1	COURT OF APPEALS
2	STATE OF NEW YORK
:	MATTER OF NEW YORK CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION,
	Appellant,
	-against- NO. 133
	NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT,
	Respondent.
	20 Eagle Street Albany, New York November 14, 2018
	CHIEF JUDGE JANET DIFIORE ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA ASSOCIATE JUDGE LESLIE E. STEIN ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE M. FAHEY ASSOCIATE JUDGE MICHAEL J. GARCIA ASSOCIATE JUDGE ROWAN D. WILSON ASSOCIATE JUDGE PAUL FEINMAN
	Appearances:
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CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Good afternoon, everyone. The first appeal on this afternoon's calendar is appeal number 133, the Matter of the New York Civil Liberties Union v. New York City Police Department. Counsel? MR. DUNN: Good afternoon. I'm Christopher Dunn with the New York Civil Liberties Union. With me is Robert Hodgson also from the NYCLU. With the Court's permission, I would like to reserve two minutes for rebuttal. CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Two minutes, sir? MR. DUNN: Yes. CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: You may. MR. DUNN: At the outset, I want to highlight, this is a case about judges, not about cops. This is a case about the public's right to know about how the court and the most influential police department in the country

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CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: So counsel, how do we

reconcile those two statutes in favor of disclosure without FOIL swallowing up the court's piece in the civil rights law?

MR. DUNN: I think it's exactly what the Supreme court did in this case and what every party before you agrees should be done, which is to redact the identifying information of the police officers.



1	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Redact it; is that what you
2	said?
3	MR. DUNN: Yes.
4	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Um-hum.
5	MR. DUNN: Yes. And so from the beginning, we
6	have never sought identifying information about the police
7	officers in these cases. Our request has been for the
8	judicial decisions with all officer identifying information
9	removed.
10	JUDGE STEIN: Well, what about the whole process
11	setup in in 50-a? Giving notice, giving a right to
12	be heard. Are you saying that that process should be now
13	incorporated into FOIL when something is sought that would
14	be covered under 50-a?
15	MR. DUNN: We are not saying that, Your Honor. I
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17	JUDGE STEIN: Okay. But then then
18	then how does that not obliterate 50-a and that whole
19	process that the legislature's set up?
20	MR. DUNN: Because I think that that process is
21	set up to deal with a situation, which is a common
22	situation, where the police officer's identity is going to
23	be revealed through the disclosure of the personnel record.
24	And in that case, 50-a provides
25	JUDGE STEIN: But but sometimes that's not



JUDGE STEIN: But - - - but sometimes that's not

clear. I mean, in this very case there seems to be an issue about whether redaction could sufficiently protect the officer's identification.

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MR. DUNN: Well, with all due respect, Judge
Stein, I don't think there - - - there is a serious
question about that. But I understand what you're saying.
And what I am suggesting is that the scheme that's set out
in 50-a, paragraphs 2, 3, and 4, deals with the situation
where a record is going to be produced in an ongoing
proceeding and the officer is going to be identified.
Here, the whole premise of this FOIL is all the officer
information comes out of the records. And it's our
position that in that situation, which is very unusual,
that those procedural safeguards just don't need to be
addressed because all of that information is coming out.
And therefore, there's no kind of process to be had with a
judge saying okay, is there enough of an interest to - - -

JUDGE FAHEY: Well, can't you just match the - - the event to the officer? As I understand it - - - and
I'm sure you know more about this than I do, but the
disciplinary hearings themselves are open to the public; is
that correct?

MR. DUNN: That's correct.

JUDGE FAHEY: And so observers can go and watch and - - and - - and certainly, while maybe not be able



to identify all the participants, can identify the particular events. That seems to be clear; couldn't they?

JUDGE FAHEY: All right. So if they can identify the particular events, then simply releasing the records, you can coordinate the event with the records and identify the officer.

MR. DUNN: Well, they could in theory. But - - -

MR. DUNN: Yeah. And to be clear, Judge Fahey, what we are saying is the sort of facts that would allow somebody to do that, can be taken out of the decision.

JUDGE FAHEY: Well, if you take those facts out, along with everything else, what's the point, I guess?

MR. DUNN: Well, there are lots of points. The facts that might identify an officer, are not all the facts that are in an opinion, one. Secondly, let's be very clear. You and I do this all the time. We read decisions that have pages and pages and pages of legal analysis in it. They say nothing about facts. These are judicial decisions. Some of these things are fifty pages long, as the City points out. There is a lot of law in there. And our primary interest here is in how judges in the NYPD are interpreting law that governs police officers. So for instance, if judges in the NYPD think there's a fourth amendment exception to the probable cause requirement, I want to know about that. I cannot - - - I cannot know

about that now because these decisions and their discussion of the law, as well as the facts, are entirely secret. I would submit - - -

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JUDGE FAHEY: I can see that. I think that - - - I think that's an interesting argument, a valid argument.

But I'm still struggling with overcoming a number of hurdles before you get there. And I'm wondering if redaction is - - - is really the - - - the way you should be doing this. And if we actually have the authority to do that, particularly in light of 50-a's requirement that there be consent by the officer. Some of the objections that were raised by the PBA in their amicus brief seem to be also compelling on the other side.

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$ DUNN: Well, let me address a couple things here if I could.

JUDGE FAHEY: Sure. Go ahead.

MR. DUNN: This court has never suggested, and no court has suggested, that redaction is only available if it renders impossible the ability to identify the redacted information. It's a commonsense approach. We are talking about trials that took place ten, twelve years ago. Our request is from 2001 to 2011. The - - - the order that was issued by the supreme court justice here was to redact factual details sufficient to conceal the identity of the officer.

JUDGE STEIN: But - - - but under FOIL, it's the agency that makes the determination as to what's sufficient and what's not. Under 50-a, it's the court that makes that determination. And that's - - - that's one of the things that troubles me here.

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MR. DUNN: Well - - - well, fair enough. But Judge Stein, keep in mind here that we went through a court process in this case. The court ordered - - -

JUDGE STEIN: Yes. But you're not saying it's required in every case.

MR. DUNN: Well, I - - - I - - -

JUDGE STEIN: You - - as a matter of fact, I think when I asked you the question, you said that the process set forth in 50-a is not necessary.

MR. DUNN: I - - - I think that fairly read - - - and this court has never addressed the issue. But fairly read, when you're dealing with documents that are redacted of the officer identifying information, that when those are sought under FOIL, that it is sufficient to have the agency make the redactions. On top of that though here, we did have a process - - - and this is unusual about this case - - - where the judge looked at five sample decisions that were directed to the City to produce with the redactions, and he determined that the redactions in fact were sufficient for purposes of concealing the identity of the

1	officer. So here we have a situation where while I don't
2	think 50-a required it, that we actually have judicial
3	review of these documents.
4	JUDGE RIVERA: Counsel, can I ask a question? I
5	just want to clarify your position and your interpretation
6	of FOIL. As I understand 87(2), it leaves to the agency
7	complete discretion whether or not to invoke the exemption.
8	So the reality is that the City could have chosen to turn
9	it over anyway.
10	MR. DUNN: That's correct, Your Honor.
11	JUDGE RIVERA: Without any redactions.
12	MR. DUNN: You're absolutely right.
13	JUDGE RIVERA: It doesn't matter what 50 says.
14	MR. DUNN: That that FOIL allows
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16	JUDGE RIVERA: Correct.
17	MR. DUNN: production.
18	JUDGE RIVERA: Correct.
19	MR. DUNN: That's exactly right.
20	JUDGE RIVERA: But they've decided to invoke the
21	exemption. And so now this is where we are.
22	MR. DUNN: That's correct.
23	JUDGE RIVERA: But I just wanted to clarify if
24	that was your interpretation also of the statute.
25	MR DIINN: Yes I mean that that's a

little bit of an odd thing about the FOIL statute. It allows agencies to withhold documents. It doesn't require

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JUDGE GARCIA: Doesn't that go to Judge Stein's point then as to what protection would 50-a afford if all we look to was FOILs permissive release provision? Then what civil rights protection is 50-a or 50-b for that matter, giving to anyone? If an agency has these records, how about the, you know, documents that tend to identify victims of a sex offense, the agency could then make a decision, you know, we don't even need to redact this, we'll give them to you.

MR. DUNN: Well, Your Honor - - JUDGE GARCIA: Only applying FOIL.

MR. DUNN: - - - happily, I'm not the agency.

I'm not in that position. What we are dealing with here is a situation in which the agency did move to redact.

JUDGE GARCIA: Right. But under your rule, the only issue is - - putting aside 50-a, the only issue is whether the agency is going to make a determination that they'll give them to you, they'll give them to you redacted, they may not redact them. And doesn't that gut the civil rights law?

MR. DUNN: Your Honor, I don't think it does. I
--- I think the agency has an obligation under 50-a



1 perhaps to redact - - - to respect the officer information. 2 JUDGE GARCIA: So the officer could bring a civil 3 action against the NYPD? 4 MR. DUNN: Well, they can and they have. I mean, 5 we have a dispute right now where the PBA has sued over the 6 release of bodycam footage claiming that those are 50-a 7 protected records. 8 JUDGE RIVERA: But 50-a's coverage is not 9 absolute even on its own terms. 10 MR. DUNN: That's exactly right. And that's an 11 important point. 12 JUDGE RIVERA: So - - - so if the legislature 13 really wanted to make these documents absolutely 14 confidential, no one can ever get to it, that's what they 15 would've said. They didn't do that. And it does have a 16 particular purpose. Could you address the question of the 17 purpose and whether or not that's implicated at all in your 18 FOIL request? 19 MR. DUNN: Well, I think it's definitely 20 implicated in the sense that you're absolutely right, that 2.1 50-a does not create an absolute bar to production of 2.2 personnel records. In fact, it creates a disclosure 23 regime. And it allows for them to be disclosed if there's 24 a process in place. And that's a situation as I - - -25 JUDGE FAHEY: But isn't that limited by a lawful

1 court order in the context of litigation? In other words, 2 it's not a FOIL request just to an agency, but instead, 3 50-a says these kind of records can only be released 4 subject to a lawful court order, usually after in camera 5 review, et cetera, and then in the context of pending 6 litigation, not just through a request to an agency. This 7 would be - - - this would subvert that process. 8 MR. DUNN: I don't think it subverts it at all, 9 Judge Fahey. I think it complements it. 10 JUDGE FAHEY: Okay. Explain to me how it doesn't, because you're taking an individual's records, 11 12 redacting them, and releasing them. So go ahead. 13

MR. DUNN: Well, I think I start with FOIL, which in its present form was enacted after 50-a was enacted.

JUDGE FAHEY: Right.

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MR. DUNN: 50-a deals with the situation, as I said before, as I understand it, where the production of the record will result in the identification of the officer. Okay. And in that situation, 50-a speaks to how to deal with that. In the FOIL context - - -

JUDGE FAHEY: So - - - so let me stop you.

MR. DUNN: Sure.

JUDGE FAHEY: So you have to - - - the record itself, if it - - - you're - - - you're saying if - - - we both know the record can't guarantee that you won't be able



to identify the officer. But in a commonsense reading of it, if the agency determines that this record could not identify the officer, then it could be releasable if redacted?

MR. DUNN: Under FOIL, absolutely, without creating any 50-a problem.

JUDGE FAHEY: I see.

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MR. DUNN: And that's the whole premise of our position here, that we are looking for documents that can and have been shown to be redacted in a way that the officers are not going to be identified. We don't care about the officer identifications. What this is about is getting at the judicial decisions that the NYPD is issuing about police misconduct. And so what I am saying to you in terms of the interest in FOIL, and the interest in 50-a, the redaction of the officer identification balances both of those interests, which is exactly what this court said in Daily Gazette.

JUDGE RIVERA: But - - - but they argue that it - - - but they argue to - - - to really have the kind of redaction that would ensure that one could never identify the officer. That that would either be totally useless to you because everything's redacted, you get nothing from it, or it would indeed not be representative of the actual determination, which then goes to how it's helpful to you.



Could you address the latter, not the former; I get where you are on the former.

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MR. DUNN: Okay. Well, so these documents, based on what I know about them - - - and I've seen examples of these and you've been given examples of these - - - they have lots of information there that is valuable to me and to the public about the way NYPD judges operate. And even if one were to take out all the facts, and I do not think that's necessary to - - - to anonymize them for police officer identity, there's plenty of information there that is valuable. And the fact that it's incomplete, that's what redaction does in every single situation. And the City wants to describe that as distortion. It's just an incomplete document. And again, I just want to reiterate, there are all kinds of useful, valuable information. again, going back in terms of the actual redaction, so this court doesn't want to get in the business, I understand, of going through documents and redacting. Judges do this all the time at the trial court level.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, Mr. Bloom.

MR. DUNN: All right. Thank you, Your Honor.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Counsel?

I meant Mr. Dunn. Excuse me.

MR. DUNN: Very well. I knew what you meant.

MR. BLOOM: Good afternoon, Your Honors. My name



1 is Aaron Bloom and I represent the respondents, the New 2 York City Police Department. Your Honors, this appeal 3 presents the court with an opportunity to both harmonize 4 three prior decisions that are intention and provide 5 quidance to a government agency, and to government agencies 6 generally trying to faithfully walk the line between two 7 competing legislative - - -8 JUDGE RIVERA: So - - - so let me ask you - - -9 MR. BLOOM: - - - policies. 10 JUDGE RIVERA: - - - also the question I asked 11 your adversary. Is it - - - is it the NYPD's position that 12 87(2) allows the agency to determine for itself whether or 13 not it will invoke the exclusion, but it does not mandate 14 the exclusion; do you agree with that or do you have a 15 different reading? MR. BLOOM: With - - - I have a different view 16 17 with - - -18 JUDGE RIVERA: Okay. 19 MR. BLOOM: - - - respect to - - -20 JUDGE RIVERA: Yes. 2.1 MR. BLOOM: - - 87(2)(a). 2.2 JUDGE RIVERA: Okay. 23 MR. BLOOM: So when there is a - - - when there 24 is another state or federal statute that mandates



confidentiality, I don't believe that anything in FOIL

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authorizes the government to ignore that other law that mandates confidentiality. So - - - JUDGE RIVERA: Well, then what does may deny?

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MR. BLOOM: That - - - that's correct. But I believe that nothing in may deny implies that - - - that another command that exists that says must keep confidential, doesn't apply.

Because that applies to all of the categories including A.

JUDGE RIVERA: But then that doesn't make sense with respect to what A says; are specifically exempted, right? May deny what is already specifically exempted.

MR. BLOOM: Well, I think that that's just - -
JUDGE RIVERA: I mean, that this is the

superseding statute.

MR. BLOOM: Well, I don't - - - respectfully,

Your Honor, I don't believe that - - - that that's what

that means. Otherwise, as I think Judge Garcia pointed

out, many of the confidentiality statutes that exist would

simply be discretionary. And - - - and I don't believe

that that has ever been the opinion of the courts that -
- that those statutes are discretionary. I believe that

the may deny applies to all of the - - - the - - - the

exemptions. And certainly, where there are exemptions that

are created by FOIL, those are ones that can be asserted in

discretion.



1	JUDGE RIVERA: What if the officer is deceased?
2	MR. BLOOM: What is what
3	JUDGE RIVERA: What if the officer's deceased?
4	Does 50-a I'm not sure even I know the answer to
5	that. Does 50-a apply to those kinds of records where the
6	officer's deceased?
7	MR. BLOOM: I I don't I believe so.
8	JUDGE RIVERA: Okay. So that might
9	MR. BLOOM: But I don't believe we've
10	JUDGE RIVERA: that might be a case, right
11	where you could see that 2(a) would allow for the
12	discretion?
13	MR. BLOOM: I I'm not sure. But I
14	but I I'm not sure. But I don't think it it
15	pertains to this
16	JUDGE RIVERA: To this issue. Fair enough.
17	MR. BLOOM: this case in particular.
18	JUDGE RIVERA: Fair enough.
19	JUDGE STEIN: Could you explain, as I understand
20	your argument however, you think that there's a distinction
21	in 87(2)(a) between the civil civil rights law 50-a
22	and other statutes that fall within that exemption.
23	MR. BLOOM: Yes.
24	JUDGE STEIN: How how do you how do
25	we find a basis to

MR. BLOOM: Sure.

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JUDGE STEIN: - - - judicially make such a
distinction?

MR. BLOOM: Well - - -

JUDGE STEIN: Where in the statute do you find that?

MR. BLOOM: I - - - I think you find it in A, the very structure of the statute; B, the legislative history; and C, this court's prior holdings - - - all of this court's prior holdings about 50-a. All of those holding - - - all of this court's prior decisions say that the structure and the legislative purpose of 50-a is very specific. It is about - - - and the touchstone is whether the records could potentially be used to embarrass an officer in litigation.

That's the touchstone that's been constant throughout all of this court's decisions. And it comes from the structure of the statute, which is - - is tailored to a litigation context, and from the legislative history. All - - this statute is unique. Unlike many confidentiality statutes, it is about a specific use of documents. It comes from the - - - the - - - to prevent the use of records to embarrass an officer in litigation, also outside of litigation. But this court has always said the context is litigation. So to determine



whether the records - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: So then that helps to explain the process, right? Isn't your adversary then correct, the process that's set out in 50-a is focused on that very purpose?

MR. BLOOM: Exactly. Yes, Your Honor. And so what I would say about the process is that that process only pertains to the litigation context. And you know that from the text of the statute itself, because what the process says is the - - - after making a showing that warrants the records to be given to a court for in camera review, the judge must decide whether those - - - whether those records are material and relevant to the action before that judge. So the standards set out in 50-a really only make sense when you have - - - when it's in a litigation context.

JUDGE FAHEY: Let me ask this question. The position that you're taking before us today, is it different than the position that you took in the Appellate Division?

MR. BLOOM: Yes.

JUDGE FAHEY: Okay. How? In a one-sentence explanation, how is it different?

MR. BLOOM: Well, we had a two-part - - - we - - we had two parts to our argument in the Appellate



1	Division. One, that this court's holding in Short and
2	Karlin controlled. And two, that effective redaction
3	wasn't feasible.
4	JUDGE FAHEY: Right.
5	MR. BLOOM: Now we argue that this court should
6	harmonize Short and Karlin with Daily Gazette.
7	JUDGE FAHEY: So basically, you want us to do
8	what you didn't want us to do in the Appellate Division?
9	MR. BLOOM: Well, I wasn't before you in the
10	Appellate Division. And I think that's the key thing.
11	JUDGE FAHEY: And I wasn't there either. So
12	- so we're we're clear on that. But
13	MR. BLOOM: But I mean, the point is that there
14	was from from the perspective of a governing
15	agency, there was controlling Court of Appeals case law
16	Short and Karlin, which at least on its face of the
17	decision, appeared to control that the the decision.
18	JUDGE FAHEY: I'm familiar with the cases and the
19	Daily Daily Gazette case also.
20	MR. BLOOM: Yes.
21	JUDGE FAHEY: I I understand the interplay
22	between them. And it it's a close question. I'm
23	just wondering why the flip?
24	MR. BLOOM: Well, again, because as a government
25	agency, we're trying to do our best to to comply with

two competing legislative policies and the controlling case 1 2 So when we're before an Appellate Division - - -3 JUDGE STEIN: Can't - - - can't you - - - can't 4 you harmonize Short and Karlin with Daily Gazette by 5 reading Daily Gazette as - - - as focusing on whether the -6 - - the documents themselves fall within the - - - what 50-7 a describes as personnel records? So they're either 8 exempt, or they're not exempt. And - - - and if they're 9 really - - - if they're really not exempt documents, but 10 there happen to be references within them to maybe some personnel issues, then it's appropriate to redact in those 11 12 situations. But not if the documents themselves are the 13 personnel records again that - - - that 50-a is - - - is 14 addressed to. You don't redact in those situations. 15 MR. BLOOM: Your Honor - - -16 JUDGE STEIN: Can't you read - - - can't you read 17 Daily Gazette that way? 18 MR. BLOOM: Your Honor, I believe you can. 19 I'm not here to tell you that the only way to harmonize 20 decision is the way that we are proposing. What I'm here 2.1 to say is that we believe that there are two competing 2.2 legislative policies here. There are - - - there is a way 23 to harmonize them that maximizes the - - - the - - - the

open government principles that are embodied in FOIL. And

that - - - we believe that - - - that one can fully respect

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the legislative policy embodied in 50-a, if we harmonize 1 2 the two decisions by allowing redacted disclosure, but only when effective redaction can be done that to a reasonable 3 4 degree of certainty would preclude identifying the officer. 5 JUDGE GARCIA: Why isn't that your - - - if you 6 just look at FOIL and put aside 50-a and the entire issue 7 with whether 50-a would ever allow this. But if we just 8 read FOIL in Short, in Karlin, you can do that. 9 I'm having some trouble understanding why you are 10 asking us to overrule Short and Karlin, which in this case

would allow you to do whatever you want.

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So in this case, if you think the records could not be properly redacted, you don't have to turn them over and it's your call. In the next case, if you do believe that, you could turn them over. So I don't understand why you're asking us to overrule Short.

MR. BLOOM: Well, I'm not - - - I'm not sure how in light - - - if - - - if Short is deemed applicable to 50 - - - if 50-a falls under the rule of Short - - - JUDGE GARCIA: Right.

MR. BLOOM: - - - then Short says that redaction is not available.

JUDGE GARCIA: Short says you can't force an agency to redact. Short in fact says, the agency can redact.



MR. BLOOM: Well, I guess what - - - I guess what 1 2 3 JUDGE GARCIA: So no one's forcing you to do 4 that. 5 MR. BLOOM: - - - that - - - that turns to my 6 response to - - - to - - - to Judge Rivera's question, 7 which is that we - - - at least we interpret the Short 8 doctrine as saying - - - the - - - the opinion in Short as 9 not giving agencies free reign to do what they want, but 10 that 50-a controls. And unless redaction is specifically 11 authorized or unless this court says that - - - that FOIL -12 - - that - - - that - - - that use - - - the use of 13 redaction is authorized through FOIL to - - - to allow for 14 disclosure, then we would not be able to do - - - to do 15 that. 16 JUDGE STEIN: Do you agree that - - - that the 17 process set forth in 50-a is not necessary or is 18 irrelevant? In other words, notice, the right to be heard, 19 and so forth? 20 MR. BLOOM: Well - - -21 JUDGE STEIN: And a decision made by a court as 22 opposed to an agency. 23 MR. BLOOM: I - - - I think that going forward, 24 assuming - - - if - - - if the court were to agree with our 25 position that redacted disclosure where effective should be

1	allowed, then in the normal course either of a FOIL reques
2	or an agency that wishes to affirmatively disclose redacted
3	documents, a a lawsuit some type of standalone
4	lawsuit to to seek judicial permission to do so would
5	not be necessary and is not in keeping with how FOIL or -
6	- or general other principles work. That would be sort of
7	creating a new sort of standalone cause of action. So we
8	don't believe that that's the case. We believe that in
9	this
10	JUDGE STEIN: You agree with your adversary on
11	that point?
12	MR. BLOOM: Yes, on that point we do. Although
13	in this case
14	JUDGE RIVERA: I'm sorry, your position is you
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JUDGE RIVERA: I'm sorry, your position is you don't have to notify the officers and they don't get entitled to - - -

MR. BLOOM: Not if - - if the agency has made a determination that the - - that redaction is possible and sufficiently prevents the identification of the officers. And I just want to - -

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Do the officers get to weigh in on that decision?

MR. BLOOM: Again, this is like many other instances under FOIL, where potential disclosure of records - - - of government records could impact third-parties'



privacy. And generally speaking, under FOIL, government agencies are entrusted to make appropriate redactions and disclose the documents without first having to go to a court.

- - of this policy be say for victims of sex offenses?

MR. BLOOM: Well, again, we don't believe that
- - that this exemption applies to 50-b. So for instance,

there - - -

JUDGE FAHEY: So what would the implications of -

MR. BLOOM: No. And I - - - the - - - the reason is what - - - how I responded previously to a question.

I'm sorry, I forget which - - - which of you asked, which is how do we explain why this particular statute should be carved out of the Short and Karlin rule. As we argue in the brief, Short and Karlin serves an important - - - I mean, the Short and Karlin rule serves an important purpose, which is to say that we don't presume that redaction would be authorized in - - in all situations where the legislature hasn't made clear that - - - that it would be.

But in Short, there was an important footnote saying, we are unwilling to presume on the record before us that the legislature - - - that the only purpose of the legislature was to preserve confidentiality and that that



1 purpose would be fully served by redaction. So - - - so -2 - - so we won't presume that. However, leaving open the 3 possibility that in a unique situation - - - and I think we 4 have that unique situation here, 50-a, which is focused on 5 a specific use of records to embarrass an officer, that 6 purpose would be served if redaction can be done 7 effectively. 8 JUDGE RIVERA: So to - - - to clarify, is your 9 position that - - - that redaction will depend on how the 10 document is written? 11 MR. BLOOM: The ability to effectively redact it? 12 JUDGE RIVERA: Yeah, well, I'm sorry, I'm not

being - -
MR. BLOOM: Yes, it could. Yes, it definitely

JUDGE RIVERA: I'm sorry, I'm not being clear.

Really, what I want to know is that your position is that redaction should be available, the court should try and harmonize these cases in the way you've suggested. But in this case, with these documents, redaction is not, I think you said meaningfully effective?

MR. BLOOM: Yes.

could. And I think that - - -

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JUDGE RIVERA: And so these documents should not be turned over even - - - even redact - - - in a redacted form. But does that mean that these - - - the class of



these documents never get turned over? Or it depends on how it was written, and I have to make that decision for each particular document?

MR. BLOOM: I think - - - I think it's a - - - I think it's a case by case determination based on the nature of the documents. I think we can look at the - - - the, you know - - - this type of document here. But that's not to say that some other agency might not call - - - might call something by a similar name. I think each case you have to look at the type of document and how it is written.

JUDGE RIVERA: So - - - so do you agree that it might be possible, just your adversary's hypothetical, that you could have one of these final decisions that's written in such a way that you redact all the facts, you redact all the names, all that, and then you have pure legal analysis that does nothing more than in his example let him know whether or not a particular legal doctrine is being applied that he would argue is not applicable?

MR. BLOOM: Well, I guess it's possible. But the prob - - - I mean, the - - - it is possible, I suppose.

But the problem would be also whether by doing all of that, one has effectively made that pure legal analysis acontextual and thus not really representative of - - - it's unclear how it was being applied in what way. So if the purpose is to assess whether the NYPD is properly

applying legal principles, doing so when all the facts are deleted, I don't believe would be - - - would be appropriate.

JUDGE RIVERA: But that's not the standard for any other FOIL document, right?

MR. BLOOM: Well, I think that - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: I mean, lots of - - - taking his point, documents get redacted regularly. And the person who gets it may say, this is telling me nothing, or this seems to tell me A, B, and C, and it's not what the government entity thinks the document really represents. I mean, isn't that the problem that's inherent, let me put it that way, in the redacting process, and there's nothing one can do about that?

MR. BLOOM: It - - - it can be inherent in the redacting process. But I don't think that it's typically the case that you have a decision that has to be - - - where - - - where so - - - so - - so much of it has to be redacted, then you leave a sentence here or there. And then the question is whether enough of those sentences in enough of the - - - enough of the decisions add up to something that could meaningfully contribute to the - - - to the purpose of the request. I guess I want to address just we didn't speak about some of the - - - the information that is available. As - - - as Your Honors may



know, a - - - if the documents are made available, they would be available to the public, they could be posted on the website. The hearings are open to the public. Also, there have been - - - there is a - - - there are civil lawsuits that often involve the same facts as these - - - these complaints.

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There is also - - - there are also news reports.

There's also something called - - - there's a - - - the

Legal Aid has compiled a database of information from civil

lawsuits, from news reports, from other - - - from - -
potentially from leaked documents - - - from other

documents that have come out in - - - in trials that - -
that it has shared with all of the - - - the criminal

defense bar with over 10,000 police officers in it.

So there is a - - - in this case, I think a substantial - - substantial possibility that these types of records, even if the identifying details are taken out, they could be identified to particular officers. And once you start going beyond sort of discreet identifying details to the facts of the case, it's hard to say, take out this fact and not this fact, without going the rest of the way.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, counsel.

MR. BLOOM: Thank you, Your Honor.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Mr. Dunn?



MR. DUNN: Just a couple quick points. 1 2 respect to this notion about these are categorically not 3 redactable, redaction is a document by document exercise. 4 Judges do it all the time. 5 JUDGE GARCIA: That's not what happened here, 6 right? You sent five examples in and the judge said, yeah, 7 these look good, do the rest. So how can you say it's a 8 document by document process? 9 MR. DUNN: Well, Your Honor, I'm saying, Judge 10 Garcia, in terms of the general process - - - and I want to 11 be clear that to the extent that the members of this court 12 think that what needs to happen is a similar process for 13 the balance of the documents, the court can do that. 14

JUDGE GARCIA: And then would the police officer involved in that particular document have an opportunity to be heard as well?

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MR. DUNN: Yes. Just as they did here. But I want to be clear, that's a situation where the City agrees that's not necessary. But to the extent the court obviously thinks it is, that's a process that can take place. It took place for the five that we had here.

JUDGE GARCIA: How many are the total universe? I forget.

MR. DUNN: Well, there's a dispute about that.

We think based upon the record there are about 120 of these



cases. The City believes that there are more. With respect to the issue about redactability - - - and Judge Stein, you asked about whether or not there's any basis for distinguishing within 87(2)(a) between 50-a and other statutes, I do want to be clear, we mentioned this before, 50-a allows disclosure.

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The statutes for instance in Short, which dealt with intimate personal information, namely abortion records of private individuals, did not allow for any disclosure.

So Short, which is not a 50-a case, can be fairly understood to be a case that deals with private individuals with statutes that never allowed any disclosure, whereas 50-a deals with police officers and policing, something at the heart of FOIL, and it allows disclosure under certain circumstances.

And that is the basis right there for distinguishing between these types of records and the records that might be covered elsewhere by Section 87.

Finally, in terms of this - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: Let me - - - let me ask you this.

Let's say you have a case - - - let's say you wanted ten

years of documents. Just make up a number. And in those

ten years - - - and we'll stay with police officers, since

that's the focus. Obviously, 50-a covers more than just

police officers, but we'll stick with the police officers.



There's been one case of a police officer putting someone in a chokehold, the individual dies. Is it your position that they would be able to redact that - - -MR. DUNN: If that would - - -JUDGE RIVERA: - - - in a way that they could turn that over if that's the only case with that kind of fact pattern? MR. DUNN: They can absolutely redact that, Your If that's going to identify Daniel Pantaleo as a member of the police department, who was a subject of the disciplinary proceeding, of course they can redact that. The standard is, you get to redact sufficient to conceal the identity of the officer. JUDGE RIVERA: But how is that going to be if - -- if there is only one individual that fits that category? MR. DUNN: Well, they would redact the word "chokehold", and Staten Island, and 2014, and Eric Garner. And it may be that, you know, in other decisions - - - and let's say you were the one looking at it, you would say with submissions from the officer perhaps, okay, these are other things that have to come out. JUDGE STEIN: But what if that was the only hearing in that - - - in that period of time, and that hearing was a public hearing?

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Well, that might be an instance, Your

1	Honor, where uniquely where they could withhold the
2	entire document. That's okay. You know, again
3	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, counsel.
4	MR. DUNN: All right. Thank you, Your Honors.
5	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: You're welcome.
6	(Court is adjourned)
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CERTIFICATION I, Amber Minton, certify that the foregoing transcript of proceedings in the Court of Appeals of Matter of New York Civil Liberties Union v. New York City Police Department, No. 133 was prepared using the required transcription equipment and is a true and accurate record of the proceedings. Signature: Agency Name: eScribers Address of Agency: 352 Seventh Avenue Suite 604 New York, NY 10001 November 20, 2018 Date: 2.2

