1	COURT OF APPEALS
2	STATE OF NEW YORK
3	
4	PEOPLE,
5	Respondent,
6	-against-
7	No. 98 SCOTT BARDEN (REARGUMENT),
8	Appellant.
9	
10	20 Eagle Street Albany, New York 12207
11	April 27, 2016
12	Before:
13	CHIEF JUDGE JANET DIFIORE ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE F. PIGOTT, JR.
14	ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA ASSOCIATE JUDGE SHEILA ABDUS-SALAAM
15	ASSOCIATE JUDGE LESLIE E. STEIN ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE M. FAHEY
16	ASSOCIATE JUDGE MICHAEL J. GARCIA
17	Appearances:
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25	Sara Winkeljohn Official Court Transcriber

1 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Next on the calendar 2 is number 98, People v. Scott Barden (reargument). 3 MR. GREENBERG: Good afternoon, Your Honors; Richard Greenberg, Office of the Appellate 4 5 Defender for Scott Barden. And, Your Honor, may I 6 reserve two minutes for rebuttal, please? 7 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Yes, you may. 8 MR. GREENBERG: Thank you. Now, Your 9 Honors, Scott Barden was denied a speedy trial in 10 this case. And in any event, the evidence was 11 insufficient to support conviction for possession of 12 stolen property and theft of services. Turning first 13 to the speedy trial issue, this action was commenced 14 in May of 2010 when Mr. Barden was arrested. 15 People answered ready for trial for the very first 16 time in October of 2011, seventeen months later. 17 30.30 provides that the People must be ready within 18 six months. 19 JUDGE STEIN: It - - - it was never a - - -20 a particularized specific analysis of which time was 21 chargeable - - - charged to the People and which was 22 charged to the defendant here, correct? I mean the

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there - - - MR. GREENBERG: The - - - the judge - - -

courts basically just said you went over it. That

1	JUDGE STEIN: wasn't a problem.
2	MR. GREENBERG: Well, the judge analyzed
3	the speedy trial motion and said I find that there
4	are 179 days charged to the People, and in this case,
5	six months by the clerk of the calendar equals 184
6	days.
7	JUDGE STEIN: Well, we don't know exactly -
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9	MR. GREENBERG: So we were five days short.
10	JUDGE STEIN: how they came up with
11	that 179
12	MR. GREENBERG: No, but the judge made that
13	finding and so that's essentially the law of the
14	case, and we're looking for five more days. And here
15	we have months and months in which the
16	People did not answer ready, and what they're trying
17	to do here is put the onus on the defense so when the
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19	JUDGE STEIN: Do you concede because
20	this seems to boil down to the language in Smith
21	about what is participation by the defendant, right?
22	MR. GREENBERG: Exactly.
23	JUDGE STEIN: Okay, so do do you
24	agree that there was at least some participation?
25	There were some requests for more time because

counsel had obligations in other courts and so on and so forth?

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MR. GREENBERG: She participated. In fact, she admitted, subsequently, on one of the record dates, she said, Judge, I did participate but there seems to be this crazy line of cases in the First Department. I think what's happened is the First Department alone, among the Departments, has taken the word participate in Smith and taken it out of context and turned it into something it was not intended to be. And that is because if you look at the context of Smith, what Smith said is when the People have never answered ready, they get charged with all the adjournments. They get charged with the time even if it's extended because the defense attorney is not available on the date the People are requesting.

Or, let's say, there's court congestion, as happened here also. On the March 2nd adjournment, the People requested March 16th. Defense counsel said well, that's a bad day, I'm going to be on trial, can we have the 28th of March? And the judge said no, it has to be after April 8th, we'll put it on for April 13th. So from - - - for the very least, from the 28th of March until April 13th, that was due

1	to court congestion.
2	JUDGE STEIN: So but counsel said
3	fine or something like that, right?
4	MR. GREENBERG: Right, she said fine, and
5	if this court wants to hold that the word
6	participation in Smith means that counsel says a word
7	and that equals participation and therefore, that is
8	the equivalent, the functional equivalent, of consent
9	to adjournment
10	JUDGE STEIN: So what's the what's
11	the magic
12	MR. GREENBERG: then that turns the
13	world upside down.
14	JUDGE STEIN: What are the magic words?
15	What what would show consent to an adjournment?
16	MR. GREENBERG: Well
17	JUDGE STEIN: That's that's really
18	the question.
19	MR. GREENBERG: If if the lawyer says
20	I consent. Oftentimes, that's what happens. A judge
21	will say, counsel, do you consent to this adjournment
22	because both sides want the adjournment. You're
23	trying to
24	JUDGE STEIN: But, counsel, if if the
25	court doesn't ask counsel, does counsel have to say,

Your Honor, I - - - I don't consent to that? I 1 2 understand that that's the court's - - -3 MR. GREENBERG: Well, this court has held many times that a counsel who says nothing is not 4 5 consenting, that consent has to be explicit and on 6 the record. 7 JUDGE PIGOTT: That - - - that was your argument last time. I think you said that the - - -8 9 the best advice you'd give lawyers aft - - -10 depending on how we go is to stand there and - - -11 MR. GREENBERG: Well, I would. 12 JUDGE PIGOTT: - - - not - - - not say 13 anything. MR. GREENBERG: Again, I think counsel 14 15 would be well advised, if that's the way this is 16 going to proceed, then when the People come in and 17 say we're not ready, we're requesting two weeks, 18 counsel can say that day is no good for me, I'm on 19 trial in another court. When the judge says what 20 date is good for you, counsel, counsel stands mute. 21 And when the judge says okay, I'll put it on for X 22 date, counsel doesn't say fine, thank you, or 23 anything else. I don't think that's what this is

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meant.

If we go back to the - - - the core cases

here, and if you look at the language of this court recently in Sibblies, this is a People-readiness statute. It's not a game where you just total up time either way. Sure, there are a few specified exclusions like motion practice that's clearly excluded, or where defense counsel clearly and unequivocally consents on the record. We're trying to work out a plea bargain or disposition, we're both consenting to this adjournment basically saying to the People you don't have to get ready for trial, I'm agreeing to consent. But here the People were not ready. They weren't ready in January, they weren't ready in February, they weren't ready in March.

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And keep in mind, when the court sets the new date and if counsel says look, that's a bad day for me, how about the following week and the judge says fine, we'll put it on for the following week, the People are not stuck with that. They can stop the clock any time they want by filing a certificate of readiness. That's what the statute contemplates, and that's why in Smith, what you said is, "The question before us is whether the People should be charged with time beyond the dates to which they requested adjournments and because the - - - the defense attorney is not available on that date. And

the People contend that the adjournment is extended because the defense rejects the original date requested." This court said that argument is without merit. This court said, "The People never stated their readiness for trial in this case. They should be charged with the entirety of the adjournment period."

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Now, again, there could be cases where the People say we want two weeks and defense counsel says in response that's a bad day for me, how about three months. Obviously, in a situation like that, the defense is extending the time and no one is saying the People should be charged for that. Although, even in that situation, the People can stop the clock any time they want by filing a certificate. They were not ready for seventeen months in this case. I don't see how you get less than six months of includable time charged against them except - - -

JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: So on - - - on the issue of - - -

MR. GREENBERG: - - - by this kind of nitpicky - - -

JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Well, your - - - your yellow light is on now, so maybe you should go to your next issue because I was going to ask you

something on speedy trial. I can bring it up on reply.

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MR. GREENBERG: I'll stay as long as you like, Judge, but turning quickly to the - - - to the stolen property charge, the legislature in 2002 create - - - did a couple things. They amended the General Business Law to change the definition of credit card for purposes of the General Business Law, not for purposes of the Penal Law. At the same time, they created a whole new panoply of crimes in the Penal Law under Article 190 for possession of identifying information. So they said okay, this is a problem, people are stealing identities, credit card numbers, Social Security numbers, here's what we're going to do. We're going to create a whole bunch of new crimes under Article 190. They did not, at that time, purport to change the law with respect to traditional larceny and stolen property crimes, which are in a different part of the Penal Law under Article 155, 160, and 165.

And so what we have is we have somebody charged with possession of stolen property when, A, the Penal Law says possession requires that you possess tangible property, not something like a number, but you have to possess tangible property to

1 be convicted of stolen property possession. Number 2 two, there was no stolen property in this case. And 3 number three, Scott Barden had absolutely no dominion or control over Joseph (sic) Catalfamo's credit card 4 5 number. Scott Barden didn't know the number. He 6 didn't charge anything to that number. He acquiesced 7 when the hotel said we'll put it on that credit card, but he had no control. The credit card - - - the - -8 9 - the hotel could have said no, we're not going to 10 charge that card, and Mr. Barden couldn't make them. 11 And he couldn't do anything else. He didn't have a 12 number. He couldn't go out and buy something at a store with that credit card. He had no dominion or 13 control whatsoever. 14 15 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Back up a second, 16 counsel. 17 MR. GREENBERG: Yes, Judge. CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: I'm still stuck on 18 19 the preservation issue. 2.0 MR. GREENBERG: On this issue? 21 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Yeah. 22 MR. GREENBERG: Well, counsel - - - counsel 23 argued - - - look, counsel could have done a little

better job, but she did argue on 437 of the record

she says, "Credit card does not mean credit card

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number." She says, "I don't know, maybe for commercial purposes it does, but in this case you can't say that a credit card equals a credit card number." She also, on 439, said, "Scott Barden cannot be charged with constructive possession of the card or the card number because the hotel had the card number, not Scott Barden." And again, on 451 to 452 of the record she reiterates that that, "Scott Barden did not knowingly possess stolen property." She argued that there was no stolen property. She said that if anything, the credit card number was in the hands of the hotel, and Scott Barden couldn't be constructively possessing something that he didn't know about and didn't have anything to do with.

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So I think it is sufficiently preserved.

Clearly, the court was on notice that counsel was saying this law does not apply to this situation, but even if it does, my client is not guilty of it. I think that's fully preserved.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, counsel.

MR. GREENBERG: Thank you.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Counsel.

MR. COHN: Good afternoon, Chief Judge

DiFiore. May it please the court, David Cohn for the

People. I'll start with the - - - the speedy trial

issue, and there's a very clear rule that this court adopted in People v. Smith which has been followed by the lower courts since 1993 when this court decided Smith. And that clear rule is that if the defendant participates in setting the final adjourn date, then the time is not charged to the People.

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JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: But what does participation mean, Mr. Cohn? Does it mean that counsel says when the People propose another date well, that's not a good date for me, I'm on trial, and so I need the day after or a week after; is that what you'd consider participation?

MR. COHN: Yes, Your Honor, and -- and that is how all the lower courts for the last twenty-three years have read Smith.

JUDGE PIGOTT: The problem with it, though, it seems to me, is it seems kind of ludicrous. I mean you - - - you're just trying to - - - you're acquiescing either in the court wanting an adjournment or the People wanting an adjournment and because you're being accommodating you're saying, you know, some word of magic that all of a sudden you're doing a disservice to your client, you know, who's entitled to get his - - - you know, to get his trial on.

1 MR. COHN: Right.

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JUDGE PIGOTT: And the ironic part of it is is that at arraignment, the People always say they're ready, and they're not. They're not any more ready - - I mean they haven't - - - they haven't disclosed, they haven't - - - they haven't done a bunch of stuff, but we say, okay, they say they're ready, and they done.

MR. COHN: Well, Your Honor, in Manhattan, the prosecutors do not say they're ready at arraignment. That might be a practice in other parts of the state, but it's certainly not the practice in Manhattan. And - - and that's one of the reasons why this case is before us because the People are being absolutely honest about their readiness.

They're being absolutely - - -

JUDGE STEIN: But did they ever submit a - a statement of readiness either in between court
appearances or - - I - - I mean what prevented
you at any one of those court appearances from
announcing your readiness?

MR. COHN: Your - - Your Honor, there was no state of - - - statement of readiness but that's really aside. That's really not related to the issue in this case. The CPL makes clear, and this court

1 make clear in Smith and in Worley, that in a pre - -- pre-readiness context, when the trial court is 2 3 calculating the time that's chargeable to the People 4 in a pre-readiness context, you exclude all periods, 5 under 30.30(4)(b), which are at the request of or with the consent of the defense attorney. 6 7 JUDGE PIGOTT: What - - - what do you think 8 of Mr. Greenberg's argument, though, that if - - - if 9 the defense lawyer just stands mute that somehow that 10 benefits her and her client? 11 MR. COHN: Well, Your Honor, that's - - all depends on what the client wants. If - - - if 12 13 the client - - -14 JUDGE PIGOTT: No, no, no. I'm just - - -15 I'm just saying exactly any of the scenarios in this, 16 if, instead of saying fine or instead of saying thank 17 you or instead of saying anything, she just said 18 nothing? 19 MR. COHN: Actually, Your Honor, that just 20 wastes the client's time and here's why - - -21 JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, let's - - - let's not 22 worry about the client's time. Is - - - is that 23 participation? 2.4 MR. COHN: Is that participation by 25 standing mute?

JUDGE PIGOTT: Yeah. 1 2 MR. COHN: No, Your Honor. And that's what 3 JUDGE PIGOTT: So you - - -4 5 MR. COHN: - - - Smith was about. 6 JUDGE PIGOTT: So you see the problem? 7 MR. COHN: Well - - -8 JUDGE PIGOTT: I mean just to say thank 9 you, Judge, or to say, you know, okay, that somehow you've - - - you've impaired your client's speedy 10 11 trial rights by who knows how much time? I mean I'm 12 - - - I'm - - -13 MR. COHN: Your - - - Your Honor, I think the fundamental confusion here is - - - is caused by 14 15 defense counsel's argument that by requesting more 16 time than the People requested that the defendant is 17 somehow participating in the People's request. 18 That's not what's going on. There are two requests 19 here, and the second part of it is being done solely 20 by the defense attorney for the benefit of the 21 defense attorney. JUDGE STEIN: But the - - - the issue that 22 23 I have is when defense counsel says I'm ready on 2.4 March 28th and the court says well, I'm sorry, I

can't do it on March 28th, I can't do it until April

1 13th, why - - - why does that period get charged to 2 the defense? 3 MR. COHN: Right. And, Your Honor, I - - -I think Worley answers that for us. And - - - and 4 5 here is why: in - - - in Worley this court said where there is a - - - and this is a direct quote 6 7 from - - - from Worley, "Where there's a delay that's 8 been caused by the defendant for his own benefit and 9 with the court's permission" - - - and that was 10 between March 28 and April 13 in that adjournment 11 you're talking about. That was for the defendant's own benefit because the defendant wanted more than -12 13 - - more time than the March 16 that the People had 14 requested. They wanted until March 28th. The Court 15 says well, if - - - if you want that, it has to be at 16 least April 8 and they agree on April 13th. 17 JUDGE STEIN: The problem is is that the defendant didn't want the adjournment in the first 18 place. The - - - the defendant was - - - didn't come 19 20 into court and say I need an adjournment. The People 21 came into court and said - - -22 MR. COHN: Right, but - - -23 JUDGE STEIN: - - - I need an adjournment. 2.4 MR. COHN: Well, Your Honor, again, I think

that's confusing the first part and the second part

1 of the request here. The court could have just 2 listened to the People. The People said March 28. 3 The court could have just said okay, we're on for 4 March 28, we'll show up. What's happening is that 5 instead of doing that, instead of making the defense 6 attorney show up on March 28, the court here is doing 7 the defense attorney a favor, doing something for the 8 defense attorney's convenience. The court - - - the 9 - - - the court is saying to the defense attorney is 10 March 28 a date that you want or do you now want this 11 to go further? And - - - and what the court - - -12 this court said in Worley, "If there's a delay that's 13 been caused by the defendant for his own benefit and 14 with the court's permission under circumstances in 15 which the - - - both the defendant and the court have 16 determined that the adjournment is desirable" - - -17 in that - - -18

JUDGE PIGOTT: But that - - -

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MR. COHN: - - - in that situation - - -

JUDGE PIGOTT: - - - that jumps the first If - - - if the People are asking for an part. adjournment and - - - and it turns out the date they want is not good for the defendant and the defendant says I want a different date, it all ends up on the defendant. What the defendant should be saying when

1 you want your adjournment, say absolutely not, you're 2 not consenting to any adjournment by the People 3 period, Judge, we're going to oppose it. 4 MR. COHN: But - - - but, Your Honor, 5 that's not true. 6 JUDGE PIGOTT: That's not a good thing to 7 do. MR. COHN: The time between - - - that - -8 9 - that's not true, Your Honor, because the time 10 between March 2 and March 16, which is the 11 adjournment the People requested, that's charged to 12 the People. 13 JUDGE PIGOTT: I understand that. But - -14 - but by trying to accommodate you, they need a new 15 date and we say, ah ha, you know. 16 MR. COHN: Well - - -17 JUDGE PIGOTT: Now - - - now you've screwed 18 up your - - - your speedy trial not because you 19 wanted the extra two weeks but because the People 20 wanted two weeks and - - - and I'm giving it to them 21 22 MR. COHN: Your Honor, that's assuming that 23 the People wouldn't have been ready on March 16, and 2.4 we don't know that on this record. They might very

well have been ready on March 16. What happens then

if - - - if - - -1 2 JUDGE PIGOTT: Were they ready when they 3 wanted the adjournment? MR. COHN: They were not ready - - - they 4 5 were - - - it was March 2nd. They said - - -6 JUDGE PIGOTT: That's my point. 7 MR. COHN: - - - not ready. 8 JUDGE PIGOTT: See, I'm going to move you 9 back a bit. I - - - I want to say when you're asking 10 for an adjournment, the - - - the defendant should 11 say no, we're - - - we're not. Judge, we - - - we 12 are - - - you know, we've got a speedy trial issue 13 here. We are not going to consent to that. 14 MR. COHN: Well - - -15 JUDGE PIGOTT: Would that make - - - would 16 that make any sense? 17 MR. COHN: Your Honor, they have every 18 right to do that. 19 JUDGE PIGOTT: Right. 20 MR. COHN: And - - - and they have every 21 right to say we're going to show up on March 16 and 22 see what the People say. They have absolutely the 23 right to do that. But what's happening here is the 2.4 defense attorney's saying look, for my own

convenience and perhaps for my client's convenience,

for whatever reason, the defense attorney - - - in this case, the defense attorney was on another trial and said I've got to finish that trial or else I'm going to kill myself, right. The defense attorney's saying look, I don't want to do March 16. I - - - I want to do March 28 at - - at least, right. Now the statute says - - the statute has solved this problem for us. The statute says, and this is in a pre-readiness context, if there's an adjournment at the request of or with the consent of the defendant, then that time is not charged to the People. And this court in Smith said that means participating, and that makes sense.

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JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Mr. - - - Mr. Cohn, why wouldn't the - - - just the amount of time that defendant asked for, as opposed to the entire amount of time that the court adjourned the matter to at the court's convenience, why would that be charged to the defense?

MR. COHN: Well, Your Honor, in - - - in
Worley, this court - - - and - - - and Worley is
really very instructive on this. In Worley, this
court said the statute is a People-readiness statute,
and that means that time that's caused by a defense
request is not supposed to be charged to the People.

Now that time between March 28 and April 13, if - - - if court congestion had delayed the proceedings due to a People's request, that is definitely charged to the People and this court has said so in Smith.

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On the other hand, if court congestion delays a proceeding because of a defense request, the Appellate Division has held in other cases, and in this case - - - and - - - and the - - - the rule logically follows from Worley that that is part of the defense request and must be charged to the defense. In - - in Worley this court said where the defendant has made this "express waiver of the delay, the People are not required to causally trace their lack of readiness to defendant's actions before the court is warranted in excluding the periods".

The People don't have to prove that their lack of readiness has something to do with the defense actions when the delay is caused by the court - - - when the delay is caused by the defense request. Here, the delay is caused by the defense request. The - - - if the defendant had agreed to the March 16 date requested by the People or they had showed up on the March 16 and then if the People had answered not ready on March 16 and requested March 28 and the court had said it's got to be April 13th, of

1 course all that time gets charged to the - - -JUDGE STEIN: What - - - what if the 2 3 defense said in - - - in this whole conversation the 4 People ask for an adjournment and the defense says 5 okay, and I can be available on March 28th and the court says, well, I can't do it until such-and-such a 6 7 date. Well, then wouldn't it behoove defense counsel 8 to say well, then I - - - I revoke my consent to the 9 adjournment in the first place? Is that what should 10 happen? 11 MR. COHN: Well, they could. They - - -12 they could say, look, the defense attorney has every 13 right to say well, sure, March 16, I'll show up on 14 March 16, forget about my request for March 28th. 15 Coun - - - defense counsel has every right to say 16 that. 17 JUDGE STEIN: No, no. I'm saying - - - no, not a consent to the - - - the adjournment that the 18 19 People requested at all because they can't be there 20 on March 16th. 21 MR. COHN: Oh, well, I mean, the - - - the 22 defense attorney isn't consenting to that first part 23 of the adjournment. The - - - it was March 2nd. 2.4 defense attorney was not consenting to the

adjournment from March 2nd to March 16. That's what

1 the People requested. That's what we admitted in the 2 trial court was chargeable to us. 3 JUDGE GARCIA: Can I ask, following up on that, so you come in on March 2nd and we're not 4 5 ready, we want March 16th, right? MR. COHN: Right. 6 7 JUDGE GARCIA: And you admit this is your 8 time, you're adjourning. You have time on the clock 9 now. 10 MR. COHN: Right. 11 JUDGE GARCIA: Let's say the defense lawyer 12 gets up and says no, I object. Does that end it? I 13 mean do you have a right to that adjournment? Is it 14 the judge's discretion, do you need consent to get 15 that adjournment? What are the rules for the People getting adjournment in a time period where they still 16 17 have time left on the clock? MR. COHN: Well, I don't think that the 18 19 statute says the judge could make us go to trial if 20 we haven't answered ready, so the - - - the statute 21 says the trial - - - the People have six months in 22 the felony case to answer. 23 JUDGE GARCIA: Right. 2.4 MR. COHN: So if - - - if less than six

months of chargeable time has elapsed and we answer

1 not ready, then I think under the statute the judge 2 has to adjourn the case. 3 JUDGE GARCIA: So you get to the 16th. 4 MR. COHN: We get to the 16th. 5 JUDGE GARCIA: The new trial date now is 6 16th, you have to be ready. 7 MR. COHN: We have to be ready and those 8 fourteen days count against us, absolutely. 9 JUDGE GARCIA: Okay. 10 MR. COHN: Absolutely. 11 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, counsel. 12 MR. COHN: All right, thank you. 13 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Mr. Greenburg. MR. GREENBERG: And following up on that 14 15 last question and answer, yes, counsel concedes that 16 the People are charged from March 2nd to March 16th. 17 However, they weren't ready on March 16th. They said they would be. That's the date they asked for. Did 18 19 they file a certificate of readiness on March 16th? 2.0 No. When they came back to court on - - - on April 21 13th were the People ready then? No. When they were 22 ready was in October, so - - - like six or seven 23 months later. So I find it incredibly troubling that

counsel will stand here and blame defense counsel and

say the defense is causing these adjournments because

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1 defense counsel can't be ready on every single date -2 - - can't - - - can't be in court on the date that 3 the People want their case adjourned to. The People have to file an answer of readiness. They have to 4 5 either say in court we're ready or file a certificate. That's what the statute is about. They 6 have six months. They have all the time in the world 7 8 to do that. There are very few recognized exclusions 9 such as defense files a motion and the People need to 10 respond to the motion and the court needs to decide 11 it. We all agree that's excludable. JUDGE GARCIA: I guess so, but then other 12 13 than those - - - those items that are articulated as these are excluded, wouldn't absent one of those 14 15 reasons then in six months they always have to file a certificate of readiness? 16 17 MR. GREENBERG: Yes. JUDGE GARCIA: Six months, that's it? 18 19 MR. GREENBERG: Absolutely. 2.0 JUDGE GARCIA: Other than the reasons that 21 are set, as you said - - -22 MR. GREENBERG: Yes. 23 JUDGE GARCIA: - - - motion practice. 2.4 MR. GREENBERG: Yes, that's the law.

as Judge Pigott said earlier, sometimes at

arraignments - - - and - - - and I practiced in

Manhattan and they do it sometimes in Manhattan as

well - - - the DAs will say at arraignments we're

ready for trial. I don't know if they are or they're

not. I've seen lawyers challenge that, and I've seen

clients get convicted in a week. But, you know, I

don't know that you want to call them on their bluff,

but if they say they're ready and if that is not an

illusory statement of readiness, then, of course,

that stops the clock and then adjournments are

treated differently after that.

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But here for counsel to say that the defense is causing the adjournment to April 13th, for example, because defense counsel said I have a trial on the date that they're asking for, March 16th, so could we have a different date and the judge says, well, I'm going to have to put it off until April, to say that that's the defendant's fault is outrageous, frankly. I mean that's just not the case. This was precipitated by the People. If you look at the language in Smith, the court said, "The adjournments here were in the first instance precipitated by the People's failure to be ready for trial. Other than stating that certain dates were inconvenient, defense counsel never consented to the adjournments and did

1 not participate." So we get back to what does that 2 word participate mean, and I don't think it can mean 3 by saying the word thank you, Judge, or that date is okay, that that means all of a sudden the defense has 4 5 consented to all of this time. It's just not fair. 6 JUDGE GARCIA: So I guess the - - - the 7 argument would be, you know, they have six months 8 plus whatever the excludable time is under the rules 9 you - - - you mentioned, and what they're doing is 10 gaming that by moving the date out and then having 11 the defense have to say that date is no good for me. 12 MR. GREENBERG: Exactly. 13 JUDGE GARCIA: So you're building in extra 14 time - - -15 MR. GREENBERG: Exactly. It doesn't really 16 matter what date the case gets adjourned to. The 17 People can just stop the clock any day they want by 18 filing the certificate saying now we're ready, and 19 they never did that here. 20 JUDGE RIVERA: Do they come - - - do they 21 come into court and just say I want that day? Do 22 they give the defendant's counsel a heads up that I'm 23 going to come in and ask for two or three weeks - - -2.4 MR. GREENBERG: Can they - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: - - - before you come in?

1 No, no, do they as a regular course, I'm just asking. 2 MR. GREENBERG: Sometimes. Sometimes 3 you'll speak to your adversary in - - - in advance 4 and say we - - - are you going to be ready next week, 5 and they say, no, I'm going to ask for a couple 6 weeks, and I'll say fine. You know, I mean that - -7 - that - - - you try to cooperate, by the way. 8 JUDGE RIVERA: Um-hum. 9 MR. GREENBERG: You try to say oh, that 10 date is no good. What's a good date that we can all 11 be here to do the trial? That's not the same as 12 saying I consent to delay my client's trial for 13 another seventeen months. That doesn't make any 14 sense. 15 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, counsel. 16 MR. GREENBERG: Thank you very much. 17 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you. (Court is adjourned) 18 19 20 21 22 23 2.4 25

CERTIFICATION

I, Sara Winkeljohn, certify that the foregoing transcript of proceedings in the Court of Appeals of People v. Scott Barden (Reargument), No. 98 was prepared using the required transcription equipment and is a true and accurate record of the

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