1	COURT OF APPEALS
2	STATE OF NEW YORK
3	
4	MATTER OF 677 NEW LOUDON CORPORATION,
5	Appellant,
6	-against-
7	No. 157 TAX APPEALS TRIBUNAL OF THE STATE
8	OF NEW YORK,
9	Respondent.
10	
11	20 Eagle Street Albany, New York 12207
12	September 5, 2012 Before:
13	CHIEF JUDGE JONATHAN LIPPMAN
14	ASSOCIATE JUDGE CARMEN BEAUCHAMP CIPARICK ASSOCIATE JUDGE VICTORIA A. GRAFFEO
15	ASSOCIATE JUDGE SUSAN PHILLIPS READ ASSOCIATE JUDGE ROBERT S. SMITH
16	ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE F. PIGOTT, JR. ASSOCIATE JUDGE THEODORE T. JONES
17	Appearances:
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25	Penina Wolicki Official Court Transcriber

1 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Matter of 677 New 2 Loudon Corporation. 3 Counselor, do you want any rebuttal time? 4 MR. MCCULLOUGH: Three minutes, if you 5 would, Your Honor. 6 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Three minutes, sure. 7 Go ahead. 8 MR. MCCULLOUGH: Afternoon. May it please 9 the court, counsel, my name is Andrew McCullough. I 10 practice primarily in Salt Lake City. I also have 11 been a member of the New York State Bar for many years, native of Albany. I represent Nite Moves and 12 13 we would say, we have said, we continue to say, that Nite Moves is a theatrical venue in which 14 15 choreographed dance performances are performed. 16 JUDGE SMITH: Do they have to be 17 choreographed? If they were improvised, would you 18 still be - - - would you have to pay the tax? MR. MCCULLOUGH: Well, that's an 19 20 interesting question. Typically, as the Appellate 21 Division mentioned, you get up on that pole and you 22 improvise too much, you may fall on your head, and -23 2.4 JUDGE PIGOTT: Do you pay the girls, or do 25

the girls pay you?

1	MR. MCCULLOUGH: The girls pay us.
2	JUDGE PIGOTT: All right. So the money you
3	get is not for their dancing. They pay you so they
4	can go perform whatever
5	MR. MCCULLOUGH: Yes.
6	JUDGE PIGOTT: they're going to
7	perform.
8	MR. MCCULLOUGH: And so the money the
9	primary the money that's at issue right here is
10	money that's gotten at the door. When you come in,
11	you pay a certain price
12	JUDGE CIPARICK: Admission fees.
13	MR. MCCULLOUGH: admission fees.
14	JUDGE CIPARICK: Admission fees from
15	patrons?
16	MR. MCCULLOUGH: Yes. And then if you want
17	a more private show in a more private room and
18	it is not totally private, it's more private
19	you pay a separate admission charge.
20	JUDGE PIGOTT: And again, the girls pay
21	you, right?
22	MR. MCCULLOUGH: Yes.
23	JUDGE PIGOTT: So
24	MR. MCCULLOUGH: Well
25	JUDGE PIGOTT: you're a custodian of

1	an establishment where girls come, pay you for the
2	privilege of getting up on stage
3	MR. MCCULLOUGH: Yes.
4	JUDGE PIGOTT: and then if they make
5	an arrangement with one of the customers, pay you,
6	again, for the use of the room.
7	MR. MCCULLOUGH: Well, in actuality
8	JUDGE PIGOTT: You're not involved in the
9	art business, is my point.
10	MR. MCCULLOUGH: in actuality, Your
11	Honor, if they do a private, that's paid to the
12	you go up to the doorman and you pay him, and then
13	that's split. So that is a separate sort of thing.
14	It is an admission charge collected by the club.
15	JUDGE GRAFFEO: If I could ask
16	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counsel go
17	ahead.
18	JUDGE GRAFFEO: If I could ask you some
19	questions
20	MR. MCCULLOUGH: Sure.
21	JUDGE GRAFFEO: about our standard of
22	review here, because this is a tax tribunal
23	MR. MCCULLOUGH: Um-hum.
24	JUDGE GRAFFEO: appeal. Do you
25	disagree that you have had to carry the burden of

1	showing that their determination was irrational?
2	MR. MCCULLOUGH: Well
3	JUDGE GRAFFEO: Or was legally erroneous?
4	Isn't that our standard of review?
5	MR. MCCULLOUGH: Yes. And whereas the
6	Appellate Division said that it was rational, they
7	didn't talk a lot about the fact that there are legal
8	errors.
9	JUDGE GRAFFEO: Well, my next question was,
10	what proof did your expert put in about what
11	activities occurred in the private rooms? I didn't
12	read
13	MR. MCCULLOUGH: Well
14	JUDGE GRAFFEO: that your expert
15	observed what occurred in the private rooms.
16	MR. MCCULLOUGH: Well, and that was
17	that's been argued quite a bit. The point, of
18	course, is that my expert's an expert. My expert did
19	not come into this cold. My expert has been to a
20	hundred and some-odd clubs, and interviewed and
21	watched she claims and she wrote
22	she literally wrote the book on it. I have a copy
23	here.
24	JUDGE CIPARICK: I don't think we're
25	disputing the fact that your expert's an expert. But

1	the question is what knowledge does she have, what
2	actual knowledge did she have at the time of what was
3	happening in the private rooms, if any?
4	MR. MCCULLOUGH: Well, she didn't have
5	direct observation of what happened in the private
6	rooms at Nite Moves, but she did have direct
7	observation of hundreds of these things.
8	JUDGE GRAFFEO: Right. So the question is,
9	was that sufficient to carry the burden that was your
10	responsibility
11	MR. MCCULLOUGH: Well, the administrative -
12	
13	JUDGE GRAFFEO: under our
14	MR. MCCULLOUGH: law judge
15	JUDGE GRAFFEO: under this standard
16	of review?
17	MR. MCCULLOUGH: Yeah. The administrative
18	law judge said that it was.
19	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yes, but why does the
20	tax tribunal have to agree with your expert?
21	MR. MCCULLOUGH: Well, they the
22	expert, you have to remember, Your Honor, that
23	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: I mean, what's the
24	test, as Judge Graffeo said before? Why they
25	disagree

1	MR. MCCULLOUGH: Well, the expert witness
2	is there to present evidence. You could, of course -
3	
4	JUDGE SMITH: She's there to give an
5	opinion, isn't she?
6	MR. MCCULLOUGH: Yes. Exactly. You could,
7	of course
8	JUDGE SMITH: But wasn't there also a fact
9	witness on what happened in the private room? Didn't
LO	your proprietor testify that it was much the same
L1	thing that was in the public?
L2	MR. MCCULLOUGH: Yes, yes. And one of the
L3	girls did, as well. But, Your Honor, you could
L4	obviously
L5	JUDGE SMITH: When you say I mean, is
L6	there anything unconventional about experts
L7	expressing opinions based on what other witnesses
L8	testified to?
L9	MR. MCCULLOUGH: No. No, and she tes
20	she interviewed dancers. Remember, she's been doing
21	this for years. She literally wrote the book on it.
22	She is the foremost expert on exotic dance in the
23	United States. And when you go in and you say well,
24	she didn't look at a specific dance on this specific

day, that's not particularly relevant.

JUDGE GRAFFEO: Well, there's a lot of 1 2 YouTube instructional videos on this - - -3 MR. MCCULLOUGH: Yes. Yes. 4 JUDGE GRAFFEO: - - - and I suppose there's 5 people that have these poles in their house and they do it. 6 7 MR. MCCULLOUGH: Yes. 8 JUDGE GRAFFEO: Are all these people 9 engaged in a choreographed artistic performance? 10 MR. MCCULLOUGH: Well, you know what? 11 - - we didn't ask her that. We asked her if people 12 engaged in the type of activity that goes on at Nite 13 Moves were engaged in choreographed dance 14 performances, and she was absolutely firm about that. 15 JUDGE SMITH: Suppose you hadn't called the 16 expert. 17 MR. MCCULLOUGH: Sure. 18 JUDGE SMITH: Suppose all you had was a 19 video of these people dancing. Isn't - - - why isn't 20 that a showing that you're putting on a musical or 21 dramatic performance for dramatic - - - where musical 22 is defined to include choreographic activity? 23 MR. MCCULLOUGH: Well, Your Honor, I was 2.4 looking - - - when I started representing this club, 25 the first thing I did was read the 1605 Book Center

1 case. And the 1605 Book Center case said - - - it 2 wasn't this court so much as it was the Appellate 3 Division - - - nobody really gave us any evidence as 4 to whether or not the performances that were going on 5 - - - they described their performance - - -JUDGE SMITH: Well, as I remember, 1605 6 7 Book Center didn't involve the issue of whether it 8 was choreographic or not. 9 MR. MCCULLOUGH: No. No, but they - - -10 JUDGE SMITH: But I guess when I read the 11 statute, it looks to me like choreographic is just a 12 synonym for dance. Do you read it differently? 13 MR. MCCULLOUGH: Well, the dictionary says 14 "planned movements", but no, I don't really. 15 JUDGE SMITH: And it just seems odd to me 16 that anybody - - - that the legislature would say 17 well, we're only going to - - - we're going to tax 18 improvised dance and not choreographed dance. 19 MR. MCCULLOUGH: Well, that's exactly our 20 point. We don't know that there's a line; we don't 21 know that there could be a line. And certainly, the 22 people who run the tax department aren't going to be 23 able to decide the line. 2.4 JUDGE CIPARICK: Isn't this a place of

amusement that - - - I mean, primarily it's a place

1 of amusement? 2 MR. MCCULLOUGH: Yes. But it's a place 3 where the amusement is choreographed dance 4 performances. There's nothing else. There's no - -5 JUDGE CIPARICK: And that takes it out of 6 7 the tax - -MR. MCCULLOUGH: Yes. 8 9 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But again, why would 10 we overturn the tax tribunal? That's what I want you 11 to focus on. What is it that they did that was 12 wrong? They felt there just wasn't enough evidence 13 to support your position. MR. MCCULLOUGH: Well, because - - -14 15 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: We can only overturn 16 them in certain circumstances. What is that 17 circumstance? JUDGE READ: Would we have to say that 18 there's just not - - - that there's insufficient 19 2.0 proof that the dances were choreographed 21 performances? 22 Well, the tax - - - the MR. MCCULLOUGH: 23 Appellate Division is supposed to affirm, and I 2.4 suppose the next step, you are supposed to affirm the

Tax Appeals Tribunal when their decision is based on

substantial evidence. And it certainly isn't. 1 2 substantial evidence is clearly on our side. 3 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Is it your view that 4 they're making a judgment as to the worth of what's 5 going on there rather than looking at the evidence? 6 Is that what you're saying? MR. MCCULLOUGH: Oh, absolutely. 7 8 Absolutely. 9 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So your position is 10 that because of the nature of what's going on, they're making a - - - whatever the basis is - - -11 12 moral or just you don't like what it is - - - what 13 they do. Is that - - -MR. MCCULLOUGH: Well, that - - -14 15 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - is that the 16 bottom line of your argument, that that's why we 17 should overturn the tax tribunal? 18 MR. MCCULLOUGH: That is certainly one of 19 the reasons. I wrote a sixty-page brief. That - - -20 it's not all right there. There's a lot of other - -21 22 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: The thrust of your 23 position. 2.4 MR. MCCULLOUGH: That is one of the 25 thrusts. There's also the one that - - - there's

1	some legal errors. They said that we don't have
2	- that an exemption is different than an exclusion
3	and we have a lot to talk about that. And then we
4	talk about the layering of $(f)(1)$ and $(f)(3)$. But
5	one of the main obviously, one of the main
6	thrusts is that we brought in the evidence that the
7	courts have previously asked for, and it was good
8	evidence, it was solid evidence. The administrative
9	law judge saw it, felt it and gave us what we
10	asked for.
11	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But if the Tax
12	Tribunal said that thought, basically, that it
13	has no artistic value, that's not enough for them to
14	
15	MR. MCCULLOUGH: No.
16	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: to rule against
17	you?
18	MR. MCCULLOUGH: No, it's not.
19	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay.
20	MR. MCCULLOUGH: And they did that.
21	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Sure. Judge Read?
22	JUDGE READ: By the way, the word
23	"choreography", that doesn't appear in the statute,
24	does it? That's just in the regulation?
25	MR. MCCULLOUGH: It does. It's

1	JUDGE READ: It's in the statute too?
2	MR. MCCULLOUGH: Well, it's a it
3	talks about musical arts performances
4	JUDGE READ: Right.
5	MR. MCCULLOUGH: and then it talks
6	about, as part of the definitions, it talks about
7	choreographic.
8	JUDGE CIPARICK: It says, "live, dramatic,
9	choreographic or musical performance."
10	MR. MCCULLOUGH: Yes.
11	JUDGE READ: But that's the regulation,
12	isn't it, or no? Or is all this
13	MR. MCCULLOUGH: No, that's part of the
14	-
15	JUDGE READ: the statute. Okay.
16	MR. MCCULLOUGH: statute.
17	JUDGE READ: Okay.
18	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay. Thanks,
19	counsel.
20	MR. MCCULLOUGH: Thank you.
21	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: You'll have rebuttal.
22	Let's hear from your adversary.
23	MR. GOLDFARB: Good afternoon. May it
24	please the Court, Rob Goldfarb appearing for the
25	Commissioner of Taxation and Finance.

1	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What is the basis for
2	the tribunal's decision?
3	MR. GOLDFARB: The basis
4	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: You agree that the
5	tribunal can't act arbitrarily, right?
6	MR. GOLDFARB: Absolutely.
7	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay. So what
8	MR. GOLDFARB: Petitioner's charges
9	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: what supports
10	their conclusion?
11	MR. GOLDFARB: What supports their
12	conclusion is that petitioner's charges are taxable
13	under two separate provisions here 1105(f)(1)
14	or $(f)(3)$ and in fact, are taxable regardless
15	of the choreographic nature of these performances.
16	JUDGE GRAFFEO: Well, I guess
17	JUDGE SMITH: Do you say they have to be
18	actually choreographed? An improvised dance is not -
19	has to pay tax?
20	MR. GOLDFARB: I'm arguing that these
21	charges
22	JUDGE SMITH: Is there a yes or no to that
23	one?
24	MR. GOLDFARB: are taxable regardless
25	of the nature

1 JUDGE SMITH: Is there a yes or no to that 2 Do you say an improvised dancer has to pay tax? 3 MR. GOLDFARB: The legislature did not 4 exempt any type of dance. It exempted choreographed 5 performances which has to mean something - - -JUDGE SMITH: But can't you read that 6 7 defini - - - choreographic as just a synonym for 8 dance there? It says theatrical, dramatic or 9 choreographic performances, just means plays or 10 dances? 11 MR. GOLDFARB: I don't think so, Your Honor. I think that - - -12 13 JUDGE SMITH: In the regulation, the 14 regulation, don't they use "dance" as a synonym for 15 "choreographic"? Remember that Theater in the Round 16 example, where they say if a Theater in the Round 17 puts on dance performances, it doesn't have to pay 18 tax? MR. GOLDFARB: Your Honor, even if these 19 20 are considered choreographed performances, these 21 charges are still taxable. And I would like to start 22 with (f)(3) - - -23 JUDGE SMITH: Okay. 2.4 MR. GOLDFARB: - - - because petitioner is

a cabaret or similar place. The charges of a cabaret

1	or similar place are taxable if the establishment's
2	sale of refreshments are more than merely incidental,
3	even if the entertainment consists of choreographed -
4	
5	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But what about the
6	amount of money that's collected from this?
7	MR. GOLDFARB: Well
8	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: When you say incident
9	defined incidental.
10	MR. GOLDFARB: Well, I would define
11	incidental as minor or rather inconsequential. And
12	that is not the case here.
13	JUDGE SMITH: I've got quite a few
14	authorities that say the test is whether it's a part
15	of the a significant part of the attraction for
16	the audience.
17	MR. GOLDFARB: That is one test. But the
18	fact
19	JUDGE SMITH: An indeed, isn't there an
20	opinion of the Department of Taxation that says that
21	if it I mean, if it's the refreshments that are
22	bringing people in, then it's taxable?
23	MR. GOLDFARB: That is only
24	JUDGE SMITH: You're not claiming that
25	anyone came to this bar for the juice?

1	MR. GOLDFARB: Absolutely, not. Although,
2	Your Honor, I would submit, if the women kept their
3	clothes on, no one would be coming to this bar for
4	the dance performance.
5	JUDGE SMITH: Of course not.
6	MR. GOLDFARB: But let me address the
7	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But that's the point,
8	counsel, isn't it?
9	MR. GOLDFARB: My point is
10	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: No, but isn't that
11	the point that Judge Smith is making, that they're
12	not coming for the juice?
13	MR. GOLDFARB: That is only one possible
14	test for merely incidental.
15	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So in terms of when
16	you say that when you say whether the tax
17	should be or not, whether it's incidental or not,
18	where does your argument prevail?
19	MR. GOLDFARB: I'd like to articulate what
20	the tribunal's basis for finding
21	JUDGE SMITH: I promise I'll stop
22	interrupting you
23	MR. GOLDFARB: Yes.
24	JUDGE SMITH: after this one more
25	time.

1 MR. GOLDFARB: Thank you. 2 JUDGE SMITH: The Tax Appeal Tribunal 3 actually said that it's not the issue whether people 4 were attracted by the juice or by the dance. There 5 are plenty of cases that say it is an issue, aren't there? 6 7 MR. GOLDFARB: The cases that I'm aware of are from the federal courts, because there's a 8 9 federal cabaret tax. And what those cases say is 10 there is no one test for merely incidental. 11 JUDGE SMITH: Okay, but - - - understood. 12 MR. GOLDFARB: You have to look at the 13 nature - - -14 JUDGE SMITH: My question is, that 15 statement in the Tax Appeal Tribunal decision is 16 wrong? 17 MR. GOLDFARB: I don't think that that's 18 wrong, because refreshments can be more than merely 19 incidental, even if they did not come - - -20 JUDGE SMITH: They say that whether it 21 attracts people or not is irrelevant. At least 22 that's what I read them as saying. You're not saying 23 it's irrelevant. 2.4 MR. GOLDFARB: I wouldn't say it's entirely

irrelevant. I would say that the tribunal's decision

that these were not merely incidental is rationally based on substantial evidence. And I'd like to say what that is.

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Petitioner had a two-drink minimum during this period; sold drinks at a substantial mark-up, up to five dollars for a nonalcoholic beverage; and in fact, its receipts from the beverages were greater than its receipts from the door admission charges, which are clearly not incidental parts of petitioner's business. They were greater than the receipts from the house fees paid by the dancers, which are not incidental.

JUDGE SMITH: Yes, but there's a history of what's incidental. And fourteen percent is rather low compared to some of the numbers in the other authorities, aren't they?

MR. GOLDFARB: The other authorities are mostly federal authorities which say that the - - -

JUDGE SMITH: Well, what about - - -

MR. GOLDFARB: - - - amount of receipts is only one factor to be considered.

JUDGE SMITH: - - - what about that same opinion of the Department of Taxation, where they - - they had thirty-three percent. They said thirty-three percent is not too low as a matter of law, but

on these facts, it's not taxable. How - - - here, the only thing, as I read it, that the tribunal relied on, was fourteen percent. That's less than half of thirty-three.

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MR. GOLDFARB: No. The tribunal also, Your Honor, relied on the fact that these were mandatory purchases. The tribunal reasonably concluded that, first of all, a mandatory requirement is not merely incidental. And when the drink receipts exceed even the amounts taken in from the door receipts, which I think that even petitioner would not argue is merely incidental, that drink sales were, in fact, a core component of petitioner's business model, and more than merely incidental.

But I would like to go on and argue that petitioner also failed to prove that its entertainment was limited to dramatic or musical arts performances, and therefore it's taxable under either (f)(1) or (f)(3). We're dealing here with exemptions from a generally applicable sales tax.

JUDGE SMITH: I'm sorry. This argument, was this something that the tribunal found, or is this an alternative argument.

JUDGE READ: This is your alternative argument. You're making your alternative argument

1	now, aren't you?
2	MR. GOLDFARB: With respect to dramatic or
3	musical arts performance?
4	JUDGE READ: No, with respect to the
5	(f)(3).
6	JUDGE CIPARICK: (f)(1) and (f)(3).
7	JUDGE READ: (f)(1) and (f)(3). You're
8	making the (f)(3) argument now.
9	MR. GOLDFARB: The (f)(3) argument, it has
LO	to be merely incidental refreshments.
L1	JUDGE SMITH: Okay. And you just finished
L2	making that
L3	MR. GOLDFARB: Yes.
L4	JUDGE SMITH: and we're going to go
L5	on to something else. Tell me again what the
L6	something else is?
L7	MR. GOLDFARB: The something else is that
L8	the petitioner failed to prove that its entertainment
L9	is limited to dramatic or musical arts performances.
20	So it doesn't enjoy the exemption in either (f)(1) or
21	(f)(3).
22	JUDGE SMITH: Is that because it wasn't
23	choreographic or for some other reason?
24	MR. GOLDFARB: That is because it was not
25	choreographic and one other reason.

1	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Why is it not
2	choreographic again?
3	MR. GOLDFARB: Let me first say
4	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: No, no. But answer
5	that. Why is it not
6	MR. GOLDFARB: Well, with respect to the
7	private dances, the only direct evidence on this
8	issue was
9	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What about the public
10	dance? That you say is choreographed?
11	MR. GOLDFARB: No, Your Honor, I think that
12	the tribunal rationally concluded that wasn't
13	choreographed. The tribunal applied a commonly
14	understood dictionary definition of choreography,
15	meaning a dance where the steps and the moves are all
16	planned, arranged, and composed in advance and then
17	it's performed that way. And the record just simply
18	does not bear this out.
19	JUDGE SMITH: So you are saying that an
20	improvised dance is taxable?
21	MR. GOLDFARB: I think that's correct, Your
22	Honor. Well, not the dance itself, but admission
23	fees.
24	JUDGE SMITH: If I if that Theater in
25	the Round that's in the example, if it puts on

improvised dance, it has to pay taxes? That's not what the regulation says.

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MR. GOLDFARB: Well, the statute uses the term "choreographic". It doesn't use the term "dance".

JUDGE SMITH: The regulation uses the word "dance" as a synonym.

MR. GOLDFARB: That is an example in the regulation, and it's not controlling over the statute.

What the record reflects is simply that there are some commonly used moves in stripping. The women would perform what they called various pole tricks, some of which are very difficult to perform, but that doesn't make the entire performance a choreographed one.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Wouldn't you say that the most creative performers are often ones who don't have every move choreographed before they start, and that creative artistic people, particularly in the dance mode, certainly there are many instances of that - - are kind of creative? They're designing their moves as they go along, although they have a whole repertoire of different moves that they might have. Isn't that couldn't that be - - -

1	JUDGE READ: Or maybe
2	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: artistic or
3	choreographic?
4	JUDGE READ: or maybe there are a
5	certain number of counts when you're doing
6	you're a ballet dancer, and you're performing a
7	pirouette or a series of pirouettes to a certain
8	number of counts, and you may vary it every time you
9	do it. It's improvised.
10	MR. GOLDFARB: I would
11	JUDGE READ: That's not choreographed?
12	MR. GOLDFARB: not dispute that that
13	is creative. But the legislature used
14	JUDGE SMITH: You say it's taxable?
15	MR. GOLDFARB: the term
16	"choreographic".
17	JUDGE SMITH: So you say that if Judge
18	Read's ballet dancer varies her counts, then someone
19	who charges admission to her performance has to pay
20	the tax?
21	MR. GOLDFARB: No, I don't think so, Your
22	Honor. I think if there's some de minimis departure
23	from choreography
24	JUDGE SMITH: It has to be de minimis?
25	MR COLDEARR: I think so Your Honor I'

like to make a more threshold point. We're dealing here with an exemption - - -

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CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But that doesn't make any sense, counselor. That can't be. You get all these dance teams who come out and they dance to music and on any given night they may be wildly different in terms of what they're doing.

MR. GOLDFARB: Your Honor, we're not talking about anything like that here. The only evidence - - -

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But is that - - - but you know what point I want to ask you, and this is what I think, to me it comes down to: is that because the tribunal is making a judgment as to the value of this particular form of choreography or dance and another form, as Judge Read's example? And maybe it is. This is not a rhetorical question. Is there a difference between the ballet dancer and these pole dancers in terms of their artistic value or their benefit to the world? And could that be the basis for what the tribunal found, or does it have nothing to do with that?

MR. GOLDFARB: That had nothing to do with it, Your Honor.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Why not? Why not?

1 MR. GOLDFARB: Because there was plainly 2 insufficient evidence here that the private dances, 3 from which petitioner derives virtually - - - most of 4 its revenue, were choreographed performances. The 5 only direct evidence - - -JUDGE SMITH: You call them private dances. 6 7 You admit they were dancing in there. I'm a little 8 suspicious myself. But you're calling them dance - -9 10 MR. GOLDFARB: Well, no. I don't admit 11 The only direct evidence of what occurred in that. 12 these private rooms in which petitioner took over 13 300,000 dollars in receipts in, in a quarter, came from one former dancer who testified - - -14 15 JUDGE SMITH: Another one - - -16 MR. GOLDFARB: - - - that she stood, 17 totally nude, near or above the patron and "danced 18 for him that way". 19 JUDGE SMITH: It sounds credible to me, 20 actually. But - - - do you - - - I could imagine the 21 possibility that something other than dance goes on 22 in those rooms once in a while. But you're really 23 saying they weren't dancing, or you're just saying it 2.4 wasn't very high class dancing?

MR. GOLDFARB: I'm saying that there was no

proof that it was a choreographic performance, which is what the statute requires.

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JUDGE SMITH: So your argument does depend on the idea that there's a distinction between a choreographic performance and a dance?

MR. GOLDFARB: No, my argument does not depend on that, because all charges of a cabaret or similar place are taxable if - - -

JUDGE SMITH: Okay. But you're - - - I'm sorry. But your (f)(1) argument does depend on that?

MR. GOLDFARB: My (f)(1) does not depend on that, because - - and I'd like to get this point out, because my red light is on - - - the main stage performances were only one component of the adult entertainment that was provided in the main room.

When the women were not on the stage, they would come off the stage, they'd mingle with the patrons, they'd interact with them. While they were doing this, they would perform so-called table dances and lap dances, during which the patron would - - - the woman would apparently sit in the patron's lap. The tribunal reasonably concluded that just sitting and moving in a patron's lap is not a choreographed performance.

JUDGE SMITH: No, I understand - - - I think I understand that argument. But I don't see

that particular argument in the tribunal's decision. 1 2 MR. GOLDFARB: I think that the tribunal 3 described the additional adult entertainment in its decision. And this - - - these interactions out on 4 5 the floor were really a large part of the 6 entertainment that was provided in exchange for the 7 door charge. So the charges don't qualify for the 8 exemption - - -9 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counselor. 10 MR. GOLDFARB: - - - for this reason alone. 11 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay. Thanks, 12 counsel. 13 MR. GOLDFARB: Thank you. CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counselor. 14 15 MR. MCCULLOUGH: Thank you, Your Honor. 16 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Are you contending 17 that the latter activity of lap dances or whatever 18 the description is, that that's not choreography, 19 right? 2.0 MR. MCCULLOUGH: We are contending that 21 it's all part of the choreographed performance. 22 expert says - - -23 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: It is? 2.4 JUDGE PIGOTT: You've got an owner who says 25 we don't require dance training; it's not necessary.

1 She gains confidence; she works some busier nights 2 and makes more money for herself. And she - - -3 MR. MCCULLOUGH: Yes. 4 JUDGE PIGOTT: - - - so I mean, the idea 5 that there's any training isn't there. And as I 6 recall your dancer, she said that she was a single 7 mom on welfare, and a friend of hers said you can 8 make money here. And she went. And there was no 9 training whatsoever. 10 MR. MCCULLOUGH: Well, she said that it 11 took her about seven or eight months, her testimony 12 was - - -13 JUDGE PIGOTT: Can we get past the idea that somehow this is the Bolshoi? I mean, it just 14 15 seems to me that what you're doing, is you're having 16 these girls pay to come to your establishment and 17 then - - - and you don't train them, and they do what 18 they do, and they make a lot of money and so do you. 19 And the twain never meet. 20 MR. MCCULLOUGH: Well, Your Honor, get away 21 from the fact that it's the Bolshoi. I'm not 22 suggesting that it's the Bolshoi. What I am 23 suggesting - - -

JUDGE SMITH: Well, if the State of New

York were to say we're going to tax these erotic

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dancers and exempt the Bolshoi wouldn't there be a 1 2 Constitutional problem? 3 MR. MCCULLOUGH: Well, exactly. And we've brought that up. The point is that the State of New 4 5 York doesn't get to be a dance critic. JUDGE PIGOTT: No. But the tax tribunal 6 7 gets to make decisions based upon what's taxable and 8 not; they have. The measure is whether there's 9 substantial evidence to support what they said. 10 you're arguing that because these people are Bolshoi 11 ballet dancers that they are somehow art and 12 therefore they're wrong. 13 MR. MCCULLOUGH: No, I'm not. What I'm suggesting, Your Honor, is that the State of New York 14 15 has no business differentiating between the Bolshoi 16 and what we do. 17 JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, how about if they don't train - - - if the owner himself says we don't 18 19 require any dance training whatsoever, and they pay 2.0 us to come to our establishment. He doesn't hire 21 these people to be dancers. He hire - - - they hire 22 him so they can come in and do whatever they do. 23 gets paid by them, and he gets paid by them for the

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rooms.

MR. MCCULLOUGH: He provides - - - he's the

1	one who's provided the training by way
2	JUDGE PIGOTT: No, he's not.
3	MR. MCCULLOUGH: in some cases it's
4	video. In some cases it's
5	JUDGE PIGOTT: No, he's not. He's just
6	giving them a pole and a stage and saying give me
7	twenty-five bucks and you can go do what you're
8	doing.
9	MR. MCCULLOUGH: He said in his testimony
10	that he provided other dancers to help and also
11	videos to help, and that it takes a period of time to
12	learn. If you saw and it's part of the record
13	if you saw what these dancers do, you would be
14	saying, no, it's not the Bolshoi, but it's good. And
15	I would point out, Your Honor, that pole dancing is
16	under serious consideration as an Olympic sport. And
17	there are people
18	JUDGE PIGOTT: Are you comparing it to
19	dressage now?
20	MR. MCCULLOUGH: You know, I don't make
21	those decisions either.
22	JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, then why make the
23	argument?
24	MR. MCCULLOUGH: But if it's under
25	consideration as an Olympic sport, these girls,

1	certainly the ones that you would see on these
2	videos, would be in standing to make the team.
3	They're that good.
4	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay.
5	MR. MCCULLOUGH: Thank you.
6	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Thank you both.
7	Appreciate it.
8	(Court is adjourned)
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1	CERTIFICATION
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3	I, Penina Wolicki, certify that the
4	foregoing transcript of proceedings in the Court of
5	Appeals of 677 New Loudon Corporation v. NYS Tax
6	Appeals Tribunal, No. 157 was prepared using the
7	required transcription equipment and is a true and
8	accurate record of the proceedings.
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17	Address of Agency: 700 West 192nd Street
18	Suite # 607
19	New York, NY 10040
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21	Date: September 11, 2012
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