1	COURT OF APPEALS
2	STATE OF NEW YORK
3	PEOPLE,
4	Respondent,
5	
6	-against- No. 114
7	MARY ANNE GRADY FLORES,
8	Appellant.
9	20 Eagle Street Albany, New York October 11, 2017
1 1	Before:
11	CHIEF JUDGE JANET DIFIORE
12	ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA ASSOCIATE JUDGE LESLIE E. STEIN
13	ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE M. FAHEY
14	ASSOCIATE JUDGE MICHAEL J. GARCIA ASSOCIATE JUDGE ROWAN D. WILSON
	ASSOCIATE JUDGE PAUL FEINMAN
15	
16	Appearances:
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24	
25	Sara Winkeljohr Official Court Transcriber



1	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: The next matter on this
2	afternoon's calendar is appeal number 114, the People of
3	the State of New York v. Mary Anne Grady Flores.
4	Good afternoon, counsel.
5	MR. SALISBURY: Good afternoon, Your Honor; Lance
6	Salisbury on behalf of Appellant Mary Anne Grady Flores.
7	I'd like to reserve two minutes for rebuttal, please.
8	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Two minutes, sir.
9	MR. SALISBURY: The central issue in this case is
10	the invalid order of protection.
11	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Mr. Salisbury, we recently
12	decided People v. Smith.
13	MR. SALISBURY: Correct, Your Honor.
14	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: And we held that the filing
15	of an affidavit of errors is a jurisdictional requirement.
16	MR. SALISBURY: Correct. This is
17	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: How do we
18	MR. SALISBURY: Sorry.
19	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: get by Smith here?
20	MR. SALISBURY: This is a pre-Smith case. This
21	appeal began percolating before Smith. At the time of this
22	case, the law was in a in a state of flux. That's
23	reflected in the in the record here. You see
24	appellant was relying in part, in fact, upon the OCA, the
25	2008 OCA memo, in the instructions from the town court

which indicated you should not file and - - - and - -
JUDGE STEIN: That happened in Smith, too, didn't

it?

MR. SALISBURY: It - - - well, it's a little different here in that in this case appellant went beyond in a - - in a motion to the county court and requested indicated we are following the case law and everything at the time it indicated not to and requested if this is incorrect please in- - - instruct us and we will go back and file the affidavit of errors.

JUDGE STEIN: If - - if - if we were to find Smith applicable here is there anything that Ms. Flores could do to - - - to have her appeal heard to - - - to extend the time or anything - - -

MR. SALISBURY: I - - -

JUDGE STEIN: - - - that you're aware of?

MR. SALISBURY: Yes. You'll notice in the - - - under, I believe, CPL 460, there's a one-year time period for cause where you can go back and file the affidavit of errors. Here in that motion that was filed well within the one-year time limit. The appellant specifically requested permission to do that. The county court did not entertain that motion, remained silent, the respondent remained silent. I think which goes to the matter of the issue of - - of flux so that if - - if the court was to so

determine that I think you could remand to the lower court, one, to allow the filing of affidavit of errors pursuant to that, and then I guess in terms of - - of judicial efficiency follow then and implement the findings of this court on - - on the merits of the case.

JUDGE RIVERA: So just to clarify is your position then that - - - that the motion that you're talking about is filed within that one-year time frame but that the court never decided the motion?

MR. SALISBURY: The - - - the court remained - - - remained silent on it. The court never answered that - - - that motion. The appellant sought - - - we've raised that issue and laid out the arguments of - - - of how we thought we were proceeding correctly at that time.

JUDGE RIVERA: So you're - - - so you're suggesting if the court views Smith as an obstacle you cannot overcome that since that motion's not decided it should be remanded for a decision on that motion. Is that what you're - - -

MR. SALISBURY: Well, I - - - I think clearly,

yes that the - - - the time period allows for the - the

party to go back and file the affidavit of errors. And

here clearly given the - - - the state of flux the law was

in at that time - - - and we would argue it was more a

procedural matter at that time, had not yet been determined

1	to be a jurisdictional defect, that, yes, the the
2	appellant has to be allowed then to remand to file the
3	affidavit of errors
4	JUDGE WILSON: In county court, did the People
5	object on the grounds that the affidavit of errors was
6	absent?
7	MR. SALISBURY: No, Your Honor. The the
8	first time they've raised that objection is here at
9	at this Court.
10	JUDGE FAHEY: Go ahead. Go ahead. Let's talk
11	about the First Amendment.
12	MR. SALISBURY: Okay.
13	JUDGE FAHEY: All right.
14	MR. SALISBURY: It this order of protection
15	does implicate the First Amendment rights of of the
16	appellant. The - the overly broad nature of the the
17	vague nature of the case of the order of protection,
18	rather, implicates when we look at at the Supreme
19	Court in McCullen, in Schenck, in Madsen
20	JUDGE FAHEY: Well, talk to us a little bit about
21	about the order itself. Does the order identify a
22	victim?
23	MR. SALISBURY: Well, the
24	JUDGE FAHEY: Because it refers to Colonel Evans
25	MR. SALISBURY: The it refers to Colonel

1	Evans, but I think we we find the rationale for the
2	order of protection was Colonel Evans' supporting
3	deposition.
4	JUDGE FAHEY: Um-hmm.
5	MR. SALISBURY: And in that supporting
6	deposition, he doesn't seek an order to protect himself.
7	Indeed, he he discusses the demonstrations that have
8	occurred, you know, at the base gates. And then he states
9	as the authorized representative of the base, I'm seeking
LO	the order of protection to keep the demonstrators away from
L1	the base.
L2	JUDGE FAHEY: What was there any
L3	specificity in the order at all?
L4	MR. SALISBURY: No. There was no
L5	JUDGE FAHEY: Have you compared the order to any
L6	of the Supreme Court cases that that have applied
L7	similar situations where particularly with abortion
L8	rights protesters?
L9	MR. SALISBURY: Right. I think you see there
20	that this this order of protection would clearly fai
21	as being overbroad and and vague on those grounds.
22	If you if you look at Schenck
23	JUDGE FAHEY: Um-hmm.
24	MR. SALISBURY: there the the court
25	overturned the floating buffer zone but it held up

1	held the permanent buffer zone space of fifteen feet from -
2	from the driveway.
3	JUDGE FAHEY: Right. But there but
4	there was specificity in those cases.
5	MR. SALISBURY: Correct. Correct, Your Honor.
6	Now
7	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: So, counsel, the order of
8	protection directed Ms. Grady Flores from being to
9	stay away from the property.
10	MR. SALISBURY: Right.
11	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: She was arrested on the
12	driveway?
13	MR. SALISBURY: She was arrested on the shoulder
14	of the of the roadway adjacent where the driveway
15	meets meets the well, I'm sorry. Let me
16	correct myself. She was not actually arrested there, Your
17	Honor. She was arrested some distance away
18	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: For being there.
19	MR. SALISBURY: for being there, being on -
20	on the shoulder
21	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Right.
22	MR. SALISBURY: taking photographs, Your
23	Honor.
24	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: So I thought that she
25	that it was actually on the property of the base is my

point.

MR. SALISBURY: Well - - -

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: There was an easement. I know there's some discussion about the easement.

MR. SALISBURY: Right.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: My question to you is if she was arrested on the property there does that limit your First Amendment argument?

MR. SALISBURY: No.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: In terms of it being over broad because the order directed her to stay away from the property and she - - - if she was in fact arrested on the property does that narrow the argument?

MR. SALISBURY: Not sufficiently, Your Honor. It

- - - and I think particularly here because of the

confusion over the - - - the base boundaries. And you see

the - - - the instructions of the trial court had given

definition - - - you know, such give some definition where

you see at - - - at - - - in the supplemental appendix I

believe on - - - in page 12 where the trial court agreed

with - - with trial counsel that she had - - - at that

time had a definition of if she was in the roadway she was

adhering to the - the order. As the trial court gained

more information over the course of 2014, that definition

changed. You see at - - - at the end of the case.



Out of time but a little bit differently, they have this order of protection. In those cases, Schenck and some of the others, you get the order, they appeal it as overly broad, it goes up to the Supreme Court. Here she's accused of violating it, right? Is - - is there an obligation to have challenged the order initially? I mean do we want people who have order of protection, let's say it's an assault and then you claim in the assault case hey, you know, it was overly broad. Sorry, you know.

MR. SALISBURY: To answer your question, Your
Honor, she - - - the appellant did - - - did object. I
believe there is - - - there is enough material in this
record for you to make that valid inference. You see, for
instance, appellant went so far as to be one of a - - - of
a group who filed the - - - an Article 78 action from the
underlying case against the order of protection. When you
read the record here, you'll note that the - - - the
prosecution never raised an issue of lack of preservation
and even noted at trial that following arguments on the
motion in the court's decision, that matter was now
preserved - - - reserved for - - - for appellate argument.

JUDGE GARCIA: No. I understand the preservation argument in - - in this case. But my other concern I guess it would be is can you really wait and challenge it,



or in this case you lose on a challenge and then you're accused of violating the order and then you say, no, the order isn't any good. I mean those cases like Schenck, they - - - they appealed the order and said that it's unconstitutional before they were arrested outside of the clinic or wherever it was. This case you're arrested. You already - - - you should have challenged the order before. MR. SALISBURY: Well - -JUDGE GARCIA: Do we really want people coming in and challenging protective orders and all after they violated them or is that a challenge you should make directly? MR. SALISBURY: Well, I believe there was a challenge made directly - - -JUDGE GARCIA: Then why doesn't that bind us here for a court hearing? MR. SALISBURY: It was never - - -

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JUDGE GARCIA: - - - if you lost.

MR. SALISBURY: - - - answered. I believe if you look in the supplemental appendix at page 20 and then pages 24 and 25, you'll see at oral arguments and motions in this case there was discussion on the fact that the trial court had not yet decided the motions made on the October 2012 So there - - - there had been no decision. case.

JUDGE GARCIA: So it was pending?



1	MR. SALISBURY: It was pending.
2	JUDGE GARCIA: That's what we're talking about,
3	it was pending?
4	MR. SALISBURY: Pending.
5	JUDGE GARCIA: So there was no no decision
6	on whether this was a valid order or not?
7	MR. SALISBURY: Correct.
8	JUDGE FAHEY: Since then, though, there
9	there has been a decision on on this, hasn't there,
10	on this type of order? I thought that Onondaga County had
11	dealt with another defendant in a similar situation.
12	MR. SALISBURY: That's correct. The Judge
13	Brunetti decision, a Supreme Court on on exactly the
14	same type of order had determined that it was overly vague
15	and in invalid on on many of the same grounds
16	that that we're raising here.
17	JUDGE FAHEY: Yeah.
18	MR. SALISBURY: So it had had been
19	addressed subsequently.
20	JUDGE FAHEY: Yeah. Well, Mr. Maxwell has
21	something to say about that.
22	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, counsel.
23	MR. SALISBURY: Yeah. Thank you, Your Honor.
24	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Counsel.
25	MR. MAXWELL: Good morning or afternoon,

excuse me.

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CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Good afternoon, sir.

MR. MAXWELL: May it please the court. If I may, I'd like to pick up on that last thread just - - - just to start. In one of the amici briefs there was a reference to Walker v. City of Birmingham, that's in 388 U.S. 307 that talks about that challenging it. And here, it's hard to piece together everything, but it seems to me that most or all of the complaining about the order of protection happened after - - after this arrest, the October issuance of the order followed by the February violation of the order and then going to, in our case, Justice Gilbert in an Article 78, and he denied it. So there was conflicting Article 78s.

JUDGE FAHEY: Well, that's basically a preservation argument, though. And it - - - it seems pretty clear that they brought this up in the omnibus motion, so it - - - it seems to be preserved. Now could it have been done better? Sure. But - - -

MR. MAXWELL: Yeah.

JUDGE FAHEY: - - - you know, the - - - the more interesting point - - - well, there's two things. First is the point that Judge DiFiore brought up and Judge Wilson also mentioned is the county court didn't rule on the motion because the jurisdictional problem is - - - is a



1	stumbling block here I think for us to get into the
2	secondary analysis.
3	MR. MAXWELL: Yeah. On the on the Smith
4	case, the analysis, I admit, I I have been bothered
5	for years waiting for you to come out with that decision
6	because it always every time we do a lower court
7	appeal we're scrambling. And getting the Smith decision
8	around the same time that we got the leave granted
9	JUDGE FAHEY: It was the same day.
LO	MR. MAXWELL: was the yes.
11	JUDGE FAHEY: The Smith decision came out on
L2	- on the 23rd, I think, of June, and that was the same day
L3	that I signed the CLA. Yeah.
L4	MR. MAXWELL: And I brought it up in the brief
L5	because at that point I thought I'd be foolish not to.
16	JUDGE WILSON: But so that is the first
L7	time you brought it up?
L8	MR. MAXWELL: Yes.
L9	JUDGE WILSON: You didn't bring it up in the
20	county court?
21	MR. MAXWELL: Not in I don't think I
22	brought it up in this case. Other cases we talked about
23	it.
24	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Does a jurisdictional
25	effect require a pres vou to bring it up in the

country court?

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MR. MAXWELL: No. Of course not.

JUDGE FAHEY: No. The only question really is is that apparently the defendant brought this issue up and it wasn't ruled on.

MR. MAXWELL: I have - - - I have to be honest, Judge. I don't remember.

JUDGE FAHEY: Oh, okay.

MR. MAXWELL: I - - - I - - -

JUDGE FAHEY: That's no problem. That's no problem.

MR. MAXWELL: I can't help you with whether he brought it up. I'm not - - -

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Mr. Maxwell, let me direct you to the accusatory instrument in which it's alleged that Ms. Grady Flores violated a dually issued order of protection, whatever the language is. Did you attach - - - was the order of protection attached to the accusatory instrument? I'm struggling to find where it is that it's alleged that an order of protection was actually in effect, she knew about it. I don't see that anywhere.

MR. MAXWELL: Well, what I recall, Your Honor, is that the order of protection was issued in October. Even at trial she testified that she - - - she knew it was issued - - -



CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: I'm talking about the 1 2 accusatory instrument and the sufficiency of that charging 3 instrument. 4 MR. MAXWELL: Again, I don't remember if we 5 physically attached it. I don't - - - I just don't see a 6 serious issue of lack of notice. She - - - the accusatory 7 instrument - - -8 JUDGE FEINMAN: And I think the question is 9 really directed to the facial sufficiency of, you know, 10 Alejandro-type analysis. CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Um-hmm. 11 12 MR. MAXWELL: I - - -13 JUDGE FEINMAN: Forgive me. I don't remember the 14 CPL section. It's 100-point-something. 15 MR. MAXWELL: 45, maybe. But I - - -16 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: 17 JUDGE FEINMAN: 40. 18 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: (1)(b). 19 MR. MAXWELL: I believe we issued a accusatory 20 instrument that clearly referenced the order, that the 2.1 order was - - - it's a routine stay away order using the 2.2 officer code administration form and stay away is the words 23 of the statute and - - - and the form. She was on notice. 24 The accusatory instrument charged her with - - - with both 25 crimes - - - or both - - - with the crime and the



Violation. And it charged her with being in the driveway. Sergeant Ramsey talked about her being in the area where the - - - where the other group was, the - - - the people were actually protesting that day on the north side of Molloy Road. So that she was, again, in this mouth of the driveway. When we talk about boundaries of - - - of the base, I think that gets us off track because I think stay away was appropriate here.

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Madsen and Schenck and - - - and those cases, doesn't this order burden speech more than necessary? I mean couldn't it have been more limited to not blocking the entrance or staying, you know, with - - - so many feet from the entrance or not being disorderly? I don't know. I - - - it just seems that this - - - this is about as broad as you can get when it comes to - - - to First Amendment rights.

MR. MAXWELL: Well, I agree, Your Honor, that it could have been worded any number of ways.

JUDGE FAHEY: But - - -

MR. MAXWELL: But - - -

JUDGE FAHEY: - - - Mr. Maxwell, it - - - it sounds like a domestic violence order, not a First

Amendment speech order. I live about five blocks away from the - - - the abortion clinic where the Schenck order came out of and there were - - - I remember going to work every

day and there were lines on the street that had been actually painted there to tell everybody where to stand so the court could supervise the - - - the effect of the First Amendment. And then when people violated those orders, trespass charges were brought against them, appropriately so. But that's not what we had here at all. We just had kind of a standard domestic violence order which I wouldn't want to undermine the jurisprudence there, but this is an entirely different kind of situation.

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MR. MAXWELL: But, Your Honor, I think what was done here was reasonable, was fair, and the - - - the case law - - - I'm looking at - - -

JUDGE FAHEY: Well, let me ask you this. And you I've always found to be an intellectually honest advocate, and I say that as a compliment because I recognize that, as an advocate. But the question is - - is how would you know where you could protest the actions that are taking place at the military base based upon this order of protection? Where would I know to stand if I came by just reading this order?

MR. MAXWELL: Well, Your Honor, you - - - I
believe you would know because you've been there before
when you got arrested the first time. You go to the - - to the same place, you know you're in violation of that
order.

JUDGE WILSON: Why does this order prevent the 1 2 defendant from sexually abusing or strangling Mr. Evans? 3 MR. MAXWELL: Well, we wouldn't want to encourage 4 that kind of thing. But - - -5 JUDGE WILSON: Well, of course, but - - - but you 6 get my point which is - - -MR. MAXWELL: It's a - it's a standard form. 7 8 JUDGE WILSON: Well, but it's a form where things 9 --- I mean there was --- it was deliberately filled out 10 to say to stay away from the school of Mr. Evans. Somebody typed his name in the form there. I mean what I'm getting 11 12 at is that both the supporting deposition and the order, 13 which is an order of the court, show an extreme 14 carelessness, for lack of a better word. And, you know, 15 these orders ought to give people concrete ideas of what it 16 is they can't do and their ought to be a concrete reason 17 for why they can't do it, and it doesn't look to me like 18 that kind of care was exercised at all. 19 MR. MAXWELL: Well, Your Honor, this is something 20 that happens every day in our town courts. The judges get 21 a request for an order of protection, and I think the 22 interpretation from this court and, you know, the courts is 23 that that should be broadly construed to give protection to 24

JUDGE STEIN:

But as - - - as Judge Fahey said,

	most of these cases, these domestic violence cases, there
2	been some act against a person, and it seems to me here
3	that the act is one of trespass. So who's the victim of a
4	trespass? Is is it anybody who might be on that
5	property at any time?
6	MR. MAXWELL: Well, Your Honor, I
7	JUDGE STEIN: I mean that's part of, you know, m
8	my problem.
9	MR. MAXWELL: Yes. But Colonel I think
10	Colonel Evans qualified as a witness and and a
11	victim. He had an
12	JUDGE STEIN: Well, but was he was he
13	did he see anything that happened here?
14	MR. MAXWELL: I'm not I don't know from the
15	from the first from the October incident where
16	he was from the
17	JUDGE STEIN: I thought he testified that he had
18	never seen her before.
19	MR. MAXWELL: He didn't recognize her.
20	JUDGE FEINMAN: He wasn't afraid.
21	MR. MAXWELL: Pardon me, Your Honor?
22	JUDGE FEINMAN: And I thought he also testified
23	he wasn't afraid.
24	MR. MAXWELL: Well, again, I don't believe you
25	should have a being afraid of test.

JUDGE RIVERA: Well, what is it that he knew? 1 Не 2 knew that there were protesters outside. Is that what you 3 mean? 4 MR. MAXWELL: Yes. And he's - - and one of the 5 things he said, he's responsible for security of the base. 6 JUDGE RIVERA: Did - - - did he know where the 7 protesters were at any particular time, though? 8 MR. MAXWELL: He - - - when these protests happen 9 he gets notified, and the police respond. 10 JUDGE RIVERA: So for all he knows the protesters are not on the property. They're across the road and 11 12 perhaps 100 yards down? 13 MR. MAXWELL: Well, once he's notified, he - - -14 like when this incident, this February incident, he 15 monitored what was going on. And the problem as he saw it, 16 I think the record supports this, is security of the base 17 and blocking the access. He's not trying to limit 18 particular speech. He's not trying to avoid personal 19 criticism. JUDGE RIVERA: Yeah. But the - - - but the 20 21 problem is that the order - - - I don't know about anything 22 he's got in his affidavit clarify for the person who's 23 subject to a judicial order and contempt and incarceration 24 and all the rest exactly where - - - where that demarcation

is, right? That's the point of the First Amendment, right?

So where am I overstepping my rights or where can I exercise my rights without fear of police action? And I'm not sure the record gives you that because, again, going back to what several members of the bench have already pointed out, you've got this form that doesn't appear to have been intended for this particular type of peaceful, political speech.

MR. MAXWELL: Well, but it does not go out of its way or directed towards limiting speech. And just real quick, as I'm running out of time, looking at McCullen v.

Coakley, the case out of Massachusetts, talked about: "The government may impose reasonable restrictions on time, place, or manner of - - of protected speech where the content of the speech isn't - - isn't limited." And so I - - I think that supports our - - our position, and I'd ask you to not grant any relief.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, sir.

Mr. Salisbury.

MR. SALISBURY: Thank you, Your Honor. A couple of - - of quick points. In - - in terms of the issue raised in terms of the qualifications of - - of Colonel Evans, I think it's important to note there's - - there's nothing in the record that - - that suggests he was present for the October 2012 incident, that he had - - was an actual witness to the - - to the crime. And I

1	think he he doesn't qualify, if you look at
2	Somerville and Creighton, under that that standard.
3	Nor did he
4	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Was that argument waived
5	when you consented or stipulated to the order, the validity
6	of the order in the trial court?
7	MR. SALISBURY: No, Your Honor. I believe if you
8	look at the record there, I think it's pages 64 and 65 and
9	then 71 and 72 of of appellant's brief, you see it
10	was clear the intent on both parties was merely to
11	introduce the order of protection at trial. And in fact,
12	both parties stated that repeatedly on the record. We're -
13	in
14	JUDGE STEIN: I understood that whole colloquy to
15	to mean that you understood that the court had ruled
16	that it was a valid order and therefore it was not
17	something you could raise again in that proceeding.
18	MR. SALISBURY: Correct.
19	JUDGE STEIN: Is that am I correct? Okay.
20	MR. SALISBURY: And and the prosecutor even
21	raised that and the court agreed that that for the -
22	you know, the case of the law at the trial level. That
23	was decided that wasn't an issue for trial. That was
24	and now

JUDGE RIVERA: You - - - you had preserved your -

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MR. SALISBURY: Correct.

JUDGE RIVERA: - - position with respect to the validity of the order.

MR. SALISBURY: Correct. We had raised that in our motions and then the motions had been - - - been denied, so it was - - - was preserved, Your Honor. In terms of the - - - Judge.

JUDGE RIVERA: Can I just ask you is your position that the form that's in use cannot be used at all or is your position that the form that's in use cannot be used at all or is your position that the form has to be somehow modified to match the facts of the situation presented to the judge? I just want to clarify that.

MR. SALISBURY: The - - - the form can be used but it should be modified, and what you increasingly see trial courts doing is providing specificity there what they mean by - - - by stay away. They'll provide definitions.

So you see, for instance, in a - - - where the two parties are in high school together there - - - they may define you have to be ten feet away from each other in the hallway, or you have to be - - I've seen forms where you have to be on the other side of the - - - the street.

JUDGE RIVERA: So what should the judge have written down on this form? If you're not challenging the



1	use of the form, what what should the judge have
2	written on this form?
3	MR. SALISBURY: He should have he should
4	have provided some specificity. I think given the First
5	Amendment implications here, we have the guidelines of
6	- of Schenck and other cases to provide some specificity o
7	of what stay away means here. Because as as
8	Judge I believe it was Judge Fahey raised the
9	question if you just look at this order and show up, you
10	don't know what you you can do and and comply.
11	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, counsel.
12	MR. SALISBURY: Thank you, Your Honor.
13	(Court is adjourned)
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CERTIFICATION I, Sara Winkeljohn, certify that the foregoing transcript of proceedings in the Court of Appeals of People v. Mary Anne Grady Flores, No. 114 was prepared using the required transcription equipment and is a true and accurate record of the proceedings. Captaria out Signature: Agency Name: eScribers Address of Agency: 352 Seventh Avenue Suite 604 New York, NY 10001 October 17, 2017 Date:

