Official Court Transcriber

1	COURT OF APPEALS	
2	STATE OF NEW YORK	
3	PEOPLE,	
4	Respondent,	
5	-against-	
6	No. 1' CALVIN L. HARRIS,	/4
7	Appellant.	
8		
9	- T	20 Eagle Street 7, New York 12207 2012 eptember 11,
LO	Before:	
L1	CHIEF JUDGE JONATHAN LIPPMA	N
L2	ASSOCIATE JUDGE CARMEN BEAUCHAMP ( ASSOCIATE JUDGE VICTORIA A. GRA	CIPARICK
L3	ASSOCIATE JUDGE SUSAN PHILLIPS ASSOCIATE JUDGE ROBERT S. SM	READ
L4	ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE F. PIGOT	Γ, JR.
L5	ASSOCIATE JUDGE THEODORE T. JO	NES
L6	Appearances:	
L7	WILLIAM T. EASTON, ESQ.	
L8	BRIAN SHIFFRIN, ESQ.  EASTON THOMPSON KASPEREK SHIFFRI	
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24		
		Sharona Shapiro

1	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: People v. Calvin
2	Harris.
3	Counselor, you want any rebuttal time?
4	MR. EASTON: Two minutes, if I may, Your
5	Honor.
6	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Sure. Go ahead,
7	counselor.
8	MR. EASTON: William Easton along with
9	Brian Shiffrin for Mr. Harris.
10	Before arguing the sufficiency point, I'd
11	like to address two legal issues, if I may.
12	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yes, sure.
13	MR. EASTON: First would be the jury
14	selection issue in point 2.
15	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yeah, let's hear
16	about that. Go ahead.
17	MR. EASTON: The record shows that juror
18	number 11 stated, when pressed, that she harbored a
19	pre-formed opinion as to the guilt or innocence as to
20	Mr. Harris. She also expressed this opinion to
21	others. She then responded to a general question in
22	the questionnaire that she could be fair. Then voir
23	dire occurred. She was given legal instructions, as
24	a juror she must face her verdict solely on the

evidence.

1	JUDGE CIPARICK: Had she never made that
2	unequivocal statement that she could be fair
3	MR. EASTON: She never made
4	JUDGE CIPARICK: and set aside
5	whatever biases she might have had?
6	MR. EASTON: She never made it. She never
7	made it after being instructed as to the law. She
8	never made it at all. She made a general assurance
9	of fairness before being instructed
10	JUDGE CIPARICK: And defendant was
11	compelled to use a preemptory?
12	MR. EASTON: What's that?
13	JUDGE CIPARICK: Was defendant compelled to
14	use a preemptory?
15	MR. EASTON: Yes, and exhaust it.
16	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So what is
17	JUDGE GRAFFEO: Neither counsel asked her
18	what the predisposition was; at least I couldn't find
19	it in the record.
20	MR. EASTON: It wasn't in the record, Your
21	Honor. We were instructed at that time not the
22	jurors and counsel were instructed not to inquire as
23	to the basis of the opinions of the jurors, a group
24	voir dire.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But basically, your

1	view is if it's not totally unequivocal that's the
2	end of the story.
3	MR. EASTON: Certainly, Your Honor. This
4	there was
5	JUDGE SMITH: Does the trial judge have any
6	leeway in judging whether it's unequivocal or not?
7	MR. EASTON: The actual statement of a
8	juror I suppose, I don't think if a juror says
9	
10	JUDGE SMITH: I guess what I'm saying is
11	could he have been within his discretion to say, this
12	is she said a lot of things, not everything
13	seems to be in English, it's a little confusing, but
14	I, on the whole, think she's assured me that she can
15	be fair?
16	MR. EASTON: I don't think so, Your Honor,
17	especially in the face of an assertion by the jury,
18	will base a portion of my verdict on my opinion
19	not my whole verdict, a portion of it.
20	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: A small part, right?
21	MR. EASTON: Yeah, a slight part. At that
22	point
23	JUDGE GRAFFEO: Are you suggesting
24	MR. EASTON: at the minimum, I
25	submit, the judge has to elicit an unequivocal

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assurance. I don't know if it - - -
 1
 2
                    JUDGE GRAFFEO: That was my question. You
 3
          think the judge had to ask her a couple more
          questions, specifically, as opposed to making a
 4
 5
          general inquiry - - -
                    MR. EASTON: Yes.
 6
 7
                    JUDGE GRAFFEO: - - - of the panel?
 8
                    MR. EASTON: And at least pose it to her at
 9
          least - - -
10
                    CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Once she says - - -
11
                    MR. EASTON: - - - as a member of the
12
          panel.
13
                    CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Once she says, at
14
          least in part or small or whatever she said?
15
                    MR. EASTON: Yeah, she says a slight part
16
          of my verdict - - -
17
                    CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Right.
18
                    MR. EASTON: - - - will be based - - -
                    JUDGE SMITH: Wouldn't - - -
19
20
                    MR. EASTON: - - - on my opinion.
21
                    JUDGE SMITH: Wouldn't any - - - wouldn't
22
          almost any juror with real insight and self-knowledge
          have to say that? Of course - - - all our
23
2.4
          preconceived notions always have some effect on us.
25
                    MR. EASTON: She's a candid juror, Your
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1 Honor, and I - - -2 JUDGE SMITH: Wouldn't you rather have 3 somebody with that much self-knowledge rather than 4 the typical one that says, oh, no, I don't care about 5 everything. I can be totally fair; it doesn't bother me a bit. 6 7 MR. EASTON: Perhaps, but she responded to 8 the repeated inquiries that it was going to be a 9 portion. And Mr. Harris was entitled to a jury 10 composed of jurors that would base its - - -11 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So it's poss - - -12 MR. EASTON: - - - verdict solely on it. 13 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: It's possible that if 14 the judge went further, she still might have been all 15 right on the theory, again, that Judge Smith has just 16 asked you, that people do have preconceived opinions 17 and sometimes they can put them aside, sometimes they 18 can't, and kind of an intelligent juror might say, 19 gee, I have it there, whatever. The judge would have 20 had to go further in order to make her an acceptable 21 juror, is that - - -22 MR. EASTON: At the very - - -23 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - what you're

MR. EASTON: At the very least, the judge

2.4

saying?

1 had to elicit that unequivocal assurance. 2 JUDGE GRAFFEO: But that would have singled 3 her out somehow. Would that have caused a problem? MR. EASTON: I don't think so. 4 5 JUDGE GRAFFEO: I guess I'm - - - I guess 6 I'm asking you what is it that the judge would have 7 asked her. 8 MR. EASTON: He - - -9 JUDGE GRAFFEO: You know, I'm looking at 10 your questionnaire and I have a problem with one of your answers. I mean, you don't want to antagonize a 11 12 prospective juror. 13 MR. EASTON: Well, after she had said in voir dire that I will base my verdict - - - a portion 14 15 of my verdict will be based on my preconceived 16 opinion, the judge at that point has to elicit an 17 unequivocal assurance - - -18 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So if he had said to 19 her - - -20 MR. EASTON: - - - that she'll base it 21 solely on the evidence. 22 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - I hear you, but 23 you understand that you have to - - - in order for 2.4 you to serve on this jury, you have to tell me 25 unequivocally that you can be fair. In light of

1	that, what you just said, can you unequivocally be
2	fair? That kind of thing
3	MR. EASTON: Yes.
4	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: would be what
5	he'd have to do?
6	MR. EASTON: Yes. And it's a simple
7	extrapolation from this court's rulings from Culhane
8	on that that bright line has to be
9	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But if she says yes
10	at that point, it might have been okay.
11	MR. EASTON: That might be necessary, not
12	sufficient, she's saying yes, and then we could look
13	at the whole record of
14	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Right.
15	MR. EASTON: what
16	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But it's conceivable
17	if she said, yeah, I'm just saying that I did have an
18	opinion but yeah, absolutely I could that might
19	be okay.
20	MR. EASTON: If she says yes, despite
21	I'll set that aside, there won't be any question
22	_
23	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Right, okay.
24	MR. EASTON: and what I said before
25	ignore

JUDGE SMITH: Is it relevant - - - I mean, as I read the discussion of this juror on the record, it was a little while after the actual questions and answers and it seemed like nobody was perfectly or correctly recalling what she had said. The argument that you're now making, you didn't make it absolutely - - - I mean, as no one ever has - - - you didn't make it quite as clearly then as you do now. Does that - - - I mean, suppose the judge had just - - - he didn't have a transcript in front of him, didn't remember it precisely and you didn't either, is it really fair to reverse this case because of that?

MR. EASTON: Well, the judge had the option then of - - - the juror was still out, we were in an anteroom. The judge could have brought the juror in or questioned the juror. The district attorney could have asked him to do it. But at that point, the cause challenge is pretty clear.

JUDGE SMITH: And I guess what I'm saying is, I mean, I see this judge sitting there; in his recollection he thought she was pretty unequivocal.

Nobody is quoting to him verbatim the words which you are now quoting. Why should he be - - - you know, why is he bound now by the fact that now when you read it over with a beady eye, it's a little tougher.

1	MR. EASTON: Well, I mean, she said it four
2	times that it was it was a slight portion. I
3	think the
4	JUDGE SMITH: That was under your
5	questioning, wasn't it?
6	MR. EASTON: It was under my questioning,
7	Your Honor.
8	JUDGE SMITH: You did it very well, I've
9	got to tell you, but
10	MR. EASTON: But Your Honor, it was 1
11	think what was drawing the judge away from it was her
12	insisting it would be a slight portion. And that, I
13	think, colored the judge's perception. She just said
14	slight. He
15	JUDGE SMITH: I'm making, perhaps, a picky
16	point. You did not quote those words to the judge at
17	the moment that you were arguing this.
18	MR. EASTON: I certainly didn't, Your
19	Honor, and if I had a better memory I would have.
20	But I didn't have a transcript in front of me,
21	either. But I did make that cause challenge clear
22	and I renewed it again.
23	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What about the
24	hearsay issue with the sisters?
25	MR. EASTON: Oh, Your Honor, that

there's - - - the hearsay issue with the sisters

leads into the other argument I have. The hearsay
issue with the sisters was there was hearsay. The
sisters-in-law relayed a conversation that occurred
in March, word-for-word, and that was concededly
hearsay. We'd had a first trial. We'd had pre-trial
rulings. It was hearsay. At the second trial, that
March conversation came into evidence over objection.
And it was certainly hearsay. It came in to provide
context to the defendant's reaction to being
confronted with what he said his sister said he - - -

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CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Well, what should have the judge done in that circumstance?

 $$\operatorname{MR}.$$  EASTON: Well, the judge should have said - - -

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Could he have let it in and limited it? What could he have done?

MR. EASTON: I think he should have let out the March - - - I mean, excluded the March - - - the conversation had nothing to do with the defendant's reaction to being confronted. If he was confronted with "Isn't it a fact you killed someone else in March?", something that was his fault, it didn't matter whether it was true or false, his reaction was in front of the jury, not the truth or falsity of the

hearsay statement months earlier.

JUDGE SMITH: But what practical difference

- - - I mean, if I say to you, Judge Jones says you

killed somebody last - - - says you admitted to him

killing somebody last week, and you say to me, well,

I said that but I didn't mean it, doesn't that sort

of - - yeah, no doubt Judge Jones' statement is

hearsay, but isn't the impact pretty much the same as

if the hearsay didn't come in?

MR. EASTON: There's an impact. I don't think it's quite the same as Judge Jones coming in and testi - - or Judge Jones saying, as a matter of fact, I told Judge Jones that. It's isn't it a fact Judge Jones said - - being confronted to it is a fundamentally different proposition than actually - - it actually occurring. And when you're asked isn't it true that this conversation occurred in March, which was a pivotal statement, and that comes in for its truth, despite the limiting instructions, that is certainly a hearsay violation.

JUDGE SMITH: Why do you mean it came in for its truth despite the limiting instruction?

MR. EASTON: Because the limiting instruction was you can consider it in context of the

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1 JUDGE SMITH: You're saying the limiting 2 instruction wasn't good enough? 3 MR. EASTON: Right, and it was the repeated 4 - - repeated requests to say it's not coming in for 5 its truth that were denied. I think the hearsay issue involving the 6 7 March statement, I think gains additional 8 significance and irony; certainly bitter irony for 9 Mr. Harris, is the exclusion of the affidavit of John 10 Steele, which was excluded as hearsay. And the 11 exclusion of Mr. Steele's statements, and as the 12 affidavit in our - - - it's our position, violated 13 New York evidentiary rules and denied Mr. Harris his 14 fundamental right to present a defense. And the 15 initial statement of Steele was a letter to the Judge 16 saying I - - - it was seeing Michele Harris at a 17 place where it at least severely compromises, if not 18 eliminated the prosecution's case; she was seen about 19 5 or 6 in the morning - - -20 JUDGE SMITH: And - - -21 MR. EASTON: - - - outside of where - - -22 JUDGE SMITH: - - - at the end of a 23 driveway in this rather lonely wooded area, right? MR. EASTON: On a public road, but at the 2.4

25

end of a - - -

1	JUDGE SMITH: I guess what I'm am I
2	being too cynical to say weren't there a rather
3	startling number of passers by wandering by just at
4	that moment?
5	MR. EASTON: Well, Your Honor, it's a car -
6	I mean, it's a road, it's early morning hours.
7	There's four witnesses that testified for the
8	prosecution as driving down that road.
9	JUDGE PIGOTT: What was Tubbs doing at that
LO	time? I forget. Was he
L1	MR. EASTON: He was hauling hay.
L2	JUDGE PIGOTT: He was hauling hay. So he -
L3	
L4	JUDGE READ: Yeah.
L5	JUDGE PIGOTT: He made some sense. I guess
L6	he was going to feed the cows or something.
L7	JUDGE READ: Would you
L8	MR. EASTON: He was hauling hay back. I
L9	mean, one of the extraordinary one of the many
20	extraordinary facts about this case was it was 9/11,
21	it was a day it was 9/11, the evening of 9/11.
22	People knew where they were. And this case was of
23	such high publicity and high
24	JUDGE READ: Are you going to talk about
25	your sufficiency argument a little bit?

MR. EASTON: No, I'm talking - - - well, I think we're talking about the reliability of the Steele affidavit.

JUDGE READ: Steele affidavit?

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JUDGE SMITH: I think she wants you to get off of that, but may I keep you on it for one more second? Oh, I'm sorry, you've only got a minute. Go ahead.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Well, do them both. Go ahead, Judge Smith, and then Judge Read will get this.

JUDGE SMITH: Okay. The point I was trying to make is can't the judge, in deciding that he's going to let in this hearsay under the hearsay exception, pretty much everything is fair game. And if he says, gee, you know, this just doesn't smell right to me, doesn't look good, these strangers who show up years after the trial to say, oh, yeah, I just happened to be there at the time of the murder, I don't think it's reliable enough to get in. Can he do that?

MR. EASTON: If there's reasons why it's not reliable, certainly. It's - - - I think to implicate a defendant's right to present a defense has to be highly relevant, go to a material element

1 and bear assurances of reliability. But I think 2 reliability, as this Court's made clear in Robinson, 3 is a different concept than credibility. 4 JUDGE SMITH: What's - - - tell me the 5 difference in thirty seconds. MR. EASTON: Reliability, I believe, would 6 7 attach to the issue - - - the circumstances of the utterance. Was a statement issued? Did the 8 9 declarant have competent knowledge? Is it what it 10 purports to be? And in this case it certainly is. 11 It's a sworn affidavit, there was a letter to the 12 judge, and he did have a basis for competent 13 knowledge, driving down a highway, and it was 14 corroborated by the - - -15 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counsel, let's 16 have Judge Read - - -17 JUDGE READ: No, I just - - -18 JUDGE PIGOTT: Judge Read, yeah. 19 JUDGE READ: Yeah, I - - - you've run out 20 of time, but I just wanted to know what you 21 considered to be a few strongest points on the 22 insufficient evidence - - - the insufficiency of the 23 evidence. I mean, there was DNA evidence, right? 2.4 MR. EASTON: There was DNA evidence from

blood, but that was blood of an extremely small

1	volume and of indeterminate age in the residence of
2	the victim.
3	JUDGE READ: And what else was there?
4	MR. EASTON: There was
5	JUDGE READ: You said that's not enough, so
6	
7	MR. EASTON: Well, there was motive and
8	intent and there was blood. And we would say the
9	motive and intent would not be enough in this case
10	without a body or an explanation as
11	JUDGE SMITH: Okay, but you've
12	JUDGE GRAFFEO: But could the jury not
13	consider his behavior after the crime?
14	MR. EASTON: It could, but I think that's
15	consciousness of guilt evidence and it's very weak
16	evidence as a genre, and in this case it's
17	particularly weak.
18	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counselor,
19	let's hear from your adversary and then we'll have
20	you back on the griddle for the rebuttal.
21	MR. EASTON: Thank you.
22	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay. Counsel?
23	JUDGE CIPARICK: This was a purely
24	circumstantial case, counsel
25	MR. KEENE: Pardon me, ma'am?

1	JUDGE CIPARICK: Purely circumstantial,
2	this case. I mean
3	MR. KEENE: Oh, the case is definitely
4	purely circumstantial.
5	JUDGE CIPARICK: You're asking the jury to
6	draw inferences
7	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What's enough that
8	they can do that? What evidence is there that allows
9	them
10	MR. KEENE: The evidence
11	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: I think that's what
12	Judge Ciparick is asking.
13	JUDGE CIPARICK: Yes.
14	MR. KEENE: I think that the people are
15	entitled to the benefit of every reasonable inference
16	to be drawn from the evidence, and the evidence
17	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So what is the
18	JUDGE CIPARICK: What is the
19	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: high points of
20	
21	MR. KEENE: Okay.
22	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: what gives them
23	that
24	MR. KEENE: Strong evidence
25	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: ability to

infer here.

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MR. KEENE: Strong evidence of motive; intent, a threat that he had made to her that was overheard by her hairdresser; opportunity, they live out in the middle of nowhere. She had just told her boyfriend that she was going home, and in fact, her car was found there at the end of her driveway; a consciousness of guilt evidence; and the blood evidence in this case was just - - -

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Well, it's very thin, the blood evidence - - -

MR. KEENE: Well, no, it was - - -

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - literally and figuratively, no?

MR. KEENE: It was very strong evidence,

Judge, because what all the experts agreed on was

that it was blood spatter, that there were fourteen

DNA matches to Michele Harris, that the blood was red

and - - -

JUDGE READ: Did they?

MR. KEENE: - - - the expert witnesses testified that blood changes from red to a darker red to a brown to a black, and the forensic man from the state police, Steve Anderson, testified that the blood that he observed was red. And the testimony -

1 JUDGE SMITH: That - - - as I understand 2 3 it, it was not fresh but it was recent at the time 4 they observed it - - -5 MR. KEENE: That's correct. JUDGE SMITH: - - - which was September 14, 6 7 or something like that. 8 MR. KEENE: And that's what Dr. Henry Lee's 9 testimony was, that the blood would look like this 10 after - - -11 JUDGE SMITH: Yeah, he also said, and it 12 puzzled me, that the blood on the rug was not recent, 13 that it was old, except for the one one-square inch stain. I couldn't make sense out of it, what 14 15 inference - - -16 MR. KEENE: What happened - - -17 JUDGE SMITH: - - - could you draw from 18 that? 19 MR. KEENE: What happened there, Judge, was 20 that when the state police went in, the first few 21 investigators in didn't see anything. It wasn't

MR. KEENE: What happened there, Judge, was that when the state police went in, the first few investigators in didn't see anything. It wasn't until September 14th that they first saw blood, went and got a search warrant, came back on September 15th, and started gathering evidence. Because this throw rug was in the area where they saw blood, they

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1 just gathered up the rug and sent it off to the crime 2 lab, so no one really looked at the rug - - -3 JUDGE SMITH: Oh, so it was old by the time 4 they looked at it. 5 MR. KEENE: It was old by the time they looked at it. 6 7 JUDGE SMITH: But the transfer stain was still recent, he said, or did I misread that? 8 9 MR. KEENE: No, the transfer stain was not 10 still recent, Judge. It was - - -11 JUDGE PIGOTT: Mr. Keene, I don't know if 12 this is the record or not, but it was troubling to 13 When Mr. Steele wrote to the court, why wouldn't me. 14 he have given that to you and to the defense, as 15 opposed to just mailing it back - - - I mean, you had 16 somebody there that, it seemed, had some pretty 17 important evidence with respect to a very high 18 profile case. 19 MR. KEENE: Right. 20 JUDGE PIGOTT: And if I'm understanding 21 this right, without telling anybody, he just mailed 22 it back to this witness. 23 MR. KEENE: He - - -2.4 JUDGE PIGOTT: Because if you had gotten it

- - as I read it, he said "we" in many spots, so it

wasn't just him, who subsequently died, but whoever
was in the vehicle with him would have been a
witness.

MR. KEENE: Right.

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JUDGE PIGOTT: And you would have had an opportunity, regardless of whether they say they want to keep it secret or not, to subpoena them and order them to disclose.

MR. KEENE: Yes, it was very strange the way that happened, Judge. He sent a letter to the first judge in the case, Judge Sgueglia, and Judge Sgueglia forwarded it on to Judge Smith, who actually sat on the case and later vacated the verdict. We became aware of that letter, asked for a copy of it, and Judge Smith refused to provide it to us. And so yes, we would have been very interested in talking to this witness. In the first letter that he sent to the court he didn't say anything about the fact that this person that was with him had died, and then later on, he - - -

JUDGE PIGOTT: Yeah, that was later on, right?

MR. KEENE: - - - he said in an affidavit, oh, by the way, that person is dead. So there were all kinds of things about his - - -

1 JUDGE SMITH: Weren't you offered some kind 2 of opportunity to talk to him on an anonymous basis? 3 MR. KEENE: They did - - - yes, they did 4 offer that opportunity, Judge, but we didn't see what 5 benefit there would be in a telephone conversation talking to some anonymous person when we couldn't 6 7 really check it out. JUDGE SMITH: What harm? I mean, the 8 9 benefit, obviously, is you find out - - - is that you 10 talk to him and get an impression as to whether he's 11 a real witness or a three-dollar bill. Why not do 12 it? 13 MR. KEENE: Yeah, I guess maybe in hindsight we could've done it and we should've done 14 15 it, but we - - -16 JUDGE GRAFFEO: Could you have asked for a 17 deposition with him with - - -18 MR. KEENE: I don't think there's anything 19 under the criminal procedure law that would allow for 20 something like that, Judge. 21 JUDGE PIGOTT: No, but you could have sent 22 a cop - - - I mean, you could have sent somebody and 23 said, you know - - -2.4 MR. KEENE: Oh, yeah, I could have - - -25 JUDGE PIGOTT: Yeah.

1	MR. KEENE: I could have had an
2	investigator.
3	JUDGE CIPARICK: An investigator.
4	MR. KEENE: But they wouldn't identify him
5	so there was no way that we could do any kind of a
6	deposition or even a statement from him.
7	JUDGE GRAFFEO: You couldn't send anybody
8	out to get a statement?
9	JUDGE PIGOTT: But isn't that I mean,
10	that's evidence. I mean, they can't hide evidence.
11	I mean, I would think you'd send a trooper to Mr.
12	Easton's
13	MR. KEENE: Well, you know, that's what I -
14	
15	JUDGE PIGOTT: office.
16	MR. KEENE: that's what I said to
17	Judge Smith. I said, you know, Your Honor, this is
18	ex parte communication.
19	JUDGE PIGOTT: Yeah.
20	MR. KEENE: We should be aware of this, we
21	would like to investigate this. And the response was
22	that he had no responsibility to give me this
23	information
24	JUDGE PIGOTT: That being
25	MR. KEENE: and wouldn't.

1 JUDGE PIGOTT: That being the case, I 2 didn't - - - it seemed to me that the cross-3 examination of Tubbs about this money - - -4 MR. KEENE: Right. 5 JUDGE PIGOTT: - - - which everybody says 6 was a joke, didn't that open the door to somehow 7 attempting to show that he was telling the truth, and 8 whether this was a joke or not, the jury heard that 9 there was some talk about bags of money, that this 10 wouldn't have come in as some evidence that Tubbs was 11 telling the truth, whether this one is true or not, 12 but it was a second person who claims the same thing. 13 MR. KEENE: Yeah, I think that the affidavit from Mr. Steele was so unreliable, Your 14 15 Honor, that there's - - - I just can't imagine - - -16 JUDGE PIGOTT: Doesn't that go to weight? 17 MR. KEENE: Pardon me? 18 JUDGE PIGOTT: Doesn't that go to weight? 19 In other words, you've got Tubbs; Tubbs says I saw 20 what I saw. You say, yeah, but isn't it true that 21 you were being told you were going to get money and 22 then that comes out that that was just a big joke by 23 the police chief. 2.4 MR. KEENE: Right.

JUDGE PIGOTT: All right. So that probably

should have been asked. I'm not blaming you - - -1 2 MR. KEENE: Okay. 3 JUDGE PIGOTT: - - - but I mean, it's clear 4 that that was a subter - - - not a subterfuge, but it 5 shouldn't have been there. So now you've got Tubbs 6 undermined by that kind of questioning. What's wrong 7 with saying and by the way, there's somebody else who 8 made a similar statement, whether you believe it or 9 not, as - - -10 MR. KEENE: Because I - - -JUDGE PIGOTT: - - - people say where 11 there's smoke there's fire sometimes. 12 13 MR. KEENE: Because I think it's just 14 absolute rank hearsay, Your Honor, that doesn't come 15 under any exceptions to the hearsay rule. Mr. Easton 16 acknowledged that when - - -17 JUDGE PIGOTT: Right. 18 MR. KEENE: - - - Judge Smith asked him 19 that. 20 JUDGE PIGOTT: But I mean, I'm trying to 21 get you to think for me. 22 MR. KEENE: Yeah. 23 JUDGE PIGOTT: It just seems to me that if 2.4 you undermine a fact witness by - - - forgive me, by 25 extraneous evidence, I mean, evidence that never

1	should I mean, it shouldn't have been asked,
2	whether he was getting paid, you know, whether
3	I mean, that just was silly, but you did it. Now,
4	they're saying you made our guy look silly and we're
5	sitting here with an affidavit that buttresses what
6	he says, so to offset the Tubbs money thing, we want
7	to at least say there was someone else who said the
8	same thing.
9	JUDGE READ: Well, it's like motive to
10	fabricate.
11	JUDGE PIGOTT: Yeah, and so
12	JUDGE READ: You suggested motive to
13	fabricate.
14	JUDGE PIGOTT: it's a weight kind of
15	thing, right?
16	MR. KEENE: I suppose maybe, you know,
17	Judge Hayden or Judge well, Judge Hayden could
18	have done that, but it was just the way the statement
19	came forward in the first place. I mean, he waited
20	until Judge Smith vacated the verdict from the first
21	trial and
22	JUDGE PIGOTT: But isn't that summation?
23	MR. KEENE: within a day pardon
24	me?
25	JUDGE PIGOTT: Isn't that summation?

1	MR. KEENE: Yeah, I guess it is. I guess
2	that goes more to, you know, what we
3	JUDGE SMITH: What is the judge allowed to
4	your opponent's relying on basically a hearsay
5	or either a hearsay exception or a
6	Constitutional rule that says if it's really, really
7	good, important stuff the hearsay rule doesn't count.
8	I mean, is the judge allowed to basically weigh
9	everything in trying to assess that or is there some
10	distinction between reliability and credibility?
11	MR. KEENE: I don't know I don't
12	think there was anything reliable about this
13	statement.
14	JUDGE SMITH: Is there I mean,
15	suppose I can understand you saying there's
16	nothing credible about it. Is it the same thing to
17	say there's nothing reliable or is there a
18	difference, and what's the difference?
19	MR. KEENE: I'm not sure what that
20	difference is, Judge. To be honest with you, I'm not
21	following you.
22	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counselor, switch
23	gears. What about the juror?
24	MR. KEENE: The juror is
25	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Do you want an

unequivocal statement that she can be fair?

MR. KEENE: Yeah, one distinction that I would ask the court - - -

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: And isn't that critically important?

MR. KEENE: Yeah, I think it is, and one of the things that I would ask the court to pay particular attention to is that nowhere in that conversation between Mr. Easton and the potential juror does she say anything about a verdict or about a decision.

Words in their mouths or ideas in their mind, but if you're a defense lawyer, sometimes you've got someone and you just don't want them and so you ask them - - you don't push them. I mean, the last thing you want to do is ask them can you be fair because they'll always say yes, so you ask questions that point out that this is a weak juror that may not be able to be fair. Then you come back and ask, you know, Mr. Easton's asked you a lot of questions; isn't it true that you can be fair, only the evidence, innocent until proven - - yada, and on, and then you put it to rest.

MR. KEENE: Yeah, to be honest with you,

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	Judge, if that's the way that the procedure works in
2	a criminal trial, I was unaware of that, because I
3	thought the prosecution goes first, you ask your
4	questions, you sit down, the defense asks their
5	questions, they sit down. If the judge has any
6	questions, he can ask questions afterwards, but I
7	wasn't aware that I could get up and ask that juror
8	any more questions.
9	JUDGE PIGOTT: They don't let you do that?
10	MR. KEENE: I'm glad I learned it.
11	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Don't you think the
12	judge should have asked more questions
13	MR. KEENE: I don't
14	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: in any event?
15	MR. KEENE: I don't think so, Judge,
16	because
17	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But we know there has
18	to be an unequivocal statement of fairness.
19	MR. KEENE: Yeah, and here's what I
20	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But I can be fair
21	_
22	MR. KEENE: Here's what I think about
23	JUDGE CIPARICK: Unless you're sort of
24	trying to
25	MR KEENE: about that Judge

1	JUDGE CIPARICK: rehabilitate.
2	MR. KEENE: The cases break down into
3	basically two categories. You have one category of
4	cases where a potential juror says that I want to
5	hear from the defendant or I have a problem with the
6	presumption of innocence or I'm biased towards blacks
7	and this defendant is black.
8	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Or I have a pre-
9	opinion on this case and it's going to stay with me
10	and I can't get it out of my head.
11	MR. KEENE: But the cases talk about a
12	predisposition as to the defendant's guilt, and in
13	this case
14	JUDGE SMITH: Well, the word you're
15	right, the word "verdict" isn't there. The word
16	"consider" is there. It's the juror says:
17	"I'm saying that how I feel opinion-wise
18	won't be all of what I consider if I'm on the
19	jury.
20	"MR. EASTON: It's not all of what you'll
21	consider?
22	"A JUROR: No.
23	"MR. EASTON: Is it a part of what you'll
24	consider?
25	"A JUROR: A slight part.

1	"MR. EASTON: So it's there and you know
2	it's there?
3	"A JUROR: Right."
4	The question is, doesn't that require
5	somebody to come back and say look, you've got to
6	promise me you can be fair?
7	MR. KEENE: I don't think so, Judge,
8	because
9	JUDGE GRAFFEO: Isn't our case law pretty
10	clear that you need to get the unequivocal assurance?
11	I mean, I think we've used that phrase dozens of
12	times
13	MR. KEENE: You do
14	JUDGE GRAFFEO: in our cases.
15	MR. KEENE: but the way I under
16	the way I read your decision in Chambers and in some
17	of the other cases is that there has to be a serious
18	doubt as to the ability of that juror to be
19	impartial, and I don't think that conversation
20	between Mr. Easton and the juror really raises a
21	serious doubt. I know it's splitting hairs but
22	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Why, because she said
23	
24	JUDGE GRAFFEO: Partial?
25	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: small or

1 partial, whatever she said or slim or whatever the 2 word was? Is that why it doesn't raise a serious 3 doubt? MR. KEENE: I think it's because she never 4 5 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: If she had said, 6 7 well, most of my decision would be on that, but I 8 could be fair otherwise, but that, you'd agree, is 9 another case. MR. KEENE: Right. 10 11 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Is it because she said "slight" or "small" or whatever it was? 12 13 MR. KEENE: I think that's part of it, 14 Judge, but I think what it really goes to is that in 15 order for her to be challenged for cause she has to 16 have a state of mind that is likely to preclude her 17 from rendering an impartial verdict based upon the 18 evidence introduced at the trial, and I don't think 19 that that exchange between Mr. Easton and that juror 20 showed - - -21 JUDGE JONES: How would you know that 22 without further inquiry? That's the point. 23 MR. KEENE: Pardon me, Judge? 2.4 JUDGE JONES: How would you know that 25 without asking additional questions?

1	MR. KEENE: You wouldn't you wouldn't
2	know, you would but what the statute says is
3	that it's likely to preclude her, and that doesn't
4	show I think it's his responsibility
5	JUDGE SMITH: Are you saying that
6	MR. KEENE: if he wants to make a
7	record for the fact that this juror should be
8	challenged for cause, the defense should make a
9	record for that and not just plant a few little seeds
10	and then move on
11	JUDGE SMITH: Aren't you really saying that
12	some of our cases, like maybe Cahill, go beyond the
13	statute, that we should back off on some of this,
14	that it's
15	MR. KEENE: Yes
16	JUDGE SMITH: asking too much of a
17	judge to do every one perfectly?
18	MR. KEENE: Yes, I think they do, Judge. I
19	think and in this case you had the juror saying
20	twice in her sworn questionnaire that she could be
21	fair and impartial. And like the judge said, he
22	didn't hear anything from her that would indicate
23	that she could not be fair
24	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But yet our
25	MR. KEENE: and impartial.

1	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: our cases are
2	so clear in using that word "unequivocal".
3	MR. KEENE: Yeah.
4	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: How do you square
5	that I see your point. I understand
6	MR. KEENE: Yeah.
7	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: likely to, et
8	cetera, but how do you square what you're saying with
9	this over and over again
10	MR. KEENE: I I think
11	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: unequivocal.
12	MR. KEENE: it's the facts of this
13	case, Judge, that make
14	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: That make it
15	unequivocal?
16	MR. KEENE: Yes.
17	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Even with her say
18	-
19	MR. KEENE: If you
20	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Even with her saying,
21	well, at least to a slight degree or some degree I'd
22	consider it, that could still be unequivocal
23	statement of fairness?
24	MR. KEENE: Yes.
25	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Even in that context

1	where there's this well, a small part of it is, you
2	know
3	MR. KEENE: Yeah, yeah. No, I mean, I
4	agree that you don't want a juror that's got even a
5	slight opinion sitting on a jury if she can't
6	disregard that opinion during deliberations. And
7	that's what
8	JUDGE PIGOTT: But you were all concerned -
9	
10	MR. KEENE: And that's what our whole
11	process is about. But if that's what he wants to
12	argue, then let him show that in the exchange that he
13	has with the juror. Let him say to her, could you
14	set that opinion aside or not?
15	JUDGE PIGOTT: This was such a high
16	visibility case, I assume it was bothering everybody
17	that because I mean there was several venue
18	motions and this is the second trial and
19	MR. KEENE: Yes.
20	JUDGE PIGOTT: everybody, I suppose,
21	in town knew that this case was coming.
22	MR. KEENE: Yes.
23	JUDGE PIGOTT: So the question was to try
24	to get
25	MR. KEENE: Right.

1	JUDGE PIGOTT: somebody that could be
2	unequivocal.
3	JUDGE SMITH: Even though you're out of
4	time, could you spend a couple of minutes on the
5	sister-in-law hearsay?
6	MR. KEENE: On which, Judge?
7	JUDGE SMITH: The sister-in-law hearsay,
8	the testimony by the two by the sisters-in-law
9	
10	MR. KEENE: Oh, the hearsay issue?
11	JUDGE SMITH: Yes.
12	MR. KEENE: I think that on that, the way
13	the witness, Mary Jo Harris, related that
14	conversation to the jury, there was no other way to
15	do it. There was no getting around
16	JUDGE SMITH: Weren't they entitled at
17	least to a limiting instruction?
18	MR. KEENE: I think they did get a limiting
19	instruction from the court. It may not have been in
20	the exact language that
21	JUDGE SMITH: Why couldn't the judge say do
22	not consider that for its truth?
23	MR. KEENE: Well, he could have said that;
24	he could have said that, Judge, but he must have
25	decided that the way he gave the instruction was a

lot more meaningful to a juror than saying you can't consider this for its truth, you can only consider it for the way Mr. Harris reacted to it. And basically that is what his instruction was, that consider that testimony insofar as the conversation that took place in Cooperstown in the way that Mr. Harris reacted to the allegation. And eventually he adopted those hearsay statements by saying, well, I might have said something like that but I didn't mean I was going to kill her.

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CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counselor, thanks.

MR. KEENE: Thank you.

the time that he signed the affidavit.

MR. EASTON: Yes, Your Honor. Briefly, the statement from Steele, the affidavit, we think is - - it is reliable under any test. And one of the tests of reliability would be it mirrors a declaration against interest. It may be not a declaration against pecuniary issue, per se, or penal interest, but it was a declaration against his marital interest. And he knew it. He knew it at the time he wrote the letter to the judge. He knew it at

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counselor, rebuttal?

Secondly, as to Judge Pigott's concern,

1 last term, this court, in People v. Reed, addressed 2 the opening the door by the defense regarding 3 confrontation clause, otherwise inadmissible evidence. And the door here was clearly opened and 4 5 the prosecution was on notice in the motion regarding the Steele affidavit that if they were to pursue 6 7 Tubbs as a rogue witness or an outlier witness, we 8 would hold that as being on open door. 9 JUDGE SMITH: But opening the door doesn't 10 usually get in hearsay. 11 MR. EASTON: It - - -JUDGE SMITH: I mean, opening the door is 12 13 essentially a relevancy rule, isn't it? 14 MR. EASTON: It is, but the Reed case, I 15 think, of this court last term, is squarely on point 16 that the confrontation clause - - - confrontation 17 clause violative evidence came in on door opening, 18 and this is just the same - - -JUDGE SMITH: Well, there's no 19 20 confrontation clause problem; this wasn't 21 testimonial, wasn't it? 22 MR. EASTON: No, this was - - - no, I'm not 23 saying that, but otherwise inadmissible evidence was

- - - the door was opened by the conduct of the

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parties.

1 Secondly, Your Honor, the blood on the rug, I think I'd like to address that. It was dark and 2 3 black. Mr. Keene has mentioned, well, it was gathered by a technician right under the situs of the 4 5 five small stains. It was examined and that technician was looking for red stains; it didn't find 6 7 It was only found to be stains on it months them. They were dark brown to black; no one could 8 later. 9 age them, and there is no evidence in this record 10 that they relate to the - - -11 JUDGE SMITH: Does - - - anyone have a 12 theory as to what the transfer stain was from? 13 MR. EASTON: No, it's a seven-eighths by 14 seven-eighths square, a half inch square, it couldn't 15 - - - we couldn't conceive of a weapon that could 16 leave that. We were hypothesizing it could be a 17 Band-Aid pad, a high heel, but no one has come up 18 with what that could be. 19 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counsel. 20 MR. EASTON: Thank you. 21 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Thank you both. 22 (Court is adjourned) 23

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## CERTIFICATION

I, Sharona Shapiro, certify that the foregoing transcript of proceedings in the court of Appeals of People v. Calvin L. Harris, No. 174 was prepared using the required transcription equipment and is a true and accurate record of the proceedings.

Shanna Shaphie

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