1	COURT OF APPEALS
2	STATE OF NEW YORK
3	ANDINO,
4	Respondent,
5	-against-
6	No. 56
7	Appellant.
9	20 Eagle Street Albany, New Yorl April 24, 2018
11	Before:
12	CHIEF JUDGE JANET DIFIORE ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA
13	ASSOCIATE JUDGE LESLIE E. STEIN ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE M. FAHEY
14	ASSOCIATE JUDGE MICHAEL J. GARCIA ASSOCIATE JUDGE ROWAN D. WILSON
15	ASSOCIATE JUDGE PAUL FEINMAN
16	Appearances:
17	TIMOTHY J. O'SHAUGHNESSY, ESQ.
18	NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY Attorney for Appellant
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20	BRIAN J. SHOOT, ESQ. SULLIVAN PAPAIN BLOCK MCGRATH & CANNAVO P.C.
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23	
24	Sara Winkeljohr
25	Official Court Transcribor



CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: The first matter on this afternoon's calendar is appeal number 56, Andino v. Mills.

Counsel.

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MR. O'SHAUGHNESSY: May it please the court, Tim
O'Shaughnessy from Transit. I'd like to reserve two
minutes for rebuttal.

When a police officer is healthy and retires his or her pension begins the very next day. When the police officer's eligible for ADR benefits, the ADR benefits begin the very next day after the police officer retires, and they continue until the end of the police officer's life, seamlessly without a gap between the years in which the police officer would have been earning salary and the years when the police officer would have been earning retirement benefits.

When CPLR 4545 was extended to public employees in 1984, the assembly committee reports explicitly stated that it contemplated that ADR benefits would be a collateral source. Now plaintiff raises three arguments in opposition. The first is that ADR benefits actually replace ordinary disability retirement benefits or that ADR benefits were intended as a reward for being injured in an accident - - -

JUDGE STEIN: Can I ask about - - - CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: How does that - - - oh,



excuse me.

JUDGE STEIN: Go ahead.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: How does that account for the fact that there's this view that the ADR benefits are intended as a show of gratitude, how does that account for whether or not that can be an offset category to category?

MR. O'SHAUGHNESSY: Well, Your Honor, frankly, we believe that - - - that it's not relevant. What happened in 1940 when the legislature first came up with ADR benefits is that it decided, for reasons that aren't really recorded, that when someone is in - - injured by an accident in the line of the duty they get a three-quarters pension, injured in the line of duty but not by an accident or injured not in the line of duty they'd get a fifty percent pension.

JUDGE STEIN: So what accounts for that twenty-five percent?

JUDGE FAHEY: So the - - - but that isn't entirely accurate. Isn't it - - - I mean you get a fifty percent pension after twenty years, but if they work thirty-seven-and-a-half years they get a higher pension, don't they?

MR. O'SHAUGHNESSY: Well, that's a service pension. That's if they're healthy.

JUDGE FAHEY: That's an ordinary service pension.



1	MR. O'SHAUGHNESSY: Well, we have to be careful.						
2	JUDGE FAHEY: Okay, go ahead.						
3	MR. O'SHAUGHNESSY: Call that a service pension						
4	and then there's an ordinary disability pension						
5	JUDGE FAHEY: Right.						
6	MR. O'SHAUGHNESSY: and accident disabilit						
7	pension. So the						
8	JUDGE FAHEY: But my point is is that is if they						
9	work for their full life in the job they get a seventy-five						
10	percent pension, and they also get a seventy well, i						
11	might might not be seventy-five, but it's around						
12	there, that number. And then if they're injured in the						
13	line of duty they immediately get a seventy-five percent						
14	pension.						
15	MR. O'SHAUGHNESSY: Well, actually the						
16	JUDGE FAHEY: Am I correct about that?						
17	MR. O'SHAUGHNESSY: The service pension I believ						
18	is about fifty percent. It comes after a minimum of twent						
19	years. Ordinary disability						
20	JUDGE FAHEY: Well, does the service pension						
21	- I would disagree with you on it. It is fifty percent						
22	after twenty years. And then if you work I say this						
23	as a son of a policeman who worked thirty-six years and go						
24	something over seventy percent when he retired from the						
25	Buffalo Police Department.						

MR. O'SHAUGHNESSY: That's - - - that's correct.

JUDGE FAHEY: Right.

MR. O'SHAUGHNESSY: Because it's the based on the final-year salary, and the salary continues to go up. So the fact of the matter is the difference between ADR and ORD is meaningless under the Oden and Bryant rule because all you do is you look at the category of the jury's awards and the category of the award - - or of the collateral benefit. In this case - - -

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JUDGE FEINMAN: Well, but what about - - - so at

- - - and correct me if I have this wrong, but at twenty

years, right, if the person had made twenty years they

could retire and continue to get - - - without any sort of

discount on their pension, to - - - to earn outside income.

I mean you have all these police officers who go out and

get second careers, whether as investigators for the Legal

Aid Society or a DA's office, wherever they may go. They

get second careers. How does that factor in here?

MR. O'SHAUGHNESSY: Well, the only way it factors in is that this shows you that the ADR covers both lost earnings and lost pension because once you - - - the individual on ADR retirement passes that twentieth year they also, just like someone with a service pension, have no limit on the outside income they can earn.

JUDGE FEINMAN: So - - - so turning to our



particular individual.

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MR. O'SHAUGHNESSY: Yes.

JUDGE FEINMAN: She goes out. She's not quite at twenty years, right?

MR. O'SHAUGHNESSY: Right.

JUDGE FEINMAN: And should this - - - the way we look at this transform at some point when she does hit twenty years in terms of how - - - $\!\!\!$

MR. O'SHAUGHNESSY: Well, it doesn't.

JUDGE FEINMAN: You know, how does that - - - how does that get calculated in?

MR. O'SHAUGHNESSY: It doesn't because of the terms of an ADR pension and the terms of ADR benefits.

They start and they seamlessly go. They - - - they increase throughout the period the plaintiff was - - - would have been working and into the period to the end of the plaintiff's life and the period when the plaintiff would have been retired. So - - -

JUDGE WILSON: Let me try Judge Feinman's question in a different way. You're - - as I understand it, you're saying that the ADR benefits, let's say after the twentieth year, are compensating for two things, both the pension that's been lost and the earnings that the person could have been made while the person was working in some other employment like a private security guard.



MR. O'SHAUGHNESSY: Well, actually, up until the twentieth year - - -

JUDGE WILSON: No, but I'm asking about after.

MR. O'SHAUGHNESSY: Okay. If I - - - if I - - -

JUDGE WILSON: Go ahead.

MR. O'SHAUGHNESSY: Your - - - your question was that two things happen afterwards, and what my answer is, actually they replace lost earnings before the twentieth year, and they have a cap on outside earnings. And they have the requirement that the disabled officer must come in for a medical exam if - - - if requested. Then once you the twentieth year in which the theoretical police officer stops working, stops earning salary, and starts getting retirement benefits and pension, then the accident disability benefits continue seamlessly and that requirement about the pension and showing up for a medical exam is removed because now we're in the years when the person would have been earning a pension and would not have had a limit on - -

JUDGE FAHEY: But see, the fundamental - -
there's a - - - I think there's a fundamental disconnect.

A pension is not a wage. A pension is an income that you

receive based upon either the - - - your wage plus your

time - - - years of service. That's how a pension is

calculated. Each of the various forms the pensions take,

here there's a form, each of those various four
different terms types, each of those various forms
are all based on some combination of a formula based on
what your wages were and what the time you had in and then
this benefit is given to you. But you're requiring us to
say in your argument that pensions are equivalent to wages
and therefore you would get an offset in both categories.
And I'm having a hard time with that for for me to
see that because you can either have an offset a ful
offset for pensions because they're equivalent and it's in
line with our case law in Oden, or it's equivalent to a
wage and you might be eligible for an offset there. But i
can't be the same thing.
MR. O'SHAUGHNESSY: Well, Your Honor, I disagree

MR. O'SHAUGHNESSY: Well, Your Honor, I disagree that it can't be the same thing.

JUDGE FAHEY: Okay.

MR. O'SHAUGHNESSY: It covers both time periods, and it treats the period where the police officer is earning a salary in one manner and ---

JUDGE FAHEY: You understand what I'm saying, though? At least - - - at least the nature of the argument.

MR. O'SHAUGHNESSY: I do understand.

JUDGE FAHEY: The pension is a benefit that you're given as a result of the time you've put in. I - -



1	- and the the legislature can put any restrictions					
2	they want on it, which they've done with these various					
3	restrictions. It's not the same as a wage which you get					
4	based on whatever on hours that you worked and you're					
5	given compensation immediately for that.					
6	MR. O'SHAUGHNESSY: But every it it					
7	has been it's a very nice benefit, really, that these					
8	police officers get.					
9	JUDGE RIVERA: Yeah, but					
10	MR. O'SHAUGHNESSY: I realize that they are					
11	injured, of course.					
12	JUDGE FAHEY: Yeah, yeah.					
13	MR. O'SHAUGHNESSY: But what it does is it puts					
14	them in					
15	JUDGE RIVERA: Well, they may earn it but they					
16	don't necessarily get it, right? Because if they are found					
17	to be capable and fit to work					
18	MR. O'SHAUGHNESSY: That's right. It it					
19	can be taken away.					
20	JUDGE RIVERA: it will be reduced by the					
21	amount					
22	MR. O'SHAUGHNESSY: It can be taken away.					
23	JUDGE RIVERA: they make or if they don't					
24	what they could have made, correct?					
25	MR. O'SHAUGHNESSY: That's correct. But the					

point - - - the point is that it puts them in a position 1 2 that they would have been had they continued - - -3 JUDGE RIVERA: So not - - - let me just - - -4 just to follow that up, so then it's not in that sense 5 earned and can't be reduced or eliminated for a period of 6 time if they're found to be able to actually work, correct? 7 That's the point of your potential - - -8 MR. O'SHAUGHNESSY: That's correct. 9 JUDGE RIVERA: - - - annual medical exam? 10 MR. O'SHAUGHNESSY: That's correct. 11 correct. Although then they - - - I guess they would go 12 back to work, and they could still qualify for a pension. 13 But that's - - - I think that's a thing that happens - - -14 JUDGE RIVERA: Rarely. 15 MR. O'SHAUGHNESSY: - - - very rare. 16 JUDGE RIVERA: Think so. 17 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, counsel. 18 Counsel. 19 MR. SHOOT: May it please the court, my name is 20 Brian Shoot. I'm here for the plaintiff. The point I 21 think Judge Fahey was making is one that this Court made 22 back in 1946, the Giannettino case that's cited. 23 the one with the - - - the part where I've talked about in 24 our brief is that pensions are presumed to be, in the words



of the Court, "Full and adequate compensation was not

received at the time of the rendition of such services."

The legal presumption is that the pension is a payment for those services that were previously provided. In

Giannettino, the facts were that - - -

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JUDGE RIVERA: But what are we to make of the fact that indeed if they're found able to be employed that it can be reduced and in fact reduced to zero?

MR. SHOOT: I think what it means is, amongst other things, that you certainly don't have - - - use the term match. They are different. They're different in a material sense in two different ways, apart from all the technical differences. They're different in one sense, and that is that with the award, the tort award, the - - - should the plaintiff die next week, next year those payments will continue towards the end of the term to her children. The award for ADR continues for life however long or short that might be, meaning that if she dies before the end of the term her children receive nothing. The other - - -

JUDGE WILSON: Isn't - - - isn't that a function of how you structured the - - - essentially the award that is - - - as I understood the jury award, there were dollar amounts - - - nominal - - - you know, today's dollars, nominal dollar amounts to be awarded right now and the - - - pursuant to some agreement you decided they would be paid

1	over a period of time. Is that
2	MR. SHOOT: No, not quite.
3	JUDGE WILSON: Is that right?
4	MR. SHOOT: The only part the requirement
5	that it be paid over a period of time is CPLR Article
6	50(b).
7	JUDGE FEINMAN: Yeah.
8	MR. SHOOT: The only agreement that was made was
9	in each instance the jury essentially rounded up the amount
10	given by the plaintiff's
11	JUDGE FAHEY: I thought you were talking about
12	the choice that a that a recipient makes on what
13	benefit what type of benefit they receive. So, you
14	know, the benefit can live on after you take a reduced
15	amount, and that applies to ADR.
16	MR. SHOOT: Oh, yes. Yes.
17	JUDGE FAHEY: That's what I thought you were
18	talking about before there.
19	MR. SHOOT: No, yeah. But you're you're
20	right of course, Your Honor, that
21	JUDGE FAHEY: Yeah.
22	MR. SHOOT: under the ADR benefits the
23	- if the person wants a death benefit they can essentially
24	pay for it by taking

JUDGE GARCIA: At a fundamental level, though,

doesn't it seem like if the jury is awarding you lost pension benefits and you're getting a pension something has to be offset there?

MR. SHOOT: Well, I - - - I appreciate but they - - we have a statute that puts the burden on the party seeking - - - seeking the reduction.

JUDGE GARCIA: But they were going to get something. Now they're getting this award. It seems to me the rest is math. The rest is figuring based on the seventy-five percent or what the expectancy was, figuring out the value of what you were going to get versus the value of this award. That's just a calculation to me. But as a fundamental matter, I don't see how you can say an award for lost pension isn't offset by pension benefits.

MR. SHOOT: Two reasons, Your Honor. One is with the statute. I don't mean the legislative history, I mean the statute. The statute - - - it's at page 33 of my brief if you don't have a copy handy. The statute provides that, "In order to find that any future cost or expense will with reasonable certainty be replaced or indemnified by the collateral source, the court must find that the plaintiff is legally entitled to the continued receipt of such collateral source pursuant to a contract or otherwise enforceable agreement."

Here's the part, "Subject only to the continued



payment of a premium and such other financial obligations as may be required by such agreement." You've just heard this is the - - - these payments are subject to a non-financial determinate, i.e. appearing under 13-254(a) of the Administrative Code for that examination. And, yes, Judge Rivera, I - - - to my knowledge, it is rare that a person who been deemed - - - yes, to be honest, in this case she's really disabled. I don't see that happening but nonetheless - - -

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JUDGE STEIN: Well, but if she's - - - but if she's gotten an award for lost earnings and the reason why she's not getting this ADR benefit before her normal retirement eligibility is because she's unable to work and in fact she is able to work and she goes out and she earns money, then why isn't that a double recovery?

MR. SHOOT: Because the statute - - - I didn't write the statute. The statute says - - - and remember it replaces a Common Law rule where there were no deductions. This is the line the legislature has drawn - - - not in the legal history, in the statute itself, "Subject only to the continued payment of a premium and such other financial obligations as may be required by such agreement." Now if the City in its wisdom decided it will not have any requirement, it will rewrite its requirements so as not to impose a non-financial obligation, that would be different.

But there's the statute. That's what it says. If I may in the short time - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: But - - - but in Oden, we made clear that the - - - you're right, this is in derogation of the Common Law. We've said we read it narrowly and strictly and so forth. But Oden made clear that the point is to avoid duplicative remedies, right? That's - - -

MR. SHOOT: The point - - -

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JUDGE RIVERA: That's what you're trying to avoid. So aren't we back to, as Judge Garcia pointed out, she's getting money as a pension and you've got something that seems very obvious on its face that works as at least a pension. Maybe it doesn't work as lost earnings, but it works as a pension. So I'm - - - I'm having difficulty following your argument.

MR. SHOOT: The legislature wanted to end double recoveries but not at any cost. And it clearly drew the line both in terms of the burden of proof that - - - and in terms of the statutory standard that any gray area is not going to be deducted. And if it's sub - - - very simply, if it's subject to a non-financial obligation that - - - the statute says there's no deduction. The - - - if the - - - the legislature could have drafted the statute differently. It could have drawn that line differently, but it didn't.



looking at the cases the statutory framework and - - and the purpose of 4545, the point is she's going to get money upon immediate retirement. This category of retirees get ADR benefits. It's making up for any earnings they would have had but for this injury that induces the disability that then makes them unable to work. If they're able to work that amount of money is reduced, perhaps to zero. And once they hit a particular time frame, which would have been the point in time in service they could get a pension, they get this money. It's not reduced in any shape or form. It sounds very much like a pension then, and I just seem - - I'm having great difficulty getting past that to understand your argument.

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MR. SHOOT: Your Honor, may I suggest - - - in the - - - the short time I have here, you've had two polar positions presented in the briefs. I want to suggest in the short time I have here, I'm not conceding anything, I'm suggesting a mid-ground if you should disagree with me.

JUDGE RIVERA: Okay.

MR. SHOOT: There is a middle ground here. My adversary said something just now that I found somewhat surprising that was not relevant, not relevant supposedly, why the seventy-five percent, not fifty percent, not relevant. I think it's very relevant. You've just had, of

course, a four-three two spirited decisions on the 1 2 intricacies of that added twenty-five percent. 3 it represent? It certainly doesn't represent greater 4 economic loss. The loss is the same regardless of how the 5 injury is sustained. It doesn't represent - - - cannot 6 represent the greater services that is expected from the 7 seventy-five percent ADR officer as opposed to the fifty 8 The only explanation - - - the only explanation 9 that anyone has ever suggested is the explanation that the 10 City itself successfully urged in the Walsh case to this 11 Court, "The rationale for accidental disability - - -12 accidental benefits as opposed to ordinary benefits is that 13 the public owes a greater debt of gratitude to those public 14 servants who suffer death or disabling injuries as a result of performing their duties." 15 16 JUDGE RIVERA: So let's say we agree - - - let's 17 say we agree with you it can still serve as a pension. 18 what do we make of it? Are you saying that you only deduct 19 a certain percentage of the ADR as the offset? 20 MR. SHOOT: What I'm saying is that - - -

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JUDGE RIVERA: Or are you going with the - - -

MR. SHOOT: - - - it's - - - it's simply not what the statute intended and wrong and unfair to take an amount that is given to you as a reward and to now - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: Well, I thought you were arguing



1 that the - - -2 MR. SHOOT: The twenty-five percent. 3 JUDGE RIVERA: Yes. Well, that's what I'm asking 4 you. 5 MR. SHOOT: Yes. 6 JUDGE RIVERA: What do we make of the twenty-7 five? Let's say we agree with you on that. Is your point 8 then that twenty-five percent should not be counted in the 9 offset? 10 MR. SHOOT: Correct. And that the middle ground then, Your Honor, is - - -11 12 JUDGE GARCIA: Wasn't - - - I'm sorry. 13 MR. SHOOT: - - is that the fifty percent, the 14 two-thirds of the seventy-five percent is calculated - - -15 you can't take - - -16 JUDGE GARCIA: Because weren't we struggling in 17 those other cases with the fact that you could have a 18 police officer who was heroically - - - you know, injured 19 in a heroic way saving someone and it's a line of duty 20 fifty percent and an officer who steps on a pothole and 21 gets seventy-five percent? 22 MR. SHOOT: Yes, but, Your Honor, and - - - but I 23 wouldn't suggest that because there's one problem in the 24 law to now magnify it. I can't understand the rationale of



saying we are taking your reward and redistributing it to

2 that money. 3 JUDGE GARCIA: But as I understand it - - -4 MR. SHOOT: If you understand - - -5 JUDGE GARCIA: - - - you're trying to justify 6 this twenty-five percent as some extra thing when I think 7 when we were struggling originally to see the justification 8 for giving an extra twenty-five percent to the person who 9 steps in the pothole and not the person who runs into the 10 burning building. 11 MR. SHOOT: No, I - - - I'm not disagreeing with 12 -- - I think both the majority and dissent said with 13 perhaps different degrees of enthusiasm that this was a 14 matter that the legislature should attend to. I'm not 15 disagreeing. I'm saying that it's fundamentally wrong to 16 simply take the reward from a person who's been injured for 17 her service now give it to the person who injured her. 18 JUDGE RIVERA: So then - - - so then without 19 doing any high-level math please, how does that affect the 20 calculation that - - -21 MR. SHOOT: It's - - -2.2 JUDGE RIVERA: - - - was done here? 23 MR. SHOOT: It's very simple. Their economist 24 said that the total ADR benefits throughout her entire life 25 were 2.554 million dollars.

the person who injured you. That's what we're doing with



JUDGE RIVERA: Okay.

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MR. SHOOT: The set-off - - - if that's the middle line you choose would be they get a settlement of two-thirds of that, fifty percent of - - - and that would be the total. You can't have more than that I would suggest. Two-thirds of the 2.54, which comes out to be approximately 1.7 million dollars, Your Honor.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, counsel.

What about this apportionment argument?

MR. O'SHAUGHNESSY: I'm forced to say there's absolutely no basis in the law for that. First of all, it would be unpreserved. In the Supreme - - - this was not raised in the Appellate Division and in the Supreme Court we had a collateral source hearing. We called an economist. He said I calculate this to be the accident disability retirement benefits, and I say that they should be set off against the jury's awards in this manner. Plaintiff did not call an economist, so there's absolutely no contrary position in the record as to how the - - -

JUDGE FEINMAN: Yeah, but that - - - that's getting into the weeds of - - - of what this particular record is and not really telling us what the rule - - - the general rule should be.

MR. O'SHAUGHNESSY: Well - - -

JUDGE FEINMAN: It may be that they have a



failure of proof when it goes back if it goes back.

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MR. O'SHAUGHNESSY: No, I'm saying it's - - - it's - - - what you just heard is unpreserved. You - - - there - - - you won't find in this record anything about let's just knock a third off of the ADR finding.

Appellate Division's decision to - - - where it says, "The jury's award for future loss of pension benefits, however, should have been offset by the total amount that plaintiff was projected to receive under that disability pension effectively reducing the category damages to zero." Can you just explain that calculation - - -

MR. O'SHAUGHNESSY: Well, that's because the - -

JUDGE RIVERA: - - - to me?

MR. O'SHAUGHNESSY: - - - Appellate Division rejected our argument that the ADR benefits should be applied to the future earnings as well. So that - - - that's why they limit it to that - - - to the future lost pension. And in fact, the ADR benefits are greater than the - - - the future lost pension. The ADR benefits, however, are less, much less, than the combination of the lost earnings and the lost pension. So if the Court agrees with us that ADR benefits should be set off against both we go back to the collateral source hearing.



1	Our economist said what well, I'm just						
2	going to take I figured out actually for past and						
3	future it's 2.8 million of ADR benefits, and since the lo						
4	earnings period comes first I'm going to apply it to lost						
5	earnings. And there's a little bit left, so it wipes out						
6	lost earnings. And there's a little bit left to wipe out						
7	the award for pension. There are many other ways it might						
8	have been done, different economists might have done it,						
9	but that's the way that's the only way it was done						
10	an economist						
11	JUDGE RIVERA: So so						
12	MR. O'SHAUGHNESSY: in this record so						
13	that's the way it should stay.						
14	JUDGE RIVERA: That that's the evidence						
15	you're presenting that it should be first apply it to the						
16	future lost earnings. If there's anything left from the						
17	ADR then you apply it to the pension?						
18	MR. O'SHAUGHNESSY: Yes, because						
19	JUDGE RIVERA: Am I understanding correctly?						
20	MR. O'SHAUGHNESSY: because they are						
21	offsetting that both.						
22	JUDGE RIVERA: Rather than aggregating the futur						
23	lost earnings and the future lost benefits award and then						
24	just subtracting from that the total ADR?						

MR. O'SHAUGHNESSY: Well, it - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: Does it matter? 1 2 MR. O'SHAUGHNESSY: Right, I think in another 3 case another economist might have done that or they might 4 have had an economist from the plaintiff and an economist 5 from the defendant and they might have slugged it out about 6 the proper way to do it. 7 JUDGE RIVERA: I quess this is what I'm not 8 understanding. 9 MR. O'SHAUGHNESSY: But that didn't happen here. 10 JUDGE RIVERA: Aren't we just coming up with a

JUDGE RIVERA: Aren't we just coming up with a rule? You're saying this will vary from economist to economist that's in these collateral source hearing?

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MR. O'SHAUGHNESSY: It may. It may. But no - - no - - neither we nor the plaintiff challenged below the method of setting off the ADR benefits against the jury's awards. So the only questions before this court today are are ADR benefits a collateral source to be set off against lost earnings and are ADR benefits a collateral source to be set off against the lost service pension.

JUDGE RIVERA: So we don't have to do any calculations? We don't have to send it back down to be recalculated?

MR. O'SHAUGHNESSY: Right.

JUDGE RIVERA: I thought that you said that the -



1	MR. O'SHAUGHNESSY: If well, if there's an
2	recalculation necessary. It depends. If the Court agrees
3	with us
4	JUDGE RIVERA: Yes.
5	MR. O'SHAUGHNESSY: that they both offset
6	
7	JUDGE RIVERA: Yes.
8	MR. O'SHAUGHNESSY: then the work has
9	already been done at the collateral source hearing and
10	there's nothing else to do about it.
11	JUDGE RIVERA: As it stands.
12	MR. O'SHAUGHNESSY: Right.
13	JUDGE RIVERA: Because you presented the
14	evidence.
15	MR. O'SHAUGHNESSY: Right.
16	JUDGE RIVERA: And we have the numbers.
17	MR. O'SHAUGHNESSY: Right. Because our economis
18	presented it on the basis that there's a set off for both
19	lost earnings and lost pension.
20	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, counsel.
21	MR. O'SHAUGHNESSY: Thank you.
22	MR. SHOOT: Your Honor, may I just give a record
23	citation?
24	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Yes.
25	MR. SHOOT: 1013.

1	CHIEF	JUDO	GΕ	DIFIORE:	Thank	you
2	(Court	is	ac	djourned)		
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CERTIFICATION I, Sara Winkeljohn, certify that the foregoing transcript of proceedings in the Court of Appeals of Andino v. Mills, No. 56 was prepared using the required transcription equipment and is a true and accurate record of the proceedings. Congleric Good Signature: Agency Name: eScribers Address of Agency: 352 Seventh Avenue Suite 604 New York, NY 10001 April 30, 2018 Date:

