"Duely & Constantly Kept"
(Click Here to view entire document in PDF format) |
|
|
Supreme Court Jurisdiction and Procedure [cont.]
Appellate Jurisdiction [cont.] |
|
| The Supreme Court also reviewed errors in law in the appellate decisions of lower courts. The courts of common pleas and the mayors' courts of certain upstate cities were authorized in 1824 to review errors in law or fact in cases transferred from justices' courts by writ of certiorari. The Superior Court of New York City, established in 1828, exercised similar jurisdiction over the court of common pleas, the assistant justices' Courts, and Marine Court, Such a case, originating in a justice's court, might subsequently be appealed on writ of error to the Supreme Court. however that court reviewed only substantial error on the legal merits of the case, not procedural error. Irregular pleadings in justices' courts were not grounds for error, because the proceedings in those courts were relatively informal and many mistakes were made. However, improper exercise of jurisdiction in a justice's court was grounds for a writ of error.[1] | |
![]() |
Writ of Certiorari, 1816. Detail. See page 40 |
|
The writ of certiorari was another means by which the Supreme Court exercised appellate or transfer jurisdiction over lower courts. The writ ordered a court or quasi-judicial tribunal to certify and return to the Supreme Court for review a copy of proceedings in a particular matter. The writ of certiorari could be employed only when a writ of error was not available, as when a case was transferred from a court of record prior to final judgment; or when the judgment or determination to be reviewed occurred in a court not of record not employing juries (for example, courts of justices of the peace), or in an administrative body exercising quasi-judicial functions. Most uses of the writ of certiorari were authorized by statute. Acts of the colonial Assembly and state Legislature authorized use of the writ of certiorari to remove a certified transcript of civil proceedings in a court of common pleas) prior to final judgment. This in effect transferred the case to the Supreme Court, which then rendered judgment. Legislation curbed the overuse of writs of certiorari to transfer minor cases to the Supreme Court. A 1787 law forbade use of the writ of certiorari to remove cases from a court of common pleas to the Supreme Court when the amount in controversy was under 100 pounds, later changed to $250 (subsequently $500 in New York City). This limitation did not apply to cases to which New York State or an incorporated city was a party or cases that involved real property, assault and battery, slander, replevin, or false imprisonment. A 1788 law required that a Supreme Court justice approve and sign any writ of certiorari (civil or criminal). Statute law also authorized use of writ of certiorari to transfer a pending criminal indictment in a court of oyer and terminer or (until 1830) court of general sessions to the Supreme Court, but only with permission of a Supreme Court justice. The case was then to be tried in a circuit court.[2]
The writ of certiorari was also used to remove judgments in justices' civil courts directly to the Supreme Court for review (bypassing the courts of common pleas and the mayors' courts). Acts of 1765, 1787, and 1788 governed this use of a writ of certiorari. A party seeking review by certiorari was required to submit an affidavit stating the grounds for the writ. Based on the affidavit, the Supreme Court justice could allow the writ upon reasonable cause, "either for error therein or some unfair practice of the justice." These certiorari cases became very numerous in the early nineteenth century; by 1814 the number was nearly two hundred a year. Many of these cases involved small amounts of money. An 1824 law attempted to stop the flow of appeals of minor civil cases to the Supreme Court. The law directed that justice court civil judgments be reviewed by a court of common pleas by writ of certiorari when the debt and damages did not exceed $25. Judgments involving more than $25 were to be reviewed by common pleas on what was called an appeal. Finally, statute law authorized the Supreme Court to review by writ of certiorari criminal convictions in courts of justices of the peace. Once the conviction was affirmed or reversed, the Supreme Court remitted the judgment to the appropriate court of general sessions for execution. There were few, if any, appeals of civil or criminal cases from justices' courts to the Supreme Court by writ of certiorari after 1830.[3] |
The writ of certiorari could be employed only when a writ of error was not available. It was used to remove judgments in justices' civil courts directly to the Supreme Court for review. |
| Besides these statutory uses of the writ of certiorari, New York common law allowed its use to review a quasi-judicial administrative determination of an executive officer or body, when the determination affected a person's rights or property. The Supreme Court exercised appellate jurisdiction by writ of certiorari over decisions of the canal appraisers in awarding damages, and of town, city, or village officers in awarding compensation for property taken for roads or streets. A writ of certiorari to review was issued at the discretion of the court[4] | |
![]() |
|
"Justice's Court in the Backwoods"
Tompkins Harrison Matteson, oil painting, 1850. Matteson lived and did much of his work in Cayuga and Chenango Counties. Prior to 1830 cases decided by justices of the peace could be appealed directly to the Supreme Court by writ of certiorari. (Courtesy New York State Historical Association.) |
|
|
The writ of habeas corpus was employed on rare occasions to direct a sheriff or other law officer to deliver a prisoner for trial and to state the reason for detaining the prisoner The writ was more commonly used to produce an arrested person to testify in another's trial, or to appear in an action to which he was a party in the Supreme Court. The writ was also occasionally employed to transfer a case from the court of common pleas to the Supreme Court.[5]
Writs of prohibition and mandamus were sterner remedies by which the Supreme Court could supervise lower courts and public officers. The writ of prohibition was used very rarely if at all in the early nineteenth century; however, the writ was available if needed to restrain an inferior court from exceeding its jurisdiction prior to final judgment in a case. The writ of mandamus was in frequent use. The writ was issued to compel a lower court to exercise its functions, or an executive officer of state or local government to perform a legally mandated, nondiscretionary act. The writ was used where no other remedy (writ of error or certiorari) was available. A Supreme Court justice allowed a writ of mandamus at his discretion, upon the relator's submission of an affidavit demonstrating a clear right to relief. The return of the writ of mandamus was treated as a declaration by a plaintiff, and it set in motion the usual civil proceedings of the Supreme Court, including pleading and possibly a trial in the county where the alleged failure to perform an official act occurred. The writ of mandamus was typically employed to compel a court of common pleas to give judgment on a verdict, to seal or amend a bill of exceptions, or to exonerate bail. There were also mandamus cases involving county boards of supervisors, county clerks, town supervisors and commissioners of highways, canal commissioners, canal appraisers, and the governor.[6] |
|
![]() |
License to Practice Law, 1808. Detail. See page 48. |
|
Note 1: On appellate jurisdiction of the lower courts see Graham, Orgainzation and Jurisdiction of the Courts, pp. 72-132. Note 2: Laws of 1787, Chap. 72; Laws of 1801, Chap. 13; Revised Laws (1813), vol. 1, pp. 140-42; Revised Statutes (1829), Part III, Chap. 7, Title 2. On use of certiorari to remove indictments to the Supreme Court from a court of oyer and terminer or court of general sessions, see Laws of 1788, Chap. 2; Laws of 1801, Chap. 13; Revised Laws (1813), vol. 1, p. 141; Revised Statutes (1829), Part IV, Chap. 2, Title 4, Art. 3. On the situations in which a writ of certiorari could be employed to review court proceedings and judgments, see Harwood vs. French, 4 Cowen 501 (1825); and People ex rd. Onderdonk vs. Queens County, 1 Hill 195 (1841). A judge's signature was required on the writ of certiorari, after the party seeking the writ had shown good cause for its issuance. Munro vs. Baker, 6 Cowen 396 (1836). On statutory certiorari generally see Graham, Organization and Jurisdiction of the Courts, pp. 328-39. The writ of habeas corpus could serve a similar function of transferring a case to the Supreme Court. However, that writ transferred only custody of the defendant, not the record of proceedings, meaning that the case had to commence anew. Note 3: On use of certiorari to review civil judgments in justice's courts, see Laws of 1765, Chap. 1279; Laws of 1787, Chap. 89; Laws of 1799, Chap. 92; Laws of 1801, Chap. 165; Revised Laws (1813), vol. 1, pp. 396-97. Supreme Court review of civil cases from justice's courts was abolished by Laws of 1824, Chap. 238. That act and Revised Statutes (1829), Part III, Chap. 2, Title 4, Arts. 10-11 governed review of inferior court judgments by writs of certiorari and appeals to the courts of common pleas and mayor's courts. On use of certiorari to review convictions in justice's courts see Laws of 1788, Chap. 2; Laws of 1801, Chap. 13; Laws of 1824, Chap. 238; Revised Statutes, Part IV, Chap. 2, Title 3, Art. 4. Note 4: Harold Weintraub, "Mandamus and Certiorari in New York from the Revolution to 1880," Fordham Law Review, 32 (1964), 717-48. A leading case on common law certiorari was Lawton vs. Commissioners of Highways of the Town of Cambridge, 2 Caines 179 (1804). Note 5: On the writ of habeas corpus to produce persons in court, whether legally or illegally detained, see laws of 1801, Chap. 65. On the use of habeas corpus and certiorari to remove cases to the Supreme Court, see Laws of 1801, Chap. 13. The statutory provisions on habeas corpus were consolidated in Revised Statutes (1819), Part III, Chap. 9, title 1. See note 2. Note 6: Weintraub, "Mandamus and Certiorari in New York," pp. 683-717. Laws of 1788, Chap. 11. Revised Statutes (1829), Part III, Chap. 9, Title 2, Art. 3. A significant case outlining the narrow scope of the writ of mandamus was Judges of the Oneida Common Pleas v. People ex rel. Savage, 18 Wendell 79 (1837). | |
|
The Historical Society of the Courts of the State of New York | |