1	COURT OF APPEALS	
2	STATE OF NEW YORK	
3		
4	MATTER OF DeVERA,	
5	Respondent,	
6	-against-	No. 115
7	ELIA,	
8	Appellant.	
9		
		20 Eagle Stree Albany, New Yor
10	Before:	October 10, 201
11	CHIEF JUDGE JAN	
12	ASSOCIATE JUDGE C ASSOCIATE JUDGE LE	SLIE E. STEIN
13	ASSOCIATE JUDGE EU ASSOCIATE JUDGE MIC	HAEL J. GARCIA
14	ASSOCIATE JUDGE RO ASSOCIATE JUDGE E	
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Sara Winkeljohn

Official Court Transcriber

1	Appearances:
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3	ZAINAB A. CHAUDHRY, ASG. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK Attorney for Appellant Elia
4	The Capitol Albany, NY 12224
5	
6	INGRID R. GUSTAFSON, ESQ. CORPORATION COUNSEL OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK
7	Attorney for Appellant NYCO DOE 100 Church Street
8	New York, NY 10007
9	STEVEN L. HOLLEY, ESQ.
10	SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP Attorney for Respondent Success Academy
11	125 Broad Street New York, NY 10004
12	New Tolk, NI 10004
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CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: The next appeal on the calendar is appeal number 115, Matter of DeVera v. Elia.

Good afternoon, counsel.

MS. CHAUDHRY: Good afternoon. May it please the court, Zainab Chaudhry for the Commissioner. Your Honor, if I may please reserve one minute for rebuttal.

When charter schools are collaborating with the school district to provide Article 73 Pre-K, they are operating outside of their charters and wholly outside of the charter school statute.

JUDGE RIVERA: Counsel, let me ask you, under the statute what is the Commissioner's interpretation of what entity is responsible for oversight and monitoring of the programs, the programs that are part of that consolidated district application that - - - that's approved?

MS. CHAUDHRY: Your Honor, the - - - it's a coextensive authority that is shared among the school
district, which is centrally responsible to, you know,
operate the streamlined oversight. The Commissioner's also
responsible ultimately for ensuring to the legislature that
the program is operating as intended and that the program
quality is being met, and the charter entities share in
that authority as well.

JUDGE RIVERA: No, but let's put aside the charter for one moment. I just - - - everybody else but

the charter, let me put it that way. Where would I find that in the legislation, what you just described that the -- - the state has particular oversight and the district who puts forward the consolidated application that's then granted or approved, where - - - where can I find that? Where's that language in the statute? MS. CHAUDHRY: Yes, Your Honor, there - - -JUDGE RIVERA: Or is it in the regs? Where - -

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where would I find that?

MS. CHAUDHRY: It's all over the place, first of all.

JUDGE RIVERA: Okay. Fair enough.

MS. CHAUDHRY: It's in the very design of the subject to the approval of the scheme contemplates this type of oversight by all three entities. But specifically, expressly in subsection (10) we have the inspection authority which does name the department, the school district with which any entity may be partnering.

JUDGE RIVERA: Yes, but that's my problem with your argument. There is a difference between an inspection and ongoing oversight and monitoring and curricular approval.

MS. CHAUDHRY: Your Honor, the inspections serve to assist and ensure that the full monitoring review is taking place. They have to under this statutory scheme



1	have a broad meaning. They can't have a narrow meaning
2	given the critical purposes those inspections serve within
3	the statutory scheme and the overall design.
4	JUDGE STEIN: Well, you'll agree that subdivision
5	(10) and subdivision (12) are apparently at odds here. An
6	let let me ask you why the following interpretation
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let - - - let me ask you why the following interpretation doesn't harmonize the two. (10) says three entities have to inspect, right, and it says that it has to be done at least twice a year, right. So that - - - we know it doesn't mean twice a year by each of those entities, right?

MS. CHAUDHRY: Right.

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JUDGE STEIN: Okay. And then it says that one of those two - - - at least one of those two times has to be by the charter entity if that's applicable, right?

MS. CHAUDHRY: Right.

JUDGE STEIN: So why can't it be that in the - - in terms of charter schools both of those times have to
be by the charter entity? Then that to me would harmonize
those two sub-divisions. Why is that not an appropriate
interpretation?

MS. CHAUDHRY: The reason is, Your Honor, because it would give the charter entities exclusive authority not only in contravention of the language of (10) but the entire statutory scheme. And what's really important is to

JUDGE STEIN: Well, but the entire statutory 1 2 scheme about charter schools is that they get to get this 3 funding, and they're overseen by the charter entity. 4 MS. CHAUDHRY: For purposes of the Charter School 5 Act, Your Honor, I will wholly agree with you. 6 JUDGE STEIN: But why would there be a different policy here? Why is that - - - why is there any reason to 7 8 think that the legislature didn't intend that very same 9 thing? MS. CHAUDHRY: There's several reasons, Your 10 11 First of all, the legislature made a deliberate 12 choice not to put charter school - - - excuse me, not to 13 put Pre-K into Charter - - - the Charter Schools Act - - -14 JUDGE GARCIA: But they would have had to put a 15 whole other statute in for everybody else anyway. 16 they couldn't have done this whole thing in the Charter 17 School Act. They did it separately, and then they 18 referenced the Charter School Act. 19 MS. CHAUDHRY: Well, but the - - -20 JUDGE GARCIA: That's a lot easier than putting 21 it in the Charter School Act and referencing everybody 2.2 else. 23 MS. CHAUDHRY: Well, it's true that the 2014 law 24 would have had to have been implemented regardless. But 25 the - - - they could still have put charter schools into

the Charter Schools Act if they wanted that full autonomy. But the reason charter school - - - excuse me, charter entity enforcement and oversight is not enough to protect the state's interest - - - and Ms. Gustafson will speak to the district's - - - but primarily because of the very limited enforcement options that a charter entity would have if one of its schools is not meeting Pre-K quality and other requirements. It doesn't hold any of the purse strings here. It's not a party to any Pre-K contract. The charter that it has with its school only covers K through 12. So the only thing it could do is enforcement under Article 56 which only allows for revocation of the entirety of the charter.

JUDGE GARCIA: Can I ask a - - - go up a little bit to ask a broader and a very basic question. I apologize, but under this grant system that worked here there was certain money available to the city, and there was a consolidated application. But it's - - - it's unclear to me, and maybe just the way I read it, that application was then made through the school district to the state and approved and the money went back down to the state and then was dispersed according to the application? Or money went down to the state, 300 million from the state to the city - - -

MS. CHAUDHRY: The district.



JUDGE GARCIA: - - - and then the city decided 1 2 who was going to get that money? How did it work? 3 MS. CHAUDHRY: The department put out a request 4 for proposals. The city school district put in an 5 application for a consolidated program which they're 6 required to do, and then it had conducted its own requests for proposals project looking for - - -7 8 JUDGE GARCIA: So the money it was getting from 9 the state in the - - - in the grant just was going to the 10 district. The state wasn't seeing, okay, there are these other entities that are consolidated in your application? 11 12 MS. CHAUDHRY: We know there are consolidated 13 entities, but we treat them as the district's 14 subcontractors. There is - - - the - - - the district has 15 the contract with the state for the grant funds, and it has 16 to assure the state that every single provider, charter 17 school or otherwise, is meeting the grant requirements. 18 JUDGE RIVERA: Okay. So it's the Commissioner's 19 -- - let me understand this. So it's the Commissioner's 20 interpretation of the statute that the districts can impose 2.1 other - - - let's use curricular for one moment, other 2.2 curricular requirements beyond what it said anywhere in the 23 legislation or anywhere in the Commissioner's regulations? 24 MS. CHAUDHRY: They're not other requirements,



Your Honor. What they are is the statute and the

regulations that set for the Pre-K requirements, they cover 1 2 the eight quality criteria in - - - in a generalized 3 manner. But the way they have to be, you know, the 4 district's terms - - - and Ms. Gustafson will speak to that 5 but they are - - - the Commissioner found them to be 6 directly correlated and linking back to each of the 7 statutory factors and that they were a reasonable means to 8 implement the district's obligations to us. 9 JUDGE RIVERA: So - - - so number two, "All 10 universal full-day Pre-K programs shall demonstrate quality on the following elements." Let's just pick the first one, 11 12 A, curriculum, okay. So that is referring to the partners 13 with the district when it says, "All universal full-day 14 Pre-K programs," right? We're talking about the programs

MS. CHAUDHRY: Correct.

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JUDGE RIVERA: Okay. Where do those partners find the curricula or can they design it themselves or is it the district that designs it and imposes it on them?

that are actually delivered by the partners, correct?

MS. CHAUDHRY: They do have the ability to be innovative and creative.

JUDGE RIVERA: Who's the they? I'm sorry.

MS. CHAUDHRY: I'm sorry. The charter schools as a provider - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: Well, the provider.



MS. CHAUDHRY: - - - or the providers in general. 1 2 JUDGE RIVERA: Yes, I - - - yeah. 3 MS. CHAUDHRY: Yes, they have the ability to be 4 innovative and creative in developing their programs as to 5 each of these aspects of the quality criteria. 6 JUDGE RIVERA: Yes. 7 MS. CHAUDHRY: But the district is responsible for supervising them, and so it must be able to supervise 8 9 them in a way that is consistent across the board. 10 JUDGE GARCIA: But does that mean - - - what bothers me with that is you're allowing let's say a 11 12 subcontractor or a sub-grantee then to kind of backdoor in 13 oversight over a curriculum that they wouldn't normally 14 have, and I think that's what the statute says. So by just 15 block granting out this money to the city, to the district, 16 you're not approving anything other than their application. 17 You're not saying no to the charter school, so they're not 18 saying no to the charter schools. They're consolidating 19 them, and then they're saying, okay, to really get this 20 money now you're going to have to do all these things we 21 want you to do. 2.2 Well, they have proposed - - -MS. CHAUDHRY: 23 JUDGE GARCIA: And I don't see where they get the 24 authority to do that.

MS. CHAUDHRY: Your Honor, the authority is

1	inherent and explicit in the statute, but they have
2	the charter schools have proposed
3	JUDGE GARCIA: Where in the statute is that? I -
4	you point to an inspection provision which as Judge
5	Stein was pointing out
6	MS. CHAUDHRY: Even under the reading of Article
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8	JUDGE GARCIA: has many different entities
9	that can inspect, and in fact, if the charter school is
10	allowed to make a direct application to the state that
11	school district isn't even involved in the inspection at
12	all. So I have a hard time seeing how critical the school
13	district inspection is when they don't even have to be
14	involved if a charter school makes a direct application.
15	MS. CHAUDHRY: Well
16	JUDGE GARCIA: So if they don't like what the
17	charter school is doing they can say go do your own thing.
18	MS. CHAUDHRY: That's right. They're involved to
19	the extent they have to consider the proposal.
20	JUDGE GARCIA: They can reject it.
21	MS. CHAUDHRY: They can reject it. But here they
22	did not reject it
23	JUDGE GARCIA: In which case they wouldn't get
24	control over the curriculum. So if they reject the charter
25	school

1 MS. CHAUDHRY: Well, in that case, Your Honor, 2 the state would have oversight authority. 3 JUDGE GARCIA: And that would be a very different 4 case. 5 MS. CHAUDHRY: And that's the problem here is 6 that under the Appellate Division's reading and the 7 petitioner's reading they've assigned them an exclusive - -8 - the charter entities an exclusive authority even to the 9 exclusion of the state. And we have no way to know that 10 millions of dollars annually that go to charter schools for 11 these programs are being used in accordance with the 12 quality requirements. 13 JUDGE STEIN: But you trust them to do that for 14 grades K through 12. 15 MS. CHAUDHRY: They do that pursuant to their 16 charter, Your Honor, and they are subject to a very 17 different oversight system. 18 JUDGE STEIN: But let me ask you this, if the 19 charter entity was the one to - - - to do the inspection or 20 the - - - you know, the supervision, would they not have to 2.1 follow - - - would that entity not have to follow the 2.2 education department's protocol - - - inspection protocol? 23 MS. CHAUDHRY: Your Honor, the statute does not 24 require them to follow the protocol exactly as - - - as a



guideline, but they are required to make sure their charter

1	schools are meeting the quality elements.
2	JUDGE STEIN: No, no. I mean under
3	under this Pre-K program not not the charter
4	schools.
5	MS. CHAUDHRY: Yes.
6	JUDGE STEIN: Okay. So
7	MS. CHAUDHRY: Yes, under the under the
8	Pre-K program the state has developed
9	JUDGE STEIN: So so let's say you agree
10	that at least they can do the inspection at least once,
11	right? That's what the that's what the
12	MS. CHAUDHRY: Well, they can do that, and they
13	have the full amount of oversight authority to look at
14	anything else. It's just not exclusive. And let me just
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16	JUDGE STEIN: But, no, my my question is
17	that one time that they do it do they have to follow the
18	state's protocol?
19	MS. CHAUDHRY: They are not required to use the
20	state's protocol in doing that inspection. However, the
21	program itself does meet need to meet the protocol
22	which is typically
23	JUDGE STEIN: Okay.
24	MS. CHAUDHRY: what the district is doing
25	and using.

1	JUDGE STEIN: But why my question is why
2	can't the entity do that very same thing that you're saying
3	that the school district should do?
4	MS. CHAUDHRY: Your Honor, they could do it. We
5	are not saying that an entity like the charter entity would
6	be flouting its obligations. What we do know is in this
7	case it was not done. There is nothing in the record about
8	that. But, you know, even
9	JUDGE GARCIA: But there was no inspection done
10	here, right?
11	MS. CHAUDHRY: there's multiple oversight -
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13	JUDGE GARCIA: They never got any money, so what
14	what are you saying if there's nothing in the record
15	that they did it? Maybe I'm misunderstanding what you
16	said.
17	MS. CHAUDHRY: Well, they were running the
18	program and they did begin running the program. And so
19	there was no indication or establishment in the record that
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21	JUDGE GARCIA: They never got any funding, right?
22	MS. CHAUDHRY: Right.
23	JUDGE GARCIA: So what would you be inspecting
24	since you never gave them any money?



MS. CHAUDHRY: I understand your point, Your

Honor. They were running the program. However, whether 1 2 they did it in this case or not beyond that that things can 3 always fall through the cracks. And under petitioner's 4 reading, there is no backup if the inspections are not 5 done. 6 JUDGE RIVERA: Well, let me ask you - - - let me 7 ask you what the Commissioner interprets provision (12) to 8 mean when it says - - - forget the word "all" for one 9 moment, please. I'm focused on something else. 10 MS. CHAUDHRY: Okay. 11 JUDGE RIVERA: It says it has, "The 12 responsibility of monitoring programmatic review and 13 operational requirements." Is that what - - - what is used 14 here, that term "responsibility," is the Commissioner's 15 position that's the same responsibility as the district? 16 It's not a different kind of review or oversight? 17 MS. CHAUDHRY: The Commissioner's position is 18 that it - - - this section that you quoted means that - - -19 JUDGE RIVERA: Yes. 20 MS. CHAUDHRY: - - - all aspects of review - - -2.1 JUDGE RIVERA: Okay. 22 MS. CHAUDHRY: - - - whether it relates to 23 quality, whether it relates to anything else, are available 24 for the charter entity to look at, just not exclusively.

But by having them involved - - - and maybe this is - - -

1 JUDGE RIVERA: No, no, no, no. 2 MS. CHAUDHRY: I'm sorry. I think I 3 misunderstood you. 4 JUDGE RIVERA: I'm sorry. I'm not being clear. 5 No, no, I get your - - - where you are. It's the argument 6 you made in the brief, but I'm asking something different. 7 MS. CHAUDHRY: I apologize, Your Honor. 8 JUDGE RIVERA: I - - - no, no, I'm not being 9 I'm trying to understand what the Commissioner's position is - - - and perhaps I'm just misunderstanding 10 11 this language, so you can help me. What that means to be, 12 "Shall be responsible" - - - "shall be responsible." 13 Responsible in my mind can mean many things. It need not 14 mean that I supervise and oversee everything that you do on 15 a - - - as a daily matter. So I'm trying to understand 16 what the Commissioner views this term "responsibility." 17 Because of course the legislature could have written that 18 the charter school charter entity shall monitor, do 19 programmatic review, and be the sole entity responsible for 20 operational requirements. But it's written differently, 2.1 and I'm trying to understand why. 2.2 MS. CHAUDHRY: I think the answer to your 23 question, Your Honor, is the reason that they needed to 24 affirmatively grant a responsibility to the charter entity

is that under - - - and this is one of the core purposes of

- of section (12) which is not only to - - - to bring charter schools in to be able to participate because they're excluded otherwise but the charter entity is also excluded from any oversight authority or responsibility just by virtue of the Charter Schools Act. Its authority was originally it's created there, the charter entity is limited to - - - to their role there. So in this case the legislature had to put it in, and this was the purpose - - the main purpose behind subsection (12).

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And it might help - - - just I understand my time is - - is expired at the moment, but just to quickly say perhaps it would step - - - help to step back and look at why the legislature would have included charter entities at all if they didn't want them to have all the responsibility. It's common to have shared oversight in - - - in the education context. Even under the Charter Schools Act, the charter entity is not the exclusive oversight authority. It shares that authority coextensively to the same extent as the Board of Regents. So it's never had exclusive authority anywhere. But secondly - - -

JUDGE WILSON: May - - - may I ask you - - - I'm sorry.

MS. CHAUDHRY: Yes.

JUDGE WILSON: Go ahead with the second and then



I'll ask you after.

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MS. CHAUDHRY: Just to quickly say why the legislature gave them a role, they gave them the ability to ensure two things. One, that Pre-K offered by their schools is appropriately integrated with their early elementary education. That is one of the quality requirements in the Pre-K law, and the legislature understood that that could only happen for charter schools if the question of continuity and integration gave - - - if they gave charter entities a role in that process.

And the second thing is it makes sure that the provision of Pre-K that the school is offering does not affect the school's ability otherwise under its charter to meet those terms and meet the requirements of the act for their K through 12. So you need the charter entity involved, but the legislature never intended that to be an exclusive authority. I'm sorry, Your Honor.

about two things if either of them is wrong. One is that the state when it used the RFP advised school districts that providers that were included within a bid would be subject to the jurisdiction of the local school district. Is that correct or not correct?

MS. CHAUDHRY: That's correct. And it's required because they consider them subcontractors, and the district



1	has to give the state assurances not just from the
2	statutory terms but from the grant terms
3	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: So, counsel, under
4	MS. CHAUDHRY: about what it will do.
5	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: appropriate
6	circumstances, can the charter make a direct application to
7	the state?
8	MS. CHAUDHRY: The charter school, Your Honor?
9	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Yes.
LO	MS. CHAUDHRY: Only if it's denied inclusion
L1	-
L2	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Okay.
L3	MS. CHAUDHRY: in the district application.
L4	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: So the answer's yes,
L5	correct? And if they are accepted would the state require
L 6	that charter to enter into the same kind contract with the
L7	same specific programmatic requirements?
L8	MS. CHAUDHRY: The programmatic requirements
L9	would be the same. We would likely require them to use the
20	statewide protocol. But it's the district in that case
21	that would have no authority to oversee.
22	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Okay.
23	JUDGE GARCIA: So I'm sorry.
24	JUDGE WILSON: I'm sorry. I
25	JUDGE GARCIA: Would that just to follow up



1 that question, would that be - - - has that happened? Have 2 charter schools gone directly to the state? 3 MS. CHAUDHRY: There are no charter schools 4 currently operating independently, and the only ones that 5 are currently operating at all are under the New York 6 City's consolidated program. 7 JUDGE GARCIA: Apologies, Judge Wilson. 8 JUDGE WILSON: The second thing that I wanted you 9 to correct me about - - -10 MS. CHAUDHRY: Yes. 11 JUDGE WILSON: - - - if I'm wrong is that when 12 the city responded to the RFP it told the state that it 13 would be responsible for, among other things, the 14 curriculum of the alternative providers included within its 15 bid? 16 MS. CHAUDHRY: Well, it was going to make sure 17 that the curriculum was going to meet the quality standards 18 that the statute and the grant terms required. 19 JUDGE WILSON: Okay. Thank you. 20 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, counsel. 2.1 MS. GUSTAFSON: Good afternoon, Your Honors; 22 Ingrid Gustafson appearing on behalf of municipal 23 appellants. I would like to reserve two minutes for 24 rebuttal, please. 25 I'd like to start with the issue of where the

school district's authority comes from in the UPK law, and the answer is it comes from multiple sources. Yes, it's explicit in (10) which specifically says that all partnering providers shall be inspected by the school district. But it is also inherent in the statutory scheme set up by subdivisions (2), (3), (7), and (9). So what subdivision (3) does is subdivision (3) favors applications by school districts. It requires all providers to you --

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charter school can come to you and you can say we want you to do these things and you can say no, and they can go their way and deal with the state. But it seems like what happened here was - - and you have that authority under the - - under the statute. But you don't say no, you say maybe. So they can't go independently, and then you have the money. And you have - - you have to sign our contract which is very heavily influencing the curriculum. So I don't see how that type of process is authorized under the statute.

MS. GUSTAFSON: If I may start with the process and then move to what exactly happened here. So the process - - - DOA in its RFP made clear that it was going to be requiring its partnering providers to be supervised by the district.

1 JUDGE GARCIA: So - - - okay. Now the charter 2 school doesn't like that. What can they do? 3 MS. GUSTAFSON: I think - - - well, they - - -4 JUDGE GARCIA: Yeah. 5 MS. GUSTAFSON: They - - - well, the statute 6 requires them to first go through the school district. 7 mean that is what - - -8 JUDGE GARCIA: Right, and you're saying maybe if 9 you sign this thing that you're not going to want to sign -10 - - but we're going to say yes contingent on that. So what can they do at that point? 11 12 MS. GUSTAFSON: That is - - -13 JUDGE GARCIA: They can't go independently, and 14 they don't want to agree that you have authority over their 15 curriculum. So they're stuck. 16 MS. GUSTAFSON: That is the nature of the 17 legislative design. It requires all partnering providers 18 to first go through - - - through school districts. 19 JUDGE GARCIA: And you have a yes or no rule. 20 JUDGE RIVERA: I don't understand how they're 21 You tell them we've got this great program, lots of stuck. 22 money, we want to be creative, do you want to be part of 23 it? Do you want to come to the party? Tell them but we're 24 going to have requirements for you to come to the party and 25

they say okay.

1 MS. GUSTAFSON: Exactly. 2 JUDGE RIVERA: They said okay. 3 MS. GUSTAFSON: That's - - - and that is exactly 4 what happened here. 5 They reserved their rights when JUDGE GARCIA: 6 they said okay. But - - -7 JUDGE RIVERA: But they can't do that. 8 JUDGE GARCIA: So the point is they - - - they 9 get neither a yes nor a no from you, so they can't go 10 separately. And then when you get your block grant, which it seems you already had, you can say we'll give you this 11 12 money, but you have to sign this contract which is 13 influencing or imposing these requirements on your 14 curriculum which arguably under the statute you can't do. 15 But the problem it seems to me is the charter schools have 16 no way then to go directly to the state and have the state 17 pass on whether or not we want to grant you this money 18 except if they agree to your terms. And if they don't they 19 have no recourse. So you are essentially putting yourself 20 in the position of the grantor with conditions on 21 curriculum which I think is problematic under the language 2.2 of the statute. 23 MS. GUSTAFSON: I - - - I disagree, and if I may, 24 I - - - I think that's inherent in the design. And if - -25 - I think the larger issue here is this. This statute

doesn't function like the Charter Schools Act for any provider, including charter schools. The Charter Schools Act is based on an accountability and oversight scheme that is very hands-off. The UPK law is not. It is a quality standards-based law - - -

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Charter Schools Act so - - - so they're - - - they're two very different things. And I guess my question is is if the state - - - if the legislature was willing to give charter schools this degree of autonomy in grades K through 12, why can't they be trusted to do that - - - or why - - - not why can't they be trusted, why wouldn't the legislature make the same determination when it comes to Pre-K? Yes, somebody obviously has to oversee them, but the charter entity was good enough for K through 12.

MS. GUSTAFSON: The answer is that they - - they didn't. There's nothing weird about that. The UPK
law sets up a unique scheme for every provider. It's not
integrated with K through 12 for anyone. It's a unique
program that functions through ongoing oversight, through
specified quality standards and other - - and other
requirements. And there's a very key difference between
how the Charter Schools Act works and how the UPK law
works. School districts are the ones in subdivision (3)
who are made responsible for determining which programs are



funded and which programs are renewed. And it can only do this $-\ -\ -$

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Is part of the problem, counsel, that in K through 12 there are objective assessments at the end of the day that you could look at to see if a program is successful and that's very different from a Pre-K program where it's more difficult to assess where children - - - and every child is going to leave the program and go on to kindergarten. Is that part of the issue?

MS. GUSTAFSON: I think it - - - I think it very well could be. But I think the key is that the legislature here made a judgment about what this type of program was going - - was going to be like, and it was going to be based on ongoing supervision and compliance with quality standards. Districts cannot grant or renew funding to providers that don't meet those quality standards. And what the Third Department's decision would - - -

JUDGE STEIN: Well, but they don't go in and monitor and do all these things before they grant the application. So isn't the question really whether they're going to renew the application or renew the - - - the grant?

MS. GUSTAFSON: I think - - - I think the renewal power is key, but the - - - the Third Department's decision



here would - - - would strip that of its - - - of any substance because it - - -

JUDGE STEIN: Well, no, it would require them to rely on another agency to implement the review protocols established by the state. That's what it would - - - that's what it would do.

MS. GUSTAFSON: Here's - - - I think this will answer your question, Your Honor. Here's our problem, the Charter Schools Act - - - what - - - what petitioners are proposing is not how things work under either the Charter Schools Act or under the UPK law. Under the Charter Schools Act, charter authorizers are the ones who grant charters and the ones that renew them and the ones that are ultimately responsible for oversight. Under the UPK law as it usually works - - again, petitioners concede that usually under the provisions of this law DOE can - - can provide the kind of supervision it does here. Usually, under the UPK law DOE has the renewal authority and it also has substantive review authority.

What petitioners are proposing is a disconnect. School districts are responsible for making the determination of who gets into the program and who gets renewed, where the money is going. They have no substantive oversight authority. Charter authorizers have all of the oversight authority but no ability to determine



who's actually participating. That's not how it works under either statute.

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JUDGE RIVERA: Let me say at the beginning you - you mentioned that the scheme overall supports your
position and you got to discuss (3) but you also mentioned
(7) and (9). You're running out of time, but can you
quickly tell us what (7) and (9) - - -

MS. GUSTAFSON: It's (2) - - - it's (2), (7), and (9). Only and all - - - what those provisions provider is that providers can only participate in the program if they meet detailed quality standards and other requirements.

Again, and DOE is the one who's making that determination.

Without any mechanism for determining whether or not all of its partnering providers - - -

on the charter entity to - - - to do the necessary monitoring and inspection based on their standards that they set and then report back. And maybe they can't - - - the charter entity can't in and of itself deny funding but certainly if it reports to the state that they're not doing what they're supposed to be doing then the state's not going to give them funding.

MS. GUSTAFSON: I think this hits on a crucial point, Your Honor. One, just very briefly, I do think it's extraordinary that DOE would require on just the pleasure



of another entity provided with that information. But what petitioners are relying on here is that - - - or hoping for, I believe, is that charter authorizers aren't going to do the kind of supervision that is required by the UPK law. Charter authorizers in the usual course are very hands-off. They don't set standards. They do an annual review. They approve - - they renew charters. But substantive standards are set by the board of the charter school. They don't usually do this kind of supervision.

JUDGE STEIN: And here the - - - JUDGE GARCIA: But that's - - I'm sorry

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JUDGE STEIN: - - - substantive standards would be set by DOE.

MS. GUSTAFSON: The - - - I think what

petitioners - - - but that wouldn't flow from the Third

Department's interpretation, Your Honor. The Third

Department said only charter authorizers have this

authority. That would appear to preclude the state, and

petitioners have never defended that result. If it's true

that only - - -

JUDGE STEIN: Well, so - - - as I - - - as I understand it, it would preclude the state from being the one to go in and monitor and inspect and all that stuff, but it wouldn't preclude the state from saying you're not getting our money.

MS. GUSTAFSON: The money, yes. Okay. Here - -- I think here is - - - here is another issue. Quality - -- the - - - to determine quality necessarily requires a judgment, necessarily requires standard. How - - - do you show quality? You have to have guideposts, standards to determine how that is shown. What the Third Department's decision does is it says only charter authorizers get - - at least on its face it appears to say only charter authorizers get to do that. But it's DOE that has the responsibility of making the funding determination here, and it's the state that authorizes the program.

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JUDGE GARCIA: But you can make that - - - what I come back to is you can make that and say under these circumstances we can do this. I'm sorry you're not part of our consolidated application which takes you out of the inspection protocol. It takes you out of this. operates the way Judge Stein says and these charter schools which are speculating are going to do this type of job which you say they're going to do, the state controls the purse at the end of the day, and they can look at what the charter school entities are doing, look at the inspection reports they're getting, and say that's not good enough. We're not giving you any money. So I don't understand this insertion of the school district into this this way.

> MS. GUSTAFSON: The -



1	JUDGE GARCIA: You can deny them part of your
2	consolidated application.
3	MS. GUSTAFSON: Here's the issue with that, Your
4	Honor. The subdivision (3) directly requires school
5	districts to solicit applications with charter schools.
6	JUDGE GARCIA: Right, but you can you can
7	say no. You can say, look, if that your view and
8	some sign this and some don't. If you aren't willing to
9	sign this then you're out.
10	MS. GUSTAFSON: We made that was made very
11	clear, Your Honor.
12	JUDGE GARCIA: So now everyone knows you're out.
13	So now charter school comes, they're not signing something
14	you say no, go your own way, and then they can go to the
15	state and and so I don't understand the crisis that
16	will happen if the statute provides for charter schools
17	being able to go directly if the school district doesn't
18	have this authority.
19	MS. GUSTAFSON: Then I think I think
20	JUDGE GARCIA: Because the statute contemplates
21	that you don't.
22	MS. GUSTAFSON: I think the school district will
23	be in the situation of doing a blanket no. Here's
24	here's the issue with what happened here. What the
25	application Success submitted complied with all of the

requirements of the contract. I mean it - - - and I - - - and I think that boil - - - shows why what this lawsuit is all about is it's the debate of philosophy. The petitioners here don't want to be subject to the oversight scheme that is contemplated by the UPK law itself. They want to be subjected to the Charter Schools Act. The contract sets baseline substantive standards. Success' application, which is in the record and I can pull the pages - - -

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JUDGE GARCIA: Even some of those baseline standards are thrown out by the state, right, three of them?

MS. GUSTAFSON: There were - - - there were two,

Your Honor. One had to do with audits and it was the role

of the state comptroller. The other had to do with the

prevailing wage provision, so it was actually sort of - -
it was - - - they were very sort of - - -

JUDGE GARCIA: But those were you considered baseline when you put them in the contract.

MS. GUSTAFSON: The contract does a lot of things, Your Honor, as does any contract that governs the distribution of funds. It - - it requires compliance with all sorts of laws, discrimination laws for example. It - - it includes basic provisions that you would have in any, you know, state contract about insurance,

licensing, things like that, and that's what a lot of the contract does. But yes, it - - - what the heart of the contract seeks to do is set - - - set baseline standards to try to implement, you know, what does it mean - - - to - - to set an understanding, what does it mean to show quality on all of these different statutory elements.

And Success' application met all of them. They have never once come forth with an example. They did - - - they - - - and I think this - - - this actually leads me to another crucial point that I think answers one of Your - - Your Honor's earlier points which is that charter schools - - - Success offered an entire year of UPK paid classes, and they have never once said, you know, yes, and our program would have done this differently. This is what we would have done differently absent your contract.

Moreover, DOE actually has sixteen charter schools that are currently partnering with it, and this is another reason why we know, Your Honor, that charter authorizers are not doing this kind of supervision.

JUDGE WILSON: I just want to go back to the mechanics for one second to what Judge Garcia was getting at. So we're arguing here for the moment about the 2015-2016 school year, right? That's - - - that's the money that's at issue.

MS. GUSTAFSON: That's right.



JUDGE WILSON: I don't see the city's application 1 2 to the state for the school year in the record anywhere. 3 What I do see is the 2014-2015. That application has a 4 really long, hard-to-read chart, covers many, many pages, 5 that lists school by school identifying whether it's a 6 school in the district, whether it's an alternate provider, 7 or whether it's a charter school. I assume that an 8 application like that was submitted for - - - to the state 9 by the city for the 2015-2016 school year; is that right? 10 MS. GUSTAFSON: That is correct. I'm not - - -11 I'm - - - my understanding and - - - was that this was the 12 application for that first year, the one that is in the 13 record is the relevant one.

JUDGE WILSON: Well, if that is the application for this year then Success Academy is not listed in it.

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MS. GUSTAFSON: That - - - that is correct.

1	listed in this application to the state for which there is
2	at least an imputed amount of money based on the headcount,
3	et cetera, that would come out, do you get to keep that
4	money or do you have to send it back to the state?
5	MS. GUSTAFSON: I think it would have to go to
6	another provider or go back to the state.
7	JUDGE WILSON: Well, which of those? Do you have
8	the authority to give it to another provider, or and
9	that's only if you were then substituting that service with
10	a different provider or
11	MS. GUSTAFSON: Yes, or
12	JUDGE WILSON: otherwise you'd have to
13	return it?
14	MS. GUSTAFSON: or adding on. What
15	happened what happened here, Your Honor, my
16	understanding isyou're correct that it's not on the
17	original list is that it was it was applied and
18	added afterward and was then funded under DOE's
19	consolidated application and that wasn't that wasn't
20	an issue because that is that is DOE's role to select
21	its partnering providers. I mean if it's an issue if
22	it were dispositive then I think
23	JUDGE WILSON: I'm sorry. What was added
24	what was added afterwards?
25	MS. GUSTAFSON: I'm sorry?

1	JUDGE WILSON: What you said it was added
2	afterwards?
3	MS. GUSTAFSON: Success is funded under the
4	consolidated application, that is it's funded in accordance
5	in accordance with those terms.
6	JUDGE WILSON: Even though it's not listed
7	MS. GUSTAFSON: In that in that 300
8	million, the application for 300 million.
9	JUDGE WILSON: Even though it's not listed in
10	that list that you've included in the record?
11	MS. GUSTAFSON: That is that is correct.
12	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, counsel. Thank
13	you.
14	MS. GUSTAFSON: Thank you.
15	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Counsel.
16	MR. HOLLEY: Good afternoon, Your Honors. May it
17	please the court, Steven Holley for Success Academy Charter
18	Schools New York City.
19	JUDGE GARCIA: Counsel, before we go off on
20	on anything else can you just follow-up on that point?
21	Because I'm a little confused now. I thought this money
22	essentially came to the city as a block and then the city
23	took applications. But was the process that these

providers applied to the city and then were a part of a

specific application to the state?

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MR. HOLLEY: That is not my understanding, Your 1 2 Honor. I could be wrong about that, but my understanding 3 was - -4 JUDGE GARCIA: 300 million is the total amount 5 going to New York City, right? 6 MR. HOLLEY: - - - 300 million came to the New York City Department of Education. They then had an RFP 7 8 process and decided who was going to get that money. 9 don't believe the state education department was making 10 that determination. 11 JUDGE WILSON: Well, but, counsel, what do you 12 make of what is at the record at 2173 which has a whole 13 series of charts behind it and just before that has an 14 affidavit from - - - I've forgotten the woman's name, Ms. 15 Pappas I think, affirming that it is a true and accurate 16 copy of the submission made by the city to the state? 17 There's a whole long list, school location by school

18 location, provider by provider, that spans I don't know 20

pages.

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JUDGE GARCIA: Is that an application or is that what the money then was going to be used for after the city RFP of the 300 million dollars?

MR. HOLLEY: And, Your Honor, just to be clear, you're referring to the statement of assurances that starts on page 2173?



JUDGE WILSON: On - - - well, the whole thing really starts on 2153, but then the chart that I'm referring to, yes, is the statement of assurances that starts at 2173 and then continues after that. It's all part of what is labeled as Exhibit C.

MR. HOLLEY: Right.

JUDGE WILSON: Which is on page 2052 as to which the - - - there's an affidavit earlier on explaining what

the - - - there's an affidavit earlier on explaining what it is. I think that's at 2058.

MR. HOLLEY: So I'm looking, Your Honor, at page 2156.

JUDGE WILSON: Yes.

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MR. HOLLEY: Which says that the New York City

Department of Education is - - is requesting 300 million

dollars from the statewide universal full-day pre
kindergarten program to provide over 50,000 high-quality

seats. My understanding is, Your Honor, that - - - that

this is not an exhaustive listing of all of those 50,000

seats for which the city was requesting 300 million

dollars. And - - -

JUDGE WILSON: Well, there's a certification on the page you read me, the statement of assurances, that says that it's to the best of my knowledge complete and accurate and what follows that is this long list, and now you're saying it's not complete.



1	MR. HOLLEY: No, I I think it it may
2	well be as Ms. Gustafson said that that this was what
3	existed in the time that this was was made, but, you
4	know, I think other
5	JUDGE WILSON: Well, this is what was this
6	is what was submitted to the state, no?
7	MR. HOLLEY: Yeah, correct, Your Honor.
8	JUDGE WILSON: So is there the possibility after
9	the submission of adding an alternative provider?
LO	MR. HOLLEY: Well
L1	JUDGE WILSON: Because that seems to me to change
L2	the nature of this case if that's right.
L3	MR. HOLLEY: Why so, Your Honor?
L4	JUDGE WILSON: Well, because then they haven't
L5	been shut out.
L6	MR. HOLLEY: Well, no, they were shut out in the
L7	sense that well, they weren't shut out. They were
L8	told that, I think as Judge Garcia said, they were kept in
L9	this limbo. They were told, you know, you have approval,
20	preliminary approval, to be part of this program. We're
21	going to approve the addition of physical plan for you to
22	operate these classes. And despite very clear reservation
23	of rights by Success Academy
24	JUDGE RIVERA: Well, I'm not I don't

understand that whole argument. I thought - - - please

1	help me on this. I thought the city said, yes, we'll
2	include you in the consolidated application subject to
3	signing off on our contract. So at that point Success
4	knows that there are are terms that's it going to
5	have to comply with.
6	MR. HOLLEY: Well, Your Honor, if
7	JUDGE RIVERA: Just tell me is that correct? I
8	just want to make sure I'm not
9	MR. HOLLEY: I think it is correct to say
10	JUDGE RIVERA: misunderstanding the record
11	MR. HOLLEY: that Success Academy said to
12	the city we hear what you're saying.
13	JUDGE RIVERA: Right.
14	MR. HOLLEY: But you can't do that under the
15	terms of state law. That is directly contrary to what
16	EE(12) says.
17	JUDGE RIVERA: Yeah, but once they tell you
18	that's not their interpretation, you're saying Success
19	decided at its peril to move forward in case it was
20	incorrect in its own interpretation?
21	MR. HOLLEY: Well, but but our position,
22	Your Honor, is that we were absolutely correct that EE(12)
23	does not permit the Department of Edu
24	JUDGE RIVERA: Did you seek clarification from

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the Commissioner?

MR. HOLLEY: Not until we brought the appeal from 1 2 the decision by the DOE to say unless you sign this 3 contract we're not going to give you any money. 4 JUDGE RIVERA: Did you ask the department - - -5 the City Department of Education to then make clear that it 6 was rejecting including you if you didn't abide by the terms since that was the position of Success so that you 7 8 could seek independently to get a grant from the state? 9 MR. HOLLEY: That did not happen, Your Honor, 10 because we were exhausting administrative remedies to try to get EE(12) enforced by its terms. 11 12 JUDGE WILSON: Had you received a draft of the 13 contract before you submitted your bid to the city? 14 I don't believe so, Your Honor. MR. HOLLEY: I 15 think those contracts came in several months after that 16 happened. 17 JUDGE FAHEY: Well, can I ask a little more basic 18 question here? Charter schools, they normally apply for 19 grants from all over the place, don't they? And my 20 experience in Buffalo is they'll - - - they'll apply for 21 grants in various local foundations to do various programs. 22 Would you agree with that? It's common. 23 MR. HOLLEY: Well, yes, but their principal 24 source of funding in the K through 12 - - -

JUDGE FAHEY: No, that - - - I understand that.

But it is common that they apply in the same way that a 1 2 not-for-profit would apply for various grants from various 3 foundations? 4 MR. HOLLEY: To supplement the money that they 5 get as public schools. 6 JUDGE FAHEY: Right, you don't have to qualify, 7 and I'm not trying - - - trying to trick you. 8 MR. HOLLEY: Yeah. 9 JUDGE FAHEY: I just want to know if it's done. 10 If you would agree that it's done. 11 MR. HOLLEY: It - - - it is done that some 12 charter schools do seek funding in addition to the funding 13 14 JUDGE FAHEY: So - - - so I say to myself when I look at this if - - - if the school was applying to a grant 15 16 from the Ford Foundation and the Ford Foundation says yes, 17 you've been accepted for the grant. Here is the contract 18 and these are the terms of the gran - - - now this is 19 outside your statutory freedoms that are outlined for K 20 through 12. So I see those as separate and clearly set 21 out. Why wouldn't this be the same as any other grant that 22 you're applying for for any national foundation or any 23 other one? 24

Honor, there isn't a state law that says in absolutely

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MR. HOLLEY: Because in those circumstances, Your

clear terms - - - I mean I hear all these arguments about how there's some inherent - - - somewhere in the penumbra of this law there is some principle that says that all these other people get to regulate Pre-K classes provided by charter schools, but that's not what the law says. The law says, "All such monitoring programmatic review and operational requirements under this section," i.e., everything that's coming before except for that little piece in (10) which talks about inspections, "shall be the responsibility of the charter entity."

JUDGE RIVERA: See, that's my difficulty and that's what I was asking before to - - - to the Commissioner's representative. The statute is written as the providers don't get to self-monitor. It's the state and the district. They don't get to self-monitor. So now you have a paragraph that's making exceptions for charter schools that could not otherwise participate and saying you get to be eligible to participate - - -

MR. HOLLEY: Correct.

JUDGE RIVERA: - - - and we're going to let you do monitoring. But that's my point if it really meant the default which is the providers don't monitor it's the state and city that monitor - - - obviously, providers are monitoring. Don't get me wrong. I understand that they are trying to ensure that they comply. But that there is

1	oversight by a governmental entity. But then (12) is
2	saying that monitoring programmatic review and operational
3	requirements are your responsibility because otherwise, yo
4	have no responsibility. I don't see how that means that
5	the Commissioner has acted in a way that's contrary to the
6	law or undermines the legislature when it says the way to
7	interpret the entire statute and this entire program is
8	that it's shared monitoring.
9	MR. HOLLEY: Your Honor
10	JUDGE RIVERA: Because you have no the
11	provider has no monitoring otherwise.
12	MR. HOLLEY: No, no. Your Honor, I I just
13	want to make sure that you and I are on the same page when
14	you use the word
15	JUDGE RIVERA: Yes, and I may be misunderstandin
16	it.
17	MR. HOLLEY: No, no, and I because to me -
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19	JUDGE RIVERA: That's why I'm asking all of you
20	to help me with that.
21	MR. HOLLEY: To me the provider in this case
22	_
23	JUDGE RIVERA: Yes.
24	MR. HOLLEY: in your parlance is Success
25	Academy. And



1 JUDGE RIVERA: Yes, sure. 2 MR. HOLLEY: - - - is it - - -3 JUDGE RIVERA: It's the day-to-day working with the kids. 4 5 MR. HOLLEY: Right. And it is - -6 JUDGE RIVERA: Yes. 7 MR. HOLLEY: - - - not our position that Success 8 Academy is not subject to any oversight by anyone. 9 our position that this statute very clearly says that all 10 monitoring programmatic review and operational requirements are the obligation of the State University of New York as 11 12 the charter entity for Success Academy. 13 JUDGE RIVERA: Right, but my - - - my question 14 was why does that mean that it can't be - - - why is the 15 Commissioner wrong looking at the entire statute and that 16 the default is that the providers are not self-monitoring 17 in the truest sense to say it's - - - it's shared 18 oversight. It's shared. MR. HOLLEY: Well, there is - - - there are cases 19 20 from this court, you know, and to be blunt that say all 21 means all, and when it - - - when you say - - - when the 22 legislature says "all such" the clear implication is that 23 they don't mean part or you share it with somebody else. 24 And the phrase "shall be the responsibility of the charter



entity" seems pretty clear. It doesn't say the charter

1 entity has some role. 2 JUDGE RIVERA: Yeah, I know. My - - - but my -3 4 MR. HOLLEY: It says shall be - - -5 JUDGE RIVERA: - - - problem is that it really -6 - - if it really meant what you say it means it would have 7 been is solely responsible for and then you would have 8 listed these three categories, and that's my problem. 9 not sure that it equates. 10 MR. HOLLEY: Well, Judge - - -11 JUDGE RIVERA: And that's what I was trying to 12 understand. 13 MR. HOLLEY: Judge Rivera, I think the next few 14 words are also important. 15 JUDGE RIVERA: Okay. MR. HOLLEY: And it says, "and shall be 16 17 consistent with the requirements under Article 56 of this 18 chapter," which of course is the Charter School Act. And 19 so it's saying that in the same way that K through 12 20 classes offered by charter schools are principally - - -21 they are, you know, regulated by charter entities, that's 22 also going to be true of Pre-K classes. And I think it may 23 have been Judge Garcia who asked this question, but what is



the logic of saying that you can teach five-year-olds

through eighteen-year-olds under one statutory scheme that

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1	seems to work just fine but for four-year-olds, it's
2	entirely different.
3	JUDGE RIVERA: But that's the pedagogical
4	JUDGE STEIN: Well, they say that's because
5	there's the charter. Yes.
6	JUDGE RIVERA: Yeah, it's the pedagogical choice
7	of the of the it's the pedagogical choice of
8	the legislature. It's not
9	MR. HOLLEY: Well, but well, okay, yes.
10	Except that I think they were absolutely clear here in
11	EE(12) what they were talking about. I mean the
12	JUDGE RIVERA: You said you said Success
13	and other charter schools do have oversight, that that
14	- that the representation or if we understood this t
15	mean that there's no one monitoring or has oversight, that
16	that would be wrong. How does it otherwise work?
17	MR. HOLLEY: The
18	JUDGE RIVERA: What's the oversight you were
19	thinking of?
20	MR. HOLLEY: The charter entities the
21	chartering entities exercise oversight. There's nothing -
22	
23	JUDGE RIVERA: Oh, so you mean exactly what this
24	says? I'm sorry. I thought you meant that there's
25	something else, another layer.

1	MR. HOLLEY: No, no, I wasn't, Your Honor,
2	suggesting that
3	JUDGE RIVERA: I misunderstood.
4	MR. HOLLEY: there's yet another layer.
5	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Judge Garcia.
6	JUDGE GARCIA: If I may ask a question, yes. So
7	let's say you get a no from the school district,
8	hypothetical, and you go directly to the state, the state
9	approves you, and they give you money. And now the state
10	comes in and they inspect under that provision. Can they
11	do that?
12	MR. HOLLEY: I think they can, Your Honor.
13	JUDGE GARCIA: Okay. And then the state comes
14	back to you and says we don't think you have appropriate
15	family engagement or staffing patterns or one of these
16	criteria that's under the statute. They can deny you
17	funding the next year, right?
18	MR. HOLLEY: I believe that's their prerogative,
19	yes, Your Honor.
20	JUDGE GARCIA: That's it.
21	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, counsel.
22	MR. HOLLEY: Thank you, Your Honor.
23	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Counsel.
24	MS. GUSTAFSON: Permission of your court I will
25	be going first on rebuttal.



CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Certainly.

MS. GUSTAFSON: Followed by the state.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Your choice.

MS. GUSTAFSON: Just very briefly to answer an earlier question about is there - - - was there a sample contract that DOE provided to Success and indicated that it would be requiring something like this for providers to sign? Absolutely. It's page 975 of the record. It's not exactly the same as the one that was ultimately adopted. However, it is very, very similar and has many similar provisions. I want to start with (12) - - -

JUDGE GARCIA: I want to just go to Judge
Wilson's question. I'm really having some trouble
understanding how this grant worked. So 300 million is the
entire amount that's designated for New York City. Is that
- - is that right?

MS. GUSTAFSON: That's correct.

JUDGE GARCIA: So if you say to a charter no, we're not consolidating you into our application and the charter goes directly to the state and they get - - let's just pick a number, a million dollars, right, that comes out of that 300 million, right? Because that's the total amount that's going to New York City, isn't it? So if it's a - - if it's a New York City charter and they go to you and you say no, go make your own application, which you can



do, then they go and they get a million dollars, doesn't that come out of your 300 million?

MS. GUSTAFSON: Frankly, Your Honor, I think that that's ambiguous. I mean it's the 300 dollars that's - - - it's an issue that hasn't been determined or presented just because there aren't any such - - - such providers. But the way the grant process worked is as - - - as Judge Wilson was - - was discussing earlier, it - - it - - - the school district, DOE, did actually have to still apply for this money. I mean it still has to comply with the requirements of the statute, and it made specific assurances to the state. The state required it to sign that it would monitor every single one of its providers, that it would adopt quality standards and assure - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: So an independent provider that's rejected by a district, if they then proceed on their own are they competing across the state or just across - - - or just with the city? Because it's a competitive process, correct?

MS. GUSTAFSON: I think they would be competing across the state because they would be applying directly to the state and not to the school district to be a part of its - - its program.

JUDGE STEIN: And if we disagree with you - - - well, wouldn't - - - wouldn't the state then have to remove



from its requirements of you, of the school district, that
you provide these assurances? In other words, if - - - if
you're not entitled to inspect or - - or monitor
obviously you can't provide those assurances unless you're
going to take the word of another entity, maybe you can.

But that's something that - - - that the state will have to
- - -

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MS. GUSTAFSON: I - - - I think that's right, but it doesn't give DOE - - -

JUDGE STEIN: - - - going forward.

MS. GUSTAFSON: Oh, I'm sorry, Your Honor. But it doesn't get DOE out of the statute which is that it can only renew or accept providers that comply with statutory quality requirements and other - - -

JUDGE WILSON: Back - - - back to Judge Garcia's issue for a second. I noticed in the record the 300 million ended up getting reduced to 294 million. I also believe that there's something in the statute that says if the program is oversubscribed, then the state will make proportional reductions in the amount that it gives to everybody throughout the state. You may or may not know the answer to this, but my assumption was that if there were alternative providers that applied, were rejected by the local district, and then made an application to the state and that was approved and the thing was - - - that



would - - - that would count towards part of the oversubscription and there would therefore be a proportional reduction in everybody's monies? I don't know if you - - -

MS. GUSTAFSON: I have to admit that I don't have that information, Your Honor, about whether that's the way that it works. My understanding is that the - - - the whole program is - - - is fully subscribed at this point.

I - - but I would like to return to your point, Judge
Garcia, about the state's ability to require compliance with these detailed quality standards because I was confused by my opponent's answer here. If it is true that the state itself could put these standards on charter schools and then deny them funding if they don't meet - - -

MS. GUSTAFSON: - - - that in effect regulation,
Your Honor - - -

JUDGE GARCIA: But that's authorized by - - -

JUDGE GARCIA: - - - the statute. That's authorized to me by the subject to the because this - - - the programs under the statute have to meet these general criteria. Which are listed in section (2). And if the state is the grantor here, right, they're giving funds out and they're doing it pursuant to this statute and they have an inspection, right, it seems a reasonable reading to me to say if you're not complying generally with one of these things they can take that into consideration as the grantor

in giving you money the next year. That seems to me a fair reading of this statute.

2.1

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What doesn't seem to me to be a fair reading of the statute, if they can delegate that authority to you and then you could then impose curriculum - - - very specific requirements on a charter school. I think that somehow is back-dooring something that you're not allowed to do given the - - - that seems to me also a fair reading of the statute.

MS. GUSTAFSON: I'd like - - - if there are multiple fair readings of the statute, that is there's an ambiguity I think that is at most what Success has highlighted here is an ambiguity in the statute. This court regularly defers - - -

carves out charter schools. I think there would be an ambiguity if you didn't have that provision there would be a very good argument. But the legislature made a specific determination that they were going to be treated differently and it was with respect to a specific area of their authority. And I have a hard time reading the inspection statute to allow that authority somehow to be delegated down to a school district which has an option of taking a charter school into an application to provide an oversight that seems to me specifically excluded by the

statutes.

2.1

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MS. GUSTAFSON: Well, I would love to focus on subdivision (12) then because we all agree this is how it works without (12), and I think for plaintiffs - - - for petitioners to prevail here they need to prove that it is crystal clear and not in conflict with the rest of the statute and subdivision (12) is at best ambiguous. The - - it doesn't say sole or exclusive. It's not framed as an exemption.

The legislature has the tools for framing an exemption and very easily could have said, as Judge Rivera pointed out earlier, sole authority to the charter entities to the exclusion of any other entity. Could have said that, didn't say that. All it said was all such monitoring programmatic review and operational requirements shall be the responsibility of the charter entity. That language by plains - - its plain terms does not preclude a role for other entities.

Now I agree with Your Honor in isolation I think that it's not entirely clear what that means. Is it exclusive, is it concurrent? But in the context of this statute, there is only one interpretation of that language that makes sense, and that is the - - - is the Commissioner's. The word "all" - - we can agree it means all. Sometimes it also has the additional meaning of

1	exclusive, and the question here is does it also have that
2	additional meaning. The statute doesn't actually say that
3	That's not consistent with the rest of the of the
4	law. Let me give an example, so let's say that the
5	legislature and they've done this decided the
6	statute
7	JUDGE RIVERA: Well, can I ask you could it
8	could it the charter entity is SUNY, correct, in
9	(12)?
10	MS. GUSTAFSON: That's
11	JUDGE RIVERA: Well, for these schools, I'm
12	sorry. For these schools, I'm sorry.
13	MS. GUSTAFSON: For the yes, for these
14	petitioning charter schools, that's correct.
15	JUDGE RIVERA: So that could be to clarify that
16	it's not the individual charter school, that it's their
17	charter entity, that that would be part of why that
18	language would be there.
19	MS. GUSTAFSON: The all such
20	JUDGE RIVERA: In terms of the monitoring
21	MS. GUSTAFSON: Absolutely absolutely, wha
22	that
23	JUDGE RIVERA: In terms of the whole sentence.
24	Everybody wants to look at one word. Let's look at the

whole sentence, shall we, for a moment?

1 MS. GUSTAFSON: I am sorry. I am not entirely 2 sure I'm understanding the question. 3 JUDGE RIVERA: No, well, I - - - I just found it 4 interesting that it says the charter entity, right, as 5 opposed to one could have said it's just the provider which 6 was my point before. The default here is the provider 7 doesn't - - - doesn't have these responsibilities. So this 8 provision is making - - -9 MS. GUSTAFSON: Yes. 10 JUDGE RIVERA: - - - it possible - - -11 MS. GUSTAFSON: Yes, and in - - -12 JUDGE RIVERA: - - - for the charter entity as 13 opposed to the provider. 14 MS. GUSTAFSON: Yes, and in the usual course 15 charter entities - - - I mean this - - - this language 16 needs to be there to give the - - - if the legislature is 17 going to put charter entities on the hook, which is what I 18 think the language does, it needs to be there because it 19 otherwise wouldn't be clear because charter authorized 20 otherwise supervised according to a charter which doesn't 21 apply in the Pre-K - - -22 JUDGE RIVERA: Let me - - - your time is up if I 23 can just ask this one question of you. Is the - - - the 24 contract - - - just to be clear, the contract that the city

wanted Success to sign off on, was that shown to the

Commissioner as part of its original RFP to the - - - for the Commissioner to say New York State, this is what we're going to do and this is how we're going to do? This is what we're going to require of them?

MS. GUSTAFSON: I'm not sure the original contract was attached to the application.

JUDGE RIVERA: Or a sample contract?

MS. GUSTAFSON: I don't think any contract, but DOE did include very specific details about what it would monitor for guality, and it executed three pages of

MS. GUSTAFSON: I don't think any contract, but DOE did include very specific details about what it would monitor for quality, and it executed three pages of assurance to the state that it would fulfill its statutory obligation as the grantor. And if I may just finish with Your Honor's permission on one sentence which is - - -

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thirty seconds, go.

MS. GUSTAFSON: - - - to the - - - thank you very much. To the extent that there is any ambiguity in the statute, I would encourage this court as it has often done before to defer to the expert interpretation of the Education Commissioner. She's been administering the UPK program for twenty years. She has expertise in educational policy, and she knows what mechanisms are required to carry out the statutory scheme that was adopted by the legislature here.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, counsel.

MS. GUSTAFSON: Thank you very much.



1	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Counsel.
2	JUDGE STEIN: Could I could I start where
3	she just left off? What how what is the
4	expertise of the State Department in in applying Pre-
5	K programs to charter schools?
6	MS. CHAUDHRY: The expertise of the Commissioner
7	JUDGE STEIN: Yes.
8	MS. CHAUDHRY: I'm sorry. Yes. The Commissione:
9	has been operating the universal Pre-K program, the
10	original framework of which goes back twenty years
11	JUDGE STEIN: Yes, but never never in
12	connection with charter schools, right? And charter
13	schools have a different scheme to them.
14	MS. CHAUDHRY: That's correct, Your Honor, but i
15	also can be looked at the other way which is that charter
16	schools have no experience with Pre-K and
17	JUDGE STEIN: Well, but that's not
18	MR. HOLLEY: they have never offered that.
19	JUDGE STEIN: the point. The point is is
20	that aren't we just dealing with a straight interpretation
21	of statutory language and what the legislature intended?
22	And I I just I don't see why deference
23	MS. CHAUDHRY: Well, I understand that. I'm not
24	trying to rely on deference.
25	JUDGE STEIN: Okay.



1	MS. CHAUDHRY: Our position is with or without
2	deference the Commissioner's reading is the most reasonabl
3	and Pre-K is different. Judge, as you mentioned, they do
4	not have objective standards. The Commissioner is not
5	allowed to give standardized testing in personal knowledge
6	and if I could just make two brief points before
7	concluding. One, I just wanted to get back to the
8	enforcement mechanism, if the charter entity is the only
9	supervising authority, the only recourse they have is to
10	what enforcement mechanisms exists in Article 56 which is
11	only revocation and termination of the charter of the
12	entirety of the school, K through 12 included. They canno
13	just do something about Pre-K, and that is just too severe
14	to be an effective remedy. And it would be implausible
15	that the legislature would have wanted a program
16	JUDGE STEIN: Why can't the remedy be that it's
17	reported to the Commissioner and the Commissioner says
18	you're not getting any more money?
19	MS. CHAUDHRY: Well
20	JUDGE STEIN: Why isn't that an appropriate
21	remedy? It ends the program.
22	MS. CHAUDHRY: Well, the the charter entit
23	is not required under the statute to report to the

Commissioner. But under their reading and under the - - -

JUDGE GARCIA: But if you had an inspection - - -

24

he just - - - I think your opponent just said the state can come in and do an inspection, and if you feel the program isn't meeting your standards you don't have to renew them.

MS. CHAUDHRY: Well, I was surprised to hear that, Your Honor, because it's true they haven't squarely made that argument, but that is the logical consequence of the Appellate Division decision and their reading.

JUDGE GARCIA: Okay. But what if that's true?

Let's assume that what he says is accurate. So then what is the problem as Judge Stein was asking you? What - - - what is - - - it's that you control the funding, and if you inspect them and you believe they're not doing one of those eight enumerated things in the statute you say, you know, next year, no. What's the harm here?

MS. CHAUDHRY: Your Honor, we haven't had that situation where the school district has not been allowed to do the comprehensive oversight that the legislative design was intended for. I - - -

JUDGE GARCIA: But there's a design that says the charter can go directly to you if they don't include them, so it's contemplated in the statute. It - - - even in fact in the inspection provision it says the district if applicable contemplating the district won't even be there. So if you are able to do that and we take this scenario as accurate, what's the difference here then?

1	MS. CHAUDHRY: Well, Your Honor, under the way
2	the Commissioner has interpreted the program until now,
3	denial by a school district of a charter school's inclusion
4	in their program for purposes of for this reason that they
5	don't want to sign a contract that they feel is onerous,
6	that that has not been considered a denial.
7	JUDGE GARCIA: But that's a different lawsuit
8	maybe.
9	MS. CHAUDHRY: Yes.
10	JUDGE GARCIA: But
11	MS. CHAUDHRY: The state wants the charter
12	schools to be a part of this program. Everybody does.
13	JUDGE RIVERA: I was going to I was going
14	to ask, I would have thought the Commissioner would not
15	want to invoke a dramatic remedy where they're removing
16	since the whole point of is this is to have innovation
17	_
18	MS. CHAUDHRY: They don't. Exactly. We don't
19	want to remove charter schools.
20	JUDGE RIVERA: creativity, you want to work
21	with them.
22	MS. CHAUDHRY: We don't want charters to be shut
23	down. We just want the quality requirements to be
24	JUDGE GARCIA: But that's true for any entity,
25	any provider, and it's that's the drastic remedy if

the parade of horribles comes true. But also, you have the authority to say if you don't fix this we won't renew you, right? So it's not yes or no. That's obviously your ultimate leverage over any provider, but you also have all these intermediary steps you can take because you are the grantor.

MS. CHAUDHRY: That's correct, Your Honor. I - I understand. But the problem is given the scale of
these programs, a single district like the city has Pre-K
happening at over 2,000 sites. It is simply not possible
for the Commissioner to be going into every single provider
and see what's happening. That's why the legislature
designed this streamlined system. The districts take care
of checking their providers, and the Commissioner comes in
and sees what records they've accumulated and what is
happening on a broader level.

JUDGE GARCIA: The problem I go back to that argument is two-fold. One, there is a charter entity inspection provision that Judge Stein has pointed out, but, two, the statute itself contemplates that the district won't be part of the inspection where there isn't a consolidated application. So for whatever reason, if there is a direct application made to you, appropriately, then you are doing that.

MS. CHAUDHRY: That's correct. The state would



1 be doing that. 2 JUDGE GARCIA: You won't have a school district 3 so that - - -4 MS. CHAUDHRY: The state would be doing that. 5 JUDGE GARCIA: - - - would be this case. 6 MS. CHAUDHRY: Yes, except under the way the 7 petitioners have argued it and the way the Appellate 8 Division's decision reads exclusive either means exclusive 9 or it doesn't. And under their decision, the state's 10 authority at - - - to go in is in question. 11 JUDGE RIVERA: May I ask for a provider who has 12 been rejected by a district and is going out on their own, 13 is that one of the factors the Commissioner would consider 14 in deciding whether or not to grant, the fact that they 15 would be working independently as opposed to under the auspices - - or in a - - in a partnership with the 16 17 district, or is that not a factor? 18 MS. CHAUDHRY: It's not a factor in evaluating 19 the appropriateness - - -20 JUDGE RIVERA: Okay. 2.1 MS. CHAUDHRY: - - - of the program they've 2.2 proposed, but it is to - - - you know, the Commissioner 23 needs evidence that they have submitted an application and 24 have been previously denied, as that's the statutory 25



requirement.

1 | JUDGE RIVERA: Okay.

MS. CHAUDHRY: And, you know, only the Commissioner's instruction ensures the appropriate accountability in the manner designed by the legislature, harmonizes every single provision of the statute, and advances the purpose of the legislature which is not only for innovative Pre-K and high-quality Pre-K, but Pre-K that is connected and coordinated and accountable across the board. We urge the court to reverse.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, Ms. Chaudhry. (Court is adjourned)



CERTIFICATION

I, Sara Winkeljohn, certify that the foregoing transcript of proceedings in the Court of Appeals of Matter of DeVera v. Elia, No. 115 was prepared using the required transcription equipment and is a true and accurate record of the proceedings.

Congleric Good

Signature:

Agency Name: eScribers

Address of Agency: 352 Seventh Avenue

Suite 604

New York, NY 10001

October 16, 2018 Date:

