COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF NEW YORK
MATTER OF GALASSO,
Appellant.
No. 170
20 Eagle Street
Albany, New York 12207 September 11, 2012
Before:
CHIEF JUDGE JONATHAN LIPPMAN
ASSOCIATE JUDGE CARMEN BEAUCHAMP CIPARICK ASSOCIATE JUDGE VICTORIA A. GRAFFEO
ASSOCIATE JUDGE SUSAN PHILLIPS READ ASSOCIATE JUDGE ROBERT S. SMITH
ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE F. PIGOTT, JR. ASSOCIATE JUDGE THEODORE T. JONES
Appearances:
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Penina Wolicki Official Court Transcriber

1	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Matter of Galasso,
2	number 170. Counsel, do you want any rebuttal time?
3	MR. CATTERSON: Yes, Your Honor. If I
4	could have two minutes, please.
5	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yes, sure. You've
6	got it. Go ahead.
7	MR. CATTERSON: Good afternoon, Your
8	Honors. May it please the court, I am Jeffrey
9	Catterson. I am co-counsel for the appellant, Peter
10	Galasso.
11	The Rules of Professional Conduct were
12	drafted for two specific purposes: to protect the
13	public and to maintain the integrity of the
14	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counsel, what do you
15	believe that the Mr. Galasso's obligation was
16	in this? What is his responsibility, particularly in
17	terms of escrow funds, and which would seem like a
18	sacred duty that a lawyer has, to make sure that
19	those funds are protected? What's his put
20	aside the ethical rules as a lawyer, put aside the
21	technicalities of the rules. What is his
22	responsibility in relation to escrow funds?
23	MR. CATTERSON: As a fiduciary, he has the
24	obligation to safeguard those funds. And the
25	fiduciary the nondelegable obligations are to

receive the monies; to make certain those monies are 1 2 not converted; to make certain that he doesn't 3 commingle those monies; and then to disburse those monies to the appropriate individuals. 4 5 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Do you believe that 6 he did not delegate that role to his brother? 7 MR. CATTERSON: Absolutely not. 8 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Why not? It seems 9 that it was kind turned over almost lock, stock, and 10 barrel. 11 MR. CATTERSON: The obligations of the 12 fiduciary that I just went over, he never delegated. 13 The only signatory - - -14 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What did he delegate? 15 MR. CATTERSON: Assigned. He assigned 16 tasks; tasks for a bookkeeper and accountant to fill, 17 that he would oversee. He never delegated - - -18 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What's the level of 19 oversight that's required? How closely should he be 20 looking at the accounts, the checks, the monthly 21 reports? Is it - - -22 JUDGE CIPARICK: How much - - -23 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - the most 24 general level, or is it a hands on? 25 MR. CATTERSON: I believe that this court

addressed that in the Matter of Holtzman. 1 We take 2 the objective standard of a reasonable attorney in a 3 similar circumstance. Taken the circumstances that 4 the appellant was addressing in 2004, we're dealing 5 with a trusted employee that was employed for fifteen 6 years. Not just an employee, but his brother as 7 well. JUDGE CIPARICK: Well, the fact that he's 8 9 changed his practices since this incident, doesn't 10 that demonstrate that there was a failure to supervise, or something had broken down in that 11 office? 12 13 MR. CATTERSON: Absolutely not. What we do 14 as attorneys, we are always looking at what can we do 15 better. We're revising our practices. We're 16 revising how we approach cases. 17 JUDGE CIPARICK: Does this - - -CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: 18 Could he have done 19 something better initially? 20 MR. CATTERSON: In hind - - -21 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Do you acknowledge 22 that - - -23 MR. CATTERSON: In hindsight, we can always 2.4 do something better. But that doesn't mean what we 25 did in the first instance was inadequate.

JUDGE GRAFFEO: Well, this conduct 1 2 occurred, what, over two and a half years? 3 MR. CATTERSON: Correct. 4 JUDGE GRAFFEO: Right? Thirty months? And 5 how much total was taken from escrow funds? Over five million dollars? 6 7 MR. CATTERSON: Correct, Your Honor. JUDGE GRAFFEO: And over four million from 8 9 just one client, correct? 10 MR. CATTERSON: Correct. From an account 11 where the theft occurred by an individual who was not 12 a signatory on the account. 13 JUDGE GRAFFEO: So there's no obligation to 14 look at bank statements? There's no particular 15 obligation of the attorneys in the firm to check the 16 oversight - - -17 MR. CATTERSON: Well, Your Honor - - -18 JUDGE GRAFFEO: - - - when you're dealing 19 with escrow funds of this enormity? 20 MR. CATTERSON: Well, the appellant did. 21 In this case specifically, the Baron escrow account 22 that you're referring to - - -JUDGE GRAFFEO: Well, I take it he didn't 23 24 look at the actual bank statements, or he would have 25 seen that there were withdrawals, substantial

1	withdrawals, from these accounts.
2	MR. CATTERSON: Well the actual bank
3	statements were forwarded to a P.O. box unbeknownst
4	to the firm.
5	JUDGE SMITH: He looked at what he thought
6	were the actual bank statements?
7	MR. CATTERSON: Correct. And not only did
8	he think that, Your Honor, anyone who looked at it
9	believed so. And there was (sic) findings by the
10	Nassau County District Attorney's Office and two
11	Nassau County Supreme Court justices
12	JUDGE CIPARICK: Because the auditors and
13	accountants who looked at it believed that these were
14	the true
15	MR. CATTERSON: Actual bank statements.
16	JUDGE CIPARICK: actual statements.
17	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Well, let me ask you
18	
19	JUDGE GRAFFEO: You can delegate all the
20	responsibility to someone else, a non-attorney?
21	MR. CATTERSON: He wasn't delegating the
22	responsibility of a fiduciary. He was assigning the
23	task for an accountant or a bookkeeper. He was not
24	giving the authority to the bookkeeper to withdraw
25	monies, to transfer monies

1 JUDGE GRAFFEO: So a lawyer could outsource 2 that to some third party - - -3 MR. CATTERSON: So long as he has 4 appropriate - - -5 JUDGE GRAFFEO: - - - and take - - -6 MR. CATTERSON: - - - oversight. 7 JUDGE GRAFFEO: - - - and make the same 8 argument? 9 MR. CATTERSON: There has to be - - -10 JUDGE GRAFFEO: I've still done my 11 fiduciary duty? 12 MR. CATTERSON: So long as he has 13 appropriate oversights and, when he establishes the 14 accounts, puts into place the provisions that comply 15 with those fiduciary obligations. There was no 16 foreseeability here. 17 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counselor, do you 18 believe that there could be a different standard in 19 what the DA might view the situation in terms of the 20 cooperation of your client versus the ethical rules 21 that govern the practice of law? 22 MR. CATTERSON: I will concede that the 23 District Attorney's Office were not viewing the 2.4 appellant's ethical obligations, but they were 25 viewing the same facts and circumstances that the

1 Appellate Division was viewing, as well - - -2 JUDGE PIGOTT: Your argument - - - I'm 3 sorry. Please finish. 4 MR. CATTERSON: - - - as well as the two 5 Nassau County Supreme Court justices all viewed the same fact pattern; all received the same 6 7 documentation, same information, came to the 8 conclusion that the appellant and the firm, not only 9 did they not know, they could not have known, given 10 the legitimate-looking bank statements they were 11 reviewing and the totality of the circumstances of 12 what they were seeing. 13 JUDGE SMITH: Counselor, what - - -14 JUDGE CIPARICK: What about the accounting 15 to the Barons? After all this was over, isn't there 16 also a charge that he failed to adequately account to 17 the Barons for monies? Yeah. MR. CATTERSON: There is. And that's 18 If you address it in the first instance, 19 twofold. 20 the accounting that he would have to initially 21 produce to the Barons, would be of the activities on 22 the account. Known to the appellant at that time, 23 there was no activity on the account. There was a 2.4 single authorized transaction of a 100,000-dollar 25 payment to Mrs. Baron's attorney. Other than that

1 singular transaction and the interest that should 2 have been accruing on a monthly basis, there was 3 nothing else to account for. JUDGE CIPARICK: What about his lack of 4 5 cooperation with the grievance committee? Isn't there an allegation that - - -6 7 MR. CATTERSON: There is an allegation, 8 Your Honor. But if you review the record, it cannot 9 be substantiated by the record. We have voluminous 10 documentation produced to the committee. And if I'm 11 going to curtail it - - -12 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Why do you think they 13 took the view that they did about his cooperation; putting aside whether he violated the ethical rules 14 15 or not? 16 MR. CATTERSON: I believe that they didn't 17 understand the fact pattern that they were dealing 18 with. I believe that there was a supposition that 19 was brought into the case originally, and their 20 investigation was trying to fit that square peg into 21 22 JUDGE SMITH: On the - - -23 MR. CATTERSON: - - - that round hole. 2.4 JUDGE SMITH: - - - on the actual 25 cooperation, is it possible that they confused a

1 disagreement with misconduct? I mean, they said we 2 want these documents; you said, I don't think you 3 should have these documents? 4 MR. CATTERSON: And I'll take it one step 5 Yes. Whereas there may have been a further. 6 dialogue about what the responsibilities were, every 7 single response at the end was we will produce - - -8 the appellant would produce. What was lost here is 9 he no longer had the documentation to produce. 10 JUDGE SMITH: Is there any allegation - - -11 I mean, I understand you would say it didn't happen -12 - - but is there any allegation that his alleged 13 noncooperation was designed to mislead or conceal or 14 slow up anything? 15 MR. CATTERSON: That was the conclusion or 16 the supposition reached by the referee, which is 17 belied - - -JUDGE SMITH: What did the referee find the 18 19 motive to be? Do you know? 20 MR. CATTERSON: There was some reference 21 that he believed the culpability in the civil action 22 by the firm may in some way have affected his 23 cooperation or the firm's cooperation - - -24 JUDGE SMITH: So the theory - - -25 MR. CATTERSON: - - - in the grievance.

1 JUDGE SMITH: - - - the theory was that he 2 wanted - - - he was trying to keep the grievance 3 committee from getting documents that might lead to some civil liability. Okay. And if I asked - - - I 4 5 shouldn't ask you to explain that; I should ask him. 6 Okay. 7 MR. CATTERSON: Correct. But that's belied by the record, which shows that four months after the 8 9 theft was discovered, the appellant and his firm 10 commenced a civil action to recoup the monies, 11 knowing full well that any and all documentation is 12 going to be disclosed in that proceeding. 13 JUDGE PIGOTT: Mr. Catterson, what is the -14 15 JUDGE GRAFFEO: Have the clients received 16 any recompense? 17 JUDGE PIGOTT: I'll get there. 18 JUDGE GRAFFEO: I'm sorry. MR. CATTERSON: Those actions are still 19 20 pending, Your Honor. It's five years later and - - -21 JUDGE GRAFFEO: Is that a no? 22 MR. CATTERSON: No, not at this point, Your 23 Honor. 2.4 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Judge Pigott. 25 MR. CATTERSON: But the civil actions are

1	still pending to do so.
2	JUDGE GRAFFEO: Judge Pigott.
3	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Judge Pigott.
4	JUDGE PIGOTT: What's our standard of
5	review here? I understand the facts that you're
6	relating and of course there's a judicial hearing
7	officer who made findings of fact and conclusions.
8	The Second Department said what it said. Isn't our
9	jurisprudence that we have a fairly narrow review
10	ability here?
11	MR. CATTERSON: I believe this court has
12	the ability to give the review it so deems warranted
13	in this specific fact pattern. The committee has
14	already said that it was a de novo review by the
15	Appellate Division. I believe that you would step
16	into those shoes, as well, and have the ability to do
17	a de novo review, as well.
18	JUDGE SMITH: Even as to the sanction?
19	MR. CATTERSON: Absolutely.
20	JUDGE SMITH: They don't doesn't the
21	Appellate Division have some discretion in making
22	this call?
23	MR. CATTERSON: But if there's an abuse of
24	that discretion based upon the record, this court can
25	step in.

1	JUDGE CIPARICK: So this is an
2	JUDGE SMITH: But that's different from de
3	novo review, isn't it?
4	JUDGE CIPARICK: This is an abuse of
5	discretion as a matter of law?
6	MR. CATTERSON: I believe, based upon the
7	record, it would be.
8	JUDGE CIPARICK: It rises to that level?
9	MR. CATTERSON: Yes.
10	JUDGE PIGOTT: Because you want to say that
11	you've been treated to a standard of strict
12	liability: that the money's missing, therefore you
13	violated the canons of professional responsibility?
14	MR. CATTERSON: Correct.
15	JUDGE PIGOTT: And you want us to say
16	that's not true. Would we then send it back?
17	MR. CATTERSON: I don't believe you would
18	have to, because the record is complete. I don't
19	believe there's a question of fact. There's a
20	question of the interpretation of those facts, but
21	there's a complete record before this court that, as
22	the committee has conceded in their brief, there were
23	stipulated facts, and the most of the exhibits that
24	went into evidence were stipulated into evidence.
25	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Why couldn't you look

1 at this, instead of saying that it's a per se rule or 2 strict liability, why wasn't what the grievance 3 committee did - - - why isn't it just a failure of 4 oversight; that monies could be missing and in some 5 cases no responsibility, because it was - - - the 6 lawyer did the best that he or she could to oversight 7 (sic) and to follow it; in other cases, it's a 8 failure of oversight. Why is it a strict - - - why 9 do you view it as a strict liability situation? 10 MR. CATTERSON: For the very reason - - -11 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: If you do. Yeah. 12 MR. CATTERSON: - - - for the very reason 13 you just brought up, that there was oversight here. 14 Every other case that's been cited by the Appellate 15 Division and the committee, there is no oversight. 16 There's a complete abdication of the account. Here 17 there - - -JUDGE SMITH: But complete abdication isn't 18 19 the standard, is it? You can't say that anything 20 short of complete abdication is okay? 21 MR. CATTERSON: Absolutely not. What we're 22 saying here is that the appellant's conduct, when 23 viewed in an objective standard of a reasonable 24 attorney and the given circumstances, not today, but 25 2004 and 2005, when it was occurring, that his

1 conduct and his oversight was reasonable at that 2 time. 3 JUDGE SMITH: And isn't - - - I mean, but 4 isn't an attorney held to a duty of extreme 5 vigilance, really, of - - - unusual vigilance, when he's looking over escrow funds. This isn't the - - -6 7 or shouldn't he be even more careful than he would 8 have been with his own money? 9 MR. CATTERSON: He's held to the standard 10 of a fiduciary. The fiduciary standard is the same 11 whether it's for an attorney, a third party, or an 12 accountant. There's a fiduciary obligation. A 13 trustee. And I labeled for this court before, the 14 four areas of that fiduciary obligation that's 15 nondelegable. 16 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Are you saying that 17 what the brother did was undetectable by a reasonably 18 vigilant, capable attorney? 19 MR. CATTERSON: Not only am I saying that, 20 Your Honor, the District Attorney's Office said that, 21 Justice Palmieri said that, Justice Warshawsky said 22 that. And we can look at it and say - - -23 JUDGE CIPARICK: Well, that's not exactly 24 what they said. They said that there was - - - it 25 was insufficient evidence to proceed with a criminal

1 prosecution. They didn't say that the oversight was 2 reasonable or not reasonable. 3 MR. CATTERSON: They didn't go to his oversight, Your Honor, because they weren't ruling on 4 5 that issue. What they did say is that - - -That's our issue here. 6 JUDGE CIPARICK: 7 MR. CATTERSON: Absolutely. But the findings of fact that the District Attorney's Office 8 9 made, and Justice Palmieri and Justice Warshawsky, 10 was that the appellant could not have known, given 11 the layers of fraud that took place by the 12 bookkeeper. 13 JUDGE GRAFFEO: Can you address the purchase of the condominium, the office? 14 15 MR. CATTERSON: Absolutely. 16 JUDGE GRAFFEO: Because where did the 17 members of the firm think that that money had come 18 from? 19 MR. CATTERSON: It was the appellant's 20 custom and practice to have a separate money market 21 account where any of his excess earnings that he 22 generated on a monthly basis, a bi-monthly basis, 23 would then be deposited into that money market 2.4 account. 25 The bookkeeper produced to the appellant

1 QuickBooks statements, which is a generally accepted 2 program for attorneys and accountants, delineating 3 the savings he was accumulating. And when the time 4 came to purchase the condominium, the appellant 5 directed the bookkeeper: from my money market account, distribute the down payment. 6 7 A year later, when the closing took place 8 in September of 2005: from my money market account, 9 make the final payment. The bookkeeper produced 10 authentic-looking QuickBooks - - -11 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Well, wouldn't he 12 have some idea of what should be in the money market 13 account? 14 MR. CATTERSON: Absolutely. And these 15 QuickBooks statements verified what it should be. 16 You had referenced before the firm's monthly 17 financial statements - - -18 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Right. 19 MR. CATTERSON: - - - which really 20 delineates all the transactions in the firm's 21 accounts on a monthly basis. That also verified the 22 money market account balances or savings that were 23 being put into the money market account. 24 JUDGE PIGOTT: In fact, Anthony had moved 25 money to make sure that that balanced, right?

1	MR. CATTERSON: Yes, he did.
2	JUDGE JONES: Do you think
3	MR. CATTERSON: This was the ultimate Ponzi
4	scheme. He would take from one victim; finish with
5	one victim; move on to the next. And he covered his
6	tracks very well. And
7	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Judge Jones?
8	JUDGE JONES: Do you think the fact that
9	this was his brother made your client less likely to
10	scrutinize the accounts?
11	MR. CATTERSON: Not that it was his
12	brother, per se. You had the whole context of the
13	employee, the fifteen-year relationship with the
14	employee, the relationship with every other member of
15	the firm and employee of the firm, with that
16	bookkeeper, and what everyone saw or believed was
17	taking place with that individual, that added to the
18	cumulative effect of how you should treat this
19	individual.
20	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counsel.
21	JUDGE SMITH: I'm sorry, can I ask?
22	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: I'm sorry. Judge
23	Smith.
24	JUDGE SMITH: Has your client made
25	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay.

1	JUDGE SMITH: any restitution from
2	his personal funds?
3	MR. CATTERSON: From his personal funds, he
4	has funded the civil litigation, Your Honor.
5	JUDGE SMITH: Okay. But he hasn't actually
6	paid claimants from his funds?
7	MR. CATTERSON: No. If he had done that,
8	then you're saying that or to do so would say
9	that he's an insurer of the monies that were taken by
10	a third party.
11	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counselor.
12	Thanks.
13	MR. CATTERSON: Thank you, Your Honor.
14	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: You have your
15	rebuttal time.
16	MR. CATTERSON: Thank you.
17	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counselor?
18	JUDGE CIPARICK: So you agree with the fact
19	that attorneys should not be deemed insurers of their
20	escrow accounts? Do you agree with that?
21	MR. LEE-RENERT: We don't believe that
22	attorneys are insurers on their escrow account, Your
23	Honor.
24	JUDGE SMITH: Is the fact are you
25	- I don't see any point at which you complain about

inadequate restitution or efforts to make 1 2 restitution. 3 MR. LEE-RENERT: Well, he was charged with 4 unjust enrichment. But the Second Department 5 specifically has a rule that restitution is not a bar 6 to a disciplinary proceeding. 7 JUDGE SMITH: Well, it's one thing to say it's not a bar. But obviously, if he had - - - if he 8 9 was sitting there on a huge pile of money and said 10 no, I'm keeping it, I'm not helping, you could have 11 held that against it - - - against him. But I don't 12 see that you did. 13 MR. LEE-RENERT: Well, typically, in 14 disciplinary cases, restitution or whether there was 15 client harm often is considered as whether it's a 16 fact in mitigation or a fact in aggravation. 17 JUDGE SMITH: And you don't say it's either 18 here? MR. LEE-RENERT: Well, while it's not 19 20 stated in here, the fact that he received money from the funds that were stolen, both for his condominium 21 22 and for his firm when it happened - - -23 JUDGE SMITH: Well, let me try a yes or no 2.4 question. Are you saying that his failure to make 25 restitution is a fact in aggravation?

1	MR. LEE-RENERT: I'm saying it could be
2	deemed as a fact in
3	JUDGE SMITH: You want to answer the
4	MR. LEE-RENERT: Then, no, it's not listed
5	as a fact in aggravation here.
6	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counselor, why would
7	the district attorney and the judges seem to make the
8	basically positive comment about Mr. Galasso and his
9	actions, and something along the lines that it really
10	wouldn't be something that he would be able to know?
11	MR. LEE-RENERT: Well, they were
12	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Why would they make -
13	is it a different standard, or what is it that's
14	not credible about those findings or statements?
15	MR. LEE-RENERT: Well, it was a standard,
16	both in the criminal matter you were talking
17	about the standard to bring criminal charges. With
18	regards to those cases, they were looking at the
19	issue of actual knowledge. I disagree with my
20	JUDGE PIGOTT: We had a case we had a
21	case a few months ago, I forget the cite, but
22	Greenberg Trager v. I think HSBC. And what had
23	happened there is that they had gotten into a
24	situation where they thought someone, I think from
25	Hong Kong, was retaining them for purposes of

collections.

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2	The sum and substance of it was that they
3	were stuck with about a 900,000-dollar check that
4	they called the bank and asked if it had cleared; the
5	bank said yes, that there's a little discrepancy
6	here. But it turns out that then CitiBank, who
7	it was drawn on said, it's a phony check; that's not
8	our check.
9	They were out of trust 900,000 dollars, I
10	think, the minute that check got dishonored. In your
11	view, is that then a violation of the canons of
12	professional responsibility?
13	MR. LEE-RENERT: That would not necessarily
14	be a violation. The standard is if whether or not,
15	in the exercise of reasonable oversight and
16	diligence, they would have been able to prevent the
17	fraud.
18	JUDGE PIGOTT: I'm having trouble finding
19	out what should have been done here that wasn't. And
20	I take a little bit of issue I know at one part
21	you say, "none of these safeguards", one of them
22	being the partners handled daily bookkeeping and
23	accounts of the firm that would mean a lot of our
24	firms better turn themselves in that the

respondent opens bank account - - - bank mail

1 himself, that he personally reviews every check and 2 every bill, and that he speak to the accountant 3 monthly. And you say that because they were doing 4 this, none of these basic safeguards, which I suggest 5 to you, I doubt that there's many firms that do them, because they didn't exist before, shows that they 6 7 didn't do what they were supposed to do. 8 And it seems to me that you're put - - -9 you say these are basic. And I don't know where you 10 get that. I mean, having been in private practice, I 11 will tell you, that is not basic. That is super 12 oversight, because of what happened in the past. 13 MR. LEE-RENERT: We weren't saying that each one of those is a requisite. But when you look 14 15 at it collectively - - -16 JUDGE PIGOTT: "None of these basic 17 safeguards existed before." That's the quote. And I 18 don't see them as basic safeguards. They're good 19 things to do. I mean, if somebody cleaned out your 20 safe, you better go change the combo. But I 21 challenge your premise that these are basic 22 safeguards, because I don't think that's what's done in firms. 23 MR. LEE-RENERT: Well, certainly there had 24

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to be something for Mr. Galasso to verify what was

1 happening in the accounts. 2 JUDGE SMITH: Are you really saying he was 3 in fault for not opening the envelopes himself? 4 MR. LEE-RENERT: No, no. We're not saying 5 that it's simply that. We're saying when you looked 6 in the totality of everything that was happening - -7 JUDGE SMITH: In the - - -8 9 MR. LEE-RENERT: - - - at this firm. 10 JUDGE SMITH: - - - the bank state - - - he 11 did - - - the record does seem to show that he looked 12 at the actual bank state - - - what he thought were 13 actual bank statements. MR. LEE-RENERT: Actually, Your Honor, the 14 15 record does not show that. If you look at the 16 referee's report, and you look at the record, all Mr. 17 Galasso ever claimed was that either he or an 18 associate looked at the record. He testified that he 19 could not remember specifically what records he may 20 have looked at. 21 JUDGE PIGOTT: Is there any venality being 22 charged here? I mean, I read the record thoroughly; I looked at all the exhibits. I looked at what their 23 24 argument is. And I was looking for some evidence, 25 scintilla of venality in what went on here. It just

1 looked to me like there was that holy smokes moment 2 when Anthony came in and said, I just got to tell 3 you, I just took five million dollars out of your firm. And then they, it seems to me, did everything 4 5 they were supposed to do. 6 MR. LEE-RENERT: That moment came after two 7 and a half years of Mr. Galasso not looking at a 8 single IOLA statement. 9 JUDGE PIGOTT: Right. But I'm saying, 10 where's the venality? I'll concede all that you want 11 to say happened here, but they did have a bookkeeper 12 who did this stuff, who reported to them on a regular 13 basis, who did absolutely it's - - - I shouldn't say 14 absolutely - - - but seemed to have done everything 15 that any law firm would want from their bookkeeper, 16 until they find out that the bookkeeper had done 17 this. 18 And you're not charging them with any 19 venality, right? 20 MR. LEE-RENERT: Venality is not a 21 necessary element to show misappropriation. 22 JUDGE PIGOTT: No. But I'm saying you're 23 not. 24 MR. LEE-RENERT: No, we're not charging 25 venality.

1 JUDGE PIGOTT: Because there's so many, as 2 you know, because you do this work, where it's - - -3 the lawyer is taking money, where one of the famous 4 ones, I'm sure you've seen, is where there's money in 5 escrow and the lawyer says, I've got to pay my 6 daughter's tuition; I've got a client coming in at 2. I'll write the check, and then when the guy comes in 7 8 at 2, I'll put the money back, and then he doesn't 9 That's - - - that's just spending out of show. 10 That - - - even that didn't happen here. trust. 11 MR. LEE-RENERT: I'm sorry, Your Honor? 12 JUDGE PIGOTT: There was no spending out of 13 trust here? 14 MR. LEE-RENERT: Well, the spending out of 15 trust was happening on a regular basis. 16 JUDGE CIPARICK: The monies were being 17 transferred to other accounts, right? 18 MR. LEE-RENERT: The monies were being 19 transferred, and more than ninety transfers came out 20 of the Baron account alone. 21 JUDGE SMITH: But you say he should have 22 known that. What exactly should he have done? 23 MR. LEE-RENERT: He should have - - - the 24 best example, I think, is when he learned - - - when 25 the firm was notified, that there was a short balance

1 in the Baron account - - - and there's no greater red 2 flag than the balance in the account being short - -3 - he should have taken some meaningful role in 4 actually finding out what happened. 5 JUDGE SMITH: There was some - - - when he was notified that there was a 5,000-dollar 6 7 discrepancy between - - -8 MR. LEE-RENERT: Yes. 9 JUDGE SMITH: - - - an ending balance and a 10 11 MR. LEE-RENERT: Yes. 12 JUDGE SMITH: - - - and obviously what 13 happened is his brother said, oh, I checked with the bank and they took care of that. 14 15 MR. LEE-RENERT: Yes. 16 JUDGE SMITH: You say he should have - - -17 what should he have done instead? 18 MR. LEE-RENERT: He could have called the 19 bank. 20 JUDGE SMITH: He could have called the 21 bank. But I guess - - -22 MR. LEE-RENERT: He could - - -23 JUDGE SMITH: - - - what I'm saying is, if 24 you're sitting there with someone you trust in a, 25 what you think is a four million dollar account, and

1 someone says hey, there's a 5,000 - - - these numbers 2 miss by 5,000 dollars. And the guy you trust says 3 yeah, I called the bank; they took care of it. Is it 4 so bad to say okay? I mean, it's not as though it's 5 50,000? 6 MR. LEE-RENERT: When you're dealing with a 7 fiduciary account, Your Honor, respectfully, no, it's 8 not okay. You should be - - - you should be seeing 9 things as potential red flags and irregularities, not 10 thinking of ways to rationalize - - -11 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What about the - - -MR. LEE-RENERT: - - - how it makes sense. 12 13 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - what effect do 14 you think all of this will have, if we affirm the 15 penalty, what does it have on the average lawyer with 16 escrow accounts? Is it a favorable result that tells 17 lawyers that you have to be extremely vigilant when 18 it comes to escrow accounts, or does it make lawyers 19 nervous about taking money in an escrow, which is a 20 fairly typical event? 21 MR. LEE-RENERT: Well, since the standard 22 here has not changed, you could say nothing would 23 happen. Understandably, any time somebody - - -CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: You don't think this 24 25 case has sort of gotten a lot of attention, because I

1 think escrow accounts are such a common thing in a 2 practicing lawyer. And I guess the standard of 3 oversight or care or vigilance, is very much a matter of interest for the bar. So does it send a message? 4 5 I would think that you want to send a message. MR. LEE-RENERT: I think it reminds 6 7 attorneys of the vigilance that they are supposed to have and that they've been consistently - - -8 9 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: How would you define 10 that vigilance? What's your standard in terms of the oversight - - - if you had to summarize it, what's 11 12 the nature of that oversight? 13 MR. LEE-RENERT: That you have to provide 14 reasonable oversight based upon the circumstances. 15 And that may vary if you're in a 500-person firm 16 versus a - - -17 JUDGE GRAFFEO: Is that a strict liability 18 standard? 19 MR. LEE-RENERT: No, it is not a strict 20 liability standard. 21 JUDGE GRAFFEO: Because if we're uncomfortable with a strict liability standard, as 22 23 obviously the bar associations that have submitted 24 briefs here are very concerned with, I think what the 25 Chief is trying to get at is, what's the test?

1	What's the rule? How do people know what they
2	how do attorneys know what they have to do?
3	MR. LEE-RENERT: On a reasonable standard,
4	there has to be some degree of leeway based on the
5	circumstances. But as the Appellate Division found
6	in their report, Mr. Galasso did not either review,
7	audit, or reconcile the accounts in any meaningful
8	way.
9	So while it doesn't define that you have to
10	do specific tasks, the attorney should find a way
11	that some fiduciary and there was no fiduciary
12	here who was overseeing the accounts, because Mr.
13	Galasso wasn't but some fiduciary should be
14	able to verify and have some more direct knowledge of
15	what's happening in the account instead of simply
16	taking the word of the non-attorney, non-fiduciary to
17	whom he delegated.
18	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So is that a new
19	rule? Is that a new standard?
20	MR. LEE-RENERT: No, it is not, Your Honor.
21	This is the same standard that's been set forth in
22	the cases that we provided in our brief.
23	JUDGE GRAFFEO: So every lawyer has to call
24	the bank periodically? Is that reasonable?
25	MR. LEE-RENERT: It's not necessarily

whether it's calling the bank or whether it's 1 2 reviewing the statements, whether it's meeting with 3 the accountant personally, but there has to be more 4 than simply looking at a piece of paper that somebody 5 wrote a number on and handed it to you. And that's what - - - all he did here. 6 7 JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, that's not what 8 happened here. You're making it - - - that's not 9 what happened here. You're making this - - - you're 10 being very flip, it seems to me, about the facts. 11 MR. LEE-RENERT: That - - - in fact, Your 12 Honor, that's exactly what happened here. Those 13 monthly statements - - -14 JUDGE PIGOTT: You're saying that Anthony 15 wrote a number on a piece of paper and handed it to 16 his brother and said this is what you got in the 17 bank? 18 MR. LEE-RENERT: That's what the monthly 19 statements were. If you look at the - - -20 JUDGE PIGOTT: I thought - - -21 MR. LEE-RENERT: - - - monthly statements -22 23 JUDGE PIGOTT: Excuse me. I thought that 24 he had doctored them, he made them look like the real 25 bank statements, and that the ones that Peter Galasso

1 got from Anthony looked like the real bank 2 statements. 3 MR. LEE-RENERT: That's for the Baron 4 account, Your Honor. For the IOLA account, the only 5 oversight that was given was these monthly statements 6 which were sometimes forty pages which contained in 7 one - - -JUDGE SMITH: Was it not - - -8 9 MR. LEE-RENERT: - - - page - - -10 JUDGE SMITH: - - - the IOLA account, as I 11 remember, was one that Mr. Galasso had rather little 12 to do with, that it was primarily his partner. I 13 mean, does every partner in the firm have to look at the IOLA statements? 14 15 MR. LEE-RENERT: He actually had more 16 involvement than he would suggest. And in 17 Respondent's Exhibit S and T - - -18 JUDGE SMITH: Weren't they mostly personal 19 injury awards in that IOLA account? 20 MR. LEE-RENERT: Well, there were more 21 personal injuries. He had thirty-three matters over 22 the course of the period in the Signature Bank 23 account. He had twenty matters in the M&T IOLA 24 account. He was regularly and periodically using the 25 account. In fact, the monthly statements - - -

1	JUDGE SMITH: So you're saying that even if
2	the account is predominantly even if it's
3	predominantly used by the personal injury attorney,
4	the matrimonial attorney, who uses it occasionally -
5	and I gather those were for less large amounts?
6	MR. LEE-RENERT: It
7	JUDGE SMITH: You don't want to answer,
8	okay.
9	MR. LEE-RENERT: Yes. I'm sorry. It
10	varies from matter to matter in each of the cases.
11	JUDGE CIPARICK: Right. Because the Baron
12	account was 4.8 million.
13	JUDGE SMITH: No, no. But the Baron
14	account was not IOLA, was it? The Baron account
15	_
16	MR. LEE-RENERT: Not the IOLA account.
17	JUDGE SMITH: was yes.
18	JUDGE CIPARICK: That was escrow.
19	JUDGE SMITH: the Baron account was a
20	Signature Bank account and
21	JUDGE PIGOTT: But if you have a
22	JUDGE SMITH: and we know we've
23	seen forged statements on that account.
24	JUDGE PIGOTT: When you have an escrow
25	account and maybe I guess the statute's

1 run on anything I did - - - but you send over your 2 paralegal to do a house closing with about three 3 escrow checks: one to pay for the mortgage recording 4 tax, one to pay for the recording of the mortgage, et 5 cetera. And they come back and then they give you 6 the closing statement and they spent this, this and 7 this. 8 Are you suggesting that I was in violation 9 of the canons of professional responsibility by 10 giving blank or signed, but not filled in, escrow 11 checks to my paralegal to close a house? 12 MR. LEE-RENERT: No, not necessarily, Your 13 Honor. 14 JUDGE PIGOTT: I'm okay, there? 15 MR. LEE-RENERT: The New York State Bar 16 Association has actually opined directly on that 17 issue, and it has said that when you delegate these 18 tasks you have - - - the attorney has to be mindful 19 of maintaining vigilant oversight, because they could 20 be responsible for the errors or the misuse of the 21 trust that's been delegated. 22 JUDGE CIPARICK: Let me ask you. If we 23 agree with you in terms of the misconduct, is there 24 anything we could do with respect to the penalty? 25 Can we bifurcate that and - - - do we have any

1	discretion?
2	MR. LEE-RENERT: I wouldn't
3	JUDGE CIPARICK: What would one have to do?
4	MR. LEE-RENERT: I wouldn't want to tell
5	Your Honors what to do. However, that would be a
6	departure from the prior cases of this court which
7	have found that the issue of sanction is in the
8	discretion of the Appellate Division.
9	JUDGE SMITH: So you
10	JUDGE CIPARICK: From us, if we found a
11	abuse of discretion of a matter of law, we couldn't
12	do anything with the penalty.
13	MR. LEE-RENERT: Well, for example, in the
14	Matter of Kelley, where it found that some of the
15	charges were dismissed, but one may be upheld, it
16	then remanded it back to this court remanded it
17	back to the Appellate Division
18	JUDGE SMITH: Are you saying
19	MR. LEE-RENERT: where it sustained
20	some but not other
21	JUDGE SMITH: are you saying we have
22	no power to review, even for abuse of discretion?
23	MR. LEE-RENERT: The cases whether it's
24	Ackstole (ph.) or Matter of Mix or who else, has
25	shown that where charges have been sustained, where

misconduct has been found - - -1 2 JUDGE SMITH: I hate to be - - - I seem to 3 be having a hard time getting yeses and nos. 4 MR. LEE-RENERT: Okay. 5 JUDGE SMITH: Are you saying we have no 6 standard - - - we have no power to review even for 7 abuse of discretion? You can say yes. It's not a 8 problem. 9 MR. LEE-RENERT: There's no precedent of 10 this court ever doing it. It has always deferred to the Appellate Division. Except for cases in which 11 12 there was no - - -13 JUDGE SMITH: Isn't that - - - I mean, I 14 guess - - -15 MR. LEE-RENERT: - - - charges sustaining, 16 you dismissed. 17 JUDGE SMITH: - - - I see your point about 18 the cases. But isn't it troublesome that you're essentially - - - if we have no power to review 19 20 there's no review, because the Appellate Division 21 makes the initial determination, right? 22 MR. LEE-RENERT: Well, with regards to 23 sanction - - -24 JUDGE SMITH: With regard to sanction. I'm 25 talking about sanction.

1 MR. LEE-RENERT: - - - the judiciary law 2 has specifically and exclusively vested that - - -3 the power to suspend or - - -4 JUDGE SMITH: Where does it say 5 "exclusively"? MR. LEE-RENERT: In Section 90 - - - it 6 7 doesn't say "exclusively". This court, however, in the arbitration of Erlanger in 1967 referred to it as 8 9 being the exclusive power of the Appellate Division. 10 JUDGE SMITH: So you do interpret that as 11 meaning there's no review at all, even for abuse of discretion? 12 13 MR. LEE-RENERT: If the court has found 14 that misconduct charges have been sustained, then 15 there's no discretion. 16 JUDGE SMITH: Yes, is a permissible answer. 17 You can say - - -18 MR. LEE-RENERT: Yes, Your Honor. 19 JUDGE SMITH: Yes. 20 JUDGE PIGOTT: Would you, in your final 21 time here, talk about the failure to cooperate? 22 MR. LEE-RENERT: Yes, Your Honor. 23 JUDGE PIGOTT: Do you disagree with Mr. Catterson on it? 2.4 25 MR. LEE-RENERT: The failure to cooperate,

which is really laid out finely in detail by the 1 2 special referee, shows that first, Mr. Galasso did 3 not timely respond to our request for information. 4 That was why the subpoenas were necessary in this 5 case, because he was unresponsive. Then for an extended period, Mr. Galasso was given the 6 7 opportunity - - -JUDGE CIPARICK: Was the criminal 8 9 investigation still pending at that time? 10 MR. LEE-RENERT: I'm sorry? 11 JUDGE CIPARICK: Was the criminal 12 investigation pending at that time? 13 MR. LEE-RENERT: The criminal - - - the criminal investigation, I don't believe was still 14 15 pending at that time, Your Honor. I'm not sure if 16 sentencing had occurred. 17 JUDGE CIPARICK: So there's no issue that 18 maybe he didn't want to cooperate because he didn't 19 want to incriminate himself or - - - there's no - - -20 MR. LEE-RENERT: There was no Fifth 21 Amendment issue raised, Your Honor. 22 JUDGE SMITH: What do you say his motive 23 was? 2.4 MR. LEE-RENERT: No matter how many times 25 we asked, he never provided - - - he never showed

where the money went. 1 2 JUDGE SMITH: What do you say his motive 3 was? 4 MR. LEE-RENERT: Motive isn't an element 5 here, but - - -6 JUDGE SMITH: Okay. MR. LEE-RENERT: - - - it seems - - - I 7 concur with the special referee that he delayed 8 9 advising us exactly how much he benefitted - - -10 JUDGE PIGOTT: Did you move for sanctions? 11 I mean, old PJ here, I mean, if our grievance 12 committee issues a subpoena that's not honored, 13 usually they come and talk to us and we get angry. MR. LEE-RENERT: The charge of failure to 14 15 cooper - -16 JUDGE PIGOTT: Did you do that? 17 MR. LEE-RENERT: I'm sorry, Your Honor. 18 JUDGE PIGOTT: Did you do that with respect 19 to your subpoenas? 20 MR. LEE-RENERT: That's what the charge of 21 failing to cooperate is. 22 JUDGE PIGOTT: I know that. But did you do 23 that with respect to your subpoenas? In other words, 24 in order to prove your case, you need this 25 information.

1	MR. LEE-RENERT: No, we
2	JUDGE PIGOTT: So when the subpoena's not
3	honored, you then move to say would you please
4	sanction these people because they're not giving us
5	what we want?
6	MR. LEE-RENERT: I apologize, Your Honor,
7	if I misunderstood. We did not allege that they
8	failed to comply with the subpoena. We alleged that
9	the subpoena was necessary because they did not
10	respond to our lawful request prior to subpoena.
11	JUDGE PIGOTT: That makes it noncooperation
12	because you had to iss
13	MR. LEE-RENERT: That is sufficient
14	that is sufficient
15	JUDGE PIGOTT: let me finish. Let me
16	finish. Because you had to issue a subpoena, means
17	they didn't cooperate?
18	MR. LEE-RENERT: Because they didn't answer
19	our request, which there's no dispute they received.
20	Because they were unresponsive, that's the failure to
21	cooperate.
22	JUDGE SMITH: So you say that even if
23	even apart from motive, if a lawyer gets a request
24	from you and does not give you what you want, that's
25	misconduct?

1	MR. LEE-RENERT: If the information
2	if it was a lawful request, and the information was
3	relevant to the investigation, yes.
4	JUDGE SMITH: What if the lawyer is surly
5	enough to disagree with you that it's relevant.
6	MR. LEE-RENERT: The lawyer has options at
7	that point. Whether they can make a motion to the
8	Appellate Division with regards to the request,
9	whether
10	JUDGE SMITH: Well, they can certainly make
11	a motion. But this is just this is before you
12	serve a subpoena. You ask them for something, they
13	say I don't think you're entitled to that.
14	MR. LEE-RENERT: There was that's not
15	the
16	JUDGE SMITH: Misconduct right there?
17	MR. LEE-RENERT: That's not the facts of
18	this case, Your Honor. There was no response. And
19	again, they had options if they felt the
20	investigation had gone beyond a proper scope. They
21	were represented by experienced counsel. Nothing was
22	done.
23	JUDGE SMITH: There was no response? I
24	mean, you say the response was unsatisfactory.
25	You're not saying they ignored your letters, or are

1 you? 2 MR. LEE-RENERT: They did ignore the letter 3 until after the subpoena. 4 JUDGE SMITH: There are unanswered letters? 5 I didn't see that. 6 MR. LEE-RENERT: They did not answer the 7 letter until after the subpoena. They then responded after service of the subpoena, and then their 8 9 examination under oath was scheduled. 10 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, Counselor. 11 Thanks. Thank you, Your Honors. 12 MR. LEE-RENERT: 13 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counselor? 14 MR. CATTERSON: Your Honors, if I may 15 address first the failure to cooperate charge. I 16 disagree, and the record will show that the appellant 17 did respond to every single request made by the committee. 18 19 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Before the subpoena? 20 MR. CATTERSON: Before the subpoena. The 21 subpoena was issued based upon the erroneous belief 22 by the committee that the appellant had the requested 23 documents in his possession. As the justice pointed 24 out, there was a district attorney's investigation, 25 that every document the firm had was turned over to

1	them. The firm no longer had the documents to
2	produce.
3	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: And did was
4	that conveyed to the committee?
5	MR. CATTERSON: It was, in several letters
6	in the record. There's a December 9th, 2008 letter
7	from Grace Moran reiterating to Mr. Still, who was
8	the lead investigator, that as soon as the
9	information is provided to the appellant at
10	that point in time the respondent we will give
11	you what we get.
12	What was insult to injury here is the
13	committee subpoenaed the information on their own,
14	received the information from Signature Bank, still
15	demanded the information from the respondent, saying
16	now we're going to hit you with a failure to
17	cooperate charge, because you haven't given it to us.
18	They had the documentation in their possession, were
19	still demanding it from respondent, who could not get
20	the banks to cooperate.
21	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: This, in a general
22	way, was not the kind of cooperation you get in the -
23	in a normal grievance? I mean, was it a
24	contentious relationship?
25	MR. CATTERSON: There appeared to be some

contention between the respondent and the lead investigator, unfortunately.

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3 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What do you think - -- what do you think was at the crux of that? What 4 5 was going on? Why did this happen? We assume, if we take you at face value, that your client wanted to be 6 7 cooperative, was as shocked as everyone else by what 8 happened. Why was this? What was underlying this? 9 I mean, is it your contention that they're looking to 10 get your client? I mean what was going on here? 11 MR. CATTERSON: I think it's a myriad of 12 circumstances that came together, one being what I 13 hinted on before that there was a presupposition 14 coming in. They believed that the appellant had to 15 know of the theft before. And his brother took the 16 money. How could the appellant not know? That's

18 And the appellant, obviously, we're looking 19 at a period of time where there's complete turmoil in 20 his life. Complete turmoil. His brother is just 21 guilty of stealing five million dollars from his 22 firm. His wife has just finished going through 23 breast cancer surgery. He's dealing with trying to 2.4 save the livelihood of his employees and is being 25 accused of certain different things.

what they came in here with.

1	So there's those combinations. So was
2	everybody perfect in that scenario? Probably not.
3	But was he uncooperative? Absolutely not. The
4	record will show every letter. A demand is made by
5	the committee. There's a response provided.
б	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counselor.
7	Thanks.
8	MR. CATTERSON: Thank you, Judges.
9	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Thank you both.
10	Appreciate it.
11	(Court is adjourned)
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2	CERTIFICATION
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4	I, Penina Wolicki, certify that the
5	foregoing transcript of proceedings in the Court of
6	Appeals of Matter of Galasso, No. 170 was prepared
7	using the required transcription equipment and is a
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18	New York, NY 10040
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20	Date: September 16, 2012
21	Date: September 10, 2012
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