| 1 | COURT OF APPEALS |
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| 2 | STATE OF NEW YORK |
| 3 | PEOPLE, |
| 4 | Respondent, |
| 5 | -against- |
| 6 | No. 117 |
| 7 | Appellant. |
| 9 | 20 Eagle Street |
| 10 | Albany, New York October 10, 2018 |
| 11 | Before: |
| 12 | CHIEF JUDGE JANET DIFIORE ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA |
| 13 | ASSOCIATE JUDGE LESLIE E. STEIN ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE M. FAHEY |
| 14 | ASSOCIATE JUDGE MICHAEL J. GARCIA ASSOCIATE JUDGE ROWAN D. WILSON |
| 15 | ASSOCIATE JUDGE ROWAN D. WILSON ASSOCIATE JUDGE PAUL FEINMAN |
| 16 | Appearances: |
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| 24 | |
| 25 | Sara Winkeljohr |



CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Number 117, the People of the State of New York v. Saylor Suazo. Counsel. MR. ZENO: May it please the court, I am Mark Zeno, and I represent appellant Saylor Suazo. I ask to reserve two minutes for rebuttal, Your Honor? CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: You may, sir. MR. ZENO: Mr. Suazo asks this court to rule as the en banc D.C. Court of Appeals did this past June in Bado v. United States that the Sixth Amendment quarantees a jury trial to a criminal defendant who faces the penalty of deportation if convicted even if the maximum sentence that the court can impose is less than six months. if he's already deportable?

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JUDGE FEINMAN: So how is deportation punishment

MR. ZENO: Let me - - - let me provide two answers to that question. First of all, it was not clear at the time that counsel made the motion that the defendant, Mr. Suazo, was deportable. That his - - - his lawful status or his out of status is actually not part of the record on this appeal. So as a preservation matter, the question is whether deportation - - - whether a defendant who is deportable is entitled to a jury trial. But - - -

JUDGE FEINMAN: So if we're fashioning a rule,



though, that's going to be applicable to beyond him - - -

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MR. ZENO: I - - - I totally understand - - - I understand where you're going, Judge, but I just wanted to clear the air with the preservation piece of it first.

JUDGE STEIN: But let me ask you this, is this

the - - is the rule tied to the crime, or is the rule

tied to - - in other words, the deportability of - - of

anyone who commits that crime? Or is the rule tied to the

individual defendant?

MR. ZENO: It is - - - it is necessarily tied to the individual defendant because the defendant's status - - and there are a variety of statuses that a non-citizen can hold, is a necessary function of determining whether a crime will make them deportable.

JUDGE FAHEY: So how would you propose that the court determine the defendant's immigration status? Would there need to be a separate hearing? Would there need to be certification or proof offered? How - - - how would it be done?

MR. ZENO: Well, the first place would be the defendant would - - - would ask for a jury trial because a conviction would lead to deportation. If the People challenge that question, then there could be further inquiry on - - - on that issue. There could be further lawful inquiry. The defendant could state under oath what

his status is, and there could be a determination of whether and how a conviction of the charged crimes would affect them and whether it would lead to their deportation or whether it would - - -

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argument, though, is that we're talking about the seriousness of the crime I think. And I think the - - - the Ninth Circuit once said that the offense isn't serious because it's severely punished. It's severely punished because it's serious. So I'm - - I'm not clear about the necessity of - - I'm not sure I agree with you about the necessity of the trial court getting into the weeds, if you will, of each individual defendant who claims that they're entitled to a jury trial of his or her status and what that means for deportability or - - -

MR. ZENO: Well, I think there are some crimes which - - - which - - - there are some categories of crimes for which no further inquiry is warranted. For example, if it's an aggravated felony, that's mandatory deportation.

JUDGE STEIN: Or a domestic violence crime?

MR. ZENO: Or a crime of domestic violence, mandatory deportation regardless of status.

JUDGE STEIN: So only if it's not obviously a crime of that nature then you would have to get into the individual - - -



1 If it's not a deportable offense. MR. ZENO: 2 JUDGE GARCIA: But what about Judge Feinman's 3 point which I believe is what if he's deportable already 4 and this is a deportable offense? So then isn't the 5 punishment under your view of it the difference between the 6 terms of your deportation? 7 MR. ZENO: No, because even someone who is 8 deportable already may have passed to lawful status. 9 client is from Honduras, for example, he has a - - - even 10 though he overstayed his visa and was out of status, he may 11 have had a lawful path to legal status as a - - - as an 12 asylee. And - - -13 JUDGE FAHEY: Would the court have an obligation 14 to notify ICE? 15 MR. ZENO: No. I - - -16 JUDGE FAHEY: Someone comes in on the record, 17 says I broke this law, and you - - - you don't have any 18 obligation? 19 MR. ZENO: I'm sure that the court has no 20 obligation. I think there are policies in New York state 2.1 that at the very least discourage courts from contacting 2.2 ICE. 23 JUDGE GARCIA: But would the client then have to 24 come in and prove that they have this path to not being 25 deported, say a visa overstay, they're fairly limited in

what they can claim so it's the chance to avoid deportation incrementally over the fact that you are deportable? You start to get into very different shades of punishment there, don't you?

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MR. ZENO: Well, the punishment is ultimately the same. The punishment is deportation. They're depending on the - - on the defendant's status. There are different paths and different likelihoods of - - of whether deportation will result depending on the crime.

JUDGE GARCIA: So just - - - just step back just for a minute. This would be a very different application of this precedent in that most of the cases, or all, seem to speak to what the State has determined is a serious crime by looking at how it's punished. In this case, if we go with your rule, it would seem that the federal government is making that determination for the states because - - -

MR. ZENO: I - - -

JUDGE GARCIA: - - - they're saying these crimes are deportable offenses. So now the U.S. Government is saying that's a serious crime.

MR. ZENO: I agree with you, and that is because Blanton leaves open the question of if a - - - even - - - even crimes that are punishable by six months or less imprisonment may be serious crimes if the legislature deems



1 them to be serious by the nature of the penalty. And here 2 Congress - - -3 JUDGE FEINMAN: And - - - and you're interpreting 4 legislature to mean Congress or the New York State 5 Legislature? 6 MR. ZENO: For sure. Congress is our national 7 legislature. It specifically - - - and in the legislative 8 history beginning in 1917 when it identified crimes that 9 should be deportable, said - - - has used words like we 10 deem the deportation appropriate because these are serious 11 offenses. And that's precisely what Blanton - - - what in 12 Blanton the Supreme Court - - -13 JUDGE RIVERA: So where - - -14 MR. ZENO: - - - asked us to look at. 15 16

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JUDGE RIVERA: Where does that rule leave us?

There are many other kinds of consequences of - - - of this type of conviction that are penalties imposed by the federal government, not the State, or perhaps imposed by both. So where do we draw the line? Is it just at deportation?

MR. ZENO: Well, I don't think we have to draw that line today, but since 1989 no appellate court has found another collateral consequence to be serious punishment.

JUDGE RIVERA: What makes deportation different?



| MR. ZENO: Deportation is different and and |
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| that's I think what Padilla the Supreme Court said in |
| Padilla v. Kentucky that that it has become since |
| 1997 an inseparable part of a criminal conviction for a |
| non-citizen. It is it is often more important to the |
| defendant that they avoid deportation than even lengthy |
| prison terms that span years or decades. Staying in the |
| country close to family, close to their home is more |
| important to them than the than the prison term, and |
| particularly in a in a shorter prison term, it's far |
| more important than I mean the U.S. Supreme Court set |
| the set the line at six months' imprisonment as |
| JUDGE RIVERA: Do they end up in immigration |
| hold? |
| MR. ZENO: And they can often end up in |

immigration hold if you have been convicted - - - as I talk about in my brief if you've been convicted of a deportable offense, detention is mandatory. And they can spend months and months, and in fact, my client spent more than six months in detention.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, counsel.

MR. ZENO: Thanks.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Counsel.

MR. CHAMOY: May it please the court, Noah Chamoy for the People. This court should decline to adopt Bado on



principle that it is not persuasive authority. Bado is in fact the first court to ever look beyond the legislature that passed a criminal statute to decide whether or not a right to jury trial is - - -

JUDGE STEIN: Has that issue - - - has ever been raised before?

MR. CHAMOY: In fact, it has many times. Four states, three state supreme courts, New Jersey, Nevada, and Arizona, and an intermediate court in Kansas all said we do not look to Congress. We look to our state. The federal circuits are unanimous. We only cite to two of them in our brief, but in fact, many more have said the same thing, what's called the Assimilative Crime Act. And basically, it's reversed, which is that statute requires the procedures of the federal government to basically match the state, to protect - - - to make sure they're not being treated differently depending on who chooses to prosecute.

And so many defendants said, well, in our state, say South Carolina as an example, there was a jury trial for everything. Consequently, the federal government must give me a jury trial, and the circuits have said unanimously, no, for jury trial rights we look to Congress because the federal government is the one prosecuting, not the state of South Carolina.

JUDGE RIVERA: Well, here we're looking to the



constitutional right to - - - to a jury trial, so let's just stick with that one and this division that the court has set up between petty and serious offenses. So why - -- why shouldn't we consider this national consensus, what the Supreme Court has set out is how serious deportation is, it is an exile from this country never to return. - - - why isn't that serious enough to distinguish deportation from other kinds of consequences?

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MR. CHAMOY: Well, there are two answers to that. JUDGE RIVERA: Yes.

MR. CHAMOY: First is that the penalty authorized by the law of the locality is what is taken as a gauge of its social and ethical judgment of the crime in question.

JUDGE RIVERA: Where - - - where does it say that?

MR. CHAMOY: Duncan v. Louisiana citing Clawans. JUDGE RIVERA: Yeah, but didn't the court in subsequent cases, Baldwin and Blanton, isn't the court looking at the nationwide consensus?

MR. CHAMOY: No, it is not. Interestingly enough, it looked at the nationwide consensus up through Baldwin to determine the objective standard that it was going to create. It was a long history of removing the common law and ultimately coming to an objective test. it never crossed the line of saying that objective test



goes anywhere further than the locality.

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JUDGE STEIN: But - - - but isn't the federal government the only legislature that can impose the - - - the penalty of deportation? So - - -

MR. CHAMOY: That is true.

JUDGE STEIN: So that's not something that a state ever could do, and yet both the Supreme Court and this court have recognized immigration consequences as being very, very serious.

MR. CHAMOY: Well, that is true, Your Honor. However, the fact is that what Congress has chosen to do in this case is to create an immigration - - - oh, I'm sorry. Let me answer first the initial part of your question which is deportation being unique. It is only unique in the sense that it is one of many things Congress has exclusive authority over. It has exclusive authority over interstate commerce, the military. There are - - - there are collateral consequences that can attach that through preemption they can pass laws that would govern states for many different things. And as a consequence - - - such as federal housing, which in reality controls housing for New York, all of these things become consequences that once we say, well, something in the control of Congress, states don't actually have that specific control so we can look beyond the line they become -

JUDGE STEIN: But that doesn't mean that all of 1 2 those things rise to the same level of severity or 3 seriousness. 4 MR. CHAMOY: Which is the next part of my answer 5 which is courts have declared it to be a severe penalty. 6 Padilla did, and it was relying on a line of cases - - -7 and Peque even did. However, there was a recognition in 8 every one of those cases that when it was defining it as a 9 severe penalty, it was looking to the individual. It was 10 looking exactly the way Blanton doesn't. It was flipping the analysis. It was looking at the individual, and 11 12 subjectively to an individual it can be a severe penalty. 13 JUDGE STEIN: Well - - -14 MR. CHAMOY: The Supreme - - -15 JUDGE STEIN: Well, one of those decisions said 16 that the - - - that the court has to inform the defendant 17 that there may be immigration consequences, right? Peque? 18 MR. CHAMOY: Yes, Your Honor, Peque. 19 JUDGE STEIN: Right. So that didn't say that it 20 --- that the court had to do a --- make a determination 2.1 as to what the consequences were for that individual 2.2 defendant. 23 MR. CHAMOY: Correct. Peque, interestingly 24 enough, limited itself to felonies. It didn't address

what's at issue here which is B misdemeanors and

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violations, and it actually states why which is unlike an 1 2 aggravative felony which is almost all felonies in New York 3 4 JUDGE RIVERA: Well, how - - - how can we square 5 the following? First, that outside of New York City any 6 other defendant would get a right to a trial for the crimes 7 charged, right? 8 MR. CHAMOY: Yes. 9 JUDGE RIVERA: For those - - - the B misdemeanor. 10 And that New York, with another small number of states, are 11 outliers, right? Most states do provide jury trials. 12 can we square that in the analysis here? Or do you think 13 it's completely irrelevant to the analysis? 14 MR. CHAMOY: Well, as for the geographic issue 15 regarding New York City versus the surrounding areas, this 16 court previously decided that issue in Hogan v. Rosenberg 17 and said there is no equal protection or other problem with 18 that citing to a U.S. Supreme Court case that actually 19 considered the - - -20 JUDGE RIVERA: Yeah, but there's not an equal 21 protection argument here? 2.2 MR. CHAMOY: Correct. 23 JUDGE RIVERA: No, the - - - the question is 24 whether or not the legislature - - - let's say that we



agreed with you that we can't look outside of the

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boundaries of New York State and Albany for our legislature's sensibility about whether or not it's a serious crime. How - - - how do we get past the fact that everywhere outside of New York City it's serious enough that you get a jury trial?

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MR. CHAMOY: Well, in New York, as I said, that is a dis - - a distinction that the legislature was allowed to make, authorized to make, and did make. And the Supreme Court has even recognized that jurisdictionally it may be, for purposes of efficiency, that large cities require different judicial - - -

Myself clear. Yes, I'm not making myself clear that I'm not - - I'm not asking you to - - - to discuss the lawfulness of the legislature's choice or the constitutionality of it or - - or otherwise whether it's as a legal matter problematic. My question is having made that choice, that as you correctly point out has been upheld, doesn't that give us a basis to say the New York Legislature thinks it's a serious crime? Even if it is a Class B misdemeanor it's serious.

MR. CHAMOY: Well, the New York Legislature was very careful - - - and in fact, its history of how it came to writing the statute - - - $\frac{1}{2}$

JUDGE FAHEY: Sort of the other side of your



argument - - - one side of your argument says that a noncitizen would have a greater right under the - - - under
the appellant's theory than a citizen. That's one side of
your argument. The other side of the argument is, well,
why should someone who lives in Binghamton have a different
right to a trial than someone who lives in Queens?

MR. CHAMOY: Well, as to the latter issue, that is actually not an issue presented by the parties to this litigation to be clear. That was actually - - -

JUDGE FAHEY: Well, answer it anyway.

MR. CHAMOY: Absolutely.

JUDGE FAHEY: Okay.

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MR. CHAMOY: The fact is, as I was just saying, basically it comes down to this: legislatures have the authority to create petty offense exceptions. We know this. We also know from Blanton and the language in it that it is what that legislature attaches to the offense -

reasonable conclusion that the legislature decided to give everybody in the state the right to a jury trial for this sort of a crime because they determined it was serious enough that it required a jury trial except in New York where things were so congested that they couldn't do what they wanted to do even though it was that serious?



MR. CHAMOY: There would have to be evidence of 1 2 legislative intent behind that. But I mean -3 JUDGE WILSON: Is there not? 4 MR. CHAMOY: There is evidence that they consider 5 it worthy of a jury trial that's out of New York City, yes. 6 But there's also evidence that they don't consider it truly 7 to be a serious offense because they chose to create the 8 petty offense exception. 9 JUDGE FEINMAN: I want to ask you a practical 10 question which is how many prosecutions are we actually 11 12 to the City of New York, and frankly, based on my 13 14

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even talking about in a given year? Because it is limited to the City of New York, and frankly, based on my experience in the City of New York before I got to be here in Albany, this is really a Bronx-specific remedy in most instances for dealing with congestion or whatever motivations may motivate the prosecutor to move to reduce it. And then even within that sub-group of cases, you're talking about only those that are prosecuted against noncitizens. So give me a best estimate. We're not talking scores and scores of cases here - - -

MR. CHAMOY: I won't engage in - - -

 $\label{eq:JUDGE FEINMAN: --- that would be required to} $$\text{now get jury trials.}$

MR. CHAMOY: I'm not going to engage in guesswork. I can say because we previously filed the brief



| 1 | that there are tens of thousands of defendants who |
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| 2 | are charged with Class A misdemeanors in New York whose |
| 3 | cases are reduced, upwards almost to 100,000 back in the |
| 4 | day. I can't answer for now. However, of those, the |
| 5 | reduction to a B misdemeanor for purposes of trial is |
| 6 | actually common in all of the jurisdictions in New York |
| 7 | City. And the number of non-citizens is conservatively |
| 8 | estimated at over 500,000, and that's a very conservative |
| 9 | estimate of the population of New York. So all told, it is |
| 10 | an extremely large number, and it only takes a few of them |
| 11 | because |
| 12 | JUDGE RIVERA: I'm sorry. The what was the |
| 13 | 500,000? Non-citizens total? |
| 14 | MR. CHAMOY: Of non-citizens in the City. |
| 15 | JUDGE RIVERA: Not those who are charged? |
| 16 | MR. CHAMOY: No, no, no. |
| 17 | JUDGE RIVERA: Okay. |
| 18 | MR. CHAMOY: That's a conservative number in the |
| 19 | |
| 20 | JUDGE RIVERA: That's I think the number Judge |
| 21 | Feinman is asking you. |
| 22 | MR. CHAMOY: Correct. But that but we |
| 23 | couldn't say, because we wouldn't know that information, |
| 24 | how many of the non-citizens are charged with crimes. |

Because that's not part of our investigation. That's not

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| 1 | information |
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| 2 | JUDGE FEINMAN: So what I'm getting at is |
| 3 | CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: So, counsel speak to the |
| 4 | procedure about |
| 5 | JUDGE FEINMAN: are you really opening a |
| 6 | floodgate if you allow jury trials in this limited category |
| 7 | of cases? |
| 8 | MR. CHAMOY: I think the bigger problem is when |
| 9 | one is offered that those who could claim to be a non- |
| 10 | citizen which includes, unfortunately, because |
| 11 | there's no database of it citizens who either believe |
| 12 | they're non-citizens or simply want to cause delay can |
| 13 | actually |
| 14 | JUDGE FEINMAN: No, but that becomes a practical |
| 15 | question that I'm going to ask him when he stands up about |
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| 17 | MR. CHAMOY: Correct. Okay. |
| 18 | JUDGE FEINMAN: how to fashion this rule. |
| 19 | CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: So, counsel, would you |
| 20 | speak to the procedure that would be required or proposed |
| 21 | to be used for the judges? |
| 22 | MR. CHAMOY: Well, if I may? It's going to take |
| 23 | a moment. |
| 24 | CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Yes, please. Go ahead. |



Yes.

MR. CHAMOY: Because this case epitomizes the 1 2 In this particular case, as I understand it, my 3 adversary's position is his admissible client is charged 4 with what's called a particularly serious offense. 5 problem there is in order to determine a particularly 6 serious offense under federal law unless it's an aggravated 7 felony, for which we're not dealing with here, you need the 8 record of the court below, meaning you'd actually have to 9 have your trial first. So you would have your trial to 10 find out the facts. Then you'd have to find out the 11 immigration consequences. And then if it turns out it was 12 - - - he was deportable as a particularly serious offense 13 because those are the facts that you found by the 14 immigration court - - -15 JUDGE STEIN: Well, why can't you just tell by 16 determining the nature of the crime with which the 17 defendant is charged?

MR. CHAMOY: Your Honor, I was - - -

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JUDGE STEIN: Isn't that the issue? I mean it doesn't make sense to me that you'd have to hold the trial first.

MR. CHAMOY: I was getting right there, Your Honor.

JUDGE STEIN: There's a - - - there's an accusatory instrument.



MR. CHAMOY: Yes.

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JUDGE STEIN: And that to me would be the basis, and then in some cases, it seems to me that it would be pretty easy to determine whether this is a deportable crime or not, and in other cases, it might not be so easy. And the burden, I think, is on the defendant to establish that it is a deportable crime because that defendant has to show - - has to rebut the presumption that it is not a serious crime. So - - -

MR. CHAMOY: Your Honor, actually, I was getting right there which is the complaint in this case, if you read it, does not actually state a crime of domestic violence. Ex-boyfriend is not under federal law domestic violence. And - - -

JUDGE STEIN: Well, maybe here the defendant didn't make an adequate showing. You know, that - - - that's a different story.

MR. CHAMOY: I'm sorry, Your Honor. I don't mean a showing. I mean that if we're saying we can rely on what's happening before trial the answer to that question is not really once you get into the weeds of B misdemeanors and violations. The fact of the matter is in this case it said on the complaint ex-boyfriend. That is not an intimate partner for domestic violence law. It also identified two children but did not identify them as in



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JUDGE STEIN: Then why can't the trial judge do one of two things, if the proof is not there then you deny the jury trial. It's not - - - you don't go ex post facto to figure out if indeed it's - - - you're - - - it's based on what it is known to the judge at the time the argument is made or the judge can err on the side of caution and give the defendant a jury trial.

MR. CHAMOY: Well, Your Honor, I believe the answer actually could be found in Bado because in Bado when they actually decided it's okay, we can do this, they said the following - - - I still - - - if I'm permitted. "Government counsel are part of the Department of Justice which has deep expertise in immigration matters and is part of the same executive branch as the Department of State and Homeland Security which have responsibility for enforcing immigration laws. Defense counsel has an obligation to advise their clients competently on the question and if necessary, the court providing over the current prosecution can appoint its own expert advisor on immigration law." That is now the standard in the District of Columbia to have basically a massive hearing on immigration in every That is the only way to reach that conclusion here. case. Only, we have none of those experts.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, counsel.



MR. CHAMOY: Thank you, Your Honor.

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CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Mr. Zeno. Mr. Zeno, did defense counsel have to have an expertise in immigration law under this?

MR. ZENO: Did defense counsel? Defense counsel worked for Bronx Defenders, and since Padilla was decided every defender office in New York City, which is the only place where this issue arises, has a staff of immigration lawyers. That's a constitutional mandate. And their purpose is to advise defense lawyers about the consequences of convictions, whether they be Class B misdemeanors or felonies.

Padilla has some very strong language that we've talked about. But Padilla itself also says there may be some cases where this is clear and you have to say this is deportable. But the language I think is that: "There are undoubtedly numerous situations in which the deportation consequences of a particular plea are unclear or uncertain and all that's required in that case is an advice that they may - - that the charges may carry a risk of adverse immigration consequences." So that's the professional standard set by the Supreme Court, and I think that would be the majority of cases. They may carry adverse immigration consequences. So whatever this is going to



show, that's the standard under Padilla. Wouldn't the rule 1 2 ultimately just come down to every non-citizen gets a jury 3 trial? MR. ZENO: Well, if the court were to impose that 4 5 rule - -6 JUDGE GARCIA: How else would you practically do 7 it if the vast majority are being held to a Padilla 8 standard of this conviction may carry adverse immigration 9 charges? 10 MR. ZENO: Well, we're talking about a subset of criminal cases, Class B misdemeanors, which is the lowest 11 12 level of - - - of conviction. 13 JUDGE GARCIA: Which may be even harder to 14 determine what the immigration consequences are. 15 16 I think that if you look at Blanton, it says if - - - if

MR. ZENO: And it may be harder to determine, and I think that if you look at Blanton, it says if - - - if the penalty is - - - the maximum penalty is a possibility. It doesn't look to the penalty that's actually imposed. It looks to what is the possible maximum penalty, and if it is deportation - - in that May situation that you're talking about then you get a jury trial. And what is the - - - and what is the harm? In the rest of New York state and most of the rest of the country, you get a jury trial. It's only in New York City that you don't get it.

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JUDGE WILSON: Well, you're sort of saying you

1 don't need to look at the characteristics of the - - - of 2 the particular defendant, right? 3 MR. ZENO: I'm sorry? 4 JUDGE WILSON: You're saying you don't need to 5 look at the characteristics of the defendant. 6 MR. ZENO: It would be the extremely rare case 7 that - - - that you would need to look at the 8 characteristics. 9 JUDGE GARCIA: Well, you would look at one 10 characteristic because it seems like any rule other than you're a non-citizen is unworkable. 11 12 JUDGE FEINMAN: As a practical matter, how is 13 this going to be implemented? Do you want - - - should we 14 put the burden on the - - - if we were to agree with you 15 that it's serious and so on, is the burden going to be on 16 the defendant when the People move to reduce to say - - -17 or perhaps it was even charged at the outset with the B 18 misdemeanor. Judge, I move for a jury trial. 19 MR. ZENO: Absolutely the defense has to ask for 20 the jury trial as they did here. 2.1 JUDGE FEINMAN: Okay. 2.2 JUDGE FAHEY: So I always like to think about 23 what the next case is going to be whenever one of the cases 24 comes in front of us, particularly on an important and 25

interesting issue like this. And it seems to me the next

case is - - - if I'm - - - if myself, Eugene Fahey, was convicted of a B misdemeanor in New York by a bench trial the first thing I'd do is challenge the constitutionality of a non-citizen getting a trial and - - - by jury and me not getting a trial by jury. Wouldn't that be a consequence that, really, inevitably we would be striking down the non-jury caveat for the city by making this decision?

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MR. ZENO: No, I don't think so, Your Honor. The

- - - the State distinguishes between classes of

defendants. An indigent defendant gets a count - - - gets

- - - under the Sixth Amendment gets a lawyer assigned to

represent them if they can't afford it. A wealthy

defendant has no right to that lawyer. That doesn't

invalidate the wealthy lawyer that says - - I mean the

wealthy defendant that says I'm entitled to a lawyer. It

doesn't invalidate the system. I mean Blanton says look at

the penalty and work backwards from there. Here the

penalty is deportation for a non-citizen, and that requires

a jury trial.

JUDGE GARCIA: Judge, may I ask just - - - CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Yes.

JUDGE GARCIA: I'm sorry. I know your time is over, but I saw also in your papers below, and I think you continued to press it here, you have made an independent



| 1 | state constitutional argument. |
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| 2 | MR. ZENO: We didn't. |
| 3 | JUDGE GARCIA: You didn't? You don't know? |
| 4 | MR. ZENO: We are not pressing a state |
| 5 | constitutional argument. |
| 6 | JUDGE GARCIA: Okay. |
| 7 | MR. ZENO: Because I think the state constitution |
| 8 | is clear that it protects the right to a jury trial only |
| 9 | where there has been an indictment, and I think that was |
| 10 | the problem in Baldwin. |
| 11 | JUDGE GARCIA: So you're not making an |
| 12 | independent state argument? |
| 13 | MR. ZENO: No. |
| 14 | JUDGE GARCIA: Okay. Thank you. |
| 15 | CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, counsel. |
| 16 | (Court is adjourned) |
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CERTIFICATION

I, Sara Winkeljohn, certify that the foregoing transcript of proceedings in the Court of Appeals of People v. Saylor Suazo, No. 117 was prepared using the required transcription equipment and is a true and accurate record of the proceedings.

Congleric Good

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