1	COURT OF APPEALS
2	STATE OF NEW YORK
3	THE MATTER OF LUIS PENA,
4	Respondent,
5	
6	-against- NO. 136
7	NEW YORK STATE GAMING COMMISSION,
8	Appellant.
9	20 Eagle Street Albany, New York
10	November 13, 2018 Before:
11	
12	CHIEF JUDGE JANET DIFIORE ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA
13	ASSOCIATE JUDGE LESLIE E. STEIN ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE M. FAHEY
14	ASSOCIATE JUDGE MICHAEL J. GARCIA ASSOCIATE JUDGE ROWAN D. WILSON
	ASSOCIATE JUDGE PAUL FEINMAN
15	
16	Appearances:
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CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Appeal number 136, Matter of Pena v. the New York State Gaming Commission. Counsel? MR. HITSOUS: Good afternoon, Your Honors. Jonathan Hitsous for the Gaming Commission. May I have two minutes for rebuttal? CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: You may, sir. MR. HITSOUS: Thank you, Your Honors. We're here today because the - - - a majority of the Third Department misapplied the substantial-evidence standard.

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CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Let me ask you a question, counsel. Is our substantial-evidence standard dependent on the kind of evidence that is presented for consideration?

MR. HITSOUS: No, Your Honor. It never has been.

And this court recently recognized, just one month ago, in the Haug case, that whether evidence is hearsay or nonhearsay, there is one substantial-evidence standard for all of this evidence. The Third Department majority did not make any kind of distinction between hearsay versus nonhearsay. The Third Department majority found that the treatment records at issue here could be admitted for whatever factual inferences the Commission could draw from them and that the substantial-evidence standard would apply to that.



The problem is that - - -

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JUDGE RIVERA: But - - - but hearsay could only be substantial evidence if it's reliable and probative, right? So you do have a certain different level of review; do you not?

MR. HITSOUS: No, Your Honor. If evidence is reliable, it can't be considered at all. But if it is sufficient to be considered, its probative value must be weighed just as any other evidence, and that is, deferentially, as long as the inferences to be drawn from that evidence are both reasonable and plausible.

Now, where the Third Department erred here is despite the fact that they recognized this standard, they proceeded to second-guess the treatment records at issue in this case. They relied primarily on a cover letter from Colts Neck Veterinary Associates that they found imputed some kind of ambiguity onto all 1,717 of the violations.

But as the dissent recognized, one need only turn past that cover letter and start looking at the records themselves to realize that their contents are unambiguous. Every last one of these violations can be attributed to an entry in the records that refers either to a treatment or, in the case of 394 violations, an injection. They mean what they say.

JUDGE RIVERA: Say we disagree with you and - - -



and we don't think it's unambiguous, we think there is a certain ambiguity or lack of clarity in those particular records, what - - - what's the basis for your argument that the inference that's drawn is - - - is that, indeed, one could read that to mean the date matches the actual description, right, the - - - the date matches when the - - - the - - - the description of the conduct occurred?

MR. HITSOUS: Well, several reasons, Your Honor. First is that the specific description of the service, treatment, or injection is given right next to that date. As the dissenting judge points out, to infer otherwise, it would mean a ruling that, as a matter of law, a reasonable mind couldn't find that treatment means treatment or injection means injection.

But there's also corroboration from Pena himself.

Now, these records were supplied by Pena - - - or a portion of these records, I should say - - - were supplied by Pena in response to a request specifically for veterinary records that would enable Investigator Leveson to review the history of the horses' treatment. He supplies these records. He doesn't give any kind of qualification. He doesn't say at the time I'm not sure what these records mean. He is sending them saying here you go; you asked me for them.

Later on during the investigation, Investigator



Leveson calls Pena, and Pena says that he treats his horses before races with two particular drugs that feature prominently here, Robinul and Robaxin. He says he uses them at the same time, and again, that he treats - - - not that he receives a prescription, not that he receives a dispensation. So these are additional building blocks.

And another important - - -

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JUDGE STEIN: What about the - - - the negative blood tests? Do - - - do they seriously controvert the - - - the veterinary records?

MR. HITSOUS: No, Your Honor. A negative drug test is not necessarily going to be proof against a violation. It's not going to necessarily disprove it.

Pena is using the presence of a handful of negative drug tests as his defense. However, he's not tying any of these negative drug tests to a particular violation in this record.

And that's important, because we have - -
JUDGE WILSON: That's what I wanted to ask you.

Is there anything in the record from which we can match up
any one of the fifty drug tests to any one of the 1,717

violations, or we just don't know if they match up, or we
know that they don't match up?

MR. HITSOUS: It would be a rather painstaking review, Your Honor. There is a regulation, it is 4120.8,



Title 9 - - - that horses that finish first and typically horses that finish second would receive drug tests. But again, this is Mr. Pena's defense. He's - - - if he wants to make this defense, it is on him to explain to the Commission that a drug test doesn't match a particular violation, because we know that there are - - -

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JUDGE RIVERA: But isn't his point that every time they're tested, they always come up negative? It doesn't really matter the dates, as long as it's within the period. His point is any time you've tru - - - tested my horses, they always come up negative. Or did I misunderstand his argument?

MR. HITSOUS: That appears to be his argument,
Your Honor. And the reason that that argument is mistaken
is because we know that not all of the drugs here are even
detectable by drug tests. We know that another number of
these drugs have drug tests, but the drug tests are
unreliable. And we know that for other - - - the other
drugs, where there are reliable drug tests that there are
ways that a false negative could arise.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: What's the typical practice with respect to drug testing?

MR. HITSOUS: The typical practice is that if a horse wins and one other horse - - - usually the second-place one - - - they would be drug tested. But the

Commission - - -

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JUDGE STEIN: That's - - - I'm sorry, go ahead.

MR. HITSOUS: - - - the - - - the Commission lacks the resources, Your Honor, to be drug testing every single horse in every single race. And - - -

JUDGE STEIN: So if -- if you could match something up here, would that be enough to seriously controvert the hearsay?

MR. HITSOUS: No, Your Honor. Even if we could have a direct match, that would still just give rise to a credibility determination; because Dr. Maylin, our expert, testifies that there are reasons to produce a false negative. Even with the most detectable drugs, those are based on an assumption that the standard therapeutic dose is what was administered. And there are ways to administer drugs without doing the standard therapeutic dose. One is a practice known as titrating, where you reduce the amount of the drug to the point that it's past detectable levels. Another possibility for this is that these drugs got purchased from something known as a compounding pharmacy.

JUDGE RIVERA: Counsel, other than the negative drug tests or the failure to have a positive drug test, what - - - what's the basis for even speculating that that might have been the reason for why these are negative drug tests?

MR. HITSOUS: Well, we have evidence in the 1 2 record that titrating is a practice in this industry, and 3 we have the records themselves. So the records are already 4 showing that an administration occurred. 5 JUDGE RIVERA: Um-hum. 6 MR. HITSOUS: And we already have undisputed evidence that titrating is a real practice. We know that -7 8 9 JUDGE RIVERA: Well, what - - - what connects what occurred here to the possibility that it was done in 10 accordance with that methodology? 11 12 MR. HITSOUS: The two piece of - - - the two 13 pieces of evidence that I discussed, Your Honor. And given 14 the burden of proof, we satisfied our burden by putting 15 forth the records. We satisfied our burden with the 16 corroborating evidence. It is not our burden to disprove a 17 potential defense - - -18 JUDGE WILSON: Does Mr. Pena have available to 19 him some sort of compulsory process if he wanted to present 20 the testimony of the veterinarian but that person was 2.1 unwilling to come voluntarily? Is there - - is that 2.2 available to him?

MR. HITSOUS: Not that I'm aware of, Your Honor.

And - - - but Mr. Pena could, if he wants,

testify on his own behalf and say, no, I was not engaging

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in titrating. Or he could say I tried to get my veterinarian to come here and my veterinarian is - - - is not complying with that.

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Another thing that he could have done - - - and I think this is important, as far as pieces of evidence go because it relates to common sense. Pena's veterinarian was in his very barn. Pena was such an important client of Colts Neck, that they worked hand-in-hand. We know from these records that Pena was paying him upwards of 35,000 dollars a month. That is a tremendous financial incentive for Pena to make sure that these records are accurate.

He also has a tremendous professional incentive, because there's no dispute here that these drugs affect the horses' performances. If they're not given accurately, that could affect his performance as - - as a racer. And of course, Pena being a trainer, is well aware of these rules - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: What - - - what's inaccurate about a record that indicates when a treatment is prescribed as opposed to when it is actually administered? What's inaccurate about that?

MR. HITSOUS: Well, Your Honor, when a - - - when a record says that a treatment occurred, when it says,

"treatment with", a reasonable reading of that is that it

means a treatment occurred on that date. It doesn't mean

1 that the Commission is compelled to find that it's 2 ambiguous. This is the substantial-evidence standard. 3 Even assuming that a court could reasonably read 4 that letter to say the same thing, it doesn't mean that 5 that reading is - - - is compelled. Because when you have 6 the court and the agency both reaching reasonable 7 conclusions, that is what this court has referred to 8 repeatedly as room for choice. Here, the Commission made 9 its choice and that choice belonged exclusively with the 10 Commission. 11 Thank you. 12 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, counsel. 13 Counsel? 14 MR. TURRO: Good afternoon, Your Honors. 15 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Good afternoon. 16 MR. TURRO: This case - - - this case is about my 17 client, Luis Pena, and trying to salvage a life. 18 JUDGE FEINMAN: So I'd - - - I'd like to start 19 right where your adversary left off. Why isn't this a case 20 about the Commission made its choice and the Appellate 2.1 Division has sort of basically turned it over, because it 2.2 might have reached a different choice? 23 MR. TURRO: Because this - - -24 JUDGE FEINMAN: Why isn't that what this case is 25 about?

MR. TURRO: Okay. And I think the - - - the best way I can approach that is to look at your recent case in -- - in the Haug matter - - - v. Potsdam. It's a very different case here. There are not competing factual accounts here as to what happened. This is not a he-said/she-said where you're - - - you're picking credibility determinations. This is all about documents - - documents and how reliable these documents are. Because these documents are the things that - - -JUDGE FEINMAN: Well, is it about the reliability or what the documents mean? MR. TURRO: Well, the documents themselves; because - - - and I think this goes back to - - - I'm not

MR. TURRO: Well, the documents themselves;

because - - and I think this goes back to - - I'm not

sure which judge had talked about - - what it means to be

substantial evidence. And substantial evidence is - - - by

its definition, has to be reliable. And the reviewing

court, part of its obligation is to look at the - - - the

evidence, whether it's hearsay or not, but especially when

it's hearsay - - -

JUDGE STEIN: But - - - but once the Appellate

Division allowed this evidence in to be considered, didn't

that indicate that it was found to be reliable, and then it

was a question of interpreting the evidence?

MR. TURRO: I think - - - I think not. And I think - - - I think - - -



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JUDGE STEIN: Well, how could the court ad - - -
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        admit it as evidence without making that determination - -
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                  MR. TURRO: Well - - -
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                  JUDGE STEIN: - - - that it was reliable?
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                  MR. TURRO: Well, the - - - well, the - - - the
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        court - - - it was - - - it was actually the hearing
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        officer, over objection - - -
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                  JUDGE STEIN: But - - -
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                  MR. TURRO: - - - is the one who admitted it - -
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                  JUDGE STEIN: I'm sorry.
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                  MR. TURRO: - - - over volumin - - - over
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        repeated objections. And - - - and it did come to - - -
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                  JUDGE STEIN: But the Appellate Division said it
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        was admissible.
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                  MR. TURRO: And it was - - - it - - - but - - -
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        but - - -
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                  JUDGE STEIN: It agreed.
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                  MR. TURRO: And it said, for whatever that is
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        worth. And just because it is admissible does not mean,
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        Your Honor, that it is reliable in the - - - in the way
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        it's being used to be reliable.
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                  In this case - - - I mean, quite frankly, these
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        are - -
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1	JUDGE STEIN: Well, I think you're using it
2	sounds to me like you're using reliable with to mean
3	the same thing as credible. And to me, those are two
4	different things.
5	MR. TURRO: No, I I think I'm trying not to
6	do that. But I the what I what I mean by
7	reliable is basically the definition of substantial
8	evidence, that its you know, by its character, you
9	know, it is something that should be that can be
10	relied on.
11	JUDGE RIVERA: Well, let's take a step back.
12	MR. TURRO: Yeah.
13	JUDGE RIVERA: Let's take a step back.
14	MR. TURRO: Yes, ma'am.
15	JUDGE RIVERA: Reliable regarding what? Reliable
16	as an actual chronology of various types of treatments, or
17	reliable with respect to the day the treatment was
18	administered?
19	MR. TURRO: Well, I think it's it's
20	JUDGE RIVERA: Or both?
21	MR. TURRO: No. I I think that they're not
22	they've been proven not to be reliable as to the date
23	of administration. In fact, there's no proof whatsoever as
24	to how

JUDGE WILSON: But how - - - how were they - - -

1 how - -2 MR. TURRO: - - - any single administration. 3 JUDGE WILSON: I'm sorry. How were they proven 4 not be reliable? 5 MR. TURRO: Well, if you go through Dr. Maylin -6 - - Dr. Maylin's testimony, the Commission's own expert - -7 - he's one of the most highly regarded labs in this 8 country. He has, in fact, in one of the cases cited in - -9 - in - - - in the briefs is the Fusco case, which - - -10 which I'm sure Your Honors are familiar with. The notion that there's possibly here titration that hasn't been 11 12 detected, or that there's been compounding, or that there 13 are some traces of these drugs, or that Robinul and 14 Robaxin, which make up over - - - over 20 - - - I'm sorry, 15 1,300 of the charges - - - 1,300 charges - - - that they -16 - - and they're both easily detectable according to our 17 expert and according to Dr. Maylin - - - the fact that 18 there were no positives, the fact that there was no 19 evidence of titration from Dr. Maylin - - -JUDGE WILSON: But so let me - - - let me ask the 20 21 same question that I asked before. Is there a way to match 22 up any of the fifty tests with any of the 1,717 violations? 23

MR. TURRO: They never provided any evidence of that, Your Honor.

JUDGE WILSON: And - - - and you didn't either?



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1	MR. TURRO: They're not our tests.
2	JUDGE WILSON: Well, I understand
3	MR. TURRO: They're Dr. Maylin
4	JUDGE WILSON: but there's nothing in the
5	record
6	MR. TURRO: No, we did not.
7	JUDGE WILSON: from we could match
8	those up?
9	MR. TURRO: We we no, there isn't.
LO	There isn't. There is not.
L1	JUDGE FAHEY: Well, let's as as Judge
L2	Rivera just said, I want to take a just a step back
L3	for a minute. Is it is it fair to say that the
L4	entire case turns, in your mind, on on how the
L5	the treatment records are are reviewed, and we have
L6	to look at, basically, what the Appellate Division did with
L7	both the cover letter describing the records and then the
L8	records themselves? You'd agree with that, right?
L9	MR. TURRO: Well, I'd agree I'd agree that
20	you look at what what the basis is for the what
21	the evidence was for the admission, which was that it was
22	consistent with custom of the
23	JUDGE FAHEY: The way I
24	MR. TURRO: of the formats of evidence.
25	JUDGE FAHEY: the way I read the way

1 I read the cover letter, it seems to expressly describe the 2 significance of the dates and the dates, themselves, as - -3 - as the date that the horse got the medication. Is - - -4 is - - - am I reading it wrong? 5 MR. TURRO: Well, I think it's vaguer than that, 6 number one, Your Honor. But number two, the - - - the - -7 - there's no foundation whatsoever. In - - - in - - - in 8 our - - - in our legal lives, reliability is usually borne 9 out when it comes with records, with a business-record 10 exception. When the certification brought by - - - by - -11 - by the prosecution was brought to the veterinarian, it 12 specifically set forth it wanted to affirm and confirm that 13 these were, in fact reliable - - -14 JUDGE FAHEY: All right. 15 JUDGE RIVERA: Well, let's try it a different 16 way. 17 JUDGE FAHEY: I wanted - - -18 JUDGE RIVERA: Let's try it a different way. 19 MR. TURRO: Okay. 20 JUDGE RIVERA: The - - - the - - - the cover 21 letter says it's either the treatment, prescription, or - -22 - I can't remember what the third category is. 23 All right. So now they put on their experts who 24 say these are records that in the custom of this particular 25 - - - let's call it industry, for the moment - - - means

the following. Why isn't that enough for substantial 1 2 evidence - - -3 MR. TURRO: Because - - -4 JUDGE RIVERA: - - - if your expert could not 5 controvert that? 6 MR. TURRO: Because what was testified to - -7 JUDGE RIVERA: Yeah. 8 MR. TURRO: - - - wasn't - - - was that - - -9 that typically, records show that next to the date is the 10 date of a treatment or next to the date is a date of 11 administration. There's nothing that goes beyond that and 12 there's nothing - - - and you have here records that are 13 not inherently reliable, that are, time and again, not - -14 you know, are refuted - - - flatly refuted. 15 JUDGE RIVERA: Well, all - - - all I'm saying is 16 17

you've got records - - - let - - - let's go for one moment with - - because if there wasn't a cover letter, I don't know how much of an argument you'd have. But let's say the cover letter somehow suggests that there's uncertainty about what this date means.

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And they have their experts who say: we look at it; we've got all these years of expertise; we understand exactly how these veterinary records are kept; Colts Neck keeps them in the same way that the - - - the custom in this particular racing industry keeps them, and this is



what they mean. The date reflects the date of administration.

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Why isn't that - - - his position is, sure, you might reject that and view this differently, but that's enough to get past the hump for the Commission to have met its substantial-evidence burden here.

MR. TURRO: Because it's not - - - because it - - - it's - - - so it - - - because it's not - - - that - - - that evidence is not the kind of evidence that inspires confidence the way this court stated - - -

JUDGE FAHEY: But that's - - -

MR. TURRO: - - - forty years ago.

JUDGE FAHEY: - - - that's not the standard. The standard is - - is - - a rationality standard is we would have to both - - - the Appellate Division and this court would have to say that it was irrational to decide when the word "treatment" appeared next to the date that - - - that - - - that that was the date of treatment. We'd have to say that it's - - - that's an irrational conclusion for the - - both the board and the hearing officer to have made.

MR. TURRO: Well, based on the record in the whole, where you have test after test after test disproving that the - - - that these - - - that they are accurate administration dates - - -



1	JUDGE FAHEY: Are you talking about are y
2	taking about the fifty drug tests?
3	MR. TURRO: Yes, the fifty drug tests.
4	JUDGE FAHEY: All right.
5	MR. TURRO: Yes.
6	JUDGE FAHEY: So the fifty tests out of 1,717 -
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8	MR. TURRO: Any test test for more
9	it's like a blood test we all go to. It doesn't test for
10	just one drug.
11	JUDGE FAHEY: No, I understand.
12	MR. TURRO: Okay. So we're talking about
13	JUDGE FAHEY: No, I understand.
14	MR. TURRO: hundreds. We're talking abou
15	hundreds.
16	JUDGE FAHEY: I sort of understand now, anyway.
17	MR. TURRO: Well, I mean
18	JUDGE FAHEY: I can't say that I really
19	understand
20	MR. TURRO: Okay. But
21	JUDGE FAHEY: it as well as I should. Bu
22	all right.
23	MR. TURRO: I I understand. But I
24	JUDGE GARCIA: Counsel counsel
25	MR. TURRO: you understand.



JUDGE GARCIA: - - - could I ask you something? 1 2 MR. TURRO: Yes. 3 JUDGE GARCIA: Just on a policy matter, as I 4 understand it, these horses are stabled in New Jersey, 5 This is a Jersey veterinarian. So the New York 6 commission has to go through the Jersey side of the house 7 to try to get these records. The veterinarian won't even 8 certify them, right? 9 MR. TURRO: Right. 10 JUDGE GARCIA: So now you come into New York and 11 you claim, oh, well, these are not reliable. But you chose 12 to stable the horses in New Jersey, right? Your client 13 also used a Jersey veterinarian. And isn't there something 14 of a policy problem with then standing back and saying, 15 well, you know, these aren't reliable records because we 16 can't compel the Jersey veterinarian to come over to New 17 York, so the New York commission is kind of out of luck? 18 MR. TURRO: Well - - - well, Your Honor, 19 certainly, one could go to another state and get - - -20 through a court and get a subpoena, if you really wanted to 21 do that. It's not something that's impossible. And we - -2.2 - we do - - - it happens - -23 JUDGE GARCIA: If it's a New York - - -

JUDGE GARCIA:

MR. TURRO: - - - as a matter of course.

-- - veterinarian, what would

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happen?

MR. TURRO: I'm sorry, Your Honor?

JUDGE GARCIA: If it was a New York veterinarian, would the Commission be able to compel them to certify the records?

MR. TURRO: I don't know if it can compel them to certify, but certainly you can subpoen them to a hearing.

JUDGE GARCIA: Is there a way for the Commission to prohibit that veterinarian from treating horses in New York in the future if they don't cooperate?

MR. TURRO: I don't know the answer to that, Your Honor. I do know that he trains horses that race in New York. So it seems to me they - - - they can probably, in - - in - - - in one shape or form, prevent those horses from running if they wished to take that kind of a sanction.

But again, Your Honor - - - and one thing I do - - - I - - I - - I think it's important to understand is when Dr. Maylin was being cross-examined - - - the Commission's expert was being cross-examined about this case, and - - - and he was specifically asked about commencing this action of prosecution based on documents - - - on documents that have, time after time after time - - his tests, his - - - his lab continually could not find any evidence of any of these substances, the - - - the

comment he said and the comment he affirmed was somebody 1 2 ought to make sure that the records are accurate before 3 they commence any such prosecution. And they've taken my 4 client's life away with records that do not bear out and do 5 not substantiate a single administration here at all, not 6 one. 7 Thank you, counsel. CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: 8 Mr. Hitsous, on the issue of certification of the 9 records, what would certification add to those records? 10 MR. HITSOUS: Your Honor, certification would add nothing here. My - - - the New Jersey veterinarian didn't 11

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MR. HITSOUS: Your Honor, certification would add nothing here. My - - - the New Jersey veterinarian didn't need to certify them under any kind of legal obligation.

But what he did need to do - - - and I would direct this to the court's attention - - - it's New Jersey Administrative

Code 13:44-4.9(a) - - - he needed to keep accurate records and to produce them on request. And that's what he did.

So later on, when they - - - when New Jersey authorities - - - not New York authorities - - - ask for certification and he doesn't provide it, it doesn't matter, because he has already discharged his legal duty.

Now, my adversary began by saying that this - - - JUDGE RIVERA: And - - - and accurate records are defined as the description next to the date of the administration?

MR. HITSOUS: No, Your Honor. Those - - - the



New Jersey Code simply says "accurate". It doesn't sub-1 2 define - - -3 JUDGE RIVERA: So - - -4 MR. HITSOUS: - - - it more. 5 JUDGE RIVERA: - - - so the records could be 6 accurate, but they could fit in one of the other categories 7 that the cover letter says, right? 8 MR. HITSOUS: Well, it - - -9 JUDGE RIVERA: The day it's prescribed, not the day it's actually administered? 10 11 MR. HITSOUS: Well, the cover letter says that 12 these records could refer to one of three. However, you 13 look at the records themselves, they will tell you which 14 one of the three that is. They say "treatment". There are 15 other areas in the records where they actually say 16 "dispensation". So the records are parsing through them 17 already. And it's eminently reasonable for the conclusion 18 --- for the Commission to conclude that they mean what 19 they say. 20 JUDGE GARCIA: Could the Commission compel a New 21 York veterinarian to testify? 22 MR. HITSOUS: Yes, but not a New Jersey 23 veterinarian, because they're not subject to our 24 jurisdiction. And that could lead to situations - - -25 because the sport of harness racing is a multistate sport.

As Your Honor noted, Mr. Pena has chosen to 1 2 stable in New Jersey and use a New Jersey veterinarian. 3 And this would severely hamper the Commission's ability to 4 regulate in - - - in multistate contexts. 5 JUDGE RIVERA: Could you clarify the testimony of 6 the experts related to the custom, with respect to 7 maintaining these kinds of records - - -8 MR. HITSOUS: Yes, Your Honor. 9 JUDGE RIVERA: - - - or the testimony that these 10 are the kinds of records that show when the - - - the drugs are administered? 11 12 MR. HITSOUS: Your Honor, all three of our 13 witnesses said that these records are consistent with 14 thousands of records that they've seen, and that they treat 15 them as accurate, and that they take them "at face value". 16 JUDGE RIVERA: All right. 17 MR. HITSOUS: We understand face value to mean 18 that they mean what they say. And here, they say 19 "treatment" and they say "injection". 20 JUDGE RIVERA: Okay. But - - - but did any or 21 all of them say that that date refers to when the horse was 2.2 treated? 23 MR. HITSOUS: It - - - Your - - -24 JUDGE RIVERA: Do any of them say that's the

inference they drew from these records based on their

experience?

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MR. HITSOUS: Oh, yeah - - - yes, Your Honor.

They - - - we would understand - - - when they say that they're taking that at face value, they're appearing in support of our case, Your Honor. They all were testifying that they understood these records to be proof of the treatment dates. Absolutely, Your Honor.

Now, if - - - if I could wrap up about the substantial-evidence standard. I think it's an important point that all of the factors that you heard my adversary talk about are factors that made it before the Commission. For every factor that they brought up during their case before the Commission, our witnesses had rebuttal evidence.

And so the Commission was faced with a situation where they were weighing Mr. Pena's defense versus our prosecution, so to speak. The Commission, here, is the fact-finder, not the court. And the Commission made its determination. The Third Department could not second-guess that unless it was so implausible, as to be irrational.

We have provided numerous reasons why it is easily plausible and eminently reasonable. Therefore we would ask this court to reverse the Third Department majority and uphold the Commission's determination in its entirety.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, counsel.



1	MR. HITSOUS: Thank you.	
2	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: You're welcom	เ∈
3	(Court is adjourned)	
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CERTIFICATION I, Sara Bernstein, certify that the foregoing transcript of proceedings in the Court of Appeals of Steven The Matter of Luis Pena v. New York State Gaming Commission, No. 136 was prepared using the required transcription equipment and is a true and accurate record of the proceedings. Lana Bernster Signature: Agency Name: eScribers Address of Agency: 352 Seventh Avenue Suite 604 New York, NY 10001 November 20, 2018 Date:

