Official Court Transcriber

1	COURT OF APPEALS
2	STATE OF NEW YORK
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4	PEOPLE,
5	Respondent,
6	-against- No. 208
7	JAMES MILLER,
8	Appellant.
9	20 Engle Street
10	20 Eagle Street Albany, New York 12207
11	November 17, 2016
12	Before:
13	CHIEF JUDGE JANET DIFIORE ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE F. PIGOTT, JR.
14	ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA ASSOCIATE JUDGE SHEILA ABDUS-SALAAM
15	ASSOCIATE JUDGE LESLIE E. STEIN ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE M. FAHEY
16	ASSOCIATE JUDGE MICHAEL J. GARCIA
17	Appearances:
18	DANIELLA P. MAIN, ESQ. ALSTON & BIRD LLP
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22	BRONX DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE Attorneys for Respondent
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24	
	Meir Sabbah

1 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: The next matter on this afternoon's calendar is appeal number 208, the 2 3 People of the State of New York v. James Miller. 4 Good afternoon, counsel. 5 MS. MAIN: Good afternoon, Your Honors. May it please the court, Daniella Main of Alston and 6 7 Bird, in conjunction with the Office of the Appellate 8 Defender, for the Appellant Mr. James Miller. 9 We request two minutes for rebuttal, 10 please. 11 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: You may have two 12 minutes. 13 MS. MAIN: Your Honors, the Constitutional 14 right to a jury trial means nothing without a fair 15 and impartial jury. 16 The trial court here deprived Mr. Miller of that 17 right when it shut down his one and only opportunity to ensure that the jurors in his case could apply an 18 19 incredibly difficult law on the single, most 2.0 incriminating, and powerful piece of evidence against him. 21 JUDGE GARCIA: But what would the question 22 have been? 23 MS. MAIN: The question that counsel asked 2.4 the court to pose was, can you instruct the jurors,

or I could do it, that there are rules that relate to

the use of a defendant's statements. 1 2 And he specifically wanted to wean out any 3 jurors who could not or would not accept the 4 proposition that you would have to disregard an 5 involuntary confession under New York Law. JUDGE PIGOTT: I couldn't tell, was there a 6 7 suppression hearing in this case? MS. MAIN: No, Your Honor, there was a 8 9 Huntley hearing beforehand. But - - - where defense, 10 you know, did reference the voluntariness, that it 11 would challenge the voluntariness of these 12 statements, if they were to come in at trial. 13 JUDGE PIGOTT: You moved to suppress the 14 statement, as to being involuntary? MS. MAIN: We did challenge the 15 16 voluntariness of this, yes. 17 JUDGE PIGOTT: And you lost. MS. MAIN: Well, there was enough 18 19 reasonable doubt - - - I mean, the statements were 2.0 voluntary enough beyond a reasonable doubt to come in 21 and be an issue for the jury at trial. 22 JUDGE PIGOTT: All right. 23 MS. MAIN: So - - -2.4 JUDGE GARCIA: But going back to the 25 question. I read then that the judge's ultimate

charge on that issue to the jury, and it's pretty
extensive on what "involuntary" means. So I'm trying
- - - I'm having some trouble envisioning, you know,
voir dire, which is relatively short process, but
what would the articulation of a question be that
could it capture what is a pretty lengthy and
technical legal instruction?

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MS. MAIN: Your Honor, the judge could have said, I don't know what evidence is going to come in at trial, and I don't want you to speculate about this, but there are rules under the laws of New York for how you can consider a statement that is made by a defendant. Could you apply the principle that, you know, under our laws, a statement that is coerced cannot be considered as evidence for any reason.

JUDGE PIGOTT: Where do you draw that line though? I mean, is it just confessions or statements of a defendant, or could you say, you know, there's going to be evidence brought in by the People here, but the main complainant has psychological problems. And would you keep an open mind, you know, when I question him or her about the fact that they've seen a psychiatrist for six months; can you - - - can you - - - or is that going to make it unable for you to sit as a juror? Can you address that?

MS. MAIN: Well, if the mental fitness of 1 2 the defendant is an issue at trial, then presumably 3 this would apply to that too. You know, we're not 4 arguing - - -5 JUDGE PIGOTT: Complainant. I'm saying, 6 you're attacking the People's case of - - -7 MS. MAIN: Well, I mean, if the - - - if 8 the complainant does have some mental issues, and 9 that is an anticipated defense, to challenge that, 10 then arguably, yes. But, you know, when you have - -11 JUDGE PIGOTT: And if - - - and if they 12 13 have a person who is a claimed eyewitness, but you're 14 going to have testimony that that eyewitness did not 15 have the point of view, and did not have the time to 16 make a good ID, can you bring that up in jury 17 selection? MS. MAIN: Well, Your Honor, that wouldn't 18 19 be, you know, a law that has to apply to that; that's 20 just basically the jury deciding whether they believe 21 the testimony of that eyewitness. 22 JUDGE PIGOTT: We have some case law that 23 says that, you know, that eyewitness testimony has to 2.4 be scrutinized very, very carefully, because - - -

particularly if it's a one eyewitness.

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MS. MAIN: Sure. And so, you know, whether they could apply, you know, the law to evaluate witness's testimony, yes. But when you're talking about getting into the specifics of the facts of the evidence that's going to come out on trial, you know, that's where - - - that's not appropriate for voir dire, but that's not what defense counsel here was trying to do. He was not trying to - - -

JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: But my understanding of what was happening here is that the People had not decided whether to present our submit this statement to the jury - - -

MS. MAIN: The pro - - - I'm sorry.

JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: - - - at the point where this voir dire was going to have to happen, and the judge apparently made a ruling that he didn't want to taint the jury because the statement may never come in.

So if that had not been the case, it was clear that this statement was going to come in, would you be able to - - - or ask, or would defense counsel be able to ask the questions that your client wanted - - defense wanted the jury to hear?

MS. MAIN: Well, Your Honor, the scope of voir dire and, you know, what is appropriate on voir

dire is not determined by the prosecution, and it's not determined based on the prosecution's stated level of certainty.

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And it's important to note that the prosecution merely said that it was not definite that these statements were going to come in. That could mean anything from probably to almost certainly will.

And here - - -

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Well, the prosecutor didn't mention it, right, in her opening, correct?

MS. MAIN: Did not mention the statement?

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: That it was going to be - - - she didn't - - - we know that prosecutors have obligations in opening statements, right, you have to mention - - - talk about the nature of the charges, the facts that you expect to prove, the evidence to support that, and here, the prosecutor didn't mention that this might - - - there might be - - - there was going to be a confession here; we're going to admit this - - - this man's confession,

MS. MAIN: Right. And - - -

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: - - - in her opening statement. So doesn't that support that the People we're intending to proceed on a theory that this was

an eyewitness case, it wasn't a confession case.

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MS. MAIN: Well, the sincerity of the prosecution's statement that she was not definite is not in dispute here. And it doesn't - - - she doesn't have to be insincere about it for this rule.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Then why - - - why would she do that up front? I'm not following what your argument is.

MS. MAIN: Well, I - - - I think that maybe the prosecution wanted to keep, you know, their options open, which is entirely fine. But the defense is entitled to do the same thing too. If there is at least a reasonable possibility that this will come in at trial, and it is relevant to the case, then voir dire should be allowed.

And it's important to note that this is a defendant's full confession to murder. It's the top count of the indictment, to murder two. And the voluntariness of that statement was - - - was the defense; it was absolutely critical to the defense.

And this is not some law that is easy to follow; this is, can you disregard this incredibly powerful and uniquely overwhelming piece of evidence, if you find it to be coerced.

This is something that we know from - - -

1 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Is there anything 2 exculpatory in that statement? 3 MS. MAIN: Your Honor, it's our position that there is not, and to the extent that there is 4 5 anything, it is of de minimis value because the statement admits to shooting the victim in the back 6 7 multiple times as he ran away. 8 Given the duty to retreat, that would not 9 justify a self-defense charge, and it didn't justify 10 one here. Instead, the jury was - - - defense 11 counsel was precluded from asking any and all 12 questioning as to whether this jury could apply this 13 incredibly difficult law on this determinative piece of evidence against the client. 14 15 JUDGE GARCIA: Would the judge ever have 16 the discretion then to say no to a request to ask the 17 jury if they could follow a particular legal instruction? 18 19 MS. MAIN: If - - - if there is - - - if 20 it's an issue or, you know, an area of law that is 21 critical to the defense, that is likely to come in at 22 trial, and particularly where a jury might struggle

JUDGE GARCIA:

with applying this law, it should be allowed.

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MS. MAIN: And this court had said in

Right.

Boulware, in Stewart, that, you know, the - - - a court's discretion is not boundless. And you have to - - -

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JUDGE GARCIA: Understood. I'm just trying to think of how would we apply this in the future. I mean, critical to the defense, and - - - these all seem fairly subjective calls to be made, or discretionary calls, better, by a trial judge. So -

MS. MAIN: Well, this was an anticipated legal defense. He was challenging the voluntariness of the statement. And in Stewart, this court said that when a court determines the scope of voir dire, it needs to take into account certain factors such as anticipated legal defenses, how much of the voir dire the court is going to engage into, and the nature and seriousness of these charges.

JUDGE GARCIA: Right. So I think what I'm struggling with a bit though is, are we going to have a bucket of potential legal charges that we say, if you ask, you get this question, or are we going to have ones you always do, and then some you might, and some you don't. It would be, it seems to me, a hard application, going forward, other than discretionary call based on the facts, and anticipated evidence,

and legal issues in the case that's more properly made by a trial court judge conducting voir dire.

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MS. MAIN: Well, Your Honor, if this is going to whether the jury can apply the law in a case that is critical to the defense, relevant to the defense, is likely to come in, this court has already held in Boulware, in Stewart, that those are precisely the types of questions that are appropriate on voir dire. Counsel should always be entitled to ask questions - - -

JUDGE STEIN: Well, what about the - - - a justification defense? What if the defense was justification, does the court then have to grant a request by the defense counsel to voir dire jurors on their ability to follow that?

Even if somebody, you know, did a terrible thing and - - - but the judge is going to instruct you that there may be circumstances under which that, you know, that's justified. Can you follow that instruction? Why wouldn't that apply to literally every defensive instruction in the case?

MS. MAIN: Well, ironically, Your Honor, the court did allow that question in here. Even though the purported self defense wouldn't have justified the charge, the defense was willing to take

that risk that those statements wouldn't come in, because it was so likely that they would, that counsel wanted to make sure that anticipated legal defenses were given to the jury.

And here, this is not some, you know, tangential piece of evidence on some, you know, something that has a remote possibility of coming in.

This is a defendant's murder - - - a confession to murder in his murder trial, and this is an incredibly difficult law for juries to follow.

And to instruct jurors, at the end of the case, after they have heard and seen the defendant tell them how he shot the victim in the back, and then ask them to apply this law, is an abuse of discretion. It infringed on the constitutional right to ensure that your verdict is given by a fair and impartial jury, and based on a fair application of the law.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, counsel.

MS. MAIN: Thank you.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Counsel.

MS. FARRINGTON: May it please the court.

Lori Farrington for the Office of the Bronx County

District Attorney.

Your Honors, the trial - - -

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JUDGE RIVERA: Counsel, if a - - - if a 1 2 prosecutor does not mention a confession during the 3 opening, does that preclude the prosecutor from submitting that evidence in his case in chief? 4 5 MS. FARRINGTON: No, it does not. The issue here is whether the trial court's determination 6 7 not to allow this particular questioning on voir dire was a reasonable exercise of its discretion, and it 8 9 clearly was. 10 Now, both Boulware and Stewart stress the broad 11 discretion that the trial court has in determining the boundaries of voir dire. 12 13 JUDGE PIGOTT: How come you hadn't made up 14 your mind whether you're going to use a confession 15 made by the defendant by the time you are picking the 16 jury? 17 MS. FARRINGTON: Well, there were numerous 18 reasons that the prosecutor might not want to use 19 this statement. First of all, there was the issue of 2.0 justification and setting up a possible justification 21 defense. And second - - -

JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, I get that, but, you know, what strikes me is that the DAs are always saying, we're not here to convict the defendant; we're here to see that justice is done. And the idea

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1 that, while there are some favorable things in the 2 confession, therefore we're not going to use it, 3 doesn't make sense to me. 4 And I - - - I just - - - I couldn't imagine not 5 putting this on. Maybe, you know, as you said, there 6 might - - - there might be two or three reasons. 7 MS. FARRINGTON: Well, the - - -8 JUDGE PIGOTT: Go ahead. 9 MS. FARRINGTON: I apologize. The second 10 reason was that it also brought up potentially prior 11 crimes by the victim, which the prosecutor - - - it's 12 very reasonable to not want the jury to be focusing 13 on whether or not your victim did something two years 14 ago. 15 JUDGE PIGOTT: Wouldn't you - - -16 MS. FARRINGTON: Justice is - - -17 JUDGE PIGOTT: Wouldn't you have exercised 18 that at the time that the suppression hearing was 19 being conducted or before you want to introduce and 2.0 say, Judge, there's stuff in here that shouldn't come 21 into the jury, we'd like to have this excised. 22 MS. FARRINGTON: That is a possibility. 23 JUDGE PIGOTT: Okay. 2.4 MS. FARRINGTON: But in this case, the

prosecutor wanted to potentially keep the statement

out in its entirety. And the First Department made the factual finding that the prosecutor was unsure as to whether or not she was going to use the statement.

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JUDGE GARCIA: But even if we assume that, wouldn't that really be the defendant's call then? I mean, if you're going to ask the question, I mean, I assume the concern, as I read the transcript, is the jury is going to hear about this confession and it may never come in, and they'll be thinking, oh, there's a confession out there.

But if the defense is asking for that, who cares - - -

MS. FARRINGTON: Well - - -

JUDGE GARCIA: - - - if you're going to use it or not, because they are willing to take the risk that you are, and they wanted to question the jury about it.

MS. FARRINGTON: Well, the trial court also had to consider a possible prejudice to the People, and now forcing the People's hands to introduce evidence that perhaps they were not planning on doing.

JUDGE STEIN: But couldn't the question had been asked in such a way that it didn't suggest that there was or was not a statement and a confession?

1 MS. FARRINGTON: Perhaps. But again - - -JUDGE STEIN: Would that have solved the 2 3 prejudice to the People problem - - -4 MS. FARRINGTON: There is - - -5 JUDGE STEIN: - - - without - - - without 6 prejudicing the defendant? In other words, wouldn't 7 that have been a better challenge - - - not a 8 challenge - - - balance? 9 MS. FARRINGTON: The trial court's concern 10 was exactly what you're saying. Getting the jurors not only to speculate about the contents of the 11 12 statement, but whether or not voluntariness was even 13 going to be an issue. 14 JUDGE STEIN: But that's so simple. I 15 mean, there are a lot of ways that could have been 16 done. 17 MS. FARRINGTON: There is - - -18 JUDGE STEIN: Sometimes, in these cases, 19 the People have statements by the defendant, and 2.0 there may or may not be such a statement here, but if 21 there is, could you, you know, follow my 22 instructions, so on, and so forth. What - - - what's 23 the problem with that? 2.4 MS. FARRINGTON: We're not saying that that

could not be done. What we are saying is that the

1 trial court's decision in this particular case, on 2 these particular facts, was a reasonable exercise of 3 its discretion. JUDGE STEIN: Well, that is indeed the 4 5 question, whether it was reasonable or whether it was 6 an abuse. And what I'm getting at is, if it could 7 easily have protected the People from prejudice 8 without leaving it open to possibly substantial 9 prejudice to the defendant, doesn't - - - doesn't 10 that make it an abuse of discretion not to do it? 11 MS. FARRINGTON: No, because the trial 12 court was concerned clearly that such an instruction 13 would not alleviate the prejudice to the People and 14 would force the People's hand. So in this particular 15 case, that is the prejudice - - -JUDGE STEIN: But is that a reasonable 16 17 concern, if it can be properly articulated, easily? 18 MS. FARRINGTON: I think it's a very 19 reasonable concern, yes. I think - - -2.0 JUDGE GARCIA: You could say, I give - - -21 I ask this question to every jurors - - - juror I, 22 you know, speak to, whether it's a confession case or 23 not. 2.4 Why would they think that there's anything

particular coming in here?

1 MS. FARRINGTON: Well, again, as the trial 2 court stated, there's not only the issue of the 3 statement, there's the issue of whether they are even 4 going to challenge the voluntariness of the 5 statement, or whether they are going to challenge the 6 statement in another way - - -7 JUDGE PIGOTT: I wonder if part - - -8 MS. FARRINGTON: - - - and that was another 9 one of the trial court's concerns in this particular 10 case. 11 JUDGE PIGOTT: Part of their argument is 12 that it sounds like the judge is favoring the People 13 in this case, because they're saying, well, it's up to the DA to decide this, and therefore I'm going to 14 15 impede the defense from - - - from questioning these 16 jurors because they have made a decision that's an 17 equivocal one at this point. And it makes it sound 18 like the judge is being unbalanced. 19 MS. FARRINGTON: Well, first, we have to 2.0 remember that there was a very detailed instruction 21 given at the end of the case here regarding 22 voluntariness. And second - - -23 JUDGE PIGOTT: That was at the end. 2.4 was at the end, right? We're - - -

MS. FARRINGTON:

Yes.

JUDGE PIGOTT: We're still picking the jury.

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MS. FARRINGTON: Second - - -

JUDGE STEIN: The issue is whether they could follow that instruction. So instruction or not, the issue is whether they could follow it. And that's - - and that's what a defendant is trying to screen for.

MS. FARRINGTON: Yes. And that was also addressed in the discussion with defense counsel, when the judge specifically said, I'm not seeing any jurors who are expressing any concerns with following the court's instructions.

And again, there's no bright line rule that if the People say, we're not sure, we're going to introduce it, that the trial court cannot allow it. But it's based on the facts of every case. And in this particular case, it was a reasonable exercise of discretion. And again, we point to Diaz, which is very similar to this case.

And the problem in Diaz was, again, that the court was worried about the speculation of the jurors. And sometimes, the trial court may feel that an instruction not to speculate is not enough in this particular case, based on these particular facts.

JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Isn't that - - - isn't

1 that exactly the problem here, counsel? You're 2 saying that at the end, the judge gave the 3 instruction about the voluntariness or involuntariness of the statement, and we'd expect the 4 5 jurors to follow that instruction. But in the 6 beginning, you don't want to give anything to the 7 jurors because you don't know if they're going to 8 follow the instruction, or they're going to 9 speculate, or they're going to do something else. 10 MS. FARRINGTON: Well, I think the reverse

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MS. FARRINGTON: Well, I think the reverse could also be true. If the jurors can follow the instruction not to speculate, why do we have any reason to believe they cannot follow a detailed instruction on the voluntariness of the statement?

So I think that argument can cut both ways.

JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Well, I agree. But that's why I'm saying, the judge - - - the judge's concern about speculation could have been - - -

MS. FARRINGTON: Well - - -

JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: - - - dealt with an instruction about speculation from the beginning, not, you know, not wait until the end.

MS. FARRINGTON: Another factor that was important in the trial court's decision was that the issue of voluntary versus involuntary statements, and

1 I'm paraphrasing the trial court, that was an issue 2 already in the public consciousness, and that he felt 3 that the instruction and the ability of jurors to do 4 that was an issue that had been raised, and the 5 jurors do not generally have a problem following that 6 type of instruction. 7 JUDGE RIVERA: But it is not - - - it's not 8 merely educational; it's to confirm, right, that the 9 jurors will not let their understanding or 10 misunderstanding impede their ability to deliberate

MS. FARRINGTON: Yes. However, again - - 
JUDGE RIVERA: So what I'm saying is, you

can know a lot of things.

MS. FARRINGTON: I'm sorry?

in a way that's fair and just.

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JUDGE RIVERA: Right. Any perspective juror can know many things. Right. We can assume they know a great deal of things. But that doesn't mean that a judge doesn't go through the exercise of asking questions and inquiring. Right?

MS. FARRINGTON: They do. And in many cases, they do. But again, they have the discretion to determine what is relevant, what the prejudice to each party might be, and which - - what outweighs - - whether the value of that question outweighs the

potential prejudice to one of the parties.

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And he also mentioned potential prejudice to the defendant. Would the jurors speculate that this was an inculpatory statement, therefore being kept out by the defense. And the trial court weighed the prejudice versus the value of asking the question, and in its discretion, made this determination.

JUDGE RIVERA: Then should the judge do that if the defendant has already made that calculated risk?

MS. FARRINGTON: Yes. That is the job of the trial court, and that is mentioned in, I believe, Stewart and Boulware, that the trial court's function is the same as it is during trial; to weigh the prejudice versus probative value. And that's exactly what the trial court did here.

And again, at the end, gave a very detailed instruction about which the jurors had no questions.

So - - and also in this analysis, there was no prejudice to the defendant. And it is clear that you need prejudice to the defendant based on Jean, and Stewart, and Pepper, and there was no prejudice here.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, Ms. Farrington.

MS. FARRINGTON: Thank you.

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CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Ms. Main?

MS. MAIN: Your Honors, when the court said he wasn't seeing any jurors that wouldn't be able to follow these instructions, no questions have been asked on voir dire yet. And the reason that this could be in the public consciousness is because false confessions are one of the leading causes of wrongful convictions, which shows that jurors - - -

And isn't Ms. Farrington right that you've got a jury that - - - you started out by saying it was a very difficult area of the law, and it is. So why wouldn't we leave it to the judge, and - - - and let the confession come in or statement come in, and then that the judge handle it after - - - after it's been handed at the time, before the jury deliberates?

MS. MAIN: Because by the time that you ask the question after the statement has come in, you have no idea whether that - - - in one or twelve of those jurors are of the mindset that, I don't believe someone under any circumstances would confess to something they didn't do, or I might be able to think that a statement is coerced, but if I believe that it's truthful, I'm not going to be able to disregard

it, and that's what the law requires.

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So un - - - and for - - - under these circumstances, for the court to just choose to suppress the Constitutional right to ensure that these jurors could follow this law in favor of the fear that there might be potential juror speculation, in the unlikely event the statements don't come in, is an abuse of discretion. And I'm unclear what prejudice would - - how that prejudice would go to the prosecution if - - -

JUDGE PIGOTT: You know, in Federal Court,

I have it on fairly good advice, that they don't let

you talk to the jurors at all. I mean, the court

does it all. You know, and asks all the questions

and - - so in terms of a Constitutional right to

talk to the jurors, it's not that.

MS. MAIN: Right. Well, in fact, Your

Honor, the defense counsel said, I would like you to
ask the jurors, or maybe I could do it. So, you

know, he asked if the court could just instruct the
jury, you know, in the same way that it had done
previously, just to ensure that those jurors who

could not disregard a confession, even if they found
it to be involuntary, were not on the panel that
decided whether this person was guilty of this crime.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, counsel.

1		MS		MAI	IN:	Thank	you,	Your	Honors.	
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1	CERTIFICATION
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