1	COURT OF APPEALS
2	STATE OF NEW YORK
3	
4	IN THE MATTER OF CATHRYN M. DOYLE,
5	Petitioner,
6	-against-
7	No. 106 NEW YORK STATE COMMISSION
8	ON JUDICIAL CONDUCT,
9	Respondent.
10	20 Eagle Street
11	Albany, New York 12207 June 5, 2014
12	Before:
13	CHIEF JUDGE JONATHAN LIPPMAN ASSOCIATE JUDGE SUSAN PHILLIPS READ
14	ASSOCIATE JUDGE ROBERT S. SMITH ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE F. PIGOTT, JR.
15	ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA ASSOCIATE JUDGE SHEILA ABDUS-SALAAM
16	
17	Appearances:  WILLIAM J. DREYER, ESQ.
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25	Official Court Transcriber

1	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Number 106.
2	Counselor?
3	MR. DREYER: Thank you, Your Honor.
4	Your Honor, may I reserve two minutes
5	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Two minutes.
6	MR. DREYER: for rebuttal.
7	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: You have it. Go
8	ahead, counsel.
9	MR. DREYER: May it please the court, when
10	when Judge Doyle first appeared before the
11	Commission, and answered questions of the Commission,
12	the ten members present, she was questioned
13	vigorously about Judge Spargo, and I'd like to spend
14	some time on her answers, because
15	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Well, why don't you
16	start by by explaining to us the dynamic of the
17	prior case and what was involved with Judge Doyle and
18	now this new case that has Spargo as a part of it?
19	MR. DREYER: Yes, well, of course, in 2007,
20	Judge Doyle was censored, and the censure was based -
21	
22	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Right.
23	MR. DREYER: on her being evasive in
24	a proceeding involving Mr. Spargo, who was the
25	subject of that proceeding, and who, as a result of

1	that proceeding, was removed from the bench. But
2	that
3	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What's the
4	relationship between the two of them?
5	MR. DREYER: Personal, very close personal
6	friends.
7	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: It's the it's
8	the relationship between the two of them
9	MR. DREYER: Yes.
LO	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: rather than the
L1	connection between what the two cases are about?
L2	MR. DREYER: I think they're both, but
L3	- but I'm the the Commission in this case
L4	found that the proximity of the censure in 2007
L5	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Right.
L6	MR. DREYER: was an aggravating
L7	factor
L8	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Right.
L9	MR. DREYER: because the proximity of
20	the censure which was based on evasiveness of
21	testimony, evasiveness in the first proceeding,
22	somehow impacted this proceeding.
23	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Why does why
24	doesn't it, counselor? What's

MR. DREYER: Because it's a pro - - - it's

1 a propensity argument as the dissent found at the 2 Commission that the two - - - the two cases are 3 unrelated - - - the two cases are un - - -4 JUDGE SMITH: Did they - - - did they find 5 a similar evasiveness here or not? The evasiveness - - - the 6 MR. DREYER: 7 evasiveness in this particular case contradicts what 8 the referee found, who found her to be credible, and 9 who found her, not only to be credible, but to have 10 an explanation as to each and every act she took. 11 The evasiveness here - - -JUDGE SMITH: The - - - the - - - in - - -12 13 in the previous one, there was - - - the word "candor" was used. 14 15 MR. DREYER: That's correct. 16 JUDGE SMITH: I guess I don't - - - I'm not 17 sure I read them as saying she's not candid this 18 Are - - - do you think they're saying that? 19 MR. DREYER: I think they're saying two 20 things. I think they said that the proximity of the 21 censure to these proceedings in 2007 and 2008 22 demonstrate that she was not - - -23 JUDGE SMITH: She should - - - she should 2.4 have been on her extra good behavior.

MR. DREYER:

That's correct. That's number

1	one. And then they throw in the fact that she was
2	evasive in the first case. They're not necessarily
3	suggesting they're not saying that means she
4	has the propensity
5	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counsel, if you take
6	out the first case
7	MR. DREYER: Yes.
8	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: take it away.
9	Does it change the equation this time?
10	MR. DREYER: It does, Your Honor. It does,
11	because that's the only aggravating factor that was -
12	in my view that was the only aggravating factor -
13	
14	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So in your view is
15	that the key to this this case, as to how
16	how much weight to give to that the earlier
17	case?
18	MR. DREYER: I say that the aggravating
19	factor that they cited should not be part of this
20	case, and that the court should judge Judge Doyle's
21	actions on the merits, and based on what she believed
22	to be the correct standard.
23	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So why do you
24	why do you what's your rationale for putting
25	out of the equation the first case?

1	MR. DREYER: It's a propensity argument.
2	It doesn't follow that it has any bearing. The
3	dissent said it's not related
4	JUDGE SMITH: Well well well,
5	wait. If we're determining sanction, aren't we
6	allowed to look at propensity?
7	MR. DREYER: Well, that's a different
8	issue. That's a different issue. The court can
9	always rely on pro the history of the
10	discipline and decide
11	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, so you're
12	saying it's relevant, you agree it's relevant for
13	sanction; you don't think it's relevant, because it's
14	a propensity argument?
15	MR. DREYER: And it's not yes.
16	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay.
17	MR. DREYER: It's not relevant on the
18	merits
19	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Go ahead, counselor.
20	MR. DREYER: because the court can
21	always consider, obviously, the history.
22	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But what let's
23	go let's go to the other two situations, with
24	the campaign manager and the personal lawyer.
25	MR. DREYER: Yes.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Why - - - why isn't that a - - also a lapse of judgment?

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MR. DREYER: I think that by the time Judge Doyle got to the Commission, she understood that she had made a wrong decision, that the decision to disqualify is based on the status of the attorney, not on the nature of the proceeding.

But when she looked at, for example, Mr.

Cade's case, she ruled that this was a statutorily

mandated result, and the important point is that when

Mr. Cade returned a year later or so to have her fix

fees, she recused herself.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counsel, why should it have been a surprise to the judge that - - - that even in an uncontested proceeding that might be viewed in certain respects as ministerial, why should that have been a surprise to a sitting surrogate that that's a problem?

MR. DREYER: I think that Judge Doyle's testimony before the Commission, before the referee and before the Commission, was that she looked at all the cases. And she thought, for example, that she was applying correctly the cases concerning campaign managers. But when it came - - when it came to the issue of appearance of impropriety, she thought that

1 Surrogate's Court was unique and it had unique 2 features that no other court has. 3 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Wouldn't it cut - - -4 doesn't it in some ways cut the other way that there 5 - - - it's a one-sided proceeding, and - - - I mean, 6 one could argue that it's even more important that 7 you be very careful about perception? 8 MR. DREYER: One could argue, but the 9 anomaly, of course, in a one-sided proceeding is that 10 disclosure and remittal, which is available in every 11 other court, and I submit to this court that 12 disclosure and remittal in many of these cases would 13 have been accomplished. But in Surrogate's Court 14 there's the anomaly that - - -15 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Well - - -16 MR. DREYER: - - - there's nobody to 17 disclose to. CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Right, but the 18 19 alternative would be to just recuse, or you don't 20 have that option? 21 MR. DREYER: Correct. But - - - but of 22 course, her rationale was, when I - - - when I get 23 rid of the case, I'm the only surrogate in Albany 2.4 County.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN:

Right.

1 MR. DREYER: I turn cases around in one to two days. Who gets hurt? The litigant? 2 3 administration of justice? And all of a sudden, the 4 litigant, who has a statutorily mandated result - - -5 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So - - -6 MR. DREYER: - - - goes to another county? 7 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So counsel, is your -8 - - your basic argument here that - - - that the 9 judge was sincere in what she did and did not think 10 she was doing anything wrong? Is that the thrust of 11 your - - - your argument? MR. DREYER: Sincere, and credible, and 12 13 candid, and more importantly, that there was no 14 partiality shown, and - - -15 JUDGE SMITH: What about - - - I'm actually 16 more bo - - - I mean, I understand the - - - I 17 understand the point that even the most ministerial 18 things she probably should have stayed away from, but 19 I'm more bothered by the couple of the things with 20 Mr. Kelly that weren't so ministerial, where she's 21 sitting there at a - - - at an examination where his 22 - - - the issue really is whether his client unduly 23 influenced the test data. 2.4 And that's at a moment, you know, when

there's something that looks a lot like a campaign to

me going on, and he looks a lot like her campaign manager. What's - - - what's the justification for that?

MR. DREYER: The answer to that, I think, lies in what the opinion - - - what the advisory opinion was in effect as of 2007. The proscription was against campaign managers. So I think, as the testimony bears out, Mr. Kelly himself did not believe he was a campaign manager. He said, look - -

JUDGE SMITH: Yeah, I - - - wouldn't - - - wouldn't you think, I mean, that a - - - someone who has - - - as much reason to be sensitive as she did at that point, to - - - to being, as somebody said, "Caesar's wife", shouldn't - - - shouldn't she have thought, like, maybe he's my campaign manager, maybe he's not, but he - - - he's - - - he's helping me organize fundraisers and giving out mailing lists, and appearing at rallies where it says "Judge Doyle for the Supreme Court", and maybe I ought to stay away from this where his - - - where his conduct might be personally questioned?

MR. DREYER: Well, certainly the Commission came to that conclusion, but our argument before the Commission and the argument we make today is that in

1	2010, when he became the campaign manager, she
2	immediately recused herself.
3	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Right, but but
4	again, I know that, obviously, there are two sides to
5	every argument, but he was in the mode of someone
6	being very active in her campaign. I mean that we
7	know, and that's, I think, uncon uncontested,
8	right?
9	MR. DREYER: The 2007 campaign was a so-
10	called "testing the waters" campaign
11	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Right
12	MR. DREYER: and never resulted
13	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: but I mean, he
14	was a key player
15	MR. DREYER: He was a key player
16	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: in that effort.
17	MR. DREYER: in the sense that he
18	threw an event for her
19	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Is there
20	MR. DREYER: and didn't even show up
21	to the second event.
22	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Counsel, is there a
23	difference between a testing-the-waters campaign and
24	a full-blown campaign? It's
25	MR. DREYER: Not as

1 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: You're still 2 describing it as a campaign, aren't you? MR. DREYER: 3 It's a campaign. I don't 4 think we - - - we disputed that during the hearing, 5 but what we did say is that the facts of the case were much different than what occurred in 2010, when 6 7 he actually became the campaign manager. JUDGE SMITH: Did - - - did she acknowledge 8 9 before the Commission, or does she acknowledge now, 10 that what she did in 2007 was a mistake, that she 11 should have stayed away from those Kelly things? 12 MR. DREYER: I believe - - - I believe that 13 her general position before the Commission was that she erred. But she also said in 2010, when first 14 15 approached by Commission counsel, and - - - and asked 16 for an explanation as to all of these things, please 17 let me know if I have erred - - - this is at 886 of the record - - - because I want to correct the way 18 19 I'm doing things in court. And that request or plea 20 to the Commission was ignored, and instead two years 21 later she was charged. 22 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Coun - - -23 MR. DREYER: So she was asking for guidance 2.4 then.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN:

Counsel, what about

the third relationship that's involved here with her personal attorney, Mr. Cade?

MR. DREYER: Mr. Cade, as I said, made - - there's one case involving Mr. Cade. There's no
question that he was in, what we call, the tainted
class. In other words, he was the former attorney
who represented her before the Commission. Then he
applied for letters in order to commence a personal
injury action.

She, again, concluded that that's a ministerial, mechanical event and that no partiality would be shown. And I guess, her sensitivity was then heightened when he returned and he asked her to do something substantive with respect to the legal fees, and she recused herself and sent it off to a Supreme Court judge.

JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Counsel, could I go back quickly to something you said a little earlier about looking for guidance? Did you - - - were you saying that Surrogate Doyle was looking for guidance from the Judicial Conduct Commission or was she looking for guidance from the Judicial Ethics Commission, because that exists, and has existed for a long time.

MR. DREYER: She conceded that she did not

2.4

go to the Ethics Commission, but when the first 1 2 inquiry was made by the Judicial Commission, she 3 wrote a responsive letter explaining all of her 4 actions, and said, in connection with guidance, if 5 I've made mistakes, I'm willing to immediately change 6 my ways, and do things - - -7 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Coun - - - counsel, 8 there's the - - - one more question. 9 MR. DREYER: Yes. 10 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Of what weight are we 11 give - - - are we to give to the cumulative nature of 12 this? What I mean is, there's lots of different 13 cases with three different relationships. Does the 14 cumulative effect matter, or are you saying they all 15 grow out of the same misconception or - - -16 MR. DREYER: They grow out of the same 17 misconception - - -18 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - most of them? 19 MR. DREYER: - - - but as I've said, there 20 are 14,000 cases during this period of time. She was 21 jealously guarding her jurisdiction, as many judges 22 These are seven cases, three relating to Spargo. 23 And so I'm not suggesting that that's still not an 2.4 important issue.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN:

Right.

1 MR. DREYER: But on the question that the 2 court is specifically asking me, her good faith 3 coupled with all of the other mitigating factors that the referee found, including her truthfulness and 4 5 candor, I think warrant the consideration for Judge -6 7 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counsel. 8 Thanks - -9 MR. DREYER: Thank you. 10 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - you'll have 11 your rebuttal time. 12 MR. DREYER: Thank you. 13 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Let's hear from your 14 adversary. 15 MR. LINDNER: Good afternoon, Your Honors, 16 may it please the court. I'd like to begin by 17 following up on something I think I just heard Mr. 18 Dreyer say, that the Judge has never disputed that 19 her 2007 run was a campaign. In fact, that was the 20 entire basis of the Commission's finding or a 21 principal basis that her testimony was evasive and 22 misleading. 23 She testified under oath, I was in charge 2.4 in 2007 and it wasn't a campaign. If you look at her

verified answer to the formal written complaint, she

1 denied even that she was a candidate for Supreme 2 Court. 3 JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, all of that's 4 technically true, and I - - - and I certainly 5 understand your point, that there's no doubt that 6 when you've got somebody doing what, in that case, Mr. Kelly was doing, but in terms of someone, you 7 8 know, knowing that it's a - - - with Supreme Court, 9 it's - - - it's all going - - - coming down to the 10 convention in September. And you're trying to figure 11 out whether or not, you know, you even have enough 12 support to do it, and you're trying to raise money. 13 But it doesn't turn into a campaign until after you 14 get the nomination. 15 But I see your point that as far - - - from 16 the point of view - - -17 MR. LINDNER: With respect to that, Your 18 Honor, there's not a single authority that they can 19 cite, and not a single authority I'm ever - - - I'm 20 aware of that would support that proposition. 21 JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, a - - - trust me - - -22 MR. LINDNER: The handbook on Judicial 23 Ethics says that it's - - - testing the waters ends 2.4 when you make a public pronouncement, which - - -

JUDGE PIGOTT: No, I - - - I'm agreeing

with you. I - - - those things that you just said, 1 2 testing the waters and making a pronouncement kick 3 stuff in, but in terms of when you're talking about a 4 campaign, it's usually when - - - when you are a 5 nominee and you run. So - - - and I agree; the 6 wordsmithing and the fencing over that was - - didn't get to - - -7 8 MR. LINDNER: The wordsmithing and fencing 9 is the problem here. 10 JUDGE PIGOTT: - - - didn't get to the - -11 - didn't get to the point that - - - that you - - -12 you folks were raising, but - - - and I agree with 13 you. It seemed to me that Mr. Kelly was in it far 14 enough to do it. 15 But I - - - I couldn't lose a - - - I 16 didn't understand why they were making the argument. 17 MR. LINDNER: Well, the reason that I - - -18 I stood up and began with responding to Mr. Dreyer's 19 statement is he - - - is precisely that. I mean, 20 it's bad enough what happened in 2007, but at the 21 time the - - -22 JUDGE SMITH: Do you dispute that in 2007, 23 obviously you think she was wrong - - - you've got a 2.4 good argument that she was wrong - - - she believed

in good faith that he wasn't - - - that this wasn't a

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1
          campaign within the meaning of the law?
 2
                    MR. LINDNER: An experienced judge, an
 3
          experienced lawyer, a formal election law lawyer - -
 4
 5
                    JUDGE SMITH: Okay, but I'm not - - - I'm
 6
          not - - -
 7
                    MR. LINDNER: How - - - how can - - - if
 8
          you're going to argue that she thought this in good
 9
          faith - - -
10
                    JUDGE SMITH: Are you saying yes or no?
11
                    MR. LINDNER: I'm saying, no, she didn't.
12
                    JUDGE SMITH: She - - - you - - -
13
                    MR. LINDNER: What's the basis - - -
14
                    JUDGE SMITH: Do you think she was trying
15
          to get away with something?
16
                    MR. LINDNER: I think that's the pattern
17
          through all of this.
                    JUDGE SMITH: Well, what's she trying to
18
19
          get - - - what's the motivation there?
20
                    MR. LINDNER: I - - - you know, I think she
21
          just wants to have her friends' cases in her court,
22
          and when she thinks she can get away with it, she
23
          does it. Look at the time line with respect to Mr.
2.4
          Cade.
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JUDGE PIGOTT: Wait, wait, wait. You're -

1 - - you say she's trying to get her friends' cases in her - - - I mean, they're - - -2 3 MR. LINDNER: Not to get them in her case, but when they bring cases to - - -4 5 JUDGE PIGOTT: That's what you said. MR. LINDNER: - - - she's happy to 6 accommodate them. 7 8 JUDGE PIGOTT: That's what you said. 9 well, to talk about that for a minute - - -10 MR. LINDNER: I don't want to - - -11 JUDGE PIGOTT: - - - and I don't mean to 12 cut off your train of thought. This is a filing 13 court, right? I mean, this is like filing deeds 14 practically. I mean, every - - - everybody that does 15 Surrogate Court work knows that you get the petition, 16 you get the waivers, you get the proofs of will, and 17 you file them. And - - - and as I think what's pointed out in the record that - - - and Mr. Dreyer 18 19 talked about 14,000; I was counting about 9,000 in 20 three years - - - we're talking about 7. And that I 21 could see - - -22 MR. LINDNER: Nine, I believe. 23 JUDGE PIGOTT: Okay, we'll do 9 out of - -2.4 - whatever the fraction is. But they - - - they were 25

filings, and - - - and I didn't see where anybody was

hurt by them. In fact, the clients got properly served as a result of this. And it seems, as Mr. Dreyer was saying, that every time there was a hint of a breeze of something that might be controversial, the judge recused herself.

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MR. LINDNER: Well, that's not entirely true. The couple of cases that the judge recused herself in early of January in 2007 came a couple of months after the Commission's first inquiry letter in October of 2010. So they - - - those recusals in those cases may have been motivated by something other than a sudden recognition - - -

JUDGE SMITH: She - - - well, she was recusing herself in Kelly matters in earlier 2010, wasn't she?

MR. LINDNER: Yes, but the Kelly matter which you raised is particularly problematic. I mean, again, the time line with that. She's censured in February 2007. Mr. Kelly is testifying in this very disputed estate in May. She announces in June that she's running for Supreme Court.

A day before she announces or two days before, she gets a letter from the guardian ad litem saying I want time, because I want to - - - an opportunity to raise objections as to whether or not

the test data was unduly influenced. It was a very 1 2 live case. It was a contested proceeding, and yet -3 JUDGE SMITH: Did she do - - - did she do 4 5 anything that looks like doing Kelly a favor in that time? 6 7 MR. LINDNER: No. No, and let me address 8 it if I may, because it's come up a couple of times. 9 If she had had - - - if there was any evidence of 10 favoritism, we would have charged a different rule. We have a rule that prohibits a judge from exhibiting 11 12 bias in favor or against any party; that's 13 100.3(B)(4). 14 The fact that there's a separate rule, 15 100.3(E)(1), which pro - - - which requires a judge 16 to recuse herself whenever her jud - - - impartiality 17 might be questioned shows you that it's - - -18 favoritism isn't required. There's a separate - - -JUDGE SMITH: Okay, I - - - I understand 19 that point, but if we're thinking about the sanction, 20 21 surely the favoritism would be - - - a stronger 22 reason for removal. 23 MR. LINDNER: No question about that. 2.4 question about that. But - - -

JUDGE PIGOTT: This is an appearance case,

## essentially?

2.4

MR. LINDNER: Well, more than that. You know, you have a rule which quite clearly says you have to get off if your impartiality can reasonably be questioned, and that's not really subject to interpretation, because you found - - -

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counselor, what - what's the relationship between this case and the earlier Spargo case - - -

MR. LINDNER: Well, I think it comes up in a number of ways.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - and - - - and Judge Doyle's involvement in that case?

MR. LINDNER: I think it comes up in a number of ways. First of all, anytime that a judge receives a sanction of censure, it's a serious discipline, and one would think that you would be more sensitive to your ethical obligations, and the judge, in fact, testified that she was, that she pored over the advisory opinions.

Secondly, I think you see in that case and in this one the same pattern of evasive and misleading testimony. In the first censure, the Commission called her testimony an "elaborate tale that strained credulity". You could say that here.

1 With respect to - - -2 JUDGE PIGOTT: What did - - - what did the 3 referee - - -4 JUDGE SMITH: Well, well - - - is it really 5 JUDGE PIGOTT: What did the referee say? 6 7 JUDGE SMITH: It is really the same? 8 MR. LINDNER: I'm sorry? 9 JUDGE SMITH: I mean, the - - - I can see 10 how the first one would read - - - it's the first one 11 was things like I didn't talk to so-and-so about that 12 - - - about that, and then so-and-so says, yes, she 13 did. You don't really have anything like that here, 14 do you? 15 MR. LINDNER: I think we have a lot that's 16 very tough to swallow. Again, I - - - I got cut off. 17 But can you - - - can you think of a way in which an 18 experienced election lawyer could convince herself 19 that what happened in 2007 wasn't a campaign and 20 could sit in a witness chair and testify under oath 21 three years later, no, that wasn't a campaign. I 22 have no authority - - -23 JUDGE SMITH: Can experienced lawyers 2.4 convince themselves of almost everything? Yeah.

JUDGE PIGOTT: No I - - -

1 JUDGE SMITH: If you're asking me, the 2 answer is yes. 3 MR. LINDNER: Well, there - - - there are 4 other - - - you know, there's a lot in there. You 5 know, she testified - - -6 JUDGE PIGOTT: Mr. - - -MR. LINDNER: - - - Mr. Spargo filed - - -7 JUDGE PIGOTT: I - - - I un - - - I can 8 9 answer yes to that. I mean, I could - - - I could 10 see where - - - where a lawyer or a judge who is 11 sitting in a justice court or some other court, and -12 - - and has it in their minds - - - crazy as it 13 sometimes may be - - - I think we have thirty-two 14 possible candidates for Supreme Court on one 15 particular party in Erie County this year. 16 Each one of them thinks that the - - - the 17 brass ring is going to fall to them. Each one of 18 them is out doing something. Now are they all "campaigning"? It would be hard to define, because 19 20 some of them you see everywhere; some you rarely see; 21 some may be out doing something else. 22 But if - - - if we were to say under all of 23 those circumstances, we - - - you know, that there's 2.4 campaigns going, then - - - then there may be some

town judges and village judges that you're going to

1	visit soon. I it's a tough definition for
2	-
3	MR. LINDNER: How about when you file a
4	document with the New York State Board of Election in
5	which you swear or affirm that you are candidate for
6	Supreme Court?
7	JUDGE PIGOTT: There you got something.
8	MR. LINDNER: It seems like she knew she
9	was a candidate, although she denied it in her
10	answer.
11	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counsel
12	MR. LINDNER: She was running a campaign.
13	But I
14	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yeah, let me
15	let me go to another issue. What is the state
16	or what was the state of ethic opinions or general
17	knowledge that in surrogate's cases they were no
18	different than other cases, you know, contested cases
19	that the judge's obligation to recuse the same?
20	Where where would one know what the state of
21	the law is or the state of compliance with ethical
22	rules was
23	MR. LINDNER: It's been established
24	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: as of that
25	time?

1 MR. LINDNER: It's been settled for twenty
2 years.
3 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Tell us.
4 MR. LINDNER: Two opinions in 1994. In

2.0

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MR. LINDNER: Two opinions in 1994. In 9405, the advisory can be held that a surrogate must recuse herself in cases brought by the former law firm, and they specifically said, the fact that in many surrogate matters that there's no opposing counsel does not diminish the appearance of impropriety.

In 9412, a surrogate must recuse in cases brought by her campaign manager, and the quote was "even if the matters are routine, noncontested or administrative".

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Do you think it's a fine point of the law or of ethical conduct this distinction or is this something that's patently obvious, at least from your perspective, the Commission's perspective.

MR. LINDNER: We've cited for you a number of advisory opinions, all involving surrogates which quite clearly hold you have to get off, even if there's no counsel on the other side, even if it's routine.

JUDGE PIGOTT: One of - - - one - - - one

1 of the things I was thinking about when we were 2 reading all of this is there are sixty-one - - -3 well, it's probably more than sixty-one other 4 surrogates, because a lot of them are two- or three-5 hatters - - -6 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yeah, yeah. 7 JUDGE PIGOTT: - - - where they know 8 everybody in the county, where the definition of 9 what's a friend and what isn't, et cetera, and isn't 10 there some room for latitude where you - - - where 11 you have cases where - - - if - - -12 MR. LINDNER: Let me refer you to 07-128. 13 JUDGE PIGOTT: I'm almost done. If I - - -14 if I recuse on this one, what I'm going to do is I'm 15 going to delay this thing. It's going to go over to 16 Judge Jones over here, who is then going to do 17 exactly what the clerk tells him or her to do, 18 because this is a filing. 19 Now, I understand you're going to say it's 20 the appearance, and I - - - I get that. But, when 21 I'm talking about latit - - -22 MR. LINDNER: It's not a small thing, Your 23 Honor. 2.4 JUDGE PIGOTT: I know. But when I'm

talking about latitude, when you - - - when you're

1 dealing - - - I'll take Mr. Dreyer's number of 14,000 2 cases, and we're dealing with 9. That make a 3 difference to you? MR. LINDNER: Well, you know, you've always 4 5 said there's no numerical yardstick; you consider all of it. I would say the fact that she made nine of 6 7 these quite serious mistakes in a period of a couple 8 of years after a censure was enforced is a 9 significant number. 10 JUDGE SMITH: Granted that you - - granted that you're right that she had to recuse 11 12 herself no matter how ministerial it was and she 13 should have known it, if - - - if - - - I mean, most 14 of these, except for two of the Kelly things, it 15 looks to me that they were indeed totally 16 ministerial. There was nothing any - - - any other -17 - - any surrogate could possibly have done except 18 what she did. 19 MR. LINDNER: Absolutely. There are cases 20 that fell exactly within the holdings of 9405 and 21 9412. 22 JUDGE SMITH: Okay. But - - - and I'm not 23 - - - I'm not saying that she wasn't wrong, but isn't 2.4 it rele - - - isn't it relevant to sanction - - -

MR. LINDNER: Yes.

1	JUDGE SMITH: Yeah.
2	MR. LINDNER: Absolutely.
3	JUDGE SMITH: So certainly if these had
4	been controverted matters or even discretionary
5	matters
6	MR. LINDNER: The Commission
7	JUDGE SMITH: you'd be all over it.
8	MR. LINDNER: The Commission wrote that if
9	it were only this matter, the judge would have a
10	better argument for retaining her judgeship. But
11	when you look at the prior censure, you look at the
12	evasive testimony, you look at the fact that she
13	testified at the hearing that she would do this
14	again. There's no concession that she did anything
15	wrong here. It's
16	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Do you agree that you
17	could have nine cases out of whatever
18	thousands, and just inadvertently handle it?
19	MR. LINDNER: I don't know that that's
20	really possible, Your Honor. We're talking about Mr.
21	Spargo, her friend's
22	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But she's not saying
23	she she inadvertently heard them she's
24	saying she mistakenly heard them.

MR. LINDNER: And in two cases, Mr. Spargo

1 handed the papers to the judge himself, rather than 2 taking them to the clerk's office. 3 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Right, but what I'm 4 saying is - - - I'm just trying to make that 5 distinction. This is not a case of inadvertently 6 handling them - - - there's a huge volume and you 7 don't know who it is - - -8 MR. LINDNER: That argument has never been 9 made. 10 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - what this is 11 about from your perspective and from your opposition 12 is that this was a - - - a contention on her part 13 that she mistakenly heard them - - - she - - -14 knowing who - - - who were the lawyers. 15 MR. LINDNER: Let me, if I can - - - the 16 answer is no. None of these were inadvertent - - -17 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay. Go ahead. 18 MR. LINDNER: - - - but let me - - - let me 19 try to give you an example. She's censured in 20 February of 2007. Six months later the advisory 21 committee issues opinion 07-128, which says that a 22 surrogate must recuse herself when the attorney 23 representing the judge's child appears in the court, 2.4 even if the matters are uncontested. Not the judge

herself, but the judge's child.

1 Four months later, Mr. Cade brings the 2 Gould matter. She's testified that she researched 3 all of this, and then she decided that she couldn't -- - that she didn't have to go for - - - oh, sorry -4 5 - - that he could appear. I don't know that - - -6 how you could interpret that in any other way. 7 She researched the issue; it wasn't 8 inadvertent. She decided, looking at the advisory 9 opinions that this was permissible, and it looks like 10 the same - - -11 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, one - - - one 12 more question. From the perspective of the Conduct 13 Commission, if you didn't have the first Spargo case, would this be a removal case in terms of the 14 15 sanction? 16 MR. LINDNER: I think it's very close. Commission said this was serious misconduct, and you 17 18 said in cases like Young that having cases in which a 19 friend or relative appears in front of you is serious 20 misconduct. 21 The charges themselves plus the evasive testimony and the failure to acknowledge any 22 23 wrongdoing would certainly - - -2.4 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Even without the

25

original - - -

1	MR. LINDNER: I think so, Your Honor.
2	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Spargo says
3	- or censure?
4	MR. LINDNER: I I agree and I
5	get where Judge Smith is coming from here. It's a
6	closer case as you peel away some of these layers.
7	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay.
8	MR. LINDNER: But
9	JUDGE PIGOTT: Can I ask one other
10	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Sure, Judge Pigott.
11	JUDGE PIGOTT: I want to ask on the
12	Cade one, if I understood Mr. Dreyer's argument,
13	that's one where you you just need somebody to
14	bring the action, right?
15	MR. LINDNER: Ministerial, administrative
16	or routine.
17	JUDGE PIGOTT: Right. But I mean, it's no
18	it's no it is a little bit different, but
19	but you got somebody who wants to
20	wants to represent a child who's been injured, and
21	you've got a good case, and you need somebody
22	MR. LINDNER: It's all noble, Your Honor.
23	But if you read 07-128, try to read it in a way that
24	you could research it, asking yourself the question,
- 1	

can Mr. Cade appear and conclude, sure, it's fine.

JUDGE READ: Okay, I take it from your answer, Mr. Lindner, to the Chief that you don't agree with Mr. Dreyer that the prior - - - the prior censure goes just to the sanction, rather than to the merits of whether or not - - -

2.4

MR. LINDNER: I think it principally goes to the sanction. It's - - - it's relative - - - relevant, I suppose to the misconduct here in the sense that it's notice. And the judge testified that.

JUDGE READ: Well, I un - - - I understood you to reply to Judge - - - when Judge - - - Judge Lippman asked you - - Chief Judge Lippman asked you if it would be a different case without that; I understood you to say that that made a difference, and that without that, on the - - - on the merits it might be a much closer case.

MR. LINDNER: I'm not sure I'm catching all the nuance in your question, Judge. I think it's true that if we didn't have the prior censure, this would be a closer case, and the Commission acknowledged that in the last page of their determination.

JUDGE SMITH: A close case on the merits or on sanction?

JUDGE READ: On the sanctions? 1 2 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yeah, that's what the 3 question is. 4 MR. LINDNER: As to sanction, would it 5 still be removal? I believe that it would be, and that would be our position. 6 JUDGE SMITH: What about - - - what about 7 on the merits, would you - - - does - - - I think the 8 9 real question is, does the - - - is this misconduct 10 in part because of the prior - - - the prior proceeding, or are they - - - or for the - - - as to 11 misconduct or not misconduct, are the two completely 12 13 independent? 14 MR. LINDNER: So is the question, just the 15 hearing the nine cases without the evasive testimony, 16 without the prior censure, and without the failure to 17 acknowledge wrongdoing? 18 JUDGE SMITH: Yeah, what I'm talking - - -19 not - - -2.0 MR. LINDNER: If - - -21 JUDGE SMITH: Not - - - now not talking about sanction; talking about whether she's quilty of 22 23 misconduct or not? 2.4 MR. LINDNER: Oh, absolutely. The rule

says you can't hear; you've got to get off the case

1	in the first
2	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: No, no, no, that's -
3	
4	JUDGE SMITH: Absolutely, what? The
5	question is, is the prior does the prior
6	proceeding make it misconduct or is it misconduct on
7	its own?
8	MR. LINDNER: No, Rule 100.3(E)(1) makes it
9	misconduct.
LO	JUDGE SMITH: Okay, and the prior
L1	proceeding has nothing to do with that question?
L2	MR. LINDNER: No.
L3	JUDGE SMITH: Okay.
L4	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, it has to do
L5	principally with sanction.
L6	JUDGE READ: Okay.
L7	MR. LINDNER: Yes.
L8	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: That's the answer to
L9	the question.
20	MR. LINDNER: I'm sorry if I misunderstood
21	Judge yes.
22	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yes, that's the
23	thrust of Judge Read's question.
24	MR. LINDNER: It's a conflict because the
25	rule says you must get off and because the advisory

1 committee - - -2 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, thank you. 3 MR. LINDNER: - - - report says when your 4 personal attorney appears - - -5 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Good, counsel. 6 MR. LINDNER: Thank you. 7 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Thank you. Counselor? 8 9 Thanks, Your Honor. MR. DREYER: 10 Honor, in response to your question about prior 11 authority, I think it's very instructive to read advisory opinion 11-43, which came out after the 12 13 conduct in question and before she was charged, 14 because there a surrogate, a downstate surrogate, 15 asked all the very questions concerning a recusal of 16 his wife and his wife's law firm, which led to an 17 opinion being expressed about the lack of distinction 18 between uncontested, contested, mechanical, 19 ministerial cases. 2.0 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Right, but the - - -21 but your adversary is saying that that was obvious 22 from earlier opinions. 23 MR. DREYER: There were - - -2.4 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: You're saying it's

not as fleshed out in the - - -

1	MR. DREYER: Correct.
2	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: as it was in
3	the later opinions.
4	MR. DREYER: Correct. One might read a
5	prior decision and see that it applies to a
6	nonsurrogate judge or one might read a prior opinion
7	and see that it's a bright line test only about
8	campaign managers.
9	Finally we get to 11-43, and the reason
10	it's important is that after she received it, and in
11	large part, based her testimony before the Commission
12	on the findings of that advisory opinion, she
13	attempted to change procedures in her own chambers to
14	order to flesh out conflicts. And she was rebuffed
15	as the papers point out.
16	So on the on the issue raised by
17	_
18	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Well, let me ask you
19	more another question is jumping to my mind.
20	With Mr. Spargo, himself.
21	MR. DREYER: Yes.
22	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Given the earlier
23	incident where Judge Doyle was censured, wouldn't you
24	be wouldn't a reasonably prudent judge if
25	there really be super, super sensitive to

1	anything that had to do with Mr. Spargo, including a
2	case in which he was a lawyer in your court?
3	MR. DREYER: Yes. And she an
4	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But why why
5	wasn't
6	MR. DREYER: And she answered yes to the
7	Commission, but here's what she said
8	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yeah.
9	MR. DREYER: that was important. Her
10	
11	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Why wouldn't you
12	- just jump out at you, gees, like
13	MR. DREYER: We're judging Mr. Spargo today
14	after having gone through not only a removal, but a
15	disbarment, a federal conviction
16	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: No, no, but we're not
17	we're not judging him at all. I'm asking you
18	as to Judge Doyle. Why wouldn't it have jumped off
19	the page at her that this was a case that had Mr.
20	Spargo in it?
21	MR. DREYER: For two reasons. She thought,
22	first of all, that the statutory mandate was more
23	important to protect litigants than Spargo or Cade or
24	anybody else. So what she told the Commission was
25	that when I ever identify a potential for conflict,

for example, when she sat as acting Supreme Court judge, she immediate - - - she had a rule: no Spargo; no Cade. They never even got into - - -

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CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: You're saying she was supersensitive but she viewed these kind of cases in a different way.

MR. DREYER: She was. And she relied in large part on her law - - - law clerk to review with her opinions. And her law clerk testified at the hearing that she reviewed them, and she also came down on the side of concluding that if there's no possibility of partiality, then the appearance issue also is removed from the matter. I'm not - - - I'm - - - that's not necessarily correct, but that's how she testified.

Counsel testified - - - or argued that this is more than an appearance case. It isn't more than an appearance case. That's what was charged. That what - - - that's what was addressed; that's what the referee addressed at the hearing.

He was in the best position to understand what Judge Doyle testified to, and he found that she was credible and that she believed that what she was doing was the correct way to handle these ministerial cases.

1	Important is that he was a practitioner in
2	Surrogate's Court for over fifty years himself, and
3	he knew the difference between a separate proceeding
4	and an act
5	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counsel.
6	MR. DREYER: and that was very
7	important to him.
8	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, thank you both.
9	Appreciate it.
10	(Court is adjourned)
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## CERTIFICATION

I, Karen Schiffmiller, certify that the foregoing transcript of proceedings in the Court of Appeals of Matter of Doyle v. State Commission on Judicial Conduct, No. 106, was prepared using the required transcription equipment and is a true and accurate record of the proceedings.

Houng Laboffmille.

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