge cannot remove the DA and you acknowledge that in some circumstances they might - - extreme, whatever you want - - however you want to describe it, but that that can be challenged.

MR. HORN: And I should be allowed to challenge that on prohibition and then everyone's protected and one branch of government is not completely superseding the rights of another branch.

JUDGE PIGOTT: But don't you run into the situation, again, not necessarily this case, where if you lose this, I mean, the judge can say I'm going to dismiss this indictment. Then you have no appeal from that.

MR. HORN: Well, you mean if you send it back with the indictment intact?

JUDGE PIGOTT: Yeah. 1 2 MR. HORN: If he dismisses that indictment 3 without leave to re-present I can appeal, depending 4 on the reason he appeals. 5 JUDGE PIGOTT: He does it again. My point 6 is that the very argument you seem to be making is 7 the one that prevents anybody from reviewing a 8 recusal or anything with respect to the judge's 9 conduct. 10 MR. HORN: We can definitely appeal a dis -11 - - I mean, if he dismisses the indictment without 12 leave to re-present we can definitely appeal him. 13 he gives us leave to re-present then we can certainly re-present it and do it over and over again. And if 14 15 I get sent up to the Appellate Division for a third 16 time on this case I will definitely ask that another 17 judge be assigned if he's just going to constantly dismiss the indictment. 18 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay. Thank - - -19 20 MR. HORN: T - - -21 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Go ahead. 22 MR. HORN: Do I have a couple of minutes? 23 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Sure, you do.

MR. HORN: With regard to whether or not

this lawsuit was tactical or whether this is a

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sincere lawsuit, there are a couple of illustrations
I can give you.

JUDGE SMITH: Does it matter?

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MR. HORN: Well, it matters in the sense because I need to illustrate for the court just how dangerous this precedent really is because in this case, going back to 2007, Judge Herrick had ordered us to turn over the remaining wiretap materials to the criminal defense attorneys; they had asked for those. But they were currently under seal down in Florida with Judge Kest. So at the judge's direction - - - he gave us ten days - - - we went down to Florida and asked that Judge Kest give us permission to release those to the criminal defense attorneys. Well, then the civil attorneys down in Florida walked into Judge Kest and opposed release of those materials so that we could comply with the order of Judge Herrick, thereby disrupting the orderly discovery process.

JUDGE PIGOTT: Sounds like a conflict.

MR. HORN: Sounds like gamesmanship, is what it sounds like.

JUDGE PIGOTT: I'm saying - - -

MR. HORN: We're not conflicted; we're doing what the court told us to do, we're prosecuting

our case - - -

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2 | JUDGE SMITH: But I - - -

MR. HORN: - - - we're doing our job.

appreciate the problem with letting the defendant disqualify the DA just by suing him. Isn't this a little unusual in that you had a federal judge uphold the civil complaint in an opinion that makes it sound as though he doesn't think that it's wholly without merit. I understand that's since been reversed, but at the time Judge Herrick decided, that was the state of play. Was it so unreasonable for him to say if the DA is in this much trouble, maybe I better get somebody else in here?

MR. HORN: I don't know whether you've all had an opportunity to read that decision, but even a cursory reading of that decision made it pretty clear that it wasn't worth the paper it was written on.

JUDGE PIGOTT: Ouch.

MR. HORN: And that - - well, and that's the way it turned out. They were all thrown out.

JUDGE SMITH: I guess I didn't read the - - I mean, I thought the Eleventh Circuit thought he'd
made an error of law but there were a lot of factual
allegations in the complaint that seemed to trouble

even the Eleventh Circuit.

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MR. HORN: They were troubled by it but they didn't rise to the level of satisfying even summary judgment standards.

DUDGE SMITH: I understand that completely, but I guess what I'm saying is, I'm a trial judge, I've got a DA before me who's been sued. I said big deal; people get sued all the time. Then I read an opinion by a federal judge that seems quite critical of the DA. I read an opinion by a federal court of appeals that seems a little bit critical of the DA. Is it such a wild thing to say you know what, it's not so good for this DA to be prosecuting this case?

MR. HORN: Sure, but again, as I've said, I don't believe he's statutorily authorized to make that decision. And as far as the sincerity of this lawsuit, they've never asked for a stay of the civil proceeding. They've invoked the Fifth Amendment to avoid answering questions. If it was a sincere civil lawsuit you would ask for a stay so that the civil litigants didn't have to choose between their Fifth Amendment rights.

JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, that's kind of unfair.

MR. HORN: I assume there's some claim - -

JUDGE PIGOTT: I mean, are you suggesting that people don't have rights under the Fifth

Amendment?

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MR. HORN: I'm saying they do, but if they really were serious about that civil case, they would ask for a stay pending resolution of the criminal case so that they didn't have to waive their Fifth Amendment rights because the criminal case would be done and then they could go forward.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counselor. Thanks, counselor.

MR. HORN: Thank you.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counselor, rebuttal?

MR. KNOX: Thank you, Your Honor. One point I wanted to address was the emphasis that the DA is a Constitutional officer and that that's what makes him immune to disqualification by a judge. But contrasted with the defendant's right to their attorney of their choice, that's also a Constitutional right, and while the DA is conceding that they can move to disqualify a defense attorney, at the same time that doesn't make sense that the defense has to suffer a prosecution by a conflicted district attorney and wait until that prosecution is concluded in order to get review. That type of - - -

1 the reason that the county court judge can - - -2 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Well, he's saying 3 that there are different branches of government, the 4 separation of powers issue - - -5 MR. KNOX: My point - - -6 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - that 7 distinguishes - - - I think that's his argument. 8 MR. KNOX: My response to that, Your Honor, 9 is that we have a system of checks and balances 10 between those different departments of government. 11 And one of the checks is that a trial court judge can 12 remove or disqualify a district attorney when there's 13 a conflict. That's a check that exists for a reason. 14 It's to balance the power of the executive branch. 15 And what they're asking you to do is to eliminate 16 that check out of our statutory system, and I don't 17 think that this court should do that and should 18 uphold Kavanagh v. Vogt. And it applies directly in 19 this case to uphold the decision that Judge Herrick 2.0 made. 21 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So you think it's 22 still good law, Kavanagh? 23 MR. KNOX: I do, Your Honor. I don't see 2.4 how you've overruled that. I don't see the case law

- - the cases that have been discussed don't

1	overrule that. To have a right to prohibition, you
2	have to have a clear, legal right. The fact is there
3	have been six judges, now, that have looked at this.
4	Three judges at the Appellate Division said that the
5	writ lied and there was no conflict. Two judges
6	there and Judge Herrick all felt the other way. They
7	felt the writ doesn't lie, and also well, at
8	least Judge Herrick they all three of those
9	felt there was a conflict that should preclude the
10	District Attorney from prosecuting this case.
11	JUDGE PIGOTT: It's a good thing there's an
12	odd number of us, huh? We'll break the tie.
13	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Thank you both.
14	Appreciate it.
15	(Court is adjourned)
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CERTIFICATION I, Sharona Shapiro, certify that the foregoing transcript of proceedings in the Court of Appeals of MATTER OF SOARES v. HERRICK, No. 198 was prepared using the required transcription equipment and is a true and accurate record of the proceedings. Showing Shaplie Signature: Agency Name: eScribers Address of Agency: 700 West 192nd Street Suite # 607 New York, NY 10040 Date: October 23, 2012