SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW
COUNTY OF CHAUTAUQUA
In the Matter of the Application of
LANCE S. SPICER, Individually and as
Chairman of the Chautauqua County
For a Judgment under Article 78 of the Index No.H-12,517
CPLR, Specifically Section 7803(1)
Andrew W. Goodell, County Executive,
MICHAEL J. SULLIVAN, ESQ.
Attorney for Petitioner
ERICKSON, WEBB, & SCOLTON
(Paul V. Webb, Jr., Esq.
of Counsel) for Respondent
BRADY, BROOKS & SMITH, LLP
(Thomas C. Brady, Esq.
of Counsel) for Intervenors
DECISION and ORDER
The Court grants the relief requested in the Petition
for an order in the nature of MANDAMUS pursuant to Section
7803(1) of the CPLR compelling and directing Andrew W.
Goodell, County Executive of the County of Chautauqua, to
execute the deeds and necessary recording documents to
complete the sale of property as authorized by the Chautauqua
County Legislature in Resolutions 73-95 and 151-95.
Petitioner and intervenors have established a clear
right to relief by mandamus.
In 1987, the County administration, without any
determination by the county legislature that the property was no
longer needed for public use, offered portions of a county owned
railroad bed to adjoining property owners and invited them to
make an offer, presumably for a private sale. They were not
Three years later, in October 1990, again without a request
to the legislature for a determination that the property was no
longer needed for public purposes, the County approached property
owners once more by offering them the land adjoining their
respective properties and inviting bids.
Two responded with offers of $.625 and $.650 per linear foot.
A Department of Public Works employee, doing what she was
assigned to do (and had done on previous occasions regarding
other property with the approval of her Department Head, the
Executive and Legislature) sent a letter of acceptance to the
A month or so later, the County Executive determined that
the property would be desirable for development of public trails,
but, not as part of the park system by use of tax dollars, but by
a yet to be created not-for-profit organization.
The County Executive, again without authority from the
legislature, and without any consideration from the organization,
decreed the organization should have first refusal, or the right
to meet or beat the bids of the adjoining landowners.
The Executive felt "The rails-to-trails concept was a 'win-
win' situation for the County taxpayers- in addition to getting
the best price for the property, the new trail would complement
the county park system and the taxpayers would still be free to
use the property whenever they desired." (September 8, 1995
Goodell letter to Comptroller,p 2, footnote.)
The landowners were advised acceptance of their offer was
premature; that the county intended to give "all other interested
parties ample opportunity to meet or exceed the bids received to
date" and that there would be a two-month period to submit
additional offers. (Riedesel to Gustafson, 3/19/91 letter).
Thus, the County Executive placed a hold on the bids of the
adjoining property owners until an organization could be
incorporated. Thus, Rails to Trails was born and made an
undisclosed offer to purchase the entire 3 mile section of
railroad property for $.70 a linear foot.
The landowners were advised the organization made an offer
in an unspecified amount on the entire section; were advised
Rails to Trails would be given the opportunity to "match your
offer" and were invited to make their "final best offer for the
parcel adjoining your premises". (See Abdella 6/19/91 letter.)
No further offers were made by the adjoining owners.
The landowners were not given the right to present an offer
on the entire section; nor were they given the right to meet or
beat the Rails to Trails offer in accordance with prior private
sales conducted by the County involving two or more interested
parties. (See prior "letter auction" sale where each party was
alternately informed of the bid of the other and given a fair
opportunity to beat the opposing offer).
Three years later, the landowners approached the Legislature
on their long standing offers. On March 10, 1995, the corporation
increased its offer to $1.00 per linear foot for the entire
parcel. (J.Goodell to Spicer 3/10/95 letter).
On March 22, 1995, the Legislature, by a 2/3 vote,
determined by resolution that the former railroad section
crossing the Gustafson's property was no longer needed for public
purposes and in the face of a higher linear per foot proposal by
Rails to Trails for the entire 3 mile section, voted to convey
the two parcels to the adjacent owners for their original 1991
offer, and, to sell the remaining portions of the property at
public auction. (Resolution 73-95).
The resolution recited that the "County Executive be and
hereby is authorized and empowered to execute all documents
necessary to transfer [the parcels] by quitclaim deed to the
adjoining landowners". The County Executive responded with a
veto; the County Legislature overrode the veto.
The County Executive caused a quit claim deed to be prepared
containing language that would put the landowners on notice of
questions of the constitutionality and legality of the
transaction in view of the higher per foot Rails to Trails bid.
The Legislature reacted by enacting resolution 151-95 on
June 12 rejecting the language and to "authorize and empower" the
County Executive to execute the deeds without the objectionable
language. The County Executive did not sign or veto this
The County Executive and Chairman of the Legislature
submitted their respective arguments on questions of legality and
constitutionality to the Comptroller for an opinion.
Reciting that the Comptroller generally does not
render opinions to local governments interpreting local
enactments or charters, or commenting on the propriety of actions
already taken, and because of the pending suit, the Comptroller
declined to render a formal opinion and instead submitted a
letter discussing principles of law relating to the issues.
(See Comptroller's letter, 11/22/95).
The County Executive has not executed the deeds authorized
by the Legislature. Petitioner individually and as Chairman of
the County Legislature instituted an action for mandamus pursuant
to Article 78 of the CPLR. The County Executive moved to dismiss
on the grounds it was premature and that:
(1) The petition fails to meet the minimum requirements for
mandamus because there has been no demand on the Executive to
perform, nor a refusal by him, and that:
a. Petitioner failed to establish a clear legal right; the
Legislature had no authority to compel the Executive to
sign deeds for the sale of real property.
b. The resolutions were plainly permissive and not mandatory
in that they authorize and empower, but do not compel,
the County Executive to execute the proposed deeds.
c. The sale of real estate inherently involves discretionary
decisions on the part of the Executive.
d. The issuance of a mandamus would be disruptive of
I. THE LEGISLATURE HAD THE POWER UNDER THE CHAUTAUQUA
COUNTY CHARTER TO AUTHORIZE THE SALE TO THE GUSTAFSONS.
County Law Section 215(5) empowers the governing board
of a County, by a 2/3 vote, to sell any county real property
that the board determines is no longer necessary for public
use. The County Law applies to charter counties where the
county law is not in conflict with or in limitation of a
provision of any county's charter. See County Law Section 2.
Section 1.03 of the Chautauqua County Charter ("the Charter")
recites, in part, as follows:
". . . whenever any State law, general, special or local
in effect, is inconsistent with the Charter . . ., such
law shall be deemed to the extent of such inconsistency
to be superseded by the Charter . . . .".
Section 2.05 of the County Charter provides:
"Except as otherwise provided in this Charter, the
County Legislature shall have and exercise all such
powers and duties conferred on County Legislatures in
the State of New York by applicable law, and all powers
necessarily incidental thereto."
This provision is reinforced by Section 2.05 of the
Administrative Code which recites:
". . . the County Legislature shall have and exercise
all such powers and duties conferred on a Board of
Supervisors or a County Legislature in the State of New
York by applicable law, and all powers necessarily
There is nothing in the Chautauqua County Charter or
Administrative Code that expressly or by implication takes
away, annuls, limits, or even specifically refers to the
power granted to this County Legislature by County Law
Section 215(5) to sell real property unneeded for public
purposes. Therefore, the Legislature retains that power.
Abolition or curtailment of powers or rights conferred
upon a county, county board, body or officer must be
expressly spelled out by state law or charter.
In passing the County Charter Laws (Alternative County
Government Law and Municipal Home Rule Law) it was not the
intent of the legislature to abolish or curtail any powers or
rights previously granted to a county, board, commission,
body or officer thereof, unless a contrary intention is
clearly manifested from the express provisions of the law or
charter. See Municipal Home Rule Law, Section 35(2) and
Alternative County Government Law, Section 700(2).
Section 35(4) of the Municipal Home Rule Law provides
that all existing state laws shall remain in force until
amended modified, superseded or repealed. See also,
Alternative County Government Law, Section 700 (4).
There is not even a hint of intention in the Charter to
affect or diminish the power of the County Legislature to
sell real property granted by the State Legislature by County
Law Section 215(5).
The Executive argues that Section 3.02(h) of the Charter
grants the Executive, not the Legislature, sole authority for
the making, signing and implementing of all contracts on
behalf of the County; that the legislature is limited to
approving, but not initiating, any contract for sale of real
There is nothing in that section nor in the rest of the
charter that requires that the process of selling property no
longer necessary for public use must originate with the
Executive; there is nothing that limits the power of the
legislature to sell by virtue of Section 2.15.(5) of the
By Resolution 73-95, the Legislature determined that the
property was no longer needed for public use and authorized
the sale to Gustafsons. When it adopted this resolution, the
Legislature met all statutory and Charter requirements.
The Executive is not without remedy in cases where he
disagrees with the legislature; he has (and in this case he
exercised) the power of veto.
Only the Legislature is authorized to sell County owned
and unneeded real property. Its adoption of resolution 73-95
pursuant to the power granted by County Law Section 215.(5),
created a binding, enforceable contract between the County
and the prospective purchasers.
". . . when an offer has been made to a municipal
corporation, a vote of the municipal council accepting the
offer will create a contract." 27 NY Jur 2d 1210 and cases
cited under note 77.
The sole acts necessary to carry out that contract
involve the signing of the deeds by the County Executive,
and, payment of the approved purchase price. See Municipal
Consultants & Publishers, Inc. v Town of Ramapo, 47 NY2d 144.
Even if the parties contemplated an additional signed
agreement (that is not the case here), the adoption of
resolution 73-95 was all that was necessary to create a
contract and impose responsibility on the County Executive to
sign the deeds. Municipal Consultants & Publishers, Inc. v
Town of Ramapo, supra, where the Court of Appeals held that
the Town Board's resolution authorizing the Supervisor to
sign an agreement was an acceptance of the offer made by the
prospective purchaser; that nothing further was necessary to
create an enforceable contract.
The authority given to the Executive by Section 3.01 of
the Charter to execute and implement all contracts on behalf
of the County did not create or recognize any discretion on
his part insofar as resolution 73-95 was concerned. His act
of signing a deed conveying the property was ministerial.
Municipal Consultants, supra; See also Orelli v Ambro, et
al., 51 AD2d 85 and Village of Lake George v Town of
Caldwell, 3 AD2d 550.
Chautauqua County Local Law 7-75 authorized the County
to sell real property no longer needed for public use at
private sale without public advertisement. This superseded
the requirements of Section 215(6) for public bidding. See
also 1991 Opns.St.Comp.No 91-27, page 79.
II. PETITIONER HAS ESTABLISHED A CLEAR, UNQUESTIONABLE RIGHT
TO RELIEF BY MANDAMUS
Respondent argues that mandamus is inappropriate because
Petitioners have failed to establish that (1) a demand was
made on Respondent to sign the deed and (2) and that
This argument ignores the fact that the Legislature
overrode the Executive's veto. The override of a veto is the
ultimate, the final demand a legislature can make.
Section 3.02(e) of the Charter requires the
"Execute and enforce all local laws and resolutions of
the County Legislature and see that all laws required to
be enforced through the County Legislature or other
county officers subject to its control are faithfully
As for the element of refusal, the Executive has yet to
execute and enforce Resolutions 73-95 and 151-95; he has yet
to sign the deeds.
Respondent also contends mandamus must relate to the
"performance of an act commanded to be performed by law and
involving no exercise of discretion, i.e., mandatory
nondiscretionary action", and that the act demanded must be
The Executive cites TRIUMPH, Inc. v O'Shea, 77 AD2d 363,
to support his argument that the act of executing the deed
was discretionary rather than ministerial.
That case is easily distinguished. The enabling
legislation whereby the Commissioner "was authorized to sell
and convey" a certain parcel of surplus property was on such
terms and conditions as he deemed necessary.
After negotiations, the Commissioner advised TRIUMPH
that its offer was "totally unacceptable", prompting TRIUMPH
to seek mandamus. The Commissioner's authority was clearly
Here, the Executive was to sign the deed which had been
authorized and approved by the Legislature. His signing of
the deed is clearly ministerial in view of the fact that the
County Legislature's adoption of Resolution 73-95 constituted
an acceptance of the Gustafson offer, thereby creating a
binding contract. There was no acceptance and no contract in
Municipal Consultants & Publishers, Inc. v Town of
Ramapo, supra, is controlling on the issue of the County
Executive's authority or discretion to withhold execution of
the deed. In the Municipal case, the resolution authorized
but did not specifically direct, in so many words, the
supervisor to sign the agreement on behalf of the town.
This is exactly the situation here.
There is nothing in the County Charter which indicates
that once the Legislature accepted the Gustafson offer, any
further act by the Legislature or County Executive was
necessary to create an enforceable contract.
Moreover, as in Municipal Consultants, supra, and as
stated earlier, there is nothing in the Charter which
recognizes, creates or authorizes any discretion on the
County Executive's part once the Legislature adopts
legislation authorizing the sale of real property and once
the Executive's veto is overridden. His act of signing the
deed is clearly ministerial.
The petitioner and intervenors have established the
clear right to the relief sought beyond reasonable doubt or
The Executive also argues that "the Petition is very
disruptive to the smooth and proper administration of County
Government" and should therefore be dismissed.
There is nothing more disruptive than the refusal of the
County Executive to carry out the resolution of the
Legislature after it overrode his veto. To grant the
Executive "discretion" to ignore the resolution and
legislative override would in effect give him a double iron
clad veto power that would make the Legislature a sterile and
toothless, quaint but unnecessary body. That is not the
intent of the County Law, and clearly not the intent of the
Charter and Administrative Code insofar as the sale of real
property is concerned.
After his veto was overridden, the County Executive had
no authority to refuse to sign the deeds authorized by the
III. THE TIME FOR THE COUNTY EXECUTIVE TO CHALLENGE THE
ACTION HAS ELAPSED.
The issue here is whether the County Executive can
continue hold back his signature to the deeds authorized by
the Legislature. He cannot.
The Charter granted him the power and authority to
accept or veto the resolution. He chose to veto; the
Legislature chose to override. The override constituted a
demand that he carry out the resolution and sign the deeds.
After his veto was overridden, the County Executive had
four months in which to bring an action or proceeding
challenging the authority of the legislature to sell the
property to the Gustafsons. He did not do so; neither did
any other interested party. Therefore, he cannot now
challenge the legislative acts authorizing the sale.
IV. THE COUNTY LEGISLATURE'S ACCEPTANCE OF THE OFFERS OF
THE ADJACENT OWNERS DID NOT VIOLATE THE CONSTITUTION; DID NOT
VIOLATE COUNTY LAW AND WAS A PROPER EXERCISE OF LEGISLATIVE
Although resolution No. 73-95 is not an issue, the Court
considers it important to address questions raised by the
Petitioner and Respondent to the Comptroller and in this
1. Did the Legislature's acceptance of the offers of the
owners violate the gift and loan prohibition of
Article VII, Section 1 of the State Constitution
which prohibits gifts or loans of public money or
property to or in aid of any individual or private
2. Did the acceptance violate the requirement that the
price at a private sale be fair and adequate?
3. Did the acceptance violate County Law Section
215(6) which requires property to be sold to the
The answer to these questions is "no". As the
Comptroller indicated in his November 22, 1995 letter:
"In applying article VIII, Section 1 to the sale of real
property, the courts have indicated that a transaction
will be construed as a gift in violation of article VII,
Section 1 if the consideration is so grossly inadequate
as to indicate that the transaction was not a bonafide
sale (see Grand Realty v City of White Plains, 125 AD2d
639, 510 NYS2d 172; Matter of Ross v Wilson, 284 AD 522,
132 NYS2d 760, revd on other grnds 308 NY 605;. . .".
The consideration here for the 800 feet was not grossly
inadequate; in fact, it initially satisfied the project
coordinator who was familiar with similar transactions.
As the Comptroller indicated, one court has held that
the Constitution article:
"is designed to prevent the gift of public property, not
to regulate the price or the adequacy of the
consideration of sales of public property made in good
faith" (Van Curler v City of Schenectady, 59 Misc 2d
621, 626, 300 NYS2d 765, 772.
"In describing a municipality's responsibility when
selling unneeded real property when competitive bidding
is not required, the courts have stated that municipal
officials have a fiduciary duty to secure the best price
obtainable in their judgment or the most beneficial
terms in the public interest for any lawful use (see,
e.g., Matter of New City v Flagg, 111 AD2d 814, 490
NYS2d 560 affd 66 NY2d 980, 499 NYS2d 395; Orelli v
Ambro, 41 NY2d 952, 394 NYS2d 636; Ross v Wilson, 284 AD
522, 132 NYS2d 760, revd on other grnds 308 NY 605;
Davis v Board of Education, 125 AD2d 534, 509 NYS2d 612,
leave denied 69 NY2d 613, 517 NYS2d 1028; 1990 Opns St
Comp No 90-37,p 84).
"The method of sale chosen is within the sound
discretion of the municipal officials charged with the
power to dispose of unneeded real property, but should
be the one which those officials belive will yield the
best price or maximum financial benefit (Feldman v
Miller, 151 AD2d 755, 542 NYS2d 777; Opn No. 90-37,
supra)." Comptroller 11/22/95 letter, supra.
And, the municipality can engage in a good faith
consideration of factors such as the prospective property
tax consequences of the proposed sale "in a credible effort
to exact the highest rate of return on the property. " New
The minutes of the committees of the Legislature which
authorized the submission of Resolution No. 73-95 indicate
the Legislature considered the fact that the property would
be returned to the tax rolls by sale to the Gustafsons,
whereas Rails to Trails would be eligible for tax exemption.
Although the Legislature accepted what appears to have
been the lower per linear foot bid, the duty of the
Legislature was to obtain the most beneficial terms in the
public interest, and, in making that determination, could
consider the tax consequences.
The bids were not for identical property. Rails to
Trails was permitted to bid on the entire 3 mile stretch; the
owners were not. Rails to Trails was advised of the owners
bid; the owners were not advised of the Rails to Trails
quotation. The bidders were not treated equally.
The County Executive gave Rails to Trails the right of
first refusal, the right to meet or beat the Gustafson bids;
the Gustafsons were not given that right. To quote the
November 22, 1995 Comptroller's letter:
"To provide such a right without corresponding
consideration to the municipality may be violative of
the gift and loan provision of article VII Section 1
(see, e.g., Teachers Association v Board of Education,
34 AD2d 351, 312 NYS2d 252). In addition, if the right
is provided to one of several participants without any
solicitation of competition, it could raise the question
of whether the private sale process used by the
municipality is designed to treat all participants
equally, without favoritism (cf. Feldman, supra; see
also 26 Opns St Comp, 1970, p 218)."
The Executive contends the Legislature could not accept
bids he rejected.
There was never a rejection of the Gustafson bids. The
invitation by the County Attorney to submit their highest
proposal did not constitute a rejection of their initial bid.
Even if there had been a rejection, the Legislature
had the authority to accept those bids. As quoted earlier:
". . . when an offer has been made to a municipal
corporation, a vote of the municipal council accepting
the offer will create a contract." 27 NY Jur 2d 1210
and cases under note 77.
Moreover, this Court holds that the Legislature has the
authority to sell unneeded property at private sale.
Under the Charter, the County Executive can negotiate
and enter into a conditional contract for a private real
property sale conditioned upon Legislative approval, but,
even this should not be undertaken without a determination by
the County Legislature that the property is no longer needed
for public purposes. Moreover, his authority to negotiate and
execute contracts does not negate the power of the County
Legislature to sell real property.
III. THE COUNTY LEGISLATURE AND THE EXECUTIVE RATIFIED THE
DPW ACCEPTANCE OF THE GUSTAFSON OFFER.
The DPW was authorized by the Executive to invite
proposals from adjoining landowners for property County
officials considered to be no longer needed for public use.
The past practice involved inviting proposals, and, if
deemed acceptable by the Department, the proposals were
approved by the Department and subsequently submitted to the
County Attorney to prepare documents and to obtain the
approval of the County Legislature.
On October 11, 1990, the Department of Public Works
wrote to Gustafsons to "offer you that entire section,
approximately 800 feet long near lot 31, which bisects your
property". Gustafsons offered $500 and on January 8, 1991,
the Project Coordinator advised them that "this Department
has decided to accept your offer . . .".
The Executive argues that the employee did not have
authority to accept the offers. Petitioners disagree,
arguing that the Executive delegated authority to the DPW
which could accept proposals, subject to Legislative
Even if the project coordinator did not have authority
to accept the Gustafson proposal, the County Legislature had
the power to ratify the contract.
"The general rule is that municipal corporations may
ratify contracts made on their behalf which they have
authority to make.(45) Thus, it is competent for a municipal
corporation to ratify a contract and thereby make it a
binding obligation, acting through its authorized agencies
and in the manner prescribed by law for making contracts of
such a character, if the contract was within its general
corporate powers but was invalid because defectively or
irregularly executed, or because the officer or agent who
purported to execute it on behalf of the municipality had not
the requisite authority. (46) . . . ." 27 NY Jur 2d 1219.
The Executive also ratified the agreement. After his
veto was overturned, he authorized a deed to be prepared to
the Gustafsons. The deed contained language which was not
acceptable to the Gustafsons or to the Legislature, whereupon
the Legislature passed Resolution 151-95 authorizing the
Executive to execute a deed without the objectionable
language. The Executive did not sign or veto that
resolution, nor institute proceedings to challenge it, and
has yet to execute the authorized deeds.
The Court cannot weigh the merits of the County
Executive's laudable objective to have the property conveyed
to Rails to Trails for the purpose of a public hiking trail
against the equally laudable objective of the County
Legislature to transfer the parcels to adjoining landowners
for agricultural purposes.
Nor can the Court weigh or question the wisdom of
selling a portion of the former railroad property when that
sale may adversely affect the price or saleably of the
remaining section or its use as a trail.
"... if a contract is within the power of a municipal
corporation, and has been duly entered into, the courts can
consider only whether the constitution permits the contract
in question; questions of whether the contract is wise or
whether its terms are advantageous for the corporation and
the public are solely for the municipal officers." 27 NY Jur
2d 1208 and cases cited under note 73.
Several other applicable principles of law support the
granting of an Order of Mandamus in this case.
"Courts should not be astute to enable a municipal
corporation to disavow its just commitments or obligations,
or to conduct itself respecting them in a manner violative of
fair dealing, which they would not sanction were natural
persons the parties involved." 27 NY Jur 2d 1208, see cases
"In the performance of its undertakings, a municipality
should be held to the same accountability as would one of its
citizens, and it should be governed by the same rules of
common honesty and fair dealing which are binding on all
individuals." 95 27 NY Jur 2d 1210.
"A municipal corporation may be estopped the same as an
individual, where it is acting in a corporate or proprietary
capacity,..." 25 NY Jur 2d 178, and cases cited in notes
"A municipality may be estopped from raising the
unconstitutionality of a statute, or that a contract is
against public policy, and if the subject matter of its act
is not ultra vires, illegal or prohibited, the defense of
estoppel is available against it in a proper case."
25 NY Jur 2d 178, cases in notes 50,51,55.
The motion of Respondent to dismiss the petition is
denied. The Petition for an order in the nature of MANDAMUS
pursuant to Section 7803(1) of the CPLR is granted, and it is
ORDERED, that Andrew W. Goodell, County Executive of
the County of Chautauqua, or in his absence, the Acting
County Executive, execute the deeds and necessary recording
documents to complete the sale of property as authorized by
the Chautauqua County Legislature in Resolutions 73-95 and
151-95. No costs to any party.
THIS IS THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THIS COURT. NO FURTHER
ORDER SHALL BE NECESSARY.
Dated: December 11, 1995
Mayville, New York
SUPREME COURT JUSTICE
The following papers and documents were considered by
Motion#1: By Petitioner for Mandamus
Petitioner's Notice of Petition
Dated: October 12, 1995
Petitioner's Memorandum of Law
Respondent's Reply Memorandum of Law
Dated: November 2, 1995
Petitioner's Attorney Affirmation
Petitioner's September 8, 1995 letter to Comptroller
Thomas C. Brady, Esq. December 7, 1995 letter to the Court
Motion#2: By Respondent to dismiss petition
Order to Show Cause
Dated: October 20, 1995
Respondent's Affidavit of Andrew W. Goodell
Dated: October 20, 1995
Respondent's Memorandum of Law
Dated: October 16, 1995
Intervenor's Gustafson's Memorandum of Law in Opposition
to Respondent's Motion to Dismiss
Petitioner's Reply Affidavit
Dated: October 27, 1995
Affidavit by Paul V. Webb, Jr., Esq. for Respondent
Dated: October 20, 1995
December 8, 1995 letter of Paul V. Webb, Jr., Esq. to the
Motion#3: by Intervenors
Intervenor's Order to Show Cause
Dated: November 9, 1995
Intervenor's Affidavit in Support of Motion to Intervene
Dated: November 8, 1995
Respondent's Affidavit in Opposition To Motion To Intervene
Dated: November 22, 1995
November 25, 1995 letter of Thomas C. Brady, Esq. to the
Comptroller's November 22, 1995 letter to the parties
The Chautauqua County Charter and Administrative Code