1	COURT OF APPEALS	
2	STATE OF NEW YORK	
3		_
4	THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK,	
5	Respondent,	
6	-against-	NO. 34
7	TERI W.,	
8	Appellant.	
		 20 F1- Church
9 10		20 Eagle Street Albany, New York February 14, 2018
11	Before:	
12	CHIEF JUDGE JANET DIFI ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RI ASSOCIATE JUDGE LESLIE E.	IVERA
13	ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE M. ASSOCIATE JUDGE MICHAEL J.	FAHEY
14	ASSOCIATE JUDGE ROWAN D.	WILSON
15	ASSOCIATE JUDGE PAUL FE	INMAN
16	Appearances:	
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24	Offici	al Court Transcriber
25		



	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: The next appeal on the	
2	calendar is appeal number 34, The People of the State of	
3	New York v. Teri W.	
4	MR. HAUSMAN: Good afternoon, Your Honors.	
5	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Good afternoon, counsel.	
6	MR. HAUSMAN: Lawrence Hausman for the defendant-	
7	appellant Teri W. And I would like to reserve two minutes.	
8	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Of course.	
9	MR. HAUSMAN: Thank you.	
10	So the the question on this appeal is the	
11	period of probation for a youthful offender whose	
12	substituted conviction was for a sex offense. And it's -	
13	- as Your Honors are aware, it's Penal Law 60.02 that	
14	governs youthful offender sentences	
15	JUDGE FEINMAN: So we have Torrez, we have Gray,	
16	and we have Brandon T. So that's the Second, Third, and -	
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18	MR. HAUSMAN: Fourth I mean, excuse me,	
19	First, Second, and Third.	
20	JUDGE FEINMAN: First, Second, and Third	
21	Department. They all agree. So what are we doing here?	
22	MR. HAUSMAN: Well, Your Honor, respectfully,	
23	they got it wrong. And	
24	JUDGE FEINMAN: But the Fourth Department, if	
25	they ever got there, they might have gotten it right?	

MR. HAUSMAN: Well, they - - - I - - - I expect 1 2 they would have. 3 JUDGE STEIN: If - - - if - - - so is there 4 anything in the language of the statute itself that says 5 that we should do the analysis that you say we should do? 6 MR. HAUSMAN: I - - - I think there is, Your 7 Honor. And I think Your Honor's decision, I think, in 8 Jorge D., although ultimately it disagrees on this - - -9 this piece of it in dicta, I think Your Honor's analysis in 10 Jorge D. gets us a long way there. And - - -11 JUDGE STEIN: Right, but in Jorge D. there was -12 - - there was actually a statute that - - - that indicated 13 that a prison term could only be a - - - a determinative -14 - - a determinative term, right, and so that's really - - -15 MR. HAUSMAN: But --16 JUDGE STEIN: - - - what we rested that decision 17 on. 18 MR. HAUSMAN: But I think if you step back a 19 little bit and you look at 60.02 together with 720.20, what 20 Jorge D., I think, recognizes is that you have this term in 21 60.02, "Class E felony offense", and the question is do you 22 mean like a regular Class E felony as opposed to a violent 23 E felony or drug E felony or sex E felony, or do you mean 24 any - - - any E felony?

And I think what 72.20 (sic) does, it says that

that language "Class E felony", 720.20 means it - - - it 1 2 means that it's that regular E felony, the indeterminate E 3 felony, right? 4 JUDGE STEIN: Well, I know. But as I say, there 5 was another statute that seemed to contradict that. And -6 - - and so is there anything here that contradicts that 7 other than - - - well, I don't know. 8 MR. HAUSMAN: Well - - -9 JUDGE STEIN: Is there anything in the statutory 10 literature - - -11 MR. HAUSMAN: - - - so but I don't think that - -12 - I don't think that 720.20 contradicted anything. 13 it informed the definition of Class E felony. And I think 14 Your Honor made the point in Jorge D. that when this all 15 started, when 60.02 was enacted, there was only one scheme. 16 There was a - - - there was a - - - what I'll call a 17 regular felon - - - regular E felony, so not - - - there 18 were no violence determinants, no drug determinants, no sex 19 offense. So clearly, at - - - at its origin, when the 20 21 legislature said E felony in 60.02, they meant a 22 determinant - - - they meant indeterminant terms with 23 maximum of five years' - - -24 JUDGE STEIN: But does that - - -

MR. HAUSMAN: - - - probation.

we have to go - - in order to - - to interpret the statute, we have to go back to the very beginning of time when that statute was originally enacted, or can't we assume that the legislature knows about Torrez and Gray and Brandon T. and how this is being - - being implemented.

And if - - if the courts were getting it wrong, they could do something about it.

MR. HAUSMAN: Well - - - well, an important point on that is that the legislature rarely intervenes over intermediate appellate authority. So - - - so the cases like State Farms and Palladino are cases where this court is considering rethinking an earlier precedent of its own.

So the cases where the legislature has - - - has been - - - has been deemed to have with - - - you know, withheld acting in light of intermediate appellate authority is when there was a special call for the legislature to - - - to overrule some lower intermediate appellate courts, and they've refrained from doing so.

JUDGE WILSON: So let me ask you this. If - - - if the legislature, instead of doing what it did, had increased the penalty for E felonies, you would agree at least in that circumstance, that increased penalty would apply - - or increased probation, let's say, for - - it didn't classify them. It didn't have a special carve-out

for sex offenders, it just said - - -1 2 MR. HAUSMAN: Yes. Then - - -3 JUDGE WILSON: You would agree with that? 4 MR. HAUSMAN: - - - absolutely I would agree. 5 JUDGE WILSON: Okay. 6 MR. HAUSMAN: And so I - - so I think there's a 7 two-step analysis here, which is first what did you mean -8 - - what did the legislature mean by Class E felony. 9 like I - - - like I think Jorge D. does a nice example, there's three reasons why a Class E felony meant a non-10 drug, non-sex, nonviolent felony, and that's: 1) because 11 12 that's how it was at the beginning; and 2) when the 13 legislature started to add all these other kinds of 14 schemes, they didn't do what you would expect them to have 15 done and what they did in other similar language in the 16 statute. They didn't say an E felony of the type that's 17 being substituted. 18 And in fact, you know, when - - - when this very 19 statute has made some other exceptions, they've said things 20 like, for - - - for example, conditional discharges and 2.1 unconditional discharges can apply to certain drug 2.2 sentences. And they say "except when the substituted 23 conviction is" X, Y, and Z.

And so you would expect that when the legislature

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1	JUDGE STEIN: But it also didn't say to an	
2	undesignated or unclassified or whatever E felony. And so	
3	when when it refers you to the the term that's	
4	permitted for an E felony, don't you have to then go to	
5	that statute and say okay, what's permitted for an E	
6	felony, and and what are we dealing with here?	
7	MR. HAUSMAN: Well, one important point is that	
8	the legislature doesn't really use the the term	
9	"undesignated" or "unclassified". And so so when	
10	they say	
11	JUDGE STEIN: Right. Well, they could the	
12	could they they could use language of that	
13	sort.	
14	MR. HAUSMAN: They could. But throughout, even	
15	in the penal law, like Penal Law 70, when they're talking	
16	about non-drug, nonviolent, non-sex felonies, they say an	
17	felony. And so and so I think you're right, in	
18	certain circumstances, maybe an E felony could mean all	
19	types of felonies.	
20	But that's why you have to look at the context,	
21	which is	
22	JUDGE STEIN: Well, talking about context, let m	
23		
24	MR. HAUSMAN: Yeah.	

JUDGE STEIN: $\mbox{---}$ ask you one other question.

If we agree with your interpretation - - -1 2 MR. HAUSMAN: Yeah. 3 JUDGE STEIN: - - - then don't we have this kind 4 of strange result that - - - that a class - - - somebody 5 who is a youthful offender having been convicted of a Class 6 A misdemeanor sex offense, gets a longer term of probation 7 available than a Class - - - than a felony sex offense? 8 MR. HAUSMAN: Assuming you agree with the 9 People's interpretation of that misdemeanor statute. And -- - and I think that you could easily also just say that in 10 2000, when the legislature expanded these probationary 11 12 terms, they weren't thinking about - - - they weren't 13 thinking about the youthful offender sentence. And I think the best evidence of that is that 14 15 although 60.02 had clearly only referred to regular E 16 felonies, they - - - the - - - the language didn't at all -17 - - they didn't introduce any language that tracked that E 18 felony which we - - - as we know, was already completely 19 separated from the level of the substitute conviction. Right? Even if you have a B conviction, you're getting an 20 21 But there's - - - they didn't do anything to connect it 22 back to the type of underlying crime. 23 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: So Mr. Hausman, come along 24 to C.P.L. 65.

MR. HAUSMAN: Yes, Your Honor.

1	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: The probation statute that
2	requires the court to consider the nature and circumstance
3	of the crime the sentencing court. So doesn't that
4	lead us right directly back to the underlying offense here
5	and the nature of that offense?
6	MR. HAUSMAN: The reason I think it doesn't, is
7	because if you start
8	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Does not?
9	MR. HAUSMAN: at the very section of Penal
LO	Law 65 where it talks about criteria, it talks about
11	convictions. And so then later, when, in Section 3 they
L2	talk about a felony sexual assault, I think clearly they'r
L3	talking about a felony sexual assault conviction, whereas
L4	
L5	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Was there no regard for -
6	- I get the conviction piece
L7	MR. HAUSMAN: Right.
L8	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: for the underlying
L9	offense and the facts and circumstances surrounding that?
20	MR. HAUSMAN: Well, Your Honor, I think you're -
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22	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: And the purpose of the
23	probation?
24	MR. HAUSMAN: you're absolutely right that
25	you would look to the underlying circumstances in fixing

the appropriate term of probation within the legal - - - once you decide what that term is and in deciding whether to impose probation or not. But in answering the legal question of whether it's a five-year term of probation or a ten-year term of probation, you have to go back to that question of when the legislature said a Class E felony, did they mean a Class E nonviolent, non-drug, non-sex felony, or did they mean one that just - - or did they mean, well, it depends. But we're not telling you when which - - when each section applies.

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I mean, an important point is that when the legislature - - - can I just finish my - - - I see my time is up.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Yes, you may.

MR. HAUSMAN: When the legislature - - - when the legislature started adding probationary - - - enlarging the probationary terms in 2000, they didn't change the language in 60.02, but so for the People's position to be right, that same language in 60.02 - - - in 60.02, a Class E felony, would have to, under Jorge D., mean a regular class E felony, not a drug E felony or sex E felony, but for - - but for probationary sentences, that very same language which they didn't even change, would all of a sudden have to also mean - - would all of a sudden have to spoosite and would have to mean a sentence based on the

underlying conviction.

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And I think 65 doesn't - - - Penal Law 65 doesn't support that, because it's limited to - - - when it talks about felony sexual assault, there has to be a reference back to the criteria section which deals with convictions.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, counsel.

MR. HAUSMAN: Thank you.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Counsel?

MR. POLLACK: Chief Judge, and may it please the court, Lee Pollack for the People.

The legislative scheme at issue in this case is entirely internally consistent, because 65.00, particularly subsection (3)(d) second - - - last paragraph, explicitly keys the enhanced probationary sentence for a sexual assault - - - for a sexual assailant, to the offense, whereas all of the legislation and all the provisions that we're discussing regarding incarceration, are keyed to someone convicted.

And while 60 - - - 60.02 does - - - does state that a youthful offender conviction substitutes for the felon - - - for the conviction - - - the adjudication substitutes for the felony of conviction, it still clearly and explicitly contemplates that a youthful offender has committed a cognizable offense.

And so the only way to read these two statutes



together is that when - - - as in this case - - - the youthful offender sub - - - has committed the offense that is a sexual assault, the separate and wholly independent definition of that term that appears only in 65.00 - - - and it says in this section this term means an offense, that the only permitted sentence, at that point, is the ten-year sentence of probation for people who have committed that offense.

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JUDGE WILSON: Do you know of anything in the legislative history that would suggest that when the legislature increased the probationary period for sex offenders, it was thinking about the interplay with the youthful offender statute?

MR. POLLACK: There's nothing in the explicit legislative history, but we do have this decade of silence in response to consistent Appellate Division precedent interpreting these statutes in this way, despite the fact that there have been multiple amendments to each and every one of these provisions, in the last ten years, but nothing that changed the outcome in Gray, in - - in Torrez, in Brandon T.

And so - - - and the other piece of - - - the other critical piece of information, I think, is that the statutes here, on their plain language, fit together correctly. They lead to exactly the result we're talking



about, exactly the result that the Appellate Divisions have repeatedly come to that for a sentence of incarceration which are keyed to conviction, a youthful offender doesn't have one.

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Which - - - for sentences of probation which are keyed to the offense, the youthful offender absolutely has one. And it even makes - - - and it makes sense that that would be where the legislature would come out, because the whole point of the legislative - - - the youthful offender scheme, repeatedly throughout all of the evidence, is to avoid the stigma of incarceration. Youthful offender - - - sexual offenders don't end up registering under SORA. It's all about avoiding stigma.

But that's different. And in fact, 65 explains that the purpose of probation is different. It's not stigmatizing. Probationers are not registered in a public - - - you know, you can't look them up online. The purpose of probation is where the defendant is in need of guidance, training, or other assistance, which in this case could be effectively administered through probation, the point of probation is to help people get back on the straight and narrow and stay on the straight and narrow.

JUDGE RIVERA: Well, being on probation can be stigmatizing. The question here is the - - - how much time you spend on probation.



MR. POLLACK: But I think that there's a critical 1 2 issue where probation isn't - - - it's not punitive. It -3 - - it is about - - - it's rehabilitative. And these 4 individuals, the legislature quite reasonably determined, 5 sexual offenders, people who've committed these sexual-6 assault offenses, benefit from additional - - - additional 7 probation. 8 JUDGE RIVERA: Then wouldn't one expect to find 9 language in the statute - - -10 MR. POLLACK: I don't think - - -11 JUDGE RIVERA: - - - so that we wouldn't be here 12 today?

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MR. POLLACK: I - - - I don't think so. I don't think the legislature needed to amend the statute - - - 60 - - - needed amend 60.02, when on its terms, when read in conjunction with 65.00 it gave the right answer, and when read in conjunction with 70.80 on the felony - - - on the incarceratory side, when read with 70.70 and 70.71 on the drug side, it also gave the right answer.

There's no reason for the legislature to engage in additional amendment - - - to expect them to engage in additional amendment when, on a close reading of the plain language of the statute, you get the answer they clearly wanted and the one they have ratified by their silence.

I - - - I do want to briefly - - - if I have a



1 moment - - - speak to one issue that my opponent raised in 2 his reply brief, and I haven't had a chance to speak to 3 before, which is this notion that you end up with a strange 4 result under 65(3)(a)(ii), which is the provision about A-1 5 drug and B second felony offenders - - - offenses. 6 JUDGE FAHEY: You're talking about - - - the 7 argument that's made against them is that an A misdemeanor 8 would be six years' probation where - - - where an 9 unclassified E would be five, and then the response would be, but look at the felonies? Is that what you're talking 10 11 about? 12 MR. POLLACK: No. So at the - - - on the last 13 page of my opponent's reply brief - - -14 JUDGE FAHEY: Um-hum. 15 MR. POLLACK: - - - he makes an argument that the 16 result - - - the - - - the reading - - - the plain language 17 reading can't be correct, because there is this additional 18 provision regarding felony - - - felony probationary 19 sentences for B second felony sex offenders and A-II drug 20 offenders. 2.1 JUDGE FAHEY: Right. 22 MR. POLLACK: Which lead to twenty-five years or 23 lifetime probation. And - - -



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JUDGE FAHEY: Oh, okay. All right.

MR. POLLACK: - - - the response, which we

haven't had a chance to give yet, because it was in our opponent's reply brief, is that actually a youthful offender can't fall under either of those provisions. A youthful offender can't be a second - - - adjudicated second felony offender by definition. They don't have a conviction. And 70.71, which is the statute that's explicitly referenced in - - - and this is 65 - - - 65.00(3)(a)(ii) - - - explicitly references an A felony drug offender as defined in subdivision 70.71. That provision also requires a person to stand convicted of a felony, which we absolutely agree with defendant, youthful offenders don't stand convicted of a felony.

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And so again, the statutes fit together, absolutely seamlessly, no additional - - - no - - - no additional amendment was required.

 $\label{eq:continuous} \mbox{ If the panel has no further questions, we ask }$ that you affirm.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, counsel.

Counsel, Mr. Hausman?

MR. HAUSMAN: Yes, Your Honor. Thank you.

Just going back to Penal Law 65, which I think - - I think where - - - is where a lot of the discussion is
focusing, I think if you go back to 2000 when the
legislature was looking at Penal Law 65 and saying we're
going to increase the adult probationary terms of ten years



or five years, I think it's pretty remarkable to think that this legislature, already knowing that - - - that that language "E felony" from 720.20 was referring to regular E felony sentences, that they would - - - that they would - - - if they thought, oh, let's raise it for youthful offenders, we'll nonetheless leave the youthful offender statute alone, and we also won't mention the word "youthful offender" in Penal Law 65.

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That's a pretty remarkable thing for them to do, to change the youthful offender sentences by both leaving the youthful offender statute unchanged and by being silent about the term "youthful offender" in Penal Law 65.

And then if you also think about the fact - - - if you also think about the fact that that term, "felony sexual assault" in Penal Law 65, as I said, is really defined by crit - - - by section 1 criteria which talks about convictions, and it's - - - it's often the case in other similar statutes - - - for example, in 70.80, the first section talks about felony sexual convictions, right. And then later on, when it says the length of sentence for those convictions, it starts referring to them as felony sexual offenses, and it drops out the word "conviction".

So clearly once you know you're talking about conviction, which you do in Penal Law 65 once you're talking about the criteria, you know, the fact that you



don't continue to repeat the word "conviction" is of no moment. Nonetheless - - - because that felony sexual assault refers back to that term "conviction".

So what you have here is you have a - - - what I think is an implausible supposition, that the legislature in 2000 is changing the probationary term of adult felony convictions, and let's suppose some legislature says, oh, well - - legislator says, all right, let's change the youthful offender sentences too.

which they know has - - - by their other statute, 720.20, really limits E - - E felonies to non-sex, non-drug, nonviolent felonies - - right - - - so they know that; and - - and they know really that felony sexual assault is defined by the term "conviction", and yet they don't say anything about youthful offenders in Penal Law 65, and they don't make any change to - - - to 60.02. I - - I think that's a remarkable inference to draw from the circumstances.

And I think - - - and again, just to emphasize one other point that I made earlier, which is I think that the - - - the sort of the legislature's failure to act in response to intermediate appellate authority, is - - - is really of no moment, because the - - - the authority that's relied on by - - - by my adversary on that point is - - -

is either the Court of Appeals saying yeah, we're not going to overdo our own prior precedent, because the legislature is aware of it, or cases where there was a - - - where there was some intermediate appellate authority, and then there was a specific call to action for the legislature to act in response to those cases, and the legislature chose not to.

Because otherwise, I think it's fairly typical for - - - you know, I mean, when - - - when the legislature, to the extent it's conscious of intermediate appellate authority, will - - - will often wait until it percolates to this court before it - - - before it takes any - - -

JUDGE WILSON: So your answer to - - -

MR. HAUSMAN: - - - corrective action.

JUDGE WILSON: - - Judge Feinman's question about why we're here is so that we can issue a ruling that the legislature can then reverse.

MR. HAUSMAN: Right. And - - - and I - - - and I hope that you'll - - - well, and hopefully they won't reverse it, because hopefully you'll agree that - - - that if they had meant to do what the People suggest they meant to do, they would have done something to - - - to either Penal Law 60.02 or to Penal Law 65 to indicate - - - to give some hint that that's what they meant to do when they

1	enhanced the probationary terms for adult felony
2	convictions.
3	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, counsel.
4	MR. HAUSMAN: Thank you, Your Honor.
5	(Court is adjourned)
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CERTIFICATION I, Penina Wolicki, certify that the foregoing transcript of proceedings in the Court of Appeals of The People of the State of New York v. Teri W., No. 34 was prepared using the required transcription equipment and is a true and accurate record of the proceedings. Penina waich. Signature: Agency Name: eScribers Address of Agency: 352 Seventh Avenue Suite 604 New York, NY 10001 Date: February 19, 2018

