1	COURT OF APPEALS
2	STATE OF NEW YORK
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4	PEOPLE,
5	Respondent,
6	-against-
7	GLENFORD C. HULL, (Papers sealed)
8	Appellant.
9	20 Devile Charact
10	20 Eagle Street Albany, New York 12207
11	April 28, 2016
12	Before:  CHIEF JUDGE JANET DIFIORE
13	ASSOCIATE JUDGE TANET DIFTORE  ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE F. PIGOTT, JR.  ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA
14	ASSOCIATE GODGE GENNT KIVERA  ASSOCIATE JUDGE SHEILA ABDUS-SALAAM  ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE M. FAHEY
15	ASSOCIATE JUDGE MICHAEL J. GARCIA
16	Appearances:
17	JONATHAN I. EDELSTEIN, ESQ. EDELSTEIN & GROSSMAN
18	Attorneys for Appellant 501 5th Avenue, Room 514
19	New York, NY 10017
20	JOHN L. HUBBARD, ADA  DELAWARE COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
21	Attorneys for Respondent
22	1 Courthouse Square Suite #5
23	Delhi, NY 13753
24	
25	Sara Winkeljohn Official Court Transcriber

1 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Next on the calendar is number 81, People v. Glenford C. Hull. 2 3 Counsel. MR. EDELSTEIN: Good afternoon, Your 4 5 Honors; I would like to reserve three minutes for rebuttal. 6 7 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Certainly. 8 MR. EDELSTEIN: May it please the court, my 9 name is Jonathan Edelstein. I represent the 10 defendant-appellant Glenford Hull. Our position is 11 that the opinion of Justice Lynch at the Appellate Division was correct. The record of this case 12 13 supports either of two things: either an accidental discharge or a shot fired with intent to kill, 14 15 nothing in between. Chance Caffery was killed with a shot directly to his forehead from just inches away. 16 17 If the defendant fired that shot accidentally, that 18 supports acquittal or possibly manslaughter in the second degree but not manslaughter in the first. If 19 2.0 he fired the shot intentionally, as the People said 21 in their summation, you don't shoot someone in the 22 forehead and intend to cause serious physical injury. 23 JUDGE RIVERA: But - - - but it is a 2.4

MR. EDELSTEIN: Well - - -

struggle, right?

JUDGE RIVERA: So if it was - - - if the jury thought there was a struggle and he's trying to get out of the struggle, could he not have tried to shoot him in a manner that would seriously injure him so he could escape? He had already made clear that he felt very vulnerable and afraid of the victim.

MR. EDELSTEIN: Except there's no testimony from anybody, including the defendant who was on the stand, that that was his intent, and I would point the court particularly to the Rielly case in which there was very similar - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: The - - - the intent to be determined from the factual circumstances, right?

That's the - - - that's the jury as a trier of fact to make that determination, correct?

MR. EDELSTEIN: Well, there was also a jury in the Rielly case, Your Honor, and the Rielly case involved very similar testimony to this case regarding a struggle over the gun. In Rielly, the - - - there was evidence, including, I believe, the testimony of Rielly, the defendant, that the gun went off during a struggle with the victim, and the Appellate Division said that this is exclusively consistent with acquittal on the ground of accidental discharge that it - - - that the fact that there was

a struggle, in and of itself, is not something that supports man one. Certainly, I think what we learn from the Rielly case, and from others cited in the briefs, is that the fact the evidence refutes a greater charge does not automatically mean that it supports the lesser one. It could support acquittal or a third charge without supporting - - -

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CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: What about Lasdon, counselor? What about Lasdon?

MR. EDELSTEIN: Lasdon?

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Ford, Lasdon.

MR. EDELSTEIN: Oh, Ford.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Um-hum.

MR. EDELSTEIN: Well, the - - - the Ford case involved a testimony that there was a statement that says give up the box or be shot. This was an argument over a radio, and during that course of that, the defendant says give up the box or be shot. It could certainly be inferred from that that the purpose of firing the shot was not to kill the victim but to secure the radio. In addition, the struggle apparently continued for about ten minutes after the shooting, which I think would also support that there was - - that he didn't consider the shooting - - - that the defendant in Ford did not consider the

shooting to be the be all and end all of - - - of the struggle, that he wasn't trying to end the struggle, he was just trying to obtain his radio, and that was his object throughout where there was no similar testimony here.

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And there are a number of cases, including the Kelly case, which the prosecution does not distinguish in its brief and which I would submit, you know, certainly, from the recitation of facts in the habeas decision, involved facts very similar to this, that there was an argument, that the defendant said you're played out, and then fired a single shot from about three feet away, apparently, with very bad aim because he did not hit the person he intended to shoot but instead shot another person and killed them. And the Kelly case, both the federal court and the state court, the Appellate Division, found that there was no place for a man one charge here.

And I would point also that although in Kelly and in some of the other cases cited by both parties, the man one charged was requested by the defendant rather than the prosecution, the standard on appellate review is the same. Regardless of who requested the charge, courts look to whether the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the

defendant supports it. So a case in which a charge is requested by the defendant is equally instructive here to one where, as in this case, it was requested by the prosecution. And I would - - - I would submit that in the face of cases like Rielly and Kelly, that there's - - - was no room in this record for a charge of manslaughter in the first degree.

Now I would like to briefly discuss a couple of the matters cited by the majority. The majority stated that if Mr. Hull had intended to kill, he could have fired the shot while Mr. Caffery was behind the door or while he was charging up the stairs. Now with respect to the door, obviously, when you're on the other side of a door from someone, you don't know exactly where his body is and where each part of his body is. And I would submit that firing a shot from behind a door would be less indicative of intent to kill.

JUDGE FAHEY: So - - - so let me say - - - let me ask this. What you're really asking us to do, then, is to deprive (sic) what's been the depraved indifferent analysis to this particular situation in - - in terms of the way we look at the intent here; is that correct?

MR. EDELSTEIN: Your Honor, I - - - I would

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not suggest that I'm asking the court to apply depraved indifference analysis.

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JUDGE FAHEY: You're asking - - - you're asking us to say that it wasn't - - - that he couldn't have done the crime unless it was intentional, and so there - - - either it has to be murder two or manslaughter two.

 $$\operatorname{MR}.$$  EDELSTEIN: That is what we - - - that is what we suggest.

JUDGE FAHEY: The problem I have with that approach here is - - - in the sufficiency analysis, is - - - is that it would seem any evidence of a struggle over the gun back and forth could be a basis for a jury analysis, and all the cases that we look at, Ford, Oliveri, Stoker (sic), they seem - - - they - - - they're in similar factual patterns, I guess, is what I'm pointing to. In those situations, there seems to be a struggle immediately before the shooting that took place and that was sufficient to establish the necessary intent for manslaughter one. And here, while there - - - there is an admitted struggle on the record, even though your client says I didn't struggle with the gun, there seems to be sufficient proof to establish that there was a struggle so there's a legal sufficiency.

1	MR. EDELSTEIN: Well, Your Honor, we
2	first of all, the way that the lesser included charge
3	analysis has been framed by this court is a
4	sufficiency analysis because you look into whether
5	the evidence in the light most favorable to the
6	defense
7	JUDGE FAHEY: No, I I agree with you
8	on that.
9	MR. EDELSTEIN: Yes.
10	JUDGE FAHEY: That's that's fine.
11	MR. EDELSTEIN: But
12	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Counsel, your light
13	is on. Do you care for an extra moment to move to
14	the Facebook issue?
15	MR. EDELSTEIN: May I answer Judge Fahey's
16	question first? But yes, I would care
17	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: That's your choice.
18	MR. EDELSTEIN: for one extra minute
19	on that.
20	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Go ahead.
21	MR. EDELSTEIN: In what I would
22	submit is that in the Ford case, and in the other
23	cases that are cited by the majority, there was more
24	than a struggle in and of itself. In Ford, as I

discussed before, there's the statement give up the

box or be shot which elucidates the defendant's purpose in firing the shot. In Oliveri, the defendant was hit in the armpit. I think a jury could infer that a shot to the armpit is not intended to be lethal. You know, we - - - we've discussed these cases in the briefs, and we believe that for this reason a struggle in and of itself - - - there's no blanket rule that where there's a struggle a man one charge is appropriate because in Rielly there was also a struggle and the court found that man one was not appropriate.

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CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: We have your point on that.

MR. EDELSTEIN: Okay. Finally, with respect to the Facebook issue, the People did not dispute that a 270.35 issue was a mode of proceedings error, and the Garbutt case so found. So I would submit that any failure to object or even consent by defense counsel was irrelevant.

And what happened here was that the trial court learned of a fact, which all parties agree that it was required to investigate, and then it didn't investigate that. It investigated something else.

It got sidetracked on Facebook posts by the jurors as opposed to the Facebook posts - - -

1 JUDGE RIVERA: So what should the judge have done? 2 3 MR. EDELSTEIN: Well, I think the judge 4 should have started by bringing in Mrs. Kelly (ph.) 5 or at least giving her a call, taking her testimony 6 over the phone, regarding what is this exact Facebook 7 post that started the - - - the dispute rather than getting sidetracked on other ones. 8 9 JUDGE RIVERA: Well, does it matter - - -10 MR. EDELSTEIN: Who made this post? 11 JUDGE RIVERA: Well, does it matter what -12 - - what she says? Doesn't it matter what the jurors 13 say? MR. EDELSTEIN: Well, but she would have 14 15 been able to identify who made this Facebook post 16 because she was the one who reported it. And then -17 18 JUDGE RIVERA: So you're suggesting that 19 other than the two jurors that the judge spoke with 20 may have been involved in this post and that's where 21 the judge failed? MR. EDELSTEIN: Well, this posting was, 22 23 according to Mrs. Kelly, by a juror's family. So by 2.4 interviewing only the jurors and having his clerk 25 look for posts by only the jurors, it didn't find - -

1 - the judge didn't find posts by defendant's families 2 - - - or jurors families. Mrs. Kelly could have said 3 well, the post was made by Mrs. Smith, the husband of 4 Mr. Smith. And then the judge could have called in 5 Mr. Smith and said - - -JUDGE RIVERA: Another juror is your point? 6 7 MR. EDELSTEIN: Yes. Yes. 8 JUDGE RIVERA: Okay. 9 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Okay. Thank you, 10 counsel. 11 MR. EDELSTEIN: Thank you. CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Counsel. 12 13 MR. HUBBARD: May it please the court, John 14 Hubbard for the respondent. Let me talk about 15 Rielly. Rielly could be easily distinguished. 16 Rielly had the victim being shot three times at close 17 range to the head and other vital parts of the body. That doesn't help the defendant here. Let me talk 18 19 about Kelly, just to mention Kelly. Kelly was a case 20 where a defendant pulled a gun in a crowded room, 21 fired the gun at close range, and hit somebody else. 22 The habeas - - - the habeas application there has 23 some facts, and that habeas application indicated 2.4 that there was no evidence that the defendant

intended only to scare - - -

1	JUDGE RIVERA: Well, that's certainly not
2	what the prosecutor said on summation, right?
3	MR. HUBBARD: Judge, you're talking about
4	Kelly?
5	JUDGE RIVERA: Didn't the prosecutor say on
6	summation no, in this case.
7	MR. EDELSTEIN: Oh, no. In summation we
8	argued
9	JUDGE RIVERA: In this case, didn't the
10	prosecutor
11	MR. HUBBARD: we argued murder two.
12	JUDGE RIVERA: Yeah.
13	MR. HUBBARD: We argued murder murder
14	two. You have the shot range
15	JUDGE RIVERA: Well, perhaps I
16	misunderstood the summation. I thought the summation
17	was there's no way you could see this other than
18	_
19	MR. HUBBARD: Right.
20	JUDGE RIVERA: because he shot him
21	right in between the eyes.
22	MR. HUBBARD: Yes. Yeah, they argued that,
23	Judge. But again, they're dealing with the trial
24	evidence, and the trial evidence was evidence of a
25	struggle. The defendant took the stand and talked

about having slippery hands because he was preparing meat. The defend - - - the - - - the 911 calls came in about hey, I shot my friend.

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JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, that's - - - that's all logical. I don't - - - I don't find anything extraordinary about that. I - - - to follow up on what Judge Fahey had asked your opponent, we went through this depraved indifference stuff and - - and giving a charge to the jury that really looked like a way - - - a way to - - - almost like a mercy thing, you know. Yeah, he - - - he really killed him but there's oth - - - there's factors so we'll do depraved indifference thinking they were - - - they were doing a - - - a reverse charge. And so we had cases where the defense then came in and said I've been convicted of depraved indifference murder. I intended it. It was my goal to - - - to murder. Therefore, I walk out of this prison because I was acquitted of murder and - - - and convicted of something I didn't do. The facts, in this case, are you say, the People say, murder, murder, murder.

MR. HUBBARD: Yeah.

JUDGE PIGOTT: He's saying accident, accident, accident. And somehow, in between, there's this thought that oh, maybe he shot to wound or - - -

1 or to seriously injure and there's no - - - where's -2 - - where's, other than speculation, you know, that 3 he may have shot, you know, I can't - - - I can't get 4 there. I'm wondering where we get that, where the 5 intent comes from? 6 MR. HUBBARD: Judge, we're only left with 7 what the record is. 8 JUDGE PIGOTT: Exactly. 9 MR. HUBBARD: So it's got to be speculation 10 to a certainty and advocacy of it. 11 JUDGE PIGOTT: No, it's - - - I don't mean 12 to fence - - - fence with you on that, but I mean, 13 you say here are the facts that show that he intended 14 to seriously injure, and I'm having trouble finding 15 that. 16 MR. HUBBARD: Okay. 17 JUDGE RIVERA: Or facts from which the jury could infer. 18 19 MR. HUBBARD: I'm sorry? 20 JUDGE RIVERA: Or facts from which the jury 21 could infer the intent? 22 MR. HUBBARD: Again, you see right after 23 the shooting, the - - - the first thing that the 2.4 defendant does is calls 911 and says I shot my 25 They instruct him - - friend.

1 JUDGE PIGOTT: Yeah. MR. HUBBARD: Well, I think it goes to 2 3 state of mind. It certainly does. JUDGE PIGOTT: I can call my friend and say 4 5 I shot a deer. I mean - - - that doesn't mean I'm -6 - - I'm admitting to a - - -7 MR. HUBBARD: I agree. JUDGE PIGOTT: - - - a crime. 8 9 MR. HUBBARD: I agree. But it's part of 10 the thing that the jury heard, you know. That - - -11 JUDGE PIGOTT: I know. But on that - - -12 maybe I'm not being clear. That's okay. 13 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Was there any testimony about this defendant aiming to shoot the -14 15 - - the victim in any way or that he didn't aim to 16 shoot anyone? 17 MR. HUBBARD: This is what the defendant says. The defendant said he - - - I had my gun, I -18 - - I went to get my gun, I came back, I had it with 19 20 my hands down. He exits his locked apartment door to 21 look down the landing to see who's there. His 22 twelve-year-old daughter's next to him. He says that 23 the defend - - - the victim comes up in a rage and 2.4 goes after his neck, and he says he - - - he raises

his arms, there's some contact with his right hand,

1 the gun goes off. That's what the defendant said. And I would sub - - - submit it's - - -2 3 JUDGE GARCIA: But, counsel, doesn't he 4 also say I wasn't aiming there. I wasn't aiming for 5 nothing. I just wanted to stop his forward movement? 6 MR. HUBBARD: He absolutely said that, 7 Judge. It's in the context. I think, and rightfully 8 pointed out by my colleague, of raising the arm - - -9 raise - - - during the - - - he was raising his arms 10 to defend himself. So if you have no other 11 questions, I'll sit down. 12 JUDGE RIVERA: Do you want to address the 13 Facebook issue? JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Yeah. 14 15 MR. HUBBARD: Judge, Facebook issue. 16 the court atte - - -17 JUDGE RIVERA: I mean shouldn't the judge have tried to find out the source of the postings? 18 19 Perhaps it was not the two jurors that the judge had 20 spoken with? 21 MR. HUBBARD: My - - - my recollection is a 22 court attendant says my wife sees something on 23 Facebook. It's a - - - it's a posting by a juror 2.4 that they're hung or something. He - - - the judge

instructs the clerk to look at all the Facebook

pages, okay, and finds the two jurors who presumably had some connection on Facebook or mention on Facebook. The nature of the posts were hey, I got grand jury today - - or, I'm sorry, I got jury duty. I'm going to - - it's going to be a long day, something like that. He brings them both in, does the inquiries, asks defense counsel, are you satisfied and defense counsel says yes, the defendant says yes.

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CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Is this a mode of proceedings error, counsel?

MR. HUBBARD: Judge, probably it is.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you.

MR. EDELSTEIN: Your Honors, first of all, as to the Facebook, the - - - page 532 of the appendix is very clear that the report that Richard (ph.) Kelly received from his wife indicated that there were posts by family members of jurors. "FYI, family members of jurors have been posting jury updates on Facebook. There is - - exclamation point, "There is one juror that is holding out." So it was very clear from the report that was given to the court that these were posts by family members, not by the jurors themselves. And I would submit that the court then got sidetracked and did not

1	perform the investigation.
2	JUDGE RIVERA: Could have said if it
3	had said friends of the juror? If if the
4	postings or if the statement was friends of the
5	jurors
6	MR. EDELSTEIN: Well
7	JUDGE RIVERA: as opposed to family
8	member or members?
9	MR. EDELSTEIN: I would submit that the
10	judge would still be required to ascertain the
11	information easily available to him by calling Mrs.
12	Kelly in
13	JUDGE RIVERA: What if it had said I heard
14	there's a hold out? What about that?
15	MR. EDELSTEIN: If it's just Mrs. Kelly
16	saying I heard there's a holdout?
17	JUDGE RIVERA: Yeah.
18	MR. EDELSTEIN: Then call Mrs. Kelly and
19	ask her where did you get that information and she
20	says, well, I'm just hearing things, end of
21	investigation.
22	JUDGE PIGOTT: Why why would it be
23	the end of the investigation? Aren't they all under
24	under direction not to discuss the case with
25	anyone?

1 MR. EDELSTEIN: Well, they - - -2 JUDGE PIGOTT: I mean you can't - - - you 3 can't go him and kick it around with your kids and 4 you - - - and you can't talk to your neighbor - - -5 MR. EDELSTEIN: Yeah. JUDGE PIGOTT: - - - about it, either, can 6 7 you? 8 MR. EDELSTEIN: They - - - they certainly 9 are, Your Honor. I guess what I was suggesting is 10 that if the investigation - - - if the judge were to 11 call Mrs. Kelly and Mrs. Kelly could not produce a 12 name and said, you know, I - - - this is just buzz 13 around town, and there was no way - - - you know, if 14 the investigation led to a dead end and there was no 15 way to trace it to anybody - - -16 JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, let's assume there's a 17 buzz around town that there may be a holdout juror or 18 something. I mean isn't the judge supposed to call 19 everybody in and say maybe you forgot - - -20 MR. EDELSTEIN: Yeah. 21 JUDGE PIGOTT: But let me emphasize the 22 fact that you're not to discuss this case with anyone 23 until you've reached a verdict? 2.4 MR. EDELSTEIN: Oh, yes, Your Honor, or

possibly even to call in each individual juror and

1	ask whether he's the holdout.
2	JUDGE PIGOTT: Okay.
3	MR. EDELSTEIN: Or ask one of them to
4	identify a holdout.
5	JUDGE RIVERA: Or or ask them if they
6	had participated in Facebook postings related to the
7	case; is that what the judge should have done?
8	MR. EDELSTEIN: Correct, Your Honor. He
9	could have done any or all of those things. But I
10	think that he
11	JUDGE RIVERA: What what was the
12	judge judge's directive regarding the use of
13	social media during the trial to the jurors? Do you
14	know?
15	MR. EDELSTEIN: Offhand, I don't this
16	was a trial in, I believe, 2006.
17	JUDGE RIVERA: Um-hum.
18	MR. EDELSTEIN: So I think this was before
19	directives regarding social media became common. I
20	don't recall that there was one, although I would
21	certainly be able to look in the record and see if
22	the court wants to hear further from me on that.
23	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, counsel.
24	(Court is adjourned)

## CERTIFICATION

I, Sara Winkeljohn, certify that the foregoing transcript of proceedings in the Court of Appeals of People v. Glenford C. Hull, No. 81 was prepared using the required transcription equipment and is a true and accurate record of the proceedings.

Considerich and

Signature: \_\_\_\_\_

Agency Name: eScribers

Address of Agency: 700 West 192nd Street

Suite # 607

New York, NY 10040

Date: May 2, 2016