1	COURT OF APPEALS
2	STATE OF NEW YORK
3	
4	PEOPLE,
5	Respondent, (Papers under seal)
6	-against- No. 219
7	CLIFFORD JONES,
8	Appellant.
9	20 Feels Gharah
10	20 Eagle Street Albany, New York 12207
11	November 17, 2014
12	Before: CHIEF JUDGE JONATHAN LIPPMAN
13	ASSOCIATE JUDGE SUSAN PHILLIPS READ ASSOCIATE JUDGE ROBERT S. SMITH
14	ASSOCIATE GUDGE ROBERT S. SMITH ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE F. PIGOTT, JR. ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA
15	ASSOCIATE GODGE GENNI KIVEKA ASSOCIATE JUDGE SHEILA ABDUS-SALAAM
16	Appearances:
17	HEATHER K. SUCHORSKY, ESQ. CLEARY GOTTLIEB STEEN & HAMILTON LLP
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23	
24	Sara Winkeljohn Official Court Transcriber
25	Official Court Transcriber

1	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: People v. Jones,
2	number 219.
3	Counsel, would you like any rebuttal time?
4	MS. SUCHORSKY: Two minutes, please.
5	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Two minutes, go
6	ahead.
7	MS. SUCHORSKY: May it please the court, my
8	name is Heather Suchorsky from Cleary Gottlieb
9	representing Clifford Jones pro bono.
10	Mr. Jones alleged a legal basis for his
11	motion to vacate, and the statute required that, at a
12	minimum, a hearing be held. Not to do so was a
13	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Can we review the
14	court's discretion?
15	MS. SUCHORSKY: This was not a
16	discretionary determination.
17	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: No, no, but
18	MS. SUCHORSKY: This is dictated by
19	statute. It was a legal error that this court should
20	weigh in on.
21	JUDGE SMITH: Well
22	JUDGE READ: Has to be a hearing, and where
23	do you find that?
24	MS. SUCHORSKY: The statute says in Section
25	4. which the DA agrees that's the subsection

we're dealing with here; 2 and 3 are not applicable. 1 2 If - - unless any of those defects are present, 3 Section 5 says a court must hold a hearing before 4 resolving a motion. 5 JUDGE SMITH: Well, didn't - - - didn't we say in - - - in Crimmins itself the - - - the - - -6 7 the - - - the court did not hold a hearing, and we said we couldn't review it. We then reviewed it, but 8 9 then we said - - - we - - - we said we couldn't 10 review it. 11 MS. SUCHORSKY: The court in Crimmins said 12 that this court cannot weigh the new evidence against 13 the trial evidence in - - -JUDGE SMITH: Yeah, but Crimmins was a - -14 15 - Crimmins was a case in which the motion was denied 16 without a hearing. 17 MS. SUCHORSKY: Correct, and in Crimmins it said the decision to hold a hearing is discretionary. 18 19 But that must be read in line with the statute. The 20 statute is clear: the decision to hold a hearing is 21 not always discretionary. JUDGE SMITH: So what makes it 22 23 undiscretionary here and discretionary in Crimmins? 2.4 MS. SUCHORSKY: It's discretionary if any

of those defects in Section 4 are present.

1	JUDGE SMITH: You mean it's non-discretion
2	oh, it's discretionary if the
3	MS. SUCHORSKY: It's discretionary to hold
4	it. The legislature allowed a court to hold a
5	hearing in an abundance of caution, but it does not
6	allow a court to refuse to hold a hearing if none of
7	those are present.
8	JUDGE SMITH: And what is what is the
9	defect you say that was present in Crimmins and is
10	not present here?
11	MS. SUCHORSKY: A court, I think could fair
12	they didn't specify, but I think you could
13	fairly say they did not allege a legal basis for that
14	motion, which is what it
15	JUDGE SMITH: But you but but
16	you acknowledge that that's not what Crimmins says?
17	MS. SUCHORSKY: Crimmins says the decision
18	to hold a hearing is discretionary. I'm saying that
19	cannot be
20	JUDGE SMITH: So you you're saying
21	that if they that if they thought it was
22	discretionary, they must have found one of these
23	statutory defects
24	MS. SUCHORSKY: Correct.
25	JUDGE SMITH: even though they didn't

1	say so.
2	MS. SUCHORSKY: The court must have been
3	speaking in line with the statute.
4	JUDGE SMITH: I
5	MS. SUCHORSKY: So that means that one of
6	those defects was present in Crimmins.
7	JUDGE SMITH: I mean, this is let
8	- let me you seem reluctant to take on
9	Crimmins, and I can understand why, but isn't
10	Crimmins a problematic case? I mean you're here
11	saying this doesn't make sense unless they were
12	thinking something they didn't say.
13	MS. SUCHORSKY: No, I'm saying that
14	Crimmins must be right in line with the statute.
15	We're talking about a statute the legislature enacted
16	for defendants who may have been wrongly convicted to
17	at least have the opportunity to clear their name.
18	The legislature
19	JUDGE SMITH: Do would you do -
20	would you think that Crimmins might might -
21	might be something that we ought to reconsider in
22	the age of DNA?
23	MS. SUCHORSKY: I certainly think that, if
24	you think Crimmins says hearings are always

discretionary, that has to be reconsidered in light

of the statute. We're not suggesting you overrule Crimmins. We're saying - - -

JUDGE SMITH: Why not?

2.4

MS. SUCHORSKY: We're saying you can clarify Crimmins, that hearings are discretionary if any of those problems under 4 are present. None of them were present in this case, and a hearing was required.

JUDGE PIGOTT: One of the problems in all of these is that there is 8,000 of them, and - - - and every defendant, every - - - everyone who is in Attica and every place else is innocent. And they - - - and they tell you that. And they tell you that in 440s, and they say, you know, I have a witness that I - - I didn't get a chance. My lawyer wasn't listening to me. I was in another state. There - - - there's all kinds of things and - - - and each one of those, if you just read it, you know, you could say that that's a prima facie showing that - - - that - - - that he may be innocent. So you have to sort of sort them out.

And - - - and in this case, I guess the sorting out came when - - - when there's only a certainly amount of DNA testing that did not establish, in their view, in the - - - in the - - -

in the court's view that - - - that - - - that you

may - - - that - - - that he may be in - - - innocent

or - - - or guilty of some - - - or the - - - the

judgment would have been more favorable, and they -
- they relied on the eyewitness. Now, how do we get

around that? How do we say well, you can't just rely

on the eyewitness, and three out of eighteen is

enough? Where - - - where do we get off saying that

the Appellate Division's wrong here?

2.4

MS. SUCHORSKY: Right, I think that the issue, aside from, you know, not following the statute which requires hearings in certain cases, is that the court applied the long - - or the wrong standard in assessing whether we had alleged a legal basis. What the court did in determining that was basically just resolved our motion on the papers and said oh, because I could do so, therefore, no hearing is required.

JUDGE SMITH: Well, you're - - - you're - - - you're say - - - you're saying the court can't say I assume that everything you say in your papers is true, and I give you every fair inference, and that's not enough; goodbye. They can't do that?

MS. SUCHORSKY: There are two problems with that. First, the standard the court applied here

_	was, it said, I give you every inference in your
2	favor, and I'm going to determine would you win. It
3	cannot be would you win. It has to be could you win.
4	If the court is asking would you win, that means a
5	court can, at the initial stage, weigh your evidence
6	and use its discretion to decide
7	JUDGE SMITH: Okay, and what what's -
8	
9	MS. SUCHORSKY: if you get a hearing.
LO	JUDGE SMITH: I mean, I can sort of
L1	understand the I don't know, the the
L2	difference
L3	MS. SUCHORSKY: Hearing
L4	JUDGE SMITH: between would you win
L5	and could you win is a little odd when it's the
L6	when the factfinder himself is making the decision,
L7	isn't it?
L8	MS. SUCHORSKY: There are mixed cases on
L9	this. It's not clear exactly what a legal basis is.
20	The court cited People v People v.
21	Satterfield. The the People say People v.
22	Satterfield. People v. Ferraras is two years later
23	and says, could you win if your allegations were
24	true.

The second problem is that the court did

1	not take our allegations as true when it made that
2	determination. It resolved issues in dispute between
3	Mr. Jones and the People about the probative value of
4	the evidence against us and then said oh, I'm viewing
5	it all in your favor; so it's fine. But the court
6	was not viewing the evidence that way. The court
7	- the even the First Department
8	JUDGE SMITH: The the you're
9	talking about the the you're talking
10	about the 440 court? The Appellate Division didn't
11	do that; did they?
12	MS. SUCHORSKY: Even the Appellate Division
13	did bec
14	JUDGE SMITH: Well, where did where -
15	where did they resolve
16	MS. SUCHORSKY: The trial court did,
17	clearly, throughout its opinion. And the First
18	Department, it seems, tried to correct that by
19	saying, I'm viewing it all in your favor. But there
20	are two places where the court relies on
21	representations the People made, some of which were
22	attributed to experts in their initial papers
23	JUDGE SMITH: Whi which court?
24	MS. SUCHORSKY: I'm talking about the First
25	Department.

1 | JUDGE SMITH: What - - - yeah.

2.4

MS. SUCHORSKY: The First Department said with respect to the hairs, "They were not all of the same color. Only eight of the hairs were curled, so there is good reason to believe the hairs did not all come from the same individual." The issue of whether someone can have slightly different colored or textured hairs when these discrepancies are so small, anyway - - there's one hair labeled as dark; one labeled golden brown to dark at the other end, once it's viewed under a microscope - - in 1981 they're all listed as dark so - -

JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, they went farther.

They said some of them were longer than what the -
- the People - - -

MS. SUCHORSKY: Correct.

JUDGE PIGOTT: - - - felt they ever had. I mean what - - - at what point does - - - I guess you said that's what a hearing is for.

MS. SUCHORSKY: Exactly, and if - - - I mean, if you look in the record there's photos of the hairs. I mean they're so tightly curled, some of them. I imagine when you stretch them out they do grow in length. But again, yeah, we didn't have a hearing to even sort of any of this out.

1	JUDGE SMITH: You your your
2	- your basic position is that if there's any
3	any way the defendant could imaginably win, the court
4	has to have a hearing?
5	MS. SUCHORSKY: No, no. My position on a
6	legal basis is that it de it means looking at
7	could you win; and I think that means, is it
8	plausible that you would win. I don't think it means
9	any possibility; I don't think that was the
10	legislature's intent. And I'm only talking about one
11	section
12	JUDGE SMITH: We can we can review
13	plausibility?
14	MS. SUCHORSKY: I think that you can tell
15	the courts, this is what a legal basis means under
16	the law and you better
17	JUDGE SMITH: I mean does does
18	MS. SUCHORSKY: apply it correctly.
19	JUDGE SMITH: Should does does
20	the court does the does the courts below
21	have no discretion in deciding what's plausible and
22	what's not plausible?
23	MS. SUCHORSKY: I think the court needs to
24	look at the facts and determine what's plausible.
25	But I think when it's a plausibility standard, it

1 removes the fact that it's always discretionary, which is more in line - - - which contradicts the 2 3 statute. The decision to hold a hearing cannot 4 always be discretionary, so the legal basis standard 5 JUDGE SMITH: Well, it could - - - well, it 6 7 - - - it could - - -8 MS. SUCHORSKY: - - - must have meaning. 9 JUDGE SMITH: - - - always be discretionary 10 if we - - - if - - - if there were such a thing as 11 abuse of discretion. We could say it's discretionary, but you went too far. What's wrong 12 13 with that? MS. SUCHORSKY: That's what - - - that's 14 15 how you deal with the four 440 motions. So I think -16 - - I'm not suggesting you review all these cases, 17 but I'm saying when there's a clear error of law, 18 when the lower courts misapply the law, hold you to 19 too high of a standard - - -JUDGE SMITH: I mean aren't - - - I mean, I 20 21 guess what I'm saying is aren't you going to a lot of 22 trouble to avoid simply saying to us, what if 23 Crimmins didn't exist? Well, the obvious thing to 2.4 say - - - this was an abuse of discretion to deny a

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hearing?

1	MS. SUCHORSKY: I mean I I wouldn't
2	fight with you that that that that's
3	correct. I'm just saying you don't have to overrule
4	Crimmins if you don't want to.
5	May I continue?
6	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: No, I think you're
7	finished, counsel
8	MS. SUCHORSKY: Okay.
9	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: until your
10	rebuttal.
11	MS. SUCHORSKY: Okay.
12	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Thank you.
13	MR. COHN: Good afternoon, Your Honors,
14	David Cohn for the People.
15	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counsel, why
16	shouldn't we direct a hearing here? Isn't that the
17	most logical thing to do?
18	MR. COHN: Your Honor, what the Appellate
19	Division did here rendered
20	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Unless we know that
21	it's it's false what what they're
22	alleging, why wouldn't you send it to a hearing under
23	the statute?
24	MR. COHN: Your Honor, two issues. Okay,
25	first, the Appellate Division took everything that

1 the defendant alleged as true. The Appell - - -2 Appellate Division said very clearly, taking as true, 3 that those three out of the eighteen hairs that were tested from this bloody hat - - -4 5 JUDGE SMITH: She - - - she - - - she says that they - - - that - - - that a possible inference 6 7 from the facts is that all those hairs did come from 8 the same - - - I guess except for the cat's - - - did 9 come from the same person. Why - - - why -10 - - why isn't she entitled to that inference? MR. COHN: Your Honor, it's not within this 11 12 court's review power to determine inferences that may 13 be drawn from the facts, and - - - and maybe I should back up and - - -14 15 JUDGE SMITH: Well, what can - - you - -16 - you're saying we - - - can we review this decision 17 for abuse of discretion or not? MR. COHN: No, Your Honor, in fact - - -18 19 JUDGE SMITH: So what can we review it for, 20 anything? 21 MR. COHN: Your Honor, under Crimmins, and 22 under the cases that follow Crimmins, this court has 23 no reviewing power whatsoever. JUDGE SMITH: So when - - - so we - - - so 2.4 25 we're wasting our time sitting here. We should just

1 go on to the next case? 2 MR. COHN: Absolutely, Your Honor. That -3 - - that - - - that is exactly what Crimmins says, 4 and - - - and - - -5 JUDGE SMITH: Isn't - - - isn't that a - -6 - isn't that - - - isn't that kind of a bad position 7 to put this court in? We - - - we're, you know - - -8 we - - - we - - - we review a lot of things, but a 9 guy says I'm innocent, and you abused your discretion 10 in denying me a hearing on that. And you're saying oh, forget about it, that - - - that's not within 11 12 your power to review? 13 MR. COHN: Well, first, the defendant has 14 not alleged that he's innocent. He's alleged that 15 there's some tangential DNA evidence, which he claims 16 casts a reasonable doubt about his conviction, but he 17 is - - - he is not alleging before this court that he is innocent. 18 JUDGE SMITH: Well, if he could - - - yeah, 19 20 okay, but if he could pro - - - but if - - - yeah, if 21 --- if --- if he could prove that he had noth --22 - that he never wore that hat, that would - - - yeah, 23 you - - - you could be excused for thinking maybe 2.4 he's innocent?

MR. COHN: Well, he is alleging that three

1	out of eighteen hairs found from a hat which was
2	found on the ground by a civilian
3	JUDGE SMITH: Suppose he had eighteen
4	suppose he had eighteen for eighteen.
5	MR. COHN: If he was eighteen for eighteen
6	obviously, that would have been a a more
7	difficult case for the lower courts.
8	JUDGE SMITH: Okay, but but we
9	couldn't
10	JUDGE PIGOTT: But here's here's what
11	-'
12	JUDGE SMITH: we couldn't touch it?
13	MR. COHN: Not under Crimmins, Your Honor.
14	Crimmins said that the Constitution and there's
15	not a matter of statute
16	JUDGE SMITH: Is is
17	should we reconsider Crimmins if it if it
18	if if it puts us in a position like that?
19	MR. COHN: Your Honor, Crimmins makes
20	sense. The the reason for the Crimmins rule is
21	that it's an inherently fact-based determination in
22	weighing new evidence against the
23	JUDGE SMITH: Yeah, there are there
24	are a million inherently fact-based determinations
25	that we leave to the lower courts, but we review them

1	for abuse or for or or for record
2	support. I mean if yeah, he you're
3	you're saying that if if if the courts
4	below decide that we don't look at DNA because we
5	- we think DNA is witchcraft, this court is powerless
6	to review that?
7	MR. COHN: Well, Your Honor, if the
8	the court below did something which was clearly
9	illegal or which was perhaps clearly at odds with the
10	record
11	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Well, they didn't
12	direct they didn't direct a hearing that they
13	should have under the statute. Why can't we review
14	that?
15	MR. COHN: Well, Your Honor, all I
16	all I can tell you is what this court has said in
17	Crimmins
18	JUDGE PIGOTT: But you didn't you
19	didn't say
20	MR. COHN: which is that is within
21	the unlimited discretion.
22	JUDGE PIGOTT: At the at the at
23	the Supreme Court level, the the papers that
24	the People put in I I thought were really
25	problematic. And there was there was

1 I'll call it testimony - - - saying we've got - - -2 we've got DNA experts who - - - who controvert this. 3 We've got - - - this does not - - - this does not 4 establish the - - - that the DNA is - - - says what 5 they say it does, and there's allusions to DNA 6 experts, but it's all hearsay. 7 MR. COHN: Well - - -8 JUDGE PIGOTT: And - - - and the lawyer 9 that wrote the affidavit never alleged that she was 10 at the trial or there's no witnesses that came. If 11 she had simply said read what they say and they're not entitled to a hearing, it would have been clear. 12 13 But they - - - the People loaded it up with an awful lot of extraneous material, it seems to me. 14 15 MR. COHN: You - - - Your Honor, first the 16 Appellate Division, and - - - and even the trial 17 court, even - - - even Justice Yates did not rely on 18 the People's - - - any conclusions reached by the 19 People's experts in issuing their decisions. 20 JUDGE PIGOTT: So why did - - - why did you 21 put them in? 22 MR. COHN: The - - - we put them in because 23 to allege - - - we made the allegations. Now, if the - - - if Justice Yates had determined that a hearing 2.4

25

was necessary - - -

1 JUDGE SMITH: It - - - it - - - it looked like - - - it looked like when they wrote that 2 3 affidavit you were expecting a hearing. 4 MR. COHN: It's possible that a judge might 5 have ordered a hearing, and it's certainly a response of what - - -6 7 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Especially when the 8 eyewitness evidence here is not very strong. 9 MR. COHN: Sorry, the - - - the evidence -10 - - yeah, the - - - the - - -11 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yeah, what's strong 12 about it? You got a - - - a witness who admits to 13 being on drugs at the time when she makes the - - the - - - the - - - the identification. Why wouldn't 14 15 you hold a hearing here? MR. COHN: You - - -16 17 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Why - - - why wouldn't you - - - in the interest of actually 18 19 knowing, why wouldn't you hold a hearing? Unless you 20 know that what they're saying is false, why wouldn't 21 you hold a hearing? MR. COHN: Well, unless you know, Your 22 23 Honor, that what they're saying is not going to get 2.4 you a reasonable probability of a different verdict.

This was - - - and as Justice Yates and the Appellate

1	Division said, this was a very strong eyewitness
2	identification.
3	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: I don't I
4	from what you have in the record, I don't know why
5	you say that, that it's a very a a strong
6	eyewitness case.
7	MR. COHN: Well
8	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: She admits to being
9	under daze when she's identified she
10	admits to being under the influence of drugs.
11	MR. COHN: Your Honor, but there was no
12	impairment of her abilities. It was the jury
13	heard her testify at trial. It was a fifteen-minute
14	encounter in broad daylight.
15	JUDGE SMITH: The the
16	there is reason to think, isn't there, that she's a
17	pretty good observer?
18	MR. COHN: Absolutely, Your Honor, and she
19	gave very, very detailed descriptions. She gave
20	detailed descriptions of the defendant's
21	JUDGE READ: That's, what, the chipped
22	tooth and every or the
23	MR. COHN: The chipped tooth and the
24	the space between the teeth.
25	JUDGE SMITH: But didn't

1 JUDGE RIVERA: I gue - - - but I guess, counsel, I - - - I thought their point was they - - -2 3 they dispute that this is a - - - a very good 4 eyewitness testimony, but they argue that there's 5 other evidence that might make a juror sit back and say hmm, let me think twice about that. 6 7 MR. COHN: Well, Your Honor - - -8 JUDGE RIVERA: Maybe - - - maybe - - -9 maybe the drugs - - - maybe the fact that she was on 10 heroin really did make a difference. 11 MR. COHN: Well, Your Honor, what they're 12 proffering here is new DNA evidence, and what both 13 courts below - - - what Justice Yates and what the 14 Appellate Division said is that even accepting that 15 those three hairs, three of the eighteen that they 16 tested - - - and they could have tested all eighteen. 17 They choose to test only - - -JUDGE PIGOTT: No, they couldn't and - - -18 19 and because - - - at - - - at least no one 20 controverted the fact that this was destructive, and 21 - - - and they were saying that they can't do all 22 eighteen because then the evidence is gone. And - -23 2.4 MR. COHN: Well - - -25

JUDGE PIGOTT: - - - one of the questions I

1 was going to ask, why wouldn't the DA get together 2 with them and say let's - - - let's share our DNA 3 testing? 4 MR. COHN: Well, Your Honor, actually, we 5 gave their lab all eighteen hairs. As far as I know, Your Honor, their lab is still in possession of all 6 7 eighteen hairs. They could have tested all of them 8 if they had wanted to. Now, if they're saying that -9 10 JUDGE PIGOTT: Did - - - did you 11 misunderstand my question? I said if they did, the 12 evidence would be gone. 13 MR. COHN: Well, Your Honor, then they have 14 to make a choice. They're the ones who have the 15 burden of - - - of demonstrating that there's a 16 reasonable probability of a different verdict. 17 JUDGE PIGOTT: Couldn't the People - - -18 couldn't the People - - - couldn't the People - - -19 when - - - when they got that and realized that that's probably true, say let's share our DNA stuff. 20 21 We can sit - - - we can go shoulder-to-shoulder and 22 see whether this DNA works on all eighteen without 23 destroying all the evidence in it? 2.4 MR. COHN: Your Honor, our lab - - - the

medical examiner's office, which is an excellent DNA

1	lab
2	JUDGE PIGOTT: Right.
3	MR. COHN: they said that these hair
4	samples were too old, too small, and too degraded.
5	JUDGE PIGOTT: Not in this case, they
6	didn't; did they?
7	MR. COHN: Yes, they did.
8	JUDGE PIGOTT: I I didn't see an
9	affidavit to that effect.
10	MR. COHN: Actually, it's it's in our
11	answer to the 440, Your Honor. The medical exam
12	-
13	JUDGE RIVERA: Is that your your
14	- is that counsel's affidavit?
15	MR. COHN: It it was counsel's
16	it was an Assistant District Attorney's sworn
17	affirmation. They sent it to the they sent all
18	eighteen hairs to the New York State Medical
19	Examiner's Office.
20	JUDGE PIGOTT: No, no, no, no. No, wait, I
21	I don't mean to misunderstand this, but one of
22	the things that I had suggested before was that the
23	only thing you submitted was a was a hearsay
24	affidavit from an attorney who said, you know, I

guess I've talked to DNA people or something, and I

1	thought that was an issue. Are you saying that if I
2	go back to the record, there are sworn affidavits
3	from the DNA people in in Manhattan?
4	MR. COHN: There there's a sworn
5	affirmation from the Assistant District Attorney
6	_
7	JUDGE PIGOTT: No, no, I
8	MR. COHN: who's an officer of the
9	court.
10	JUDGE PIGOTT: Excuse me, excuse me, Mr.
11	Cohn. I I wanted to ask if, with respect to
12	the experts
13	MR. COHN: Yes.
14	JUDGE PIGOTT: if there's a sworn
15	expert affidavit?
16	MR. COHN: No, there is not, Your Honor.
17	JUDGE PIGOTT: Okay.
18	MR. COHN: There is there is not, and
19	there's actually no requirement that we do that in
20	order to we don't have the burden of going
21	forward here, and and
22	JUDGE SMITH: But you but you
23	but you admit that that the the denial of
24	a hearing can't rest on that proffer?
25	MR. COHN: We are saying that the reason

that the hearing was denied is exactly why the 1 Appellate Division denied it. 2 3 JUDGE SMITH: Try - - - try - - - try to 4 answer my question directly. 5 MR. COHN: Yes, yes, Your Honor. The - - the denial of the hearing cannot - - - did not rest, 6 7 in this case, on the expert proffer made by the Assistant District Attorney. The denial of the 8 9 hearing rested on the determination of the trial 10 judge, Justice Yates, and of the Appellate Division 11 majority that, even accepting that these three hairs 12 did not belong to the defendant, and even accepting 13 that that one piece of DNA from the fingernail clipping did not belong to the defendant - - - then 14 15 that was not enough. JUDGE PIGOTT: Suppose none of them did. 16 17 Suppose none of the eighteen and none of the scrapings apply to the defendant. 18 MR. COHN: Well, Your Honor - - -19 2.0 JUDGE PIGOTT: Is he entitled - - - or is 21 he entitled to a hearing then? 22 MR. COHN: Your - - - Your Honor, that 23 would raise a host of questions. We don't know how 2.4 many other people - - -

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But we couldn't

1	review it?
2	MR. COHN: That's true, Your Honor.
3	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Even if even if
4	Judge Pigott's hypothetical is right, we we
5	couldn't review it. Now, if that's the case, why
6	don't we just overrule Crimmins, if you're saying
7	that's because of Crimmins?
8	MR. COHN: Well, Your Honor, I I
9	believe that the Crimmins rule is a good one. If
10	- if this court wishes to overrule Crimmins, of
11	course it has the right to.
12	JUDGE SMITH: Under under your
13	under your view of Crimmins, we couldn't review it if
14	Mother Teresa and all her nuns were swearing that
15	this guy had an alibi?
16	MR. COHN: Well, it's very possible that -
17	that the judge didn't found some reason why
18	those those affirmations were not enough. I
19	wouldn't know what the particular evidence would be.
20	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So the answer is yes,
21	we could not review it, even if Mother Teresa and
22	whoever else
23	MR. COHN: That is the clear answer under
24	Crimming

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Is that - - - is that

1	the law that we want? Is that the precedent that we
2	want to follow here?
3	MR. COHN: Well, Your Honor, in Crimmins,
4	this court says
5	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: No, no. I asked you
6	is that good?
7	MR. COHN: I
8	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Is that something we
9	should be following? If that's what you're hinging
10	what we're doing and why he can't get a hearing here,
11	why wouldn't you just overrule that case? Doesn't
12	sound like something we'd want to rely on.
13	MR. COHN: Well, I think at the time this
14	court decided Crimmins and and
15	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yeah, but now is now.
16	MR. COHN: Well, if this court believes in
17	stare decisis and believes in precedent, at the court
18	this at the time this court decided Crimmins,
19	the court thought these determinations
20	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What year was
21	Crimmins?
22	MR. COHN: I believe it was in the it
23	was either '70s or '80s; I don't remember.
24	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yeah, but in light of
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	MR. COHN: It was 19
2	CHIEF JUSTICE LIPPMAN: I think Judge Smith
3	asked you before, with all the advances in DNA, does
4	it make any sense today?
5	MR. COHN: Your Honor if if there
6	- if this court wanted to carve out a principle for
7	an extreme case where where there was a a
8	compelling evidence that somebody was innocent, and
9	for some reason
LO	JUDGE SMITH: Isn't isn't isn't
L1	abuse of discretion just another way of saying
L2	extreme case?
L3	MR. COHN: And perhaps, and Your Your
L4	Honor, if if this court were to go that way,
L5	this is not an extreme case. This is a case where
L6	you have marginal DNA evidence, and the courts below
L7	look
L8	JUDGE SMITH: So you're so you're
L9	- so you're arguing in the alternative that
20	discretion was not abused?
21	MR. COHN: Yes, yes, Your Honor.
22	JUDGE RIVERA: What why is it
23	marginal DNA evidence?
24	MR. COHN: It's marginal DNA evidence for -
25	for multiple reasons Your Honor

JUDGE RIVERA: Um-hum.

MS. SUCHORSKY: First.

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MS. SUCHORSKY: First, it's - - - as I -
- I mentioned there's only three out of eighteen
hairs. We don't know how many other people's hairs
might have gotten in this hat. We don't even know
whether the defendant was wearing hair extensions and
might not have even had his hair. We - - - we don't

- - we don't know how many people handled this hat.
We don't know how many people's hairs adhered to the
hat while it was sitting on the ground soaked in
blood. We're - - it's not clear from the record,
as the Appellate Division pointed out, where exactly
on the hat these hairs came from and where the
hatband was on the hat.

JUDGE SMITH: Of course not - - - a lot of not clears doesn't do it when reasonable doubt is supposed to go to the defendant.

MR. COHN: But, Your Honor, actually, that's at trial. This is post-trial in the 440 context.

JUDGE SMITH: Well, but - - - but the question is - - - but the question is whether - - - whether it was likely to have produced a - - - what was it, likely to have produced a different result, something like that?

1	MR. COHN: A probability of a different
2	result.
3	JUDGE SMITH: Probability of a different
4	result, but the question on which the result would
5	have been different is reasonable doubt.
6	MR. COHN: The question it would have
7	been whether this old evidence and and -
8	- a a defendant does
9	JUDGE SMITH: But the question the
10	question the question is whether these three
11	hairs would have been enough to create a reasonable
12	doubt.
13	MR. COHN: Right, Your Honor, and and
14	that's a it's a
15	JUDGE RIVERA: And the scraping; it's not
16	just the hairs, right?
17	MR. COHN: Your sorry, Your Honor?
18	JUDGE RIVERA: And the scraping, the
19	the DNA regarding the scraping.
20	MR. COHN: The the fingernail
21	scraping, right.
22	JUDGE RIVERA: What about that?
23	MR. COHN: So there were seven fingernail
24	scrapings that survived from from the victim -
25	from the murder victim. Six of them, there was

no useful DNA. One fingernail scraping, there's a small amount of DNA recovered from it that did not belong to the defendant.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counsel. Thanks, counsel.

Let's have rebuttal.

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MS. SUCHORSKY: Just to be clear, Your

Honors are not wasting your time by hearing this

case. I'd like to go back to the point I was making

earlier that the First Department also relied on

representations the People made that were in dispute

between the People and Mr. Jones. It wasn't just the

trial court.

So the First Department relied on hair color, hair texture, to say these probably didn't come from the same people. And actually, the first time that the DA makes that argument is the trial court in her affirmation - - I think it's at A-79 in the record, and it's in a paragraph where she mentions Dr. Baum (ph.), which the court - - trial court and the First Department said we can't rely on those experts. So she makes this argument in a paragraph from one of her experts.

Second, with the fingernail scrapings the court said - - - fully - - - First Department fully

adopted the People's two different positions on the fingernails. They said, on the one hand, no evidence of scraping, so not probative, and on the other hand - - - scratching, sorry - - - even though there's clear evidence of struggle in this record and - - - the prosecutor himself at trial says struggle so many times in that trial transcript - - -

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JUDGE SMITH: But is it - - - but couldn't -- is it unreasonable for the courts below to have looked at the case this way: you have a - - - a - -- a witness - - - I grant you she's a drug addict and a prostitute who used heroin that day. She also has a very impressive ability to observe. She described the clothing in incredible detail. She - - - she has the gapped teeth; she has the chipped tooth. She - -- she went through four - - - she went through hundreds and hundreds and hundreds of pictures and didn't pick out anybody until she saw this guy's picture. She had fifteen minutes with a good - - of good opportunity to see him. She - - - and the -- - and the courts below said I'm sorry. I don't care how good your evidence is on three hairs in the hat; it's not going to do it because somebody else could have worn the hat. Why is that an abuse of discretion?

MS. SUCHORSKY: Well, first of all, this is not going to all your points, the ID. This is not a strong ID. At trial the prosecutor himself stopped the trial the day before it was done to do a second lineup and says in the record, on the chance that we might have the wrong person - - - because this a single eyewitness ID. The jury struggled with the ID at trial. They requested to see photos of the lineup. They requested to see the multiple descriptions she gave. JUDGE SMITH: Maybe you're - - - maybe 12 you're really saying there's - - - there's no such

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thing as a single-witness ID that's all that strong?

MS. SUCHORSKY: I'm - - - yeah, and I'm saying when you make the legal basis standard so discretionary that a court can always rely on the trial evidence to say there's no hearing needed, that's how you get an opinion where a ID five months after the fact on drug use with inconsistent descriptions is strong.

JUDGE SMITH: Isn't it - - - isn't - - wouldn't it be different if you had eighteen hairs and they were all - - - and yeah - - - yeah, they - -- I - - - I guess maybe my real question is what are you saving the other fifteen for?

MS. SUCHORSKY: Well, this has been touched on, but the People, from the beginning, disputed that testing these hairs would ever be probative because, as they say, though only in their affirmation, that the OCME said these hairs weren't suitable for testing. They - - they wouldn't test the hairs, so we tested them. But the People continue to say it's never going to be viable, and the testing destroys the sample.

TUDGE SMITH: Okay, well, they - -
they're gon - - - they - - - you're - - - they - -
they're - - - they're going to say whatever you don't

want them to say. They're going to make you

miserable whatever it is. Why - - why are you

worrying about what they say? Why don't you just -
- you know, why - - - yeah, what - - - why not test

all eighteen unless, of course, you're worried that

you might get a match, which would be a problem.

MS. SUCHORSKY: No, because we're worried about destroying the only evidence left in a thirty-year-old case.

JUDGE SMITH: What are you saving them for?

MS. SUCHORSKY: We asked the court to hold

a hearing to resolve the issues about the testing - -

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1	JUDGE SMITH: What are you saving the
2	MS. SUCHORSKY: before we tested them
3	all.
4	JUDGE SMITH: What are you sav what -
5	what are you going to do with those fifteen hairs
6	you've so carefully conserved?
7	MS. SUCHORSKY: We would love for them to
8	be tested. We would just not like to test them and
9	have it be worth nothing. We constantly, throughout
10	
11	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: That come out of the
12	the hearing, that the other hairs would be
13	tested; is that what you're saying?
14	JUDGE RIVERA: Is your argument that the
15	court would reject this kind of testing, so you don't
16	want to waste your time on it?
17	MS. SUCHORSKY: No, no, no. We're saying
18	that the People held us constantly said, you
19	know, this won't be viable. So before the the
20	court didn't ever dig into these issues and resolve
21	the issues whether
22	JUDGE SMITH: Yeah, but but aren't
23	they going to be a lot but aren't they a lot
24	more persuasive saying that when they talk about
25	three hairs than if they were talking about all

1	eighteen?
2	MS. SUCHORSKY: Certainly, but we offered
3	for the People
4	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But would the other
5	fifteen be be tested as a result of the
6	hearing? Is that what you're arguing, you have a
7	hearing
8	MS. SUCHORSKY: Yes.
9	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: test all the
10	hairs at that point.
11	MS. SUCHORSKY: Yes.
12	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Is that what
13	the point that you're making?
14	MS. SUCHORSKY: We always offered for the
15	People to do confirmatory testing. They declined
16	because they wanted to keep us in a heads-I-win-
17	tails-you-lose situation
18	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But
19	MS. SUCHORSKY: where we can't test
20	all the hairs without destroying the evidence, but
21	they can still say oh, look, they didn't test all the
22	hairs, so it's not meaningful. We asked the court to
23	hold a hearing to resolve issues related to the
24	testing.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So you want the whole

1	thing to be looked at?
2	MS. SUCHORSKY: We want a complete, factual
3	record before a decision is made.
4	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: As as to what
5	happened with the testing, the three, the fifteen,
6	whatever?
7	MS. SUCHORSKY: Absolutely.
8	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay.
9	MS. SUCHORSKY: We want a complete record.
10	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Thank you.
11	JUDGE RIVERA: I'm sorry, can I just
12	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: I'm sorry, Judge
13	Rivera.
14	JUDGE RIVERA: I am just I'm not
15	understanding
16	MS. SUCHORSKY: Okay.
17	JUDGE RIVERA: this argument. So are
18	you saying that if the court grants a hearing, that
19	then you're going to go and test the fifteen?
20	MS. SUCHORSKY: I'm saying that if we held
21	a hearing, a court could we could put the
22	experts forward
23	JUDGE RIVERA: Okay.
24	MS. SUCHORSKY: we could they
25	could sort out the issues of mitotyping's results and

1 whether testing these hairs is viable. And then - -- if it's - - - if the - - - if the court is 2 3 satisfied that it's vi - - - viable, then we can test the rest of the hairs. 4 5 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, Judge Abdus-6 Salaam. 7 JUDGE SMITH: Really, you're asking the court to decide whether they test those other fifteen 8 9 hairs? Isn't that really - - - isn't that an argu -10 11 MS. SUCHORSKY: We're just asking the court 12 13 JUDGE SMITH: - - - isn't it usually the advocate who makes that call? 14 15 MS. SUCHORSKY: Certainly, but we're asking 16 the court to resolve an issue that was never resolved 17 before we do so. CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, Judge Abdus-18 19 Salaam. 20 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: My question's about 21 the hairs, too. If you lose now, and those hairs 22 still exist, could you test them; and if the test 23 results were similar to the three, would you be able 2.4 to bring another hearing - - - a request for another

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hearing?

1	MS. SUCHORSKY: We could bring another 440,
2	but I believe the standard is quite difficult
3	that you could, under Section 2, just dismiss the
4	- the motion because we could have technically
5	brought it before. So that's
6	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay.
7	MS. SUCHORSKY: a possibility we're
8	concerned of. Thank you.
9	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Thanks, counsel.
10	Thank you both; appreciate it.
11	(Court is adjourned)
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CERTIFICATION

I, Sara Winkeljohn, certify that the foregoing transcript of proceedings in the Court of

6 Appeals of People v. Clifford Jones, No. 219 was

7 prepared using the required transcription equipment

8 and is a true and accurate record of the proceedings.

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