1	COURT OF APPEALS
2	STATE OF NEW YORK
3	PEOPLE,
4	Appellant,
5	-against-
6	No. 6 CASIMIRO REYES,
7	Respondent.
9	20 Eagle Street Albany, New York January 3, 2018
	Before:
11	CHIEF JUDGE JANET DIFIORE
12	ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA ASSOCIATE JUDGE LESLIE E. STEIN
13	ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE M. FAHEY
14	ASSOCIATE JUDGE MICHAEL J. GARCIA ASSOCIATE JUDGE ROWAN D. WILSON
15	ASSOCIATE JUDGE PAUL FEINMAN
16	Appearances:
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24	Sara Winkeljohn
25	Official Court Transcriber



CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Appeal number 6, People of 1 2 the State of New York v. Casimiro Reyes. 3 MR. ROSS: May I request two minutes rebuttal, 4 please? 5 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: How many - - - how much 6 time, sir? 7 MR. ROSS: Two minutes. 8 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Yes, you may. 9 MR. ROSS: Okay. May it please the court, my 10 name is Thomas Ross. I represent the appellant in this 11 case. The evidence here was legally sufficient to prove 12 that the defendant was part of an agreement that shared the 13 intent of his fellow co-conspirators in the gang that the 14 arson at Fifty-seventh Street - - -15 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: So what is the concrete and 16 unambiguous expression of his intent to commit a crime 17 here? 18 MR. ROSS: Well, the evidence showed a sequence 19 of events which targeted Juan Kuang beginning - - - it 20 lasted several days. It started with him retaliating over 21 him just trying to leave the gang and eventually when he 2.2 stabbed someone they were retaliating for that. It was a 23 series of - - - the defendant was involved in every - - -24 JUDGE WILSON: The indictment doesn't charge him

with a series, though. The indictment charges him with a

specific arson on a specific date, right? 1 2 MR. ROSS: It charges him with conspiracy. 3 wasn't charged with the arson itself. 4 JUDGE WILSON: The conspiracy to commit that 5 arson? 6 MR. ROSS: To commit - - - to commit - - - yeah, 7 that's true. But the - - - the one event that is most 8 telling is the fact that there was evidence he was - - -9 participated in the attempted arson on the Eighteenth 10 Avenue Apartment. 11 JUDGE FAHEY: Right, but that's not what the 12 evidence shows on this date. The evidence shows on this 13 date that he was on his way to take revenge against another 14 gang, Patrias I believe they were - - - were called. Isn't 15 that correct?

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MR. ROSS: That's true, but - - -

JUDGE FAHEY: All right. So - - - so that being the case then I guess the - - - it seemed that he may have been involved in a conspiracy to commit an assault, but I guess I'm finding a hard time to point in the record where you can say that there was an agreement by him to - - - to commit an arson or to participate or engage in an arson that's concrete and unambiguous.

MR. ROSS: Well, it - - - there's no one particular - - -



JUDGE FAHEY: Well, how about this. I understand that because clearly there's a criminal conspiracy. People aren't signing a contract and agreeing to go out and commit a crime. We understand that, but I - - you need to point in the record to a particular spot and say where it is or say - - you argue that there are a series of five points, I believe, right?

MR. ROSS: Yes.

JUDGE FAHEY: Okay. They - - - they all seem to involve presence, not agreement, except for the false confession. Would you agree with that?

MR. ROSS: Well, not just the - - - the false confession but his earlier confession where he says I'm a part of something but I didn't do it. I mean he's basically saying I'm a part of this agreement but I didn't do the - - -

JUDGE WILSON: Well, maybe he's saying I'm part of the gang but I didn't do it? And this is - - - remember, this is the police - - - this isn't his word.

This is the police officer saying he said something like I'm a part of it but I didn't do it.

MR. ROSS: Well, the police officer was saying I want to speak to an incident that happened the night before. And then the defendant eventually said, well, I was a part of something but I didn't do it. And - - -



1	JUDGE RIVERA: And in his written confession,
2	isn't there a line about him not agreeing with what the
3	head of the gang hoped would be the consequences of this
4	attack?
5	MR. ROSS: It was not that he didn't agree. It's
6	just that
7	JUDGE RIVERA: Well, at least there's some
8	ambiguity. I mean you have language more than once that
9	the man is saying I don't agree.
10	MR. ROSS: It's not that he didn't agree. He
11	just said he was sorry that it happened.
12	JUDGE FAHEY: So so let me ask this. If -
13	if you don't have the confession, is your proof legally
14	sufficient?
15	MR. ROSS: Yes, it still
16	JUDGE FAHEY: Okay. So let's say the confession
17	is taken out, you only have four points you rely on. How
18	so is your proof legally sufficient then?
19	MR. ROSS: Well, first, we have to look at the
20	context of the fact that he belongs to this gang, and there
21	are just certain assumptions that don't need to be spoken
22	of.
23	JUDGE STEIN: So so are one of them that if
24	you are part of a gang then then you essentially
25	agree with anything that any members of that gang might do?

1	MR. ROSS: Under certain circumstances that migh
2	well be. That's that's not what we have here. We
3	have like I say, we have more. But just the
4	membership of the gang. It it was explained that,
5	you know, if you agree to follow the orders of the Crowns.
6	That's just understood. It's also understood
7	JUDGE STEIN: But then if if that's true i
8	there any indication that he was ordered to do this?
9	MR. ROSS: Not the Fifty-seventh Street. He
10	wasn't ordered to do that.
11	JUDGE FAHEY: Well, that's the one we're talking
12	about, though.
13	MR. ROSS: But his presence at the Prospect Park
14	meeting just was not superfluous. There was a purpose to
15	that presence.
16	JUDGE FAHEY: So is everyone who was present at
17	that meeting part of the Fifty-seventh Street arson
18	conspiracy?
19	MR. ROSS: Yes, everyone was charged with that
20	conspiracy. I mean you don't have to
21	JUDGE STEIN: But doesn't that contradict federa
22	law?
23	MR. ROSS: No well
24	JUDGE STEIN: I mean not federal law but federal
25	case law?

1	MR. ROSS: No, because all you need to be
2	convicted of conspiracy is to be part of the agreement and
3	then have an overt act in furtherance of it. That
4	that overt act doesn't have to be the crime itself. It
5	doesn't have to be
6	JUDGE STEIN: Well
7	MR. ROSS: the attempt of the crime.
8	JUDGE STEIN: But what I what I'm having
9	trouble seeing is what where is the evidence of
10	agreement beyond mere presence? Doesn't there have to be
11	something, some verbal or other manifestation that you
12	agree with what is being discussed?
13	MR. ROSS: Not not under the circumstances
14	here because it's just understood that
15	JUDGE RIVERA: Well, generally, is that the rule
16	MR. ROSS: Generally, not necessarily because,
17	yes, it's better
18	JUDGE FAHEY: Well, I think part of the problem
19	here is
20	MR. ROSS: if it's overt and say I agree
21	but
22	JUDGE FAHEY: Hold on hold on a second.
23	Part of the problem is perhaps we need to clarify what
24	constitutes agreement in New York. There is a Second
25	Circuit case that that's been relied on, U.S. v.

1	Ceballos. Are you familiar with that?
2	MR. ROSS: Yes.
3	JUDGE FAHEY: Okay. And some of the language
4	there says that: "You need more than mere knowledge,
5	approval, or acquiescence. There need there needs to
6	be a need to make an affirmative attempt to further its
7	purpose" the conspiracy's purpose. So if that was
8	the New York standard, would you say that you met it in
9	this instance?
10	MR. ROSS: In this instance, yes, because it is
11	participate even though the Eighteenth Avenue attacks
12	that he took part in weren't part of the overt acts for the
13	Fifty-seventh Street, it still showed his intent, that he
14	shared the intent of this co-conspiracy.
15	JUDGE WILSON: Do you do you think there
16	were two Eighteenth Street attacks? Is that right?
17	MR. ROSS: Yes, it was somewhat ambiguous but
18	_
19	JUDGE WILSON: And you think there's evidence
20	that he participated in both of those directly? He was
21	there for both of them?
22	MR. ROSS: Yes, he confessed as part of his
23	confession he was part of a rock-throwing where they
24	threw rocks and bottles and

JUDGE WILSON: The first one, right?

MR. ROSS: The first one. 1 2 JUDGE WILSON: It's the rock-throwing bottle. 3 MR. ROSS: And then there was evidence from Juan 4 Burkette's statement at the pizzeria that was testified to 5 by Jose Brand that defendant was one of the five people who 6 was in the group that threw two Molotov cocktails at the 7 Eighteenth Avenue apartment. So the fact that, you know, 8 he's willing to take part in this Eighteenth Avenue - - -9 JUDGE STEIN: He was acquitted of - - - of 10 charges with regard to that event, wasn't he? 11 MR. ROSS: That - - - well, that was just for 12 criminal mischief. Yes. 13 JUDGE RIVERA: So - - - because, counsel, let me 14 ask you, given - - - given gang culture and the gang 15 hierarchy with respect to this gang, but it seems to be 16 similar to gang hierarchy. 17 MR. ROSS: Yes. 18 JUDGE RIVERA: But anyway, with respect to this 19 gang, when - - - when would someone who's not part of that 20 top branch, the decision-making branch of - - - of the gang 21 be a co-conspirator - - -22 MR. ROSS: Well, under - - -23 JUDGE RIVERA: When they - - right, they attend 24 a meeting. They don't speak. They're not asked a 25 When - - - when do they, because of the

membership in the gang, from - - - from the People's 1 2 position, when are they co-conspirators in the actions of 3 the gang? 4 MR. ROSS: Actually, when they - - -5 JUDGE RIVERA: If they are not the actor. 6 understand someone else is the actor. 7 MR. ROSS: Right. When they find out about that 8 this gang is going to commit this - - - this - - - the 9 object crime and they - - -10 JUDGE RIVERA: So how is that not, as Judge 11 Fahey's already pointed out, mere acquiescence which isn't 12 enough, at least in the Second Circuit? 13 MR. ROSS: Because, like I say, his - - - his 14 15 16 wanted done they could have just gathered the four people 17 18

presence at the Prospect Park meeting was not superfluous. If it was just some private thing from the - - - the Crowns they assigned to the mission and told them. But by having everybody in the gang there in the - - - at the park, they could show that this is not just their private little thing. This is a whole gang. This is on behalf of the gang. This is something that we all agreed to.

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JUDGE FAHEY: Well, I - - - I had thought that they were - - - the people that were ordered to do it were ordered to do it as a punishment for not having fulfilled the responsibilities to the gang membership and the other



members of the gang were not ordered or required to do that.

MR. ROSS: Yeah, but that just shows that those who - - even though it was punishment for them for

it.

Meeting, they had no idea what the meeting was going to be about, and - - and all of a sudden they're talking about some - - some arson that - - - that they're going to do, the only way to avoid being a co-conspirator would be to say - - raise your hand and say I don't agree or get up and leave? Is that - - -

neglecting their gang duties they still went ahead and did

MR. ROSS: Under these circumstances yes, because it's just understood that when somebody in this gang is attacked or someone just simply tries to leave as Juan Kuang did, there's going to be retaliation against that person. They don't have to - - - they have to talk about that. That's just understood.

JUDGE STEIN: But it seems to me that - - - MR. ROSS: That's part of the culture.

JUDGE STEIN: - - - the evidence, in this case, shows that - - - that this guy was a friend of his. That he - - - that there was no indication that he would have wanted to - - - I mean he actually went against the gang in



some ways by not telling them certain things he knew about 1 2 his friend and so on and so forth. So, you know, I - - -3 MR. ROSS: But at the latest by the time of the 4 stabbing, the - - - the defendant had a choice. You know, 5 either I'm loyal to my friend or I'm loyal to the gang. He 6 chose loyalty to the gang, and furthermore - - -7 JUDGE GARCIA: Chief, may I ask - - -8 JUDGE RIVERA: Well, he stayed in the gang. 9 is that loyalty an agreement to this particular act? 10 MR. ROSS: The - - - well, the fact that he - - he tried to commit the act itself just the day - - - the 11 12 night before by - - - by throwing Molotov cocktails and 13 being part of the - - -14 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Judge Garcia. 15 What - - - what's your evidence of JUDGE GARCIA: 16 his participation in the earlier attempt at arson? 17 was the evidence at trial on that? 18 MR. ROSS: The - - - it was the statement that 19 Juan Burkette made at the pizzeria that was testified to by 20 Jose Brand. He said that - - - that defendant was one of 21 five people who threw Molotov cocktails but that failed 22 because they didn't break the windows. 23 corroborated by - - - by Soria's testimony that when he was 24 going to the Prospect Park meeting Desmond Blount related



to him the Eighteenth Avenue arson and Blount told him that

there were five people involved. He didn't mention the defendant. He couldn't remember who that fifth person was. But the four people that he did remember were the four people that Burkette had remembered. So in a sense, Soria's testimony corroborated Brand's testimony.

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JUDGE GARCIA: I - - - I see. And so going back to something Judge Stein said on that conduct underlying that earlier attempt, I - - - it's somewhat confusing.

One, I don't think the charging document is in this record that you provided. Is that right?

MR. ROSS: No, we didn't - - -

JUDGE GARCIA: But it seems at some part in the transcript that information about the earlier arson comes in only as background or as proof of this agreement. But as Judge Stein says, it seems that there's a criminal mischief and misdemeanor charge that actually charges that. So it seems inconsistent in the record to me.

MR. ROSS: Well, it was -- it was based largely on his -- his statement there. The --

JUDGE GARCIA: Was it charged or was it not charged? Because somewhere in the record the prosecutor and the defense lawyer are arguing and it's the defense lawyer for Mr. Reyes about this coming in and it's only coming in for this limited purpose. But it seems like it was actually also charged as a basis for a criminal

1	mischief count.
2	MR. ROSS: No, well, the criminal mischief, there
3	were two separate attacks on the Eighteenth Avenue. One
4	was the the attempt at arson. The other was when
5	defendant confessed to throwing rocks and bottles and
6	JUDGE GARCIA: I see.
7	MR. ROSS: And and there was evidence that
8	there were two. When Lawrence Tranese, the owner of the
9	Eighteenth Avenue, he when he found
10	JUDGE GARCIA: So the criminal mischief count is
11	based on the rocks and bottles and not on the attempted
12	arson?
13	MR. ROSS: Right.
14	JUDGE GARCIA: Okay.
15	MR. ROSS: The the attempted arson came in
16	and the the judge charged the jury that that was to
17	be considered only to show that defendant and the co-
18	defendants' intent for the Fifty-seventh Street arson and
19	to reflect their agreement.
20	JUDGE GARCIA: Understood.
21	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, counsel.
22	MR. ROSS: Thank you.
23	MR. FALLEK: Good morning, Your Honors. My name
24	is Allen Fallek. I represent respondent.
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CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Counsel, why isn't

1	membership in a gang, knowledge of the crime, presence at
2	the I think it's Prospect Park meeting, connection to
3	the prior arson attempt at the Eighteenth Avenue location,
4	and and the defendant's statements to the police, why
5	isn't that enough to get us there?
6	MR. FALLEK: That's not enough because none of
7	that evidence, separate or apart, actually connects
8	respondent in this case to the agreement for which he is
9	charged. The
10	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: What would it take to
11	connect him to that agreement if not all of those disparate
12	things?
13	MR. FALLEK: You know, that that's a
14	difficult question. Actually, the control of the of
15	the gang by by the leaders is so all-controlling.
16	They they plan, they're the ones who select who's
17	going to be part of it. Nobody's allowed to speak about
18	it.
19	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: But they need soldiers
20	_
21	MR. FALLEK: And in fact ultimately
22	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: to execute the plan,
23	right?
24	MR. FALLEK: They they select who's going
25	to yeah, right. And they actually exclude all the

others so it's hard to even imagine what someone would have 1 2 to do. They're almost precluded from being - - -3 JUDGE WILSON: Let's say he - - - let's say the 4 defendant showed up at the Prospect Park meeting, which he 5 did, and all the gang members put their names into a hat 6 understanding that whoever's name was drawn out was going 7 to go commit the arson. Would that be sufficient? 8 MR. FALLEK: If - - - if his name was among 9 those? 10 JUDGE WILSON: If he - - - yeah, if he - - - if 11 they - - -12 MR. FALLEK: If he was unfortunate enough to be 13 selected - - -JUDGE FEINMAN: I don't think that's what he's 14 15 asking. 16 JUDGE WILSON: It's not whether he's selected. 17 It's - - - it's whether he sat there while his name was put 18 into a hat knowing that if it's drawn he was going to go 19 commit this arson. Is that sufficient to show agreement? 20 MR. FALLEK: I don't think so. The reason being 21 that, yes, by - - - by being a member he agrees - - - so he 22 agrees to - - - to follow orders so he would have to comply 23 with - - - with that method and he would have to ultimately 24 comply with the order. And by unfortunately being selected 25 and - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: Is that because you think he could change his mind?

MR. FALLEK: Well - - 
JUDGE RIVERA: Is that because you're saying even

JUDGE RIVERA: Is that because you're saying even if he's picked he could change his - - - change his mind or he put his name in so he didn't get beat that day and maybe he won't get picked and he's hoping for the odds to work in his favor? Is that the argument you're making?

MR. FALLEK: No, my - - - my argument is that if he were selected either by that means or deliberately selected he would probably, unfortunately, like these participants who were selected, be - - - be forced at the risk of maybe just having to leave the gang or just getting up and facing the consequence for leaving, they'd be forced to be - - - commit the arson and thereby being involved in the planning as these selected co-conspirators were at the pizzeria. They sat down and unless one of them got up - -

JUDGE RIVERA: You lose some standing of forced, right, because he has agency, he has volition. He can choose not to be in the gang, choose not to show up, choose to walk away. At his peril, I understand that, but nevertheless, he has some choice.

JUDGE FAHEY: Well, some. It seems to me, listen, part - - being part of an organization, I'm part



of the Catholic Church, part of the Democratic Party, I'm a part of the Ancient Order of Hibernians. I - - - I don't agree with every principle or every action that any of those groups take. And whether it's a criminal conspiracy or not, the part - - being part of an organization really can't be enough. I go to mass. That doesn't mean I - - - I subscribe to every - - everything that Pope Francis says. Presence isn't - - isn't clearly enough. It would take an agreement with a specific act, and I think we should focus in a little bit on the Eighteenth Street attack. I think that you need to focus in there because that seems to be - - - now the - - - the - - -

MR. FALLEK: Yeah - - -

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JUDGE FAHEY: Let me finish. The People say that this criminal mischief acquittal does not involve an attempted arson, only involving - - - or only involves throwing of rocks and bottles. I thought that was all one event that took place simultaneously. Some people throw rocks and bottles, some people attempt to commit an arson. What do you say about it?

MR. FALLEK: Apparently - - - apparently based on respondent's statement, the videotaped statement, some other gang members, not - - - he didn't include himself, went back as part of that mission - - - the same mission and threw Molotov cocktails. So - - -



JUDGE WILSON: On a different day?

MR. FALLEK: On a - - it's not as clear, yes.

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I think he said a day or two later, right. I think the
important - - -

JUDGE FAHEY: What is the - - - what is the acquittal on the criminal mischief charge - - -  $\phantom{a}$ 

MR. FALLEK: Yeah - - -

JUDGE FAHEY: - - - an acquittal for?

MR. FALLEK: Well, the - - - okay, the acquittal on the - - - on the mischief charge is sort of irrelevant in that the Molineux - - - according to the Court's Molineux determination and its charge, it was the - - - the evidence of his purported involvement in the Molotov cocktail-throwing that made that an arson. I would preface that by adding our - - our position is that the evidence is not reliable enough to show that he was actually involved in that. And that - - and that's even in the light most favorable to - - -

JUDGE GARCIA: Counsel, I guess just to go to

Judge Fahey's point, there's some confusion in the record,

without the charging document, whether the criminal

mischief count included the earlier attempted arson, and it

seems that the People's point is it did not. It was rocks

and bottle throwing. And it seems from the transcript

there is argument by defense counsel and the prosecutor



that the evidence of the earlier arson was only coming in to show agreement or other types of things.

MR. FALLEK: Yeah.

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JUDGE GARCIA: Do you agree with that or not?

MR. FALLEK: I - - I actually - - - the

evidence is not clear enough. You're - - - you're correct

that the indictment actually - - - which doesn't charge

appellant in that arson, that separate arson, actually

charged - - - charges that that occurred on the same day

that the evidence showed the rock throwing occurred whether

it's the same or not.

But I just wanted to point out for Molineux purposes that it was the arson and - - - and we'll assume that - - - that appellate was involved, I mean just assuming argument that he was involved, I think that the - - - the Molineux evidence here, the evidence of those prior incidents have become very clouded analytically. The Molineux evidence was - - - was admitted for a particular purpose, only to show state of mind, that is to infer state of mind from respondent's involvement in the - - - in this past crime to show his state of mind with respect to his purported involvement in this agreement. So we're - - - we're going way beyond the bounds of that Molineux purpose when we - - - when we start to argue that because he was involved in Crime A he was involved in Crime B.



JUDGE GARCIA: No, no, understood. But I think 1 2 the - - - it seemed to me the purpose was to show the 3 agreement later by showing he was involved in the earlier 4 arson. 5 MR. FALLEK: No, no. To show - - - it was to 6 show his state of mind with respect to an agreement - - -7 JUDGE GARCIA: Right. 8 MR. FALLEK: - - - which presumably was - - - was 9 established by other evidence, not the Molineux evidence. 10 So with - - - in that regard because our position is that 11 there was no other evidence of his agreement. There was no 12 evidence personally as opposed to based on his association 13 with - - - with a gang personally involving him in any 14 agreement with others. And with others is very important. 15 JUDGE WILSON: Let me go to the - - - let me go 16 to the confession for a moment, right. We - - - we agree 17 I think everybody agrees he was not actually at the March 18 1st arson, right? 19 That - - - that's correct. MR. FALLEK: 20 JUDGE WILSON: Okay. So a part of his confession 21 is clearly false, but there are details in his confession 22 that are true, right, that he clearly evidenced his

MR. FALLEK: I think that's true.

knowledge of the plan. He knew when it was going to



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happen.

1 JUDGE WILSON: He knew where it was going to 2 There are a variety of things like that. So -3 and then his confession as to his own participation is 4 false, right? 5 MR. FALLEK: Right. 6 JUDGE WILSON: So why doesn't the fact that he 7 falsely confessed to a plan where - - - where he was not 8 present, itself provide evidence of his agreement? 9 MR. FALLEK: Well, that he - - - that he knew 10 about these - - -11 JUDGE WILSON: No, no. Not that he knew about 12 it. He could have said I know about some details but I 13 wasn't there. But instead he said I was there. Why 14 doesn't his - - - his falsely putting himself at the arson 15 16 MR. FALLEK: Oh, I see. 17 JUDGE WILSON: - - - provide evidence that he 18 agreed? 19 MR. FALLEK: It doesn't because it's just so wildly speculative to say that it - - - it might provide 20 21 evidence. There are so many other -- I would say 22 speculative evidence is that much more plausible than that 23 speculative conclusion. 24 JUDGE GARCIA: But isn't this an appeal of a

guilty verdict, so don't the People get any reasonable

inference?

MR. FALLEK: They - - - they certainly benefit from the - - - the deference that the sufficiency analysis affords, but even based on that evidence, the inferences that they draw, they have to be reasonable. Our position is that an inference like that, for instance, is just patently unreasonable.

JUDGE STEIN: What - - - what about a statement that he - - - that he was part of something?

MR. FALLEK: That - - - that too. As Judge
Wilson pointed out, one, it's not necessarily what was
said. It's what the police officer said he said. And he
said he said something to that effect. And also, what - - even in the context is - - - is not clear. He didn't say
that in direct response to what were you doing, were you
involved in this arson last night? The original question
was do you know something about this arson? And I - the record is very clear that it was three or four minutes
later in the course of that conversation when he - - - he
says this, so we don't even know what it is that triggered
that as far as - - -

JUDGE FAHEY: I thought it was he said I was part of something but I didn't do it. I thought that was the phrase that's - - -

MR. FALLEK: Yeah, I mean we're - - - we're just



1 talking, again, about wild speculation. But - - - but it's 2 interesting that that particular statement, unlike the 3 other statement, comes in for its truth, and we know what 4 the truth is that he was out looking for the Patrias at 5 that time. 6 JUDGE FAHEY: The - - - the more important point 7 is whether or not a lie, a false confession, a lie, can be 8 evidence of an agreement. 9 MR. FALLEK: The - - - the short answer is no. 10 mean possibly if the People had called an expert to 11 describe how, but I - - - I would say that most people from 12 any objective standard would not know what a voluntary 13 inculpatory statement really meant. I would - - - I would 14 guess that - - - that he had been led by the People - - -15 the police officers and the fire marshals to provide more 16 and more evidence. Possibly he felt that he'd be released 17 afterwards. It's just not clear. 18 JUDGE RIVERA: But - - - but - - -19 MR. FALLEK: Liars we also speculate in our brief 20 2.1 JUDGE RIVERA: Isn't - - - isn't the real answer 2.2 it depends? It depends. 23 MR. FALLEK: Certainly. 24 JUDGE RIVERA: It depends on all the other

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circumstances - - -

1 MR. FALLEK: In my - - -2 JUDGE RIVERA: - - - that may otherwise confirm 3 or corroborate - - -4 MR. FALLEK: Right. 5 JUDGE RIVERA: - - - that indeed this individual 6 agreed. 7 MR. FALLEK: Individuals and whatever would be 8 contingent - - - that would be contingent upon is certainly 9 not present here. We really don't know what that possibly 10 could mean. And as I said, and with respect to I was part 11 of something, he was part of a mission to find these 12 Patrias. That we know and this evidence - - - this 13 statement came in for its truth, so that's the - - - it's 14 much more likely that that's what he meant. Ultimately, 15 it's just wild speculation. It's not competent evidence of 16 his agreement. 17 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, counsel. 18 Mr. Ross. 19 MR. ROSS: When he made his confessions, the 20 police didn't know anything about this Patrias mission. 21 They were asking about an incident and they were asking 22 about the arson - -23 JUDGE FAHEY: Yeah, but - - - but the proof seems 24 to be pretty consistent that by their own work, the fire



marshal's work, they're looking at the videos, guy wasn't

argument is we want to say this part of his false confession proves a positive fact. These other parts that prove that he might have been with the Patrias committing some other act, we don't want you to count that on - - - on the conspiracy. You're asking us to parse it in - - - in a - - -

MR. ROSS: Well, we're not - - -

JUDGE FAHEY: Well, let me finish. In --- as the key lynchpin in establishing these other four points, and that's why I'm having the difficulty with it. Go ahead.

MR. ROSS: Okay. Well, as far as the Patrias, it still shows that even though he found out about this arson mission he wasn't so repulsed by the fact that this gang - - his - - - was going to do this.

JUDGE WILSON: Well, repulsion's not the standard for conspiracy.

MR. ROSS: I - - - I know it's not the standard but it just shows everything all along the line. The fact that he's sitting there the day - - - the night before - - - probably the night before, he's - - - he's part of a group throwing Molotov cocktails at the Eighteenth Avenue.

There's just no need for the gang to ask him, well, are you - - - do you agree to this Fifty-seventh? It's just



understood.

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JUDGE GARCIA: Counsel, you didn't - - - the

People didn't make an argument in this trial - - it seems

from reading the record that the Patrias incident comes up

when the team that's going to go commit the arson goes out

on the street after this meeting and they see this rival

gang and they report in and another team comes in to deal

with the rival gang, including allegedly this defendant,

right?

MR. ROSS: Yes.

JUDGE GARCIA: Did the People ever argue that that mission itself was furthering the arson mission because there was a gang on the street that was interfering with their ability to accomplish that?

MR. ROSS: No, it wasn't charged as an overt act.

And there was nothing that said that it would be interference because the people who went on that mission weren't the ones who were on the arson mission, so it didn't really inhibit them.

JUDGE RIVERA: So - - - so counsel, let me - - - let me just clarify is - - - is the key point of your argument this participation - - - what you claim is his participation in an arson that - - - an attempted arson that looks very much like the arson that's been the basis for the conspiracy charge. So if that's - - - if that's

your point, then, let's try this hypothetical. Let's say 1 2 he's ordered to go out and find Patrias, and in the 3 interim, they decide they're not going to use Molotov cocktails because that didn't work out so well the last 4 5 time. They decide they're going to - - - they're going to 6 get back at him, JT, JK, whatever his name is, in a 7 different way. Would his participation beforehand in an 8 arson to get back at Kuang make him now a conspirator in a 9 different type of action because is that the agreement to 10 get back at Kuang? MR. ROSS: Not if he didn't know - - - wasn't 11 12 aware of this different type of action. Now if - - - if he 13 had agreed to do the arson and there had been an overt act 14 for that arson, say they went and bought their bottles of 15 iced tea to use as Molotov cocktails and then they changed 16 their minds, he still would be guilty of the arson because 17 he still agreed to that. 18 JUDGE RIVERA: So - - - so if the agreement was 19 merely we're going to get Kuang without specifying how - -20 2.1 MR. ROSS: Yes. 2.2 JUDGE RIVERA: - - - could he be a conspirator -23 24 MR. ROSS: I think - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: - - - regardless of the method

that's used if he's not a participant in the actual method that's used?

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MR. ROSS: It depends on what you mean - - - how they're going to get Kuang. Because here the agreement was for a Class A - - - that a Class A felony be committed which was second-degree arson. Now if it was just how to get it, it was just to beat him up, well, then it would be a lower level of conspiracy because there would - - - it would - - - the object crime would be a lesser classification of crime.

Just one thing about the - - - the charge, the charge for the criminal mischief was on or about February 22nd through February 26th. So that clearly refers to the rock-throwing because the evidence showed that the Eighteenth Avenue attempted arson most likely occurred on February 28th which was the Saturday. And it was - - it was - - - there was some evidence it might have occurred a day or two earlier. But - - and there - - - there was discussion about amending the indictment because the rock-throwing incident, there were various dates and - - - and so we needed to amend the indictment, and there was discussion on that and the Court allowed that. So that had the - - so definitely the - - - the mischief was about the rock-throwing and not the Eighteenth Avenue arson.

But even though they acquitted on that, there was



1	still evidence that showed that he was still you
2	know, had this shared the the gang's antipathy
3	towards Kuang. So basically what this case just comes down
4	to is do you always have to have an you know, an
5	expressed agreement to be a member of a conspiracy or can
6	just the totality of the circumstances show that you
7	implicitly agreed? And I think when you look at his
8	confessions, his participation, the nature of the gang, you
9	know, his presence at the meeting, like I say, which was
10	not superfluous, and and all of the all of what
11	it meant just to be a part of this gang and his actions
12	showing that he shared their intent. This was legally
13	sufficient to show an implicit agreement, and I ask that
14	you reverse the order of the Appellate Division and send it
15	back to consider the rest of the claims. Thank you.
16	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, counsel.
17	(Court is adjourned)
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## CERTIFICATION

I, Sara Winkeljohn, certify that the foregoing transcript of proceedings in the Court of Appeals of People v. Casimiro Reyes, No. 6 was prepared using the required transcription equipment and is a true and accurate record of the proceedings.

Congleric Good

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