1	COURT OF APPEALS
2	STATE OF NEW YORK
3	PEOPLE,
:	Respondent,
	-against-
	No. 119 ROHAN MANRAGH, JR.,
	Appellant.
	20 Eagle Street Albany, New York October 11, 2018
	Before:
	CHIEF JUDGE JANET DIFIORE
	ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA ASSOCIATE JUDGE LESLIE E. STEIN
	ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE M. FAHEY ASSOCIATE JUDGE MICHAEL J. GARCIA
	ASSOCIATE JUDGE ROWAN D. WILSON ASSOCIATE JUDGE PAUL FEINMAN
	Appearances:
	THOMAS E. SCOTT, ESQ.
	LAW OFFICE OF THOMAS E. SCOTT Attorney for Appellant
	115 Broadhollow Road Suite 250
	Melville, NY 11747
	CAREN C. MANZELLO, ESQ.
	SUFFOLK COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE Attorney for Respondent
	200 Center Drive Riverhead, NY 11901
	Nivernead, Ni iiyoi
	Sara Winkeljohn Official Court Transcriber



CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Number 119, the People of 1 2 the State of New York v. Rohan Manragh. 3 Good afternoon, counsel. 4 MR. SCOTT: Good afternoon, justices; Thomas 5 Scott for the defendant-appellant Rohan Manragh. 6 JUDGE FAHEY: Mr. Scott, would you move over in 7 the center so I can hear you better? Thanks. 8 MR. SCOTT: Yes, Your Honor. 9 JUDGE FAHEY: I'm getting old. Okay. 10 MR. SCOTT: Okay. This all began with a contested grand jury proceeding wherein the defendant 11 12 testified and his mother testified and he and - - -13 JUDGE GARCIA: Counsel, you have two main cases 14 it seems here to me that we've decided, Pelchat, right, and 15 Pelchat we say it's - - - you know, we reverse and 16 Hansen we say we don't on the introduction of hearsay. 17 Pelchat, sole witness in the grand jury confesses that to 18 the ADA that he was mistaken, and the ADA doesn't correct Why is this more like Pelchat and not Hansen? 19 20 MR. SCOTT: Well, Pelchat hinged substantially on 21 the constitutional function of the grand jury to indict as 22 well as the prosecutor's duty of fair dealing. And I think 23 those are the issues in our case. And - - -24 JUDGE GARCIA: But here your client is asking to



put in a statement which is essentially hearsay and the

district - - - the people don't make the request to the grand jury. There's a hearing in front of the - - - in front of the trial court, and that motion is denied. But - - so what is it about not relaying that request to the grand jury that makes this a fundamental error in the sense of Pelchat?

MR. SCOTT: Okay. I - - - I think another case to be considered by this court to juxtapose with Hansen is Huston. Now in Huston, there was a grand jury presentation where the prosecutor committed a variety of errors introducing hearsay evidence, vouching for witnesses, et cetera, and there was an indictment for murder. He - - - the defendant stood trial and was convicted. And the - - - this court reversed that conviction, you know, finding that the error committed in the grand jury was not vitiated by a conviction by jury.

JUDGE GARCIA: Again, that seems to go, Huston, to the integrity of the proceeding, right. There was misconduct by the prosecutor in the grand jury room that I think we said tainted the integrity of the proceeding itself, so the proceeding that led to the indictment. And here it seems the argument is they should have relayed this request to put in this kind of testimony that would, for the most part as I read it, be hearsay testimony.

MR. SCOTT: Well, I - - - I mean I just - - -



well, even if it's hearsay, it - - - the question remains whether it's admissible.

JUDGE GARCIA: But how did not doing that impair the integrity of what the grand jury actually did which I think is more Huston and Pelchat.

MR. SCOTT: All right. I - - I think you're perhaps giving too much focus on, you know, intent or - - rather than results. Now for example, in Hill, you know, there was an impairment of the grand jury because the prosecutor was asked by the grand foreman what were the nature of the witness that the defendant wanted the grand jury to hear, and he knew they were alibi witnesses, but he - - he said he didn't know. And - -

JUDGE GARCIA: Hill is not a - - Hill is not a case like this. Hill was a direct appeal of the denial of the motion, wasn't it?

MR. SCOTT: That's correct. It was - - - it was not a guilty plea, Your Honor. It was a - - - it was a motion to dismiss an indictment.

JUDGE GARCIA: So isn't that a different analysis than what is such a fundamental defect in the grand jury proceeding that it survives a guilty plea?

MR. SCOTT: Well, there was a finding in Hill that there was an impairment of the integrity of the grand jury proceeding which is the same finding as in - - -



1	JUDGE FAHEY: Well, I guess just to follow up on
2	on the Judge's question, the problem I have in
3	looking at it is is I have to say is this if
4	it's fundamental to the integrity of the grand jury that
5	means two things to me just off the top of my head. First
6	that the grand jury was not able to make a fair or honest
7	evaluation, number one, and, number two, that the evidence
8	was of such a nature that it could be dispositive or
9	or play a large role in their determination. This evidence
10	doesn't seem to fall within that category, and that's what
11	I think you need to address. Why does this evidence fall
12	within one of those two categories?
13	MR. SCOTT: Well, you had a situation here
14	I mean the record if you look at the record,
15	including, for example, the presentence report, there is a

including, for example, the presentence report, there is an indication that - - - that the complainant was charged at some point in this with a crime.

JUDGE FAHEY: Right.

MR. SCOTT: So - - - and there is also the fact that there's a relationship between the two, relationship obviously gone sour. And - - -

JUDGE WILSON: He pleaded guilty to violating a protective order essentially, right? An order of protection?

MR. SCOTT: That's correct, Your Honor.



JUDGE WILSON: So how does - - - so forget the hearsay issue, suppose this is all non-hearsay. How does it affect his guilt or innocence as to the violation of the order of protection? It - - - it almost seems to do the opposite, right? It puts him in a place that he wasn't supposed to be.

MR. SCOTT: Well, I think there's definitely an

MR. SCOTT: Well, I think there's definitely an issue as to the credibility of the complainant and the defendant. And - -

JUDGE RIVERA: I think Judge Wilson's point is that the - - - that the testimony that's proffered, right, that - - - that Naper (ph), I think that's how it's pronounced, was going to give would have placed him in the - - in the location that would establish the violation of the orders.

MR. SCOTT: Well - - - well, the violation he pled to - - -  $\!\!\!$ 

JUDGE RIVERA: He himself was seeking to put information forward that was not exculpatory.

MR. SCOTT: Okay. What - - - what the violation of which he was convicted was telephone calls. All right. Not being at that location where - - - where according to that source there was a chaotic scene and perhaps he was a victim of a crime. And if the proposed testimony of Naper did go to the complaining witness' credibility, Tiffany

(ph), and to her motive in terms of, you know, her disdain for the defendant. And as the cases I've cited in my briefs indicate, that is relevant testimony, you know, that could be admissible by external evidence. And that's the reason why it was not irrelevant hearsay.

And I would like to point out that all this larger issue of the fact of whether a plea survives - - - a claim survives a guilty plea is before this court that there is other issues that may foreclose this court reaching that. If the defendant's plea was found to be involuntary then any, you know, potential issue with Pelchat or Hansen would be obviated.

And, you know, I think the record speaks for itself that you had a defendant suffering from multiple sclerosis. You had the coercion of a consecutive sentence for promoting prison contraband when in fact that was not the law. You had threats of consecutive incarceration.

You had the defendant's mother removed from the courtroom on June 4th I believe, two days before he pled guilty. And all of these factors cumulatively, I submit, would demonstrate that the plea was not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently made.

And with regard to that issue and the trial court's denial of his motion to withdraw that plea, I think this court's decision in McKeon - - - McKennan (ph), I'm



sorry, when you said that ordinarily if a defendant makes a claim of innocence before sentence is imposed, the court should either allow the withdrawal of the plea or conduct a hearing to determine whether there's merit to that claim.

And that clearly was not followed in this case.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Mr. Scott, excuse me. I neglected to ask you if you wanted to reserve two minutes for rebuttal time, so I took it upon myself to reserve the two minutes for you. If you would like to continue now and forgo rebuttal or sit down and wait until you're - - -

MR. SCOTT: I'll take the rebuttal, Your Honor. Thank you.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Okay. Excellent. Thank you.

Counsel.

2.1

2.2

MS. MANZELLO: Good afternoon, Your Honors. I'm
Assistant District Attorney Caren Manzello on behalf of the
District Attorney of Suffolk County, Timothy Sini, for
respondent, may it please the court. This court has long
recognized society's interests in the finality of
judgments. I think previously describing - - -

JUDGE FEINMAN: So - - - so are there any violations of CPL 190 that would survive a guilty plea?

MS. MANZELLO: Well, in this particular case,

190.50(6) has been called into question which is the

defendant's right to call his own witnesses. Certainly, if there was a violation of the defendant's right to testify on his own behalf and that was denied that would survive.

2.2

JUDGE GARCIA: What if he has an alibi witness that puts him far away from the scene of the crime and the request is made to the ADA and the ADA doesn't relay that to the grand jury?

MS. MANZELLO: Well, I think that the most important thing that we have to keep in mind is that the district attorney's function and the district attorney's role is to make a determination as to what evidence should go before the grand jury and what evidence should not.

JUDGE GARCIA: I'm curious about that actually, under the statute. So is it your view that if a defendant presents a witness with a summary like this and the ADA believes it's inadmissible hearsay, they don't have to send that to the jury or would the proper procedure be - - - and again, not going to the ultimate issue in this case but would the proper procedure be to relay the request to the grand jury with an explanation of the type of evidence that it's appropriate for the grand jury to hear generally?

MS. MANZELLO: I believe pursuant to the findings in both Huston and DeFalco (ph) where they specifically say that the district attorney has broad discretion and is to make the decision whether or not to present evidence and

1 whether or not to exclude it that the district attorney is 2 not required to put to vote every witness. The district 3 attorney should as a legal advisor make a determination. 4 And in this case, an appropriate determination that the 5 evidence - - -6 JUDGE FAHEY: Well, but that's - - - I didn't - -7 - I didn't think that right was reserved for the district 8 attorney. I thought the decision on the evidence was 9 reserved for the grand jury, and that the - - - the 10 district attorney has an ethical obligation to present that 11 evidence to the grand jury. 12 MS. MANZELLO: Well, under 210.35 of the CPL 13 there is a subsection (4) that lists the errors that the 14 district attorney could make that would render a grand jury 15 proceeding defective, and not calling a witness the 16 defendant has requested be called is not listed. And I 17 think that gives us some - - -18 JUDGE WILSON: But it might fall under - - - it 19

might fall under subdivision (5), no?

20

21

2.2

23

24

25

MS. MANZELLO: Right, the catch-all phrase it might fall under, but that would be I think of a very rare occasion something such as is the nature - - -

JUDGE WILSON: Something like Judge Garcia's example where there's an alibi witness?

MS. MANZELLO: Well, I think that without knowing



specifically the testimony that alibi witness was going to 1 2 give it's somewhat speculative on my part but - - -3 JUDGE FAHEY: Well, but let's - - - let's just 4 assume it's exculpatory evidence. That's what Judge Garcia 5 was talking about. 6 MS. MANZELLO: Well, not - - -7 JUDGE GARCIA: Right, let's say I met the guy in 8 a - - in a city that's 500 miles away at the exact time, 9 and in fact, I took a photo with my phone and I have my 10 phone with the photo and a time date stamp. MS. MANZELLO: I think that - - - I think that 11 12 witness - - - the appropriate thing to do would be for the 13 district attorney to go before the grand jury and explain 14 to the grand jury this is the nature of the witness 15 defendant has proffered and have them vote. But I don't 16 think - - -17 JUDGE WILSON: But the question - - - but - - -18 MS. MANZELLO: - - - every witness qualifies for 19 that. 20 JUDGE WILSON: But the question is not that. The 21 question is if that happens and the - - - and the 22 prosecutor doesn't do that and the defendant pleads guilty 23 what then? 24 MS. MANZELLO: Well, that's why I think this

case, the overriding issue is the finality of judgments.

What we have here is a defendant that has stood up and acknowledged his quilt. And the - - -JUDGE FAHEY: But that's not really what we're asking you. What we're asking you - - - I understand the nature of the finality here. But what - - - what we're

asking you is what does impair the integrity of grand jury 7 when you have an obligation to present evidence, evidence 8 have been proffered, you basically said the evidence isn't 9 strong enough, I'm not going to bother to present it, who gets to make that call, you or the grand jury? And if you 10

12 be vacated?

1

2

3

4

5

6

11

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

MS. MANZELLO: I think the district attorney gets to make that call. I believe that in this case, the call was appropriate because if we take it a step further, what was the district attorney actually supposed to put to vote before this grand jury?

don't present the evidence and it is exculpatory can a plea

JUDGE GARCIA: Do you want to hear this witness? The way I read the statute is - - -

MS. MANZELLO: But then would it - - -

JUDGE GARCIA: - - - you relay the request, here's what they want to testify about. I can remind you that only non-hearsay evidence is admissible for your consideration in this. And then the grand jury can make a determination of whether or not they believe that's



relevant. I - - - that's how I read the statute.

MS. MANZELLO: Well, I believe that given the broad discretion the district attorney has as a legal advisor that it wouldn't particularly seem productive for her to put to vote a witness that already has - - - there's been a determination made really doesn't have evidence that should be heard by this grand jury. So - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: But isn't your recourse already in the statute that if - - - if the grand jury votes to hear the witness you can go to a judge?

MS. MANZELLO: True.

JUDGE RIVERA: Right? You can go to a judge and request that there not be a subpoena issued, quash the subpoena, whatever it is so that the witness doesn't appear. And you can make your arguments or limit the testimony to whatever is non-hearsay testimony. But the questions that are being asked is why, given the nature of the statute and the nature of the right and the grand jury proceedings and the purpose of the grand jury are you able not to present the question to the grand juries as to whether or not they want to hear from the witness?

MS. MANZELLO: Well, perhaps the - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: I mean in this case they might have agreed with the ADA.

MS. MANZELLO: Exactly. Perhaps the better



2 JUDGE RIVERA: We wouldn't be here. 3 MS. MANZELLO: - - - would be always to, you 4 know, preserve the record and put before the grand jury 5 that question and then ultimately if you disagree with them 6 to go before the impaneling - - - impaneling judge and ask 7 for some type of ruling, but I think we've kind of moved 8 past that. 9 JUDGE STEIN: But do you - - - do you agree that 10 there are any circumstances under which the failure of the 11 - - - other than the defendant's testimony, the failure of 12 the DA to bring a witness to the grand jury's attention 13 would survive a guilty plea? 14 MS. MANZELLO: I think that the only direction 15 that I find guidance from that would be a case such as 16 Pelchat where there is some particular willful or 17 intentional or pervasive misconduct where the district 18 attorney knows - - -19 JUDGE RIVERA: Why - - - why is that necessary? 20 Where would we find that in the statute or if you've got 2.1 some - - -22 MS. MANZELLO: Well, I think that that implicates 23 the integrity - - -24 JUDGE RIVERA: Where is that? 25 MS. MANZELLO: - - - of the process. I think

1

practice - - -



1 that goes to the heart of the process and is of a more of a 2 constitutional - - -JUDGE RIVERA: You mean - - - so you mean even 3 4 when an ADA in good faith acts - - -5 MS. MANZELLO: When the ADA - - -6 JUDGE RIVERA: - - - that they're - - - excuse 7 They could not be something that so taints the process me. 8 for a reason not to related to someone's bad faith or bad 9 conduct? 10 MS. MANZELLO: I suppose there could be something 11 that so taints the process but I think that would then rise 12 to the level of the conduct by the district attorney being 13 pervasive and willful. And then - - -14 JUDGE GARCIA: But let's say in my example they 15 misread the testimony affidavit and they think it's a 16 different time and place then the crime. So they think 17

misread the testimony affidavit and they think it's a different time and place then the crime. So they think this just isn't relevant. It's not really an alibi, but in fact it's just a misreading and it's not intentional. It's just a mistake. But this exculpatory evidence that shows the person was in a different time and place or strongly supports that never gets presented to the grand jury.

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

MS. MANZELLO: Well, there we would have a situation of an honest mistake or an honest error. And once again - - -

JUDGE GARCIA: And is that what we're really



looking at in terms of the grand jury not getting that
exculpatory evidence? It would have to be intentional?

MS. MANZELLO: Well, I think anytime there's
intentional conduct it - - - it sort of changes the playing
field. However, in that case where your example is that

2.1

2.2

the district attorney simply made an error, I think it clearly falls into an evidentiary ruling, and it doesn't impair the integrity of the process or rise to the level of a constitutional defect we have to - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: So then under your rule in any bad faith conduct regardless of the nature of the testimony or evidence that the defendant wanted to - - - the individual wants to present to the grand jury or wants the grand jury to at least know exists to decide for itself whether or not it wants to hear - - - as long as there's bad faith or bad conduct does it matter the nature of the actual evidence that might be presented?

MS. MANZELLO: Meaning that there's bad faith but it's evidence that would not have been appropriate in any event if I'm understanding your question?

JUDGE RIVERA: I'm ask - - I'm asking you how you're caveating if at all your rule. It's my question to you.

MS. MANZELLO: Okay. Well, I think that what the rule should be is that once the - - - the district attorney



exercises the broad discretion and makes a decision not to 1 2 proffer or inform the grand jury of a witness the defendant 3 has made or requests to call, which is a statutory right, I 4 think that that does not constitute either a jurisdictional 5 defect, it doesn't constitute something of a constitutional 6 defect either, and that it would not survive - - -7 JUDGE STEIN: But why doesn't it go to the - - -8 MS. MANZELLO: - - - a guilty plea. 9 JUDGE STEIN: Why doesn't it go to the integrity, 10 though, of the process? Even if it's a mistake if it's 11 such a fundamental mistake as such as a witness who says 12 this person couldn't possibly have been there, why doesn't 13 that amount to a constitutional defect? 14 MS. MANZELLO: Well, I don't believe that every 15 evidentiary or technical error made by the district 16 attorney - - -17 JUDGE STEIN: Not every evidentiary - - -18 MS. MANZELLO: - - - could rise to that level. JUDGE STEIN: No, that's the - - - that's the 19 20 point is obviously not every evidentiary ruling, but there

point is obviously not every evidentiary ruling, but there

- - but your position seems to be that there are none

that could rise to that level unless they were intentional.

And - - and I - - you know, and I - - in my mind,

something like that could be seen as going to the integrity

of the process. It's more likely than not - - and I'm

2.1

2.2

23

24

not saying this is the standard - - - that the grand jury wouldn't indict if they had that - - - that information.

MS. MANZELLO: Well, I think that's an important distinction. I think that in particular, the factual circumstances of this case show that's not even remotely accurate. The defendant actually testified in the grand jury. This witness was not a witness giving rise to the incident and the charges before the grand jury. I don't think this case on its facts even approaches any of these examples. And in fact, I think Hansen is where we find our greatest guidance. The bottom line was the district attorney behaved appropriately, made an evidentiary ruling whether in question or not as to the accuracy of the correctness of that ruling, and then the defendant pled guilty.

And once the defendant pled guilty there was no further opportunity for him to go back and challenge issues of evidentiary nature and pretrial proceedings. And he - - he knew that. He was advised of that when he pled guilty that he was giving up his right to do that. And so where would there ever be finality if a defendant was given the opportunity after pleading guilty, a voluntary and knowing and intelligent plea, which I think this record clearly establishes, to go back and challenge every evidentiary ruling that occurred in the grand jury and any pretrial



1 proceeding. I don't - - - I don't think we would ever move 2 forward towards that formidable interest of finality to a 3 plea for society. And I think this case is ripe for forfeiture. I think that the facts of this case are so 4 5 similar to Hansen that it would be really, you know, 6 unfortunate for us to abandon the very well-reasoned 7 decision in Hansen. And - - -8 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, Ms. Manzello. 9 MS. MANZELLO: Thank you. 10 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Mr. Scott. 11 MR. SCOTT: Yes, thank you. Okay. Hansen 12 involved the district attorney playing a videotape I

MR. SCOTT: Yes, thank you. Okay. Hansen involved the district attorney playing a videotape I believe of a news clipping. He - - news - - - news story, excuse me. He inadvertently played too much and introduced hearsay. He instructed the grand jury, disregard that hearsay and the record is clear that the quantum of evidence, non-hearsay evidence, was sufficient to sustain the indictment. So clearly, any possible prejudice to the defendant in that case was de minimis, and it's not analogous to our case.

JUDGE FEINMAN: All right - - -

JUDGE GARCIA: But I think - - - I'm sorry, go

23 | ahead.

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

2.1

22

24

25

JUDGE FEINMAN: Oh, I'm sorry. Go ahead.

JUDGE GARCIA: I think what I was getting at and



I think some of my colleagues is what we were - - - I think the hypotheticals were going to go was almost a reverse Pelchat, right. So instead of the grand jury getting the notice and the - - - and - - - or instead of the DA doing this in the grand jury and knowing there was this fundamental error there was this piece of evidence that should have gone in that didn't go in. And I think that's a - - that's an interesting issue.

But I'm - - - what I'm having trouble with is seeing how what happened in this case with the statement assume that that should have been brought to the grand jury and the grand jury should have been given the opportunity to look at that properly instructed and make a decision.

Assume that. I still have some difficulty seeing how what happened specifically here with this proffer rises to the level of Pelchat or to call it a reverse Pelchat.

MR. SCOTT: Well, Pelchat is sui generis because I mean obviously there was no evidence before the grand jury connecting the defendant with the commission of the crime. So that's kind of unique.

JUDGE GARCIA: But it still - - - to go to your - - your opponent's point here, it's still I think given the finality of pleas has to be some fundamental type of impairment of the integrity of the grand jury process which I think is what our case law pretty clearly says. So again

I go back to my original question is how does your alleged error here fit within that scheme.

2.1

MR. SCOTT: Again, I think focusing on intent, whether it was bad faith - - - you know, the prosecutor in Hill, he was told the - - - to have these alibi witnesses and then he was told I believe by the police that one of the alibi witnesses recanted. So he was, like, well, what should I do? So he made the wrong decision, I mean obviously. But my point is that it's the result that - - that I believe should be focused on. If the result is the exclusion of relevant evidence, then - - - then that is the evil that should be sought to be obviated. Not whether the prosecutor had a venal intent.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: And you're not arguing that there wasn't legally sufficient evidence before the grand jury that indicted your client, are you?

MR. SCOTT: No, but I think that had this evidence been introduced on a closed case such as this dealing with people who have a relationship, who have a child together - - -

JUDGE FEINMAN: Well, so I want to focus on the actual record here for just a second, if I may. And your client testified in the grand jury, right?

MR. SCOTT: That's correct, Your Honor.

JUDGE FEINMAN: And so why didn't when he was



testifying in the grand jury have an opportunity to sort of put forth in the course of his testimony the existence of Ms. Naper and her so-called evidence.

2.1

MR. SCOTT: I believe he did, Your Honor. That's
--- that would be in the record ---

JUDGE FEINMAN: So if that's the case, if the grand jury wanted to hear from her, they could have told the DA that.

MR. SCOTT: Well, I think there's a procedure, there's a statute. The statute should be followed, and I mean whether or not the grand jury could have taken it upon themselves to, you know, confront the prosecutors - - - and say we want to hear this testimony, I think - - -

JUDGE FEINMAN: Grand juries, you know, they have a police officer in a police case says that I saw whatever, you know, in terms of a sale and the defendant comes in and says something different and sometimes the grand jury says to the DA, you know what, we want to hear from the - - - the other officer who was on the scene. Grand juries do things like that all the time.

MR. SCOTT: Well, I think we can rely on the affirmation of the prosecutor who said in - - - in that affirmation which was in opposition to the defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment based on the 190(6) violation that the grand jury was not given an opportunity

- - - I'm paraphrasing of course, not given an opportunity 1 2 to hear the testimony of Naper as it was excluded by the 3 district attorney's office. Maybe we can take that at its 4 face value. 5 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: And, Mr. Scott, is it your 6 position that every witness that the defendant requests to 7 go before the grand jury, the prosecutor must put that 8 witness before the grand jury? 9 MR. SCOTT: That's what the statute says, Your 10 Honor, and I believe - - -JUDGE WILSON: Well, must - - - must put the 11 12 witness before the grand jury or must advise the grand jury 13 of the witness's - - -14 MR. SCOTT: That's - - - that's the correct 15 statement. Is to advise the grand jury and request that 16 the grand jury determine whether they want to hear this 17 witness, and then the prosecutor has the option of seeking 18 a protective order if the evidence - - -19 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: So there are no 20 circumstances under which the district attorney has the authority to make a determination that it's not even - - -21 22 based on whatever the particulars are it's not even to - -23 - they don't have the obligation to even advise the grand 24 jury and - - - is that what you're arguing?

MR. SCOTT: I think that's what the statute says,

Your Honor. 1 2 JUDGE FAHEY: Well, it doesn't say that they - -3 - that they - - - you're not saying that they don't have 4 the right to advise the grand jury. The only question 5 really is do they have an obligation to put it to the grand 6 jury. Of course, the DA could advise the grand jury. 7 MR. SCOTT: The grand jury - - - I think there's 8 a case in my brief - - -9 JUDGE FAHEY: No, no. Answer my question now. 10 MR. SCOTT: Yeah. 11 JUDGE FAHEY: My question is - - - and it was 12 Judge Wilson's question before - - - do they have to put 13 the name to the grand jury and say do you want to hear from 14 this person? 15 MR. SCOTT: Yes, I think that's what the statute 16 says. 17 JUDGE FAHEY: Isn't that what you're asking here? 18 MR. SCOTT: Yes. And - - -19 JUDGE FAHEY: You're not saying that they have to 20 hear from them, that they can't deny them, that the DA 21 can't advise them. You're saying that if I'm a defendant 22 and I say I want you to hear from this witness you've got 23 to at least ask the grand jury if they will want to hear



from this witness?

MR. SCOTT:

24

25

Precisely.

1	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: No gatekeeping function for
2	the district attorney?
3	MR. SCOTT: There's no gatekeeping function in
4	the statute, Your Honor.
5	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: All right.
6	MR. SCOTT: And
7	JUDGE FAHEY: Well, only for the defendant,
8	though, not for any other witness or any other person.
9	Only the defendant can say this is my witnesses I want you
10	to hear.
11	MR. SCOTT: Right, but the district attorney
12	doesn't have a gatekeeping function saying that I can
13	exclude this witness.
14	JUDGE FAHEY: Right.
15	MR. SCOTT: This case saying maybe the district
16	attorney could tell the grand jury I don't think you should
17	hear this witness, even that might be questionable, but
18	
	ultimately the decision has to be made by the grand jury.
19	ultimately the decision has to be made by the grand jury.  JUDGE RIVERA: To to clarify, the defendant
19	JUDGE RIVERA: To to clarify, the defendant
19	JUDGE RIVERA: To to clarify, the defendant here testified before the grand jury?
19 20 21	JUDGE RIVERA: To to clarify, the defendant here testified before the grand jury?  MR. SCOTT: That's correct, Your Honor.

MR. SCOTT: That's correct, Your Honor.

JUDGE RIVERA: He did or did not? 1 2 MR. SCOTT: Did. Did. 3 JUDGE RIVERA: He did? 4 MR. SCOTT: That's according to the - - - again, 5 according to the affirmation of ADA Walsh which is in the 6 record, and she said that that it was a request pre-grand 7 jury and a request during the grand jury. 8 JUDGE RIVERA: So - - - so why doesn't that 9 satisfy (6)? Because it says, "A defendant may request the 10 grand jury either orally or in writing." So the - - - the 11 defendant testifies and says by the way, I want you to hear 12 this witness. You can call her. 13 MR. SCOTT: Again, I think we rely on the 14 affirmation of ADA Julie Walsh. She said the grand jury 15 was not given an opportunity to hear this witness as the 16 testimony was excluded by the district attorney's office. 17 JUDGE RIVERA: Yes, but let me just - - - if he 18 says that can not the ADA read the statute to mean okay, he 19 requested it, I don't have to now present the name, he 20 already did so through his testimony? 2.1 MR. SCOTT: Well, that's not what she said in an 2.2 affirmation. 23 JUDGE RIVERA: No, but I'm asking you as a 24 hypothetical. If that were the case does the ADA still 25 have to go to the grand jury and say you know that witness



1	he he said he wanted to call, I'm repeating that he
2	says he wants to call that he wants you to consider
3	calling that witness?
4	MR. SCOTT: I think that would be
5	JUDGE RIVERA: Hearing from that witness.
6	MR. SCOTT: appropriate, Your Honor.
7	JUDGE RIVERA: What?
8	MR. SCOTT: I think that would be appropriate,
9	Your Honor.
10	JUDGE RIVERA: For the ADA not to then repeat
11	what the defendant has said on the
12	MR. SCOTT: Well, perhaps you say that you've
13	heard the defendant testify that Diane Naper has a certain
14	testimony he wants you to hear. Now I'd like you to
15	consider that and vote and tell me whether you want to hea
16	that witness. And like I and like I said if the
17	witness testimony proposed testimony was so obviousl
18	inadmissible then the remedy would be to seek the
19	intervention of the court.
20	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, counsel.
21	(Court is adjourned)
22	
23	
21	



CERTIFICATION I, Sara Winkeljohn, certify that the foregoing transcript of proceedings in the Court of Appeals of People v. Rohan Manragh, Jr., No. 119 was prepared using the required transcription equipment and is a true and accurate record of the proceedings. Considerica and Signature: Agency Name: eScribers Address of Agency: 352 Seventh Avenue Suite 604 New York, NY 10001 October 16, 2018 Date: 

