1	COURT OF APPEALS
2	STATE OF NEW YORK
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4	PEOPLE,
5	Respondent,
6	-against-
7	No. 156 WESTERN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
8	et al., Appellants.
9	
10	20 Eagle Street Albany, New York 12207
11	September 5, 2012
12	Before:
13	CHIEF JUDGE JONATHAN LIPPMAN ASSOCIATE JUDGE CARMEN BEAUCHAMP CIPARICK
14	ASSOCIATE JUDGE VICTORIA A. GRAFFEO ASSOCIATE JUDGE SUSAN PHILLIPS READ
15	ASSOCIATE JUDGE ROBERT S. SMITH ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE F. PIGOTT, JR. ASSOCIATE JUDGE THEODORE T. JONES
16	
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24	Penina Wolicki
25	Official Court Transcriber

1	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: 156, People v.
2	Western Express.
3	Counselor, do you want any rebuttal time?
4	MS. HOTH: Your Honor, me and my co-counsel
5	would each like to reserve thirty seconds for a
6	combined one and a half minutes, which I will do
7	rebuttal, not all three of us.
8	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: You're going to each
9	take how much?
LO	MS. HOTH: Thirty seconds.
L1	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: And that gives you
L2	one and a half.
L3	MS. HOTH: A minute and a half for
L4	rebuttal, which I will do, and it gives us each four
L5	and a half minutes.
L6	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: They're each giving
L7	you their two thirty seconds, plus yours?
L8	MS. HOTH: They're each giving me thirty
L9	seconds, and trusting me to do a good job with it.
20	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay.
21	MS. HOTH: Okay.
22	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: I think the clock
23	keeper is going to have a lot of problems. But it
24	sounds good.

MS. HOTH: Okay. Although creatively

1 named, there never was a Western Express cybercrime 2 group. There was no group at all. Instead there was 3 a series of individuals, like my client, who availed 4 themselves of a legitimate service provided by 5 Western Express. JUDGE PIGOTT: Why isn't that a question of 6 7 fact for the jury, rather than determining now whether an indictment lies? 8 9 MS. HOTH: Because there's no evidence 10 presented to the grand jury to provide a basis for concluding that there was enterprise corruption here. 11 We don't --12 13 JUDGE READ: Is the structure a problem? There's no evidence to show a structure. Is that 14 15 what you're arguing? 16 MS. HOTH: There's - - - well, there's no 17 evidence showing an ascertainable structure distinct 18 from a pattern of criminal activity. We don't try 19 people for crimes unless the People can present a 2.0 grand jury with - - -21 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So there's a structure and there's criminal conduct, but they're 22 23 not intersecting. Is that what you're saying? 2.4 MS. HOTH: Not in this case, Your Honor.

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Not at all.

1	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Does everyone know
2	what's happening, that this is a vehicle for what one
3	might call money laundering or carding transactions?
4	Everyone is aware of what they're doing, right?
5	MS. HOTH: Well, no, Your Honor. In this
6	case, nobody is aware of what anybody else
7	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What anybody else is
8	doing?
9	MS. HOTH: is doing. If everybody
10	was aware and working for
11	JUDGE SMITH: Assume that your client
12	well, assume that Mr. Vassilenko he's the boss
13	of Western Express?
14	MS. HOTH: Yes, he was the president.
15	JUDGE SMITH: Assume he knows that a lot of
16	his customer are crooks. Does that mean we have to
17	uphold the indictment?
18	MS. HOTH: This count of the indictment,
19	absolutely not, Your Honor. Whether or not Mr.
20	Vassilenko knows that his clients are crooks, does
21	not connect him to what my client and the other
22	defendants here were doing. It's very important to
23	remem
24	JUDGE SMITH: I'm looking at the definition
25	of criminal enterprise and it begins "A group of

1 persons sharing a common purpose of engaging in 2 criminal conduct." And then it says, "associated and 3 ascertainable structure, " et cetera. But I guess I'm 4 asking, do you concede that you even got the fra - -5 - have you got a group of persons sharing a common 6 purpose? 7 MS. HOTH: No. I think it's very - - -JUDGE CIPARICK: So what would make it a 8 9 com - - - what would make it a common purpose; if 10 they were sharing in the profits? If they were - - -11 they had knowledge of what each other was doing? 12 MS. HOTH: Sharing profits, clearly, that 13 would be one of the easiest ways. 14 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But what if they all 15 know that they're doing transactions in stolen credit 16 cards and that this is the place to do it? They're 17 all aware that you want to - - - let's assume you 18 want to engage in stolen credit card transactions; 19 you go to this outfit and that's how you do it, and

understands that that's what they're doing?

MS. HOTH: Okay. There's two points that need to be - - -

they're all aware of it. And consistent with what

Judge Smith is saying, the person running this

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CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Why isn't that an

1 ascertainable - - -2 MS. HOTH: It may be. 3 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - structure? 4 MS. HOTH: And in fact, the government has 5 gone after carder forums such as ShadowCrew where someone is controlling who's purchasing the stolen 6 7 credit card information and how it's being distributed and what they're doing with it. First of 8 9 all, that was not what Western Express was doing 10 here. Even if they were, that's - - - my client 11 wasn't going through Western Express to purchase 12 credit card information. He was buying Egold. It 13 was legal to buy Egold. It was legal to use Egold. 14 JUDGE SMITH: Okay, so Western Express, is 15 it reasonable to see - - - to picture this Western 16 Express as essentially a currency salesman? 17 MS. HOTH: Exactly. 18 JUDGE SMITH: And it's selling currency. 19 Is it fair to say it is selling currency very useful 2.0 in criminal transactions to a lot of criminals? 21 MS. HOTH: Of course it is, but it's also 22 very con - - -23 JUDGE SMITH: Yes, but you're saying that 2.4 accepting that version of the facts, you haven't got

one enterprise. You've got one - - - you've got an

1	enterprise plus customers, but they're not all in the
2	same enterprise.
3	MS. HOTH: Whether Western Express, itself,
4	constitutes an enterprise, still does not connect
5	what my client was doing through Western Express
6	_
7	JUDGE CIPARICK: What was your client
8	doing, exactly?
9	MS. HOTH: My client was purchasing Egold
10	from Western Express. Then he had no other dealings
11	with Western Express whatsoever. Western Express
12	didn't know what he was doing with the Egold.
13	Whether Vassilenko could surmise it or not is not the
14	point. My
15	JUDGE GRAFFEO: Was the Egold the final
16	result or did your client intend to do something with
17	the Egold?
18	MS. HOTH: Yes. My
19	JUDGE GRAFFEO: Isn't that what the
20	indictment is
21	MS. HOTH: The indictment
22	JUDGE GRAFFEO: charging?
23	MS. HOTH: alleges that my client
24	then took the Egold and used it to purchase stolen
25	credit card information. But

1	JUDGE GRAFFEO: So
2	MS. HOTH: he did that
3	JUDGE GRAFFEO: isn't that something
4	the jury should determine?
5	MS. HOTH: But he did that totally
6	independent of Western Express. I have to go back
7	to, we don't try people for crimes that there's even
8	insufficient evidence
9	JUDGE GRAFFEO: Well, wasn't the structure
10	of Western Express accommodating this transaction?
11	MS. HOTH: Absolutely not, Your Honor. My
12	client could have purchased Egold from any number of
13	registered traders. If you went to Egold's Web site
14	they had a list of traders there. He happened to
15	choose Western Express.
16	JUDGE SMITH: Well, suppose somebody had a
17	gun store, legal guns, and was selling them to
18	murderers. Is that enterprise cor are the
19	murders and the gun store involved in a common
20	criminal enterprise?
21	MS. HOTH: You'd have to show more I
22	believe the People would have
23	JUDGE SMITH: Well, I guess, apart from the
24	I understand that that's kind of a provocative
25	way of stating the facts. But is that a fair

1	analogy?
2	MS. HOTH: No, Your Honor. And if you look
3	at way back, there was a trial court case
4	JUDGE SMITH: What's wrong with it?
5	MS. HOTH: of People v. Yarmy where
6	the guy was selling guns
7	JUDGE SMITH: Well, I mean no, I
8	mean, I see your point that that's not enterprise
9	corruption. I guess I'm saying, is it a fair
10	analogy? Should we view this, apart from the fact
11	that I know your clients aren't murderers
12	should we view this as though we had a
13	MS. HOTH: Exactly.
14	JUDGE SMITH: a gun store a gun
15	store that knew a lot of its clients were using its
16	guns to commit crimes?
17	MS. HOTH: Exactly. Because knowing or
18	thinking you know what your clients are doing,
19	doesn't mean you're directing. You're not sharing
20	purpose.
21	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yes, but aren't you a
22	facilitator in Judge Smith's hypothetical?
23	MS. HOTH: But
24	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: You're a facilitator
25	of people getting murdered and whatever.

MS. HOTH: Well, I think - - -

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CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: And just like,

couldn't you argue under our statute that Western was

a facilitator of these carding transactions, that

they knew what was happening; you had to hold your

hand over your eyes not to know; and the people doing

it know that this is the vehicle that will facilitate

what they want; why can't that be an arguable

enterprise in this context?

MS. HOTH: Facilitating - - - and I'm not going to concede that that's what Western Express was doing here - - - but facilitating something doesn't make an enterprise. The statute requires that this group of people act with some sort of common purpose, whether it's a hierarchal structure, whether it's a common plan. There must be something pulling these people together other than the fact that they're engaging in criminal activity.

We don't have that here. Again, Western

Express was shut down by the government, and the
allegations against my client and the other
defendants continue. They didn't stop doing what
they were doing. So a facilitator, if I was to
concede that, and I'm not, still wouldn't make it an
enterprise.

1 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counsel. 2 counselor, thanks. 3 Counselor, five minutes minus thirty 4 seconds. 5 MR. GALLUZZO: Right. That's right. 6 and a half minutes, please. Thank you. And thank 7 you, Your Honor. My name is Matthew Galluzzo. I 8 represent appellant Angela Perez, also known as Ms. 9 Ciano at both the trial and the appellate levels, 10 pursuant to the 18-B felony bar plans. 11 Your Honor, my client is similar to the 12 other two clients present here today; my client is 13 alleged to have been a buyer of Egold currency, and 14 it is alleged that she essentially used this currency 15 to buy stolen credit card information for - - -16 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Assume it's true. 17 MR. GALLUZZO: Assume that's true for 18 purposes of sufficiency, Your Honor. 19 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Right. 20 MR. GALLUZZO: What the People are trying 21 to pitch to you essentially, is that there's this 22 enterprise, this structure, called the Western 23 Express cybercrime group that includes not only the

Western Express Corporation and Vassilenko at its

center, but buyers and vendors - - - to adopt their

2.4

1 terminology - - - as well; the people who were buying 2 Egold or buying this stolen information. 3 And what we're really looking at is where to draw the line in the sand and how broad - - -4 5 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Say there were only -6 - - say there were only X people who dealt with 7 Western. In other words, there were ten people; 8 they're all doing illegal carding transactions. 9 MR. GALLUZZO: Okay. 10 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Everyone knows - - those ten know this is the place to go. It's not - -11 - there are no innocents in this. Does that matter? 12 13 Isn't that an ascertainable structure, or is it? 14 MR. GALLUZZO: Well, no, it's not. I mean, 15 when you look at - - -16 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: If the structure by 17 which these legal transactions take place, the person 18 facilitating it knows, and the people using it know, 19 is that an ascertainable - - -20 MR. GALLUZZO: I think the key - - -21 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - could you say 22 that's interaction in a sense? 23 MR. GALLUZZO: - - - well, I think the key, 2.4 I think you have to find that they're actually part 25 of the enterprise, the buyers and the vendors.

1 when you are determining that, you have to look at 2 the relationships between the parties and what their 3 motivations are. JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, that's why I asked if 4 5 it's not a question of fact for the jury. I mean, 6 it's alleged that that's the case. Why wouldn't the 7 People put their proof and you do yours, assuming 8 that your - - -9 MR. GALLUZZO: Well, we have two problems 10 with that, Your Honor. Obviously, you have to 11 determine, or the court below had to determine, as a 12 matter of law, whether or not there was sufficient 13 evidence. But also, I think we're going to have a 14 problem instructing the jury if we don't have some 15 clear guidance as to where we draw the line - - -16 JUDGE READ: You're saying customers - - -17 MR. GALLUZZO: - - - between whether 18 structure - - -19 JUDGE GRAFFEO: Wouldn't they - - -2.0 JUDGE READ: - - - are not enough? 21 JUDGE GRAFFEO: I'm sorry. 22 JUDGE READ: To be a customer is not 23 enough? 2.4 MR. GALLUZZO: Exactly. That's exactly it. 25 To be a customer is simply not enough, because you

1 don't have the same - - -2 JUDGE GRAFFEO: What about the frequency of 3 being a customer, though? I mean, I could see there could be a difference if somebody just goes and buys 4 5 Egold once and doesn't really know what's going on. 6 But if somebody goes in and does it two dozen times, 7 they absolutely know that they're going to get the stolen credit card information? 8 9 MR. GALLUZZO: Well, I'd say that that's 10 just a pattern of - - -11 JUDGE GRAFFEO: Have they somehow gotten 12 themselves absorbed into the enterprise? 13 MR. GALLUZZO: Well, I would say no, Your 14 Honor. I'd say you have a repeat customer that is 15 engaging in a pattern of criminal activity. But to 16 have an ascertainable structure, which we have to 17 have, it has to be something - - - some relationship 18 between those parties that is separate and distinct 19 from - - -2.0 JUDGE GRAFFEO: Well, they can't - - -21 MR. GALLUZZO: - - - that pattern. 22 JUDGE GRAFFEO: - - - commit that - - -23 they can't commit those crimes without using these 2.4 services?

MR. GALLUZZO: Well, in this particular

1 case, actually, you would - - - there's been evidence 2 before the grand jury that the buyers and the vendors 3 actually continued to transact business after Western 4 Express, the money mover or the provider of Egold, 5 had ceased to operate. 6 JUDGE JONES: In your analysis, what more 7 would have to be presented to a grand jury to bring 8 this up to a criminal enterprise - - -9 MR. GALLUZZO: Well, I think if you're - -10 11 JUDGE JONES: - - - with regard to your 12 client? 13 MR. GALLUZZO: - - - I think if you're looking for some kind of rule or some sort of bright 14 15 line, you have to show there would be a common 16 purpose between the parties, that they're basically 17 the same team, that they're all in it together, 18 they're all advancing the - - -19 JUDGE SMITH: Would there have to be some 20 decision-making apparatus, some way, whether by vote 21 or authority or hierarchy or something, where 22 decisions got made? 23 MR. GALLUZZO: Well, that's right. That's 2.4 what the dissents in the court below said. And if 25

you look at, say, for example, Boyle, that federal

RICO case, which is somewhat relevant here, although

I wouldn't say it's - - - it's a different statute - - what you have in that case is you have a group of
bank robbers, essentially, who would get together
before they robbed a bank, discussed what they were
going to do, whose job is going to be what, and how
they're going to divide the profits. They go out and
they have the same shared common purpose: we're
going to rob this bank tonight. And then afterwards,
they go back and they split up the profits.

Here, all you have is people going to a Web
site, conducting a quick transaction and then going

2.4

Here, all you have is people going to a Web site, conducting a quick transaction and then going their own independent ways, because they're just customers. They're not part of the same team, as Western Express. Let's just put it that way.

JUDGE GRAFFEO: Well, I guess that's the question here. Do we stay within the traditional view of a hierarchal, you know, joint enterprise, or in light of computer crime, is there - - - do we need to adopt a slightly broader view of what's an enterprise?

MR. GALLUZZO: Well, Your Honor, I'm not -

JUDGE GRAFFEO: Because they still have - - they still have a goal here. They're all making

1 money off these stolen credit cards. 2 MR. GALLUZZO: Well, that's perhaps true, 3 Your Honor, but - - -4 JUDGE GRAFFEO: And they're all aware of 5 it. That's right. But their 6 MR. GALLUZZO: 7 common - - - their purpose is not the same. You have 8 people whose purpose is to make money from selling 9 Egold. You've got people who are there to make money 10 selling stolen credit card information. You have people who are there to purchase stolen credit card 11 12 information. They have differing purposes. 13 And if you could apply the analogy, 14 perhaps, to someone who purchases drugs, I suppose -15 - - who purchases drugs from a drug seller, those 16 people are both - - - they both share the common 17 purpose, so to speak, of committing drug crimes, but 18 their purposes are very different here. One person 19 is there to sell, and one person is there to buy. 20 And that's why the customers and the sellers are not 21 in the same enterprise together. They would never be 22 associated as part of the same enterprise. 23 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: All the buyers have

MR. GALLUZZO: Right. The pur - - - their

the same purpose, right?

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1 purposes are their own. Their purpose has nothing to do with that organization. They have no vested 2 3 interest in the organization that's selling them 4 something. They're - - -5 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Well, I mean - - -MR. GALLUZZO: - - - there for themselves. 6 7 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - they can't find 8 it any other place, maybe. They do have an interest 9 in - - -10 MR. GALLUZZO: Well, perhaps. 11 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - and maybe with 12 Western, maybe they can't find it any other place, so 13 they all go there. MR. GALLUZZO: Well, when I went to 14 15 Starbucks this morning to buy a latte, Your Honor, I 16 had no vested interest in Starbucks' share price. 17 It's not part of my - - -18 JUDGE PIGOTT: Yes, but you're an end user. 19 I see your point. If the purchaser that you're 20 talking about is an end user, that's one thing. If 21 he was buying or she was buying for the purpose of 22 then selling it to two or three more, then you'd get 23 into an issue of whether or not that's an enterprise, 2.4 wouldn't you?

MR. GALLUZZO: Well, you might have an

1 issue there, Your Honor, but you don't have that 2 evidence before the grand jury in this particular 3 case. 4 JUDGE SMITH: You say - - - you say that 5 your client was the end user of the Egold? MR. GALLUZZO: Yes. Yes, that's right, 6 Your Honor. She was using - - - the allegation is 7 that she was using the Egold to buy stolen credit 8 9 card information and then do whatever she wanted to 10 do with it. At that point, whatever she did with it, 11 the other members of this purported enterprise of 12 this cybercrime group, couldn't really have cared 13 less. If she wanted to sit on that information or she wanted to use it - - -14 15 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counsel. 16 MR. GALLUZZO: - - - they had no interest 17 in it. 18 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay. Thanks, 19 counsel. 2.0 MR. GALLUZZO: Thank you, Your Honor. 21 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counselor? 22 MR. FALLEK: Good afternoon, Your Honors. 23 My name is Allen Fallek. I represent Lyndon Roach, 2.4 whose only connection to Western Express was as a

customer. That is, he purchased Egold - - -

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Are you any different than the other two?

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MR. FALLEK: No dif - - - just like the other buyers, perhaps even less of a connection with respect to Mr. Roach. But analytically the same.

So our point is that because all he did was use the Egold, that he's really not connected criminally with Western Express in this transaction, the pattern crimes, if you will. And so he's much less than associated with Western Express in an entity whose scope exists beyond the pattern crimes. And our position is that analysis simply ends right there.

But I think it's important to understand that legally, this discussion also needs a structure in order to understand what this is. We can't just assume that for this reason or for that reason that somehow a structured enterprise exists.

And so I'd like to address the notion that even if my client and Western Express were associated in these transactions, which analytically constitute the pattern crimes, the notion that from that it can be inferred, therefore, that they also exist in an entity with - - - a structured entity that exists beyond the scope of those crimes. That's the crux of

the People's argument, that you can infer an entity with an ascertainable structure from these - - - the structure that exists between Western Express in the middle, selling the Egold, and the buyer and the seller.

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Yes, under - - - the People rely on the

Supreme Court case, Boyle, which addresses a RICO

structure. And to the degree that it's suggested

that RICO might - - - a RICO structure might have

anything to do with this - - - with an OCCA

structure, I would just like to remind the court that

JUDGE SMITH: But your point - - - the point you're making now, as I understand it, is that the state law does not reach - - -

MR. FALLEK: Correct.

JUDGE SMITH: - - - as far as RICO.

MR. FALLEK: Right. RICO basically allows an enterprise to be inferred from nothing more than a group associated solely to commit the pattern acts and whose structure is nothing more than the means through which the group commits those pattern acts.

RICO allows that - - - under Boyle, allows an inference that from that alone, we can infer that there's a separate structure, a structured entity,

1 that exists beyond those - - -2 JUDGE READ: So what you're saying in 3 effect, is that RICO's broader? 4 MR. FALLEK: Much, much broader. 5 JUDGE READ: And I guess the one thing I 6 got from the legislative history, I didn't get much, 7 but there was an intent to make this narrower than 8 RICO. And I guess we're trying to figure out - - -9 MR. FALLEK: For sure. I mean - - -10 JUDGE READ: - - - what the limits are. 11 MR. FALLEK: - - - just the terms of the 12 statute itself are an indication. But I'd just like 13 to prove to you that the inference that the People 14 claim justifies the drawing or that an entity beyond 15 the scope of the pattern acts exists, is just wrong. 16 Besides the definitional differences, as I said, RICO 17 permits it from a group whose purpose is to commit 18 that and whose structure is nothing more than their 19 roles; whereas under the OCCA, just from the 20 language, its purpose has to go - - - be greater, 21 must advance the affairs of the enterprise, and the 22 structure itself has to be greater than what's 23 minimally necessary to commit the pattern acts. 2.4 doesn't exist here.

JUDGE PIGOTT: Let me - - - one of the

thoughts that I have is, as Judge Graffeo points out, the computer age these days is something. And if Western makes its money by servicing these people, not necessarily your defendants, but other people, and the other people are on the Internet, they don't know each other, other than the fact that they all know that they're on the Internet, and they're in the business of child porn, for example; and they start telling their confreres and buddies, this is where you can get it. Wouldn't that be an enterprise?

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MR. FALLEK: Well, it's possible that the relationship between Western Express and these people maybe in Russia are selling porn, you know, based on the relationships, based on how those sellers rely on Western Express. I mean, there's - - - the People have all these facts about layering money; if they engage in that, take advantage of Western Express, that may or may not comprise enter - - but we're simply talking about buyers who were customers of Western Express, and who were legitimate customers. I mean, it's one of the areas that Western Express provides a legitimate service: the Egold.

JUDGE PIGOTT: But I mean, isn't that their burden, then? I mean, they're going to say you're an enterprise, and your client's going to - - - at the

1 end of the People's case, is going to say there's no 2 showing that my client ever bought credit card 3 numbers; ever got into any of this. The Egold was used to buy Netflix movies, and therefore I move to 4 5 dismiss, and it would be granted. MR. FALLEK: Well, I don't quite understand 6 7 that. I mean, at least for purposes of analysis 8 here, there's no question that our clients bought 9 Egold there for an illicit purpose. Buying - - -10 JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, my point is, when you 11 read indictments these days, I mean, they say you 12 committed grand larceny, and you committed grand 13 larceny in violation of the appropriate section, in 14 that you stole money in excess of 250 dollars. I 15 don't know how much farther you've got to go to get 16 an indictment. And they do that - - -17 MR. FALLEK: Well, here, there's a 18 requirement, an element that there be a structure or 19 an entity that exists beyond the scope of the crimes 20 21 JUDGE PIGOTT: Which they've alleged. 22 MR. FALLEK: - - - and that entity must 23 have an ascertainable structure. I mean, that's what 2.4 - - - there was no evidence of that at the grand

25

jury.

1 The question is what are - - - what is an 2 ascertainable structure? Is it what the People say? 3 Is it simply what RICO requires? And we're arguing no, that it's not. And then how structured must it 4 5 be? 6 JUDGE SMITH: You're also saying that here 7 we don't even have what RICO requires? MR. FALLEK: No, we don't have the - - -8 9 but I'm conceding for argument's sake that if we 10 simply had the RICO structure, that is, that this 11 association for the purpose of buying the stolen 12 information over the Internet with Egold, if that's 13 an association, then that's comparable to the RICO 14 enterprise, which is not close enough to be an OCCA 15 structure. 16 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counselor. 17 Thanks. 18 JUDGE READ: I have one - - - I have one 19 more question. 20 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Oh, I'm sorry. Judge 21 Read? 22 JUDGE READ: It may not be a fair one 23 either. But one thing that's puzzled me about this, 2.4 there are a lot of crimes charged here. And what - -

- why is the People - - - why do you think the People

1	pursue this? I mean, is there a forfeiture element
2	to this or does it increase the sentencing potential
3	or
4	MR. FALLEK: It definitely it's a B
5	felony versus
6	JUDGE READ: But there are other B felonies
7	too, right, that are
8	MR. FALLEK: I'm not sure if there are
9	other B felonies.
10	JUDGE READ: No? Okay. So that's why
11	-
12	MR. FALLEK: Maybe the People can answer
13	that.
14	JUDGE READ: Okay.
15	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay.
16	JUDGE READ: All right. Thank you.
17	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Thanks, counsel.
18	MR. COHN: Good afternoon, Your Honors.
19	David Cohn for the People.
20	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Do you want to answer
21	Judge Read's question?
22	MR. COHN: Sure. I'll start with Judge
23	Read's question very quickly. Enterprise corruption
24	is a B felony. There are enhanced sentencing
25	provisions. There also are forfeiture provisions for

the overseas defendants. And this was an 1 2 international ring of identity thieves. There are 3 extradition advantages to charging enterprise 4 corruption. And - - -5 JUDGE CIPARICK: And what's the next - - -6 JUDGE READ: Extradition advantages? 7 MR. COHN: Extradition advantages. 8 JUDGE READ: Okay. 9 JUDGE CIPARICK: And what's the next level 10 of crime that's charged in the indictments? 11 MR. COHN: Perhaps the grand larceny or the 12 money laundering. 13 JUDGE READ: Yeah, it's grand larceny. MR. COHN: Yes. 14 15 Counsel, why isn't CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: 16 this just a neutral use of the Internet for the 17 conduct of business? Why isn't that all it is? 18 MR. COHN: Your Honor, there's a wealth of 19 evidence here that this is far more than a neutral 2.0 use of the Internet. In fact, as the indictment 21 charged, this was an international ring of thieves 22 and traffickers facilitated - - -23 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yes, but are they 2.4 connected in some kind of a structure, as what we've 25

been talking about?

1	MR. COHN: And they are. And in fact
2	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: How are they
3	how are they connected and what is the interaction
4	between the different users?
5	MR. COHN: Absolutely. And I'm glad you
6	asked that question.
7	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Go ahead.
8	MR. COHN: So first we'll start out with
9	Western Express itself
10	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yes.
11	MR. COHN: which was at the hub of
12	this charged enterprise, of this alleged enterprise.
13	And I would also like to reiterate that this is at
14	the grand jury stage. The People are merely asking
15	for the opportunity to prove to a jury that there was
16	an enterprise here.
17	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: To prove what?
18	What's the connection between Western Express and the
19	people who use it?
20	MR. COHN: So first
21	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Or these people who
22	use it.
23	MR. COHN: Well, first, let's start with
24	the structure, which no one has disputed that Western
25	Express had a clear structure. They had a physical

1 headquarters - - -2 JUDGE SMITH: Western Express had a clear 3 structure, but that's not the enterprise you indicted. 4 5 MR. COHN: Well, it's part of it. And I 6 think we have to start with Western Express. 7 JUDGE SMITH: Yes, but isn't that the 8 problem? It's a - - - you have a clear - - - you 9 have an enterprise, Western Express, which for all I 10 know is a criminal enterprise, but you say you've got 11 the Western Express criminal group, or whatever it 12 is. How is that any different from putting - - -13 saying that a drug dealer is in the same enterprise 14 with all his suppliers and customers? 15 MR. COHN: Well, this is far different. 16 Nobody here is a user; nobody here is an addict. 17 Everyone here - - -JUDGE SMITH: That's the difference, that 18 they're not addicts? I mean, isn't the question 19 2.0 whether I'm the same enterprise? 21 MR. COHN: Well, everyone here - - -22 there's a structure. The question is whether there's 23 an ascertainable structure. And in our view - - -2.4 JUDGE SMITH: Actually, I think the

question, before you get to ascertainable structure,

1 is whether there's a group of people seeking a common 2 purpose? 3 MR. COHN: Yes, they are. They're a group 4 of people who are seeking a common purpose of 5 furthering identity theft, furthering the trafficking 6 7 JUDGE SMITH: Exactly. Is the same true of 8 the drug dealer, who's buy - - - and his customers 9 and his suppliers. Do they all have the same kind of 10 a common purpose? 11 MR. COHN: The customer of a drug dealer is not interested in the traffic. The customer of - - -12 13 the trafficking. The customer of a drug dealer is 14 simply interested in getting high. None of these 15 people here - - -16 JUDGE SMITH: Well, what if he's - - - what 17 about somebody who buys for resale? 18 MR. COHN: Right. And that person could be 19 charged with enterprise corruption. If you have a 20 drug ring, and there are higher level dealers and 21 there mid-level dealers, and they're selling and 22 reselling, they could all be part of an enterprise. 23 And there, in fact, are federal prosecutions of drug 2.4 rings on RICO grounds for - - -

JUDGE SMITH: But don't you have to show

1 some kind of common effort - - - some kind of common 2 decision-making, common structure? 3 MR. COHN: In fact, the practice 4 commentaries to enterprise corruption, the case law 5 that exists on it, although there's none from this 6 court yet, the case law that exists on enterprise 7 corruption says that the common purpose only has to 8 be something very general, even just the purpose of 9 making money through coordinated criminal activity. 10 JUDGE PIGOTT: Is that the difference that the lower court judge - - - I forget his name - - -11 12 but he seemed to go off on the fact that you failed -13 - - he says, "to even articulate, much less adduce 14 evidence proving any system of authority or 15 hierarchy." And it's your argument, if I understand 16 it, that you don't have to show authority or 17 hierarchy; you just have to show this enterprise. 18 MR. COHN: Yes, Your Honor. The statute 19 says absolutely nothing about hierarchy or system of 20 authority. The trial judge came to that conclusion 21 relying on other - - -22 JUDGE SMITH: Is there any - - - is there 23 any decision-making mechanism, even of the kind there 2.4 was in Boyle?

25 MR. COHN: In Boyle - - - I would argue

1	this was different from Boyle. I would argue that
2	this is a more structured enterprise than Boyle.
3	Boyle was like a pick-up game of basketball.
4	Everyone shows up on a particular day and they say
5	I'm you play point guard, you play forward, and
6	we're all going to go play this game.
7	Here, Western Express set up a very
8	organized scheme
9	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But these guys are
10	all playing on their own court.
11	MR. COHN: They're actually
12	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: They're not coming
13	for a pick-up game. Isn't that the issue here? Can
14	they be shooting baskets individually and have some
15	relationship to each other and to Western Express?
16	MR. COHN: Actually not, Your Honor. What
17	Western Express what Vassilenko and Western
18	Express did here was they set up a system that made
19	it easy and safe for all
20	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: They were a
21	facilitator.
22	MR. COHN: these people
23	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: They were a
24	facilitator.
25	MR. COHN: They're a facilitator, and they

did more than just facilitate. They did more than 1 2 just hand off the ball. 3 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What more did they 4 do? 5 MR. COHN: They set up a very organized 6 system that made it easy and safe for a large number 7 of people, who were engaged in coordinated criminal 8 activity - - -9 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Coordinated? How so 10 coordinated? 11 MR. COHN: So - - -12 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Why is it 13 coordinated? 14 MR. COHN: So Western Express had Web 15 sites, and they explained how their entire system 16 works, and they explained how all their transactions 17 worked. 18 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yes, but what's the 19 coordinated activity of the people using - - -20 MR. COHN: The coordinated activity. Okay, 21 first, Western Express, for the buyers, converts cash 22 into Egold. Western Express knows - - - at least we 23 have to take this as true for current purposes, 2.4 because we're just at the indictment stage - - -25 Western Express knows that these buyers are going to

1 use that Egold to buy stolen credit card data. CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Let's say they know 2 3 that all their clients are crooks. 4 MR. COHN: Right. 5 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: They know it. They know it. They facilitate it. What's the 6 7 relationship, though - - - what if they don't know 8 each other at all, and there's no interaction between 9 them? 10 MR. COHN: They're all part of a community. 11 They all post on the same Internet forums. 12 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: A community of 13 thieves? A community of thieves? 14 MR. COHN: Yes, they are. They're all part 15 of a very coordinated community of thieves. 16 have Internet forums where they have specific, very 17 graphic discussions about transactions about how to steal credit card data. 18 JUDGE SMITH: On this theory, can't you 19 2.0 indict a whole industry? I mean, couldn't you indict 21 the whole heroin industry in the United States as 22 being part of the same enterprise, because they're 23 all buying and selling from each other? 2.4 MR. COHN: If the heroin industry is

organized around a structure, around a company,

around Web sites, where they coordinate with each
other, and they do it over and over and over again,
for years, then the argument is yes, that is an
enterprise.

JUDGE SMITH: Is my analogy of the gun
store a fair one?

MR. COHN: I think your analogy of the gun
store could possibly be a fair one if the gun store

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store could possibly be a fair one if the gun store made it clear to everyone that this is where murderers will come. We will turn the blind eye to the fact that you're a murderer. In fact, we not only will turn a blind eye; we know that you're a murderer; we want murderers to come here.

JUDGE SMITH: So you're saying that under those circumstances, you can indict the - - - not just the gun store, but the gun store and its customers, as part of the same enterprise?

MR. COHN: Well, assuming that they were more than just customers. Right? Assuming that they were buying guns because they were engaged in large-scale criminal activity, too.

JUDGE SMITH: It sounds like a customer to me. I mean, yes. They're still customers.

MR. COHN: They're were more than end users. They were more than end users. They were not

1	just the junkie on the street
2	JUDGE SMITH: Well, they were end users of
3	the guns.
4	MR. COHN: Well, perhaps that would make
5	this different, because here we have people who are
6	the so-called buyers are really importers. Maybe
7	they're
8	JUDGE JONES: Did you present any of
9	Western Express' legitimate activities to the grand
10	jury?
11	MR. COHN: There was some evidence, I
12	believe, of their selling of phone cards. There was
13	some of the people who posted on Western
14	Express' own boards, own Internet forums, said that
15	upwards of ninety percent of their customers were
16	engaged in credit card fraud. Everyone knew that
17	Western Express was the place to go for this. And
18	they all coordinate through Western Express.
19	I think it might be helpful to imagine that
20	
21	JUDGE READ: Would they coordinate with
22	each other?
23	MR. COHN: They did. They talked to each
24	other over the Internet. Western Express posted
25	-

1 JUDGE READ: Is that critical to your case? 2 MR. COHN: I think - - - I think it helps 3 the case. I think it's - - -JUDGE SMITH: Do you have evidence that 4 5 they were actually making deals on the Western Express Web site to buy and sell credit card 6 7 information? MR. COHN: I believe there's some evidence 8 9 that Shevelev or Burak, one of the two, posted on 10 Denge (ph.) forum about selling dumps, about selling 11 stolen credit card data. Most of that was not done 12 on the Western Express site. But everyone knew that 13 Western Express was the place to go. Western Express 14 allowed all these people to engage in large-scale 15 financial transactions with no oversight, no 16 compliance - - -17 JUDGE JONES: The question is, what was 18 specifically presented to the grand jury? 19 MR. COHN: Well - - -20 JUDGE JONES: These assumptions, what 21 everyone may have known is very difficult to pin 22 down. 23 MR. COHN: Well, Judge, obviously, the jury 2.4 could listen to the evidence at trial and decide

whether to infer that there was knowledge on - - -

1 JUDGE JONES: We're trying to - - -2 MR. COHN: - - - anyone's part. 3 JUDGE JONES: - - - we're trying to determine here whether you have a valid indictment. 4 5 MR. COHN: Yes. Our argument is that there was certainly a wealth of evidence from which a jury 6 7 could infer that everyone knew. Given the volume of 8 Internet postings, given the volume of transactions, 9 over a long period of years, even the people who say 10 they were just minimally involved dealt tens of thousands of dollars of business with Western 11 12 Express. 13 This was a ring of people from which almost 100,000 stolen credit card numbers were recovered; 4 14 15 million dollars in fraud was identified from just 16 about a tenth of the credit cards that were 17 recovered. 18 JUDGE GRAFFEO: I guess what - - -19 JUDGE CIPARICK: Was there any evidence 2.0 that these three people - - - well, there's a fourth 21 one too, Mr. Vassilenko - - -22 MR. COHN: Vassilenko. 23 JUDGE CIPARICK: - - - knew each other? 2.4 MR. COHN: Well, they certainly - - -25 JUDGE CIPARICK: Communicated with each

other?

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MR. COHN: - - - did business with each other. Well Latta and Perez knew each other. Latta and Perez were, in fact, involved in doing criminal activity together. Vassilenko knew all of them because he was the hub of the enterprise.

As this court has said in First Meridian that it doesn't matter in a criminal scheme whether everybody knows everyone else who's involved in the scheme. The question is was this coordinated criminal activity?

JUDGE GRAFFEO: Well, I guess what I'm struggling with is what makes this different because it's done on the Internet? In an age before the Internet, if Western Express, say, had a storefront and these defendants walked in and purchased credit - - - you know, stolen credit cards, I don't think that would fall under the enterprise. So what is it, that once this goes on to the - - - once this scheme is developed on the Internet, that takes it over that line between being separate crimes, and this now becomes a criminal enterprise?

MR. COHN: Well, actually, Your Honor, if we had all the evidence here and it were happening at a physical location, I believe it still would be an

1 enterprise. Because we have more than just a 2 storefront. This is not just a store that people are 3 walking in and out of. It's not just a bazaar. 4 What's happening here is they are all coordinating. 5 They all know that it's a very dangerous thing. 6 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: You keep saying 7 they're coordinating, but it's hard to picture how they can be coordinating if they're not - - - if 8 9 there's no interaction between them. 10 MR. COHN: Well, they can be coordinating 11 by reading posts on the Web which says if you want to 12 do credit card theft, if you want to do identity 13 fraud, if you want to traffic in stolen credit card numbers - - -14 15 JUDGE GRAFFEO: It's the sharing of 16 information? Is that what's different? 17 MR. COHN: That is certainly part of it. 18 And that's unique to the Internet. That's what would 19 have to happen in the physical world by, say, word of 2.0 mouth. 21 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So they're all reading this same information and that makes them 22 23 coordinate? Even though they have no particular 2.4 interaction with each other?

MR. COHN: The buyers might not. Buyer A,

buyer B might not have a particular interaction with each other. You could imagine an organized crime syndicate that has soldiers in various parts of the globe that have no interaction with each other.

They're all - - -

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JUDGE SMITH: But the soldiers have somebody deciding for them where they're going to go. The soldiers in an organized crime ring, have some central direction. And maybe - - - and in that case, it's usually hierarchical. In Boyle, it was almost democratic. But there's still a decision-making mechanism. Who is making decisions for this enterprise that you indicted?

MR. COHN: Well, there weren't really decisions to be made. Vassilenko set it all up. They all knew what had to happen.

JUDGE SMITH: How can you have a criminal enterprise that has no decisions to be made?

MR. COHN: They all knew what had to happen. These were all people who had a common purpose, which was to facilitate the trafficking of stolen credit card data. They knew this was a very dangerous business. They knew that it's easy to get caught. They knew there are these rules which say if you engage - - -

1 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But it's not a common 2 purpose in the sense that team, we're going to do 3 this. Team, we have a common purpose to help our 4 team. We have a common purpose that each one 5 individually has the same purpose. Isn't that different? 6 7 MR. COHN: I think here they were a team. 8 They did act as a team. 9 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: How were they a team? 10 MR. COHN: They did the same thing over and 11 over and over again for several years. We're talking 12 13 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So? MR. COHN: - - - tens of thousands - - -14 15 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So? MR. COHN: - - - of stolen credit - - -16 17 this is - - - this, in our view, is exactly what the 18 legislature was trying to target when it passed the enterprise corruption statute. The legislature was 19 2.0 trying to target groups of criminals that organize 21 together in an ascertainable structure, because they 22 pose a greater threat. 23 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But why aren't they 2.4 habitual criminals rather than a team of criminals?

MR. COHN: Because here - - -

1 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Why aren't each one 2 individually a habitual criminal? Many transactions. 3 MR. COHN: Our argument, Your Honor, is 4 here they pose a greater threat, because Western 5 Express has set up a structure. And I find it 6 interesting that my opponents today have not actually 7 really talked about all the elements of the structure here. 8 9 They set up a structure which made it 10 easier for everyone to engage in this large-scale 11 trafficking in credit card data very safely - - relatively safely, because there was no money 12 13 laundering protocols at Western Express. There was 14 no reporting of suspicious activities. In fact, 15 Western Express was happy to wire hundreds - - -16 JUDGE JONES: That's like saying - - -17 MR. COHN: - - - of thousands of dollars to 18 Shevelev's overseas shell accounts - - -19 JUDGE JONES: - - - that's like saying you 2.0 21 MR. COHN: - - - in order to help him 22 launder money. 23 JUDGE JONES: - - - open a store that's 2.4 twenty-four hours a day, and it made it easy for

customers to come in. That doesn't necessarily make

it a criminal enterprise.

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MR. COHN: Your Honor, I would agree with that if there wasn't a common purpose, if there weren't common discussions about, look, we're all in this clandestine business together; how can we do it better? How can we figure out a safe way to do this? This is what all these various players in the scheme were trying to do.

And I agree with Judge Graffeo that the Internet makes it more organic. It makes it less hierarchical, because they can come together in a more organic way. Boyle, in fact, was an organic sort of organization too, just a different - - -

JUDGE GRAFFEO: I know your red light is on. But do you see a distinction between the role of Vassilenko and the three defendants that are represented at the table today?

MR. COHN: Your Honor, I think that could be a jury question for the trial. I think the defen - - - the three defendants at the table who were buyers or importers of the stolen credit card data, they could argue to a jury that they didn't have knowledge of the enterprise or they didn't have the intent to participate in the affairs of the enterprise. The argument is that there's enough

1 evidence, certainly enough circumstantial evidence 2 that a jury could infer that they intended to 3 participate in the affairs of the enterprise. 4 As far as the question before us today, 5 that's where the enterprise had a structure. And that's the only question this court has to answer 6 7 today. And the structure was there for everyone involved. There - - -8 9 JUDGE SMITH: Well, did you - - - I think 10 there's even a question as to whether there's an 11 enterprise. But you agree that the state statute is 12 less broad than RICO? 13 MR. COHN: Your Honor, I agree that on its 14 face, the state statute is less broad than RICO by 15 its statutory language. The state statute, the 16 enterprise corruption statute has certain 17 requirements that RICO does not. It requires three 18 pattern acts instead of two. It requires that two of 19 the pattern acts be felonies, where as in RICO - - -2.0 JUDGE SMITH: Well, what about the - - -21 MR. COHN: - - - it must be misdemeanors. 22 JUDGE SMITH: - - - ascertainable structure

and the continuity of existence?

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MR. COHN: I believe, Your Honor, as we argued in the brief, that the ascertainable structure

1	element of the enterprise corruption statute is
2	essentially identical to the way that the Supreme
3	Court defined the structure element in Boyle. They
4	said there has to be a structure
5	JUDGE SMITH: So the legis the New
6	York legislature was wasting its time writing those
7	words in?
8	MR. COHN: They wrote it in the statute
9	because they wanted to be clear. In fact, they were
10	probably relying on federal case law which
11	interpreted RICO to say that an enterprise had to
12	have a structure. In fact, they in the
13	legislative history, the legislature said we're
14	relying heavily on the RICO experience when we're
15	drafting the
16	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counsel.
17	MR. COHN: OCCA statute.
18	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Thanks, counsel.
19	MR. COHN: Thank you.
20	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counsel, a
21	minute and a half. It's yours.
22	MS. HOTH: Thank you, Your Honor. I'd like
23	to take the sports analogy to its obvious conclusion.
24	Even if it's a pick-up basketball game, there's two
25	teams. And on a team, when one person scores, that

team gets the goal, and that team, if they score more often than the other team, wins.

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Here, if my client scores it doesn't help any of the other defendants here. It didn't help Vassilenko; it didn't help anybody. He was in it for himself, as were the other defendants.

JUDGE GRAFFEO: I thought Vassilenko got a commission on all these transactions.

MS. HOTH: I don't know if it's a commission or just a fee. I see it simply the same as if I go to a bank and buy a money order, the bank charges me a fee for changing my cash into a money order. If - - -

JUDGE SMITH: Did Vassilenko get commissions on the actual purchase and sale of the credit card information?

MS. HOTH: No, he had nothing to do with it. And the district attorney is making a lot of assumptions and hypothesizing things here. But the point is, they had an intent to show to the grand jury a connection between Western Express' Web site and our client's activities. And there is none. Whether or not my client bought his Egold from Western Express or someone else, as he did after Western Express was shut down, does not make this an

enterprise.

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Again, one person scores, the team should get the score, not one person, if you're in it. A pick-up game doesn't require a coach or a captain, but you still see a team and you still see a collective reward at the end. Here we had a bunch of individuals working for themselves.

Remember, what they did through Western

Express was legal. Egold was legal. Buying it was

legal. Opening an account under a pseudonym was

legal. It's the same as using PayPal. The

difference is that PayPal voluntarily agreed to

accept government regulations, and Egold did not. So

it was the government's lack of regulation of Egold

that was allowing the anonymity that the DA is

relying on to show a structure.

I said it several times and I have to come back to it, and my adversary didn't mention it at all. These activities continued after Western Express was shut down. If Western Express - - -

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counselor.

 ${\tt MS.\ HOTH:}$ - - - was central, it could not have happened that way.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay. Thanks.

MS. HOTH: Thank you.

1	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Thank you all.
2	(Court is adjourned)
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23	CERTIFICATION
24	
25	I, Penina Wolicki, certify that the

1	foregoing transcript of proceedings in the Court of
2	Appeals of People, etc. v. Western Express
3	International, Inc., et al., No. 156 was prepared
4	using the required transcription equipment and is a
5	true and accurate record of the proceedings.
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11	
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14	Address of Agency: 700 West 192nd Street
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16	New York, NY 10040
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