1	COURT OF APPEALS
2	STATE OF NEW YORK
3	
4	MATTER OF JAMIE J.
5	(Papers Sealed)
6	No. 118
7	20 Eagle Stree Albany, New Yor
	October 17, 201 Before:
9	CHIEF JUDGE JANET DIFIORE
10	ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA
11	ASSOCIATE JUDGE LESLIE E. STEIN ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE M. FAHEY
1.0	ASSOCIATE JUDGE MICHAEL J. GARCIA
12	ASSOCIATE JUDGE ROWAN D. WILSON ASSOCIATE JUDGE PAUL FEINMAN
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1	Appearances:
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24	Sara Winkeljohn Official Court Transcriber



1 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: The next appeal on this 2 afternoon's calendar is appeal number 118, Matter of Jamie 3 J. 4 Good afternoon, counsel. 5 MS. WOODS: Good afternoon. May it please the 6 court, Kate Woods of Legal Assistance of Western New York 7 on behalf of the appellant, Michelle C. I'd like to 8 request to reserve two minutes of my time for rebuttal. 9 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: You may have it. 10 MS. WOODS: Thank you. The purpose of Article 10 11 of the Family Court Act is clear. It provides a 12 comprehensive framework for the family courts of the State 13 of New York to determine whether a child has been abused or 14 neglected. 15 JUDGE RIVERA: Okay. So let me ask you this. 16 Once, as in this case, a judge decides the - - - that -17 that DSS has not met its burden, denies the petition, does 18 the judge have to sign a separate order so that the child 19 is released back to the custody of the parent? 20 MS. WOODS: There is no requirement that the 21 court sign a separate specific order releasing the child

MS. WOODS: There is no requirement that the court sign a separate specific order releasing the child back. It's assumed that when a petition is dismissed and an order of dismissal is granted that that is what happens.

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JUDGE RIVERA: So there's not another step that the judge needed to take here?



1	MS. WOODS: No.
2	JUDGE FAHEY: Doesn't the court have to hold a
3	dispositional hearing?
4	MS. WOODS: Only if a finding of neglect or abus
5	is made.
6	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORIE: Is there any
7	JUDGE FAHEY: So at the end of a fact-finding
8	hearing and dismiss as neglect, the way I read the
9	commentaries and Professor Sobie that's it's that a
10	depositional hearing is then held.
11	MS. WOODS: If there is a finding that's correct
12	These are bifurcated hearings.
13	JUDGE FAHEY: You have a hearing. The court
14	determines you didn't meet their your burden of prod
15	to establish neglect. And then they say okay. What are w
16	going to do? They have a dispositional hearing, right?
17	MS. WOODS: There is a no dis- dispositional
18	hearing.
19	JUDGE FAHEY: So your position is that
20	immediately the parent would then take the child and
21	and walk out of the courtroom?
22	MS. WOODS: No.
23	JUDGE STEIN: Okay.
24	MS. WOODS: Article 10 contemplates this
25	situation

1	JUDGE FAHEY: Okay.							
2	MS. WOODS: In a in a case where there is a							
3	dismissal and a child is placed in foster care, there is an							
4	automatic stay on the return of the child until five p.m.							
5	the following business day, and that is specifically to							
6	address the concern here. If there are							
7	JUDGE FAHEY: So so I'm clear, though, your							
8	position is there's no dispositional hearing?							
9	MS. WOODS: Absolutely not. If there is no							
10	finding there is no dispositional hearing.							
11	JUDGE GARCIA: Isn't that what we said in Tammie							
12	Z.? I mean in upholding the standard, didn't we say that							
13	if you lose in the Article 10 the child immediately goes							
14	back?							
15	MS. WOODS: Absolutely. And that's how the court							
16								
17	JUDGE GARCIA: And that's how we justified							
18	upholding the standard of proof in that case?							
19	MS. WOODS: Exactly.							
20	JUDGE RIVERA: So during the period of the stay,							
21	that's when DSS can act if it feels that the child is in							
22	some kind of danger?							
23	MS. WOODS: Exactly. The DSS							
24	JUDGE RIVERA: And what what exactly are							
25	the is the recourse available to DSS?							



2	request an ongoing stay pending the outcome of that appeal							
3	And they could also file a new neglect petition							
4	articulating these new concerns they have and seek							
5	placement under that new docket. And indeed, in that case							
6	eventually the Department did bring a new neglect petition							
7	JUDGE RIVERA: And before the petition is denied							
8	or before the judge decides it they can also seek to amend							
9	the petition?							
10	MS. WOODS: Absolutely. And that is a common							
11	practice to amend the pleadings to conform to the proof.							
12	JUDGE RIVERA: Is that the error here?							
13	MS. WOODS: I would argue that no neglect							
14	occurred on behalf of Michelle C. However, I think it							
15	would be a fair reading to say that the court perhaps							
16	should have permitted pleadings to be conformed to the							
17	proof.							
18	JUDGE STEIN: In in all fairness, didn't							
19	the family court repeatedly tell DSS to amend their							
20	petition before trial?							
21	MS. WOODS: Yes.							
22	JUDGE WILSON: Can you shed any light on why it							
23	took more than a year from the removal to the fact-finding							
24	hearing?							
25	MS. WOODS: That timeline is not uncommon for							

MS. WOODS: DSS can file an immediate appeal and

these cases for many factors. This type of litigation tends to be slow. Docket congestion can often lead to that issue.

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CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Counsel, is there any significance to the fact that Article 10 is silent as to when placement is terminated when the underlying 1022 neglect petition is dismissed?

MS. WOODS: No. I think - - - I think the idea of - - of what happens after the dismissal of any petition is so basic to the practice of law that it is unnecessary to even state. Nowhere in the Family Court Act at all does it say what you do when a dismiss - - - when a petition is dismissed because it's obvious. The court no longer has the authority to act.

JUDGE STEIN: In - - in this particular case was the termination petition that has been since filed based at all on the duration of the time that the child has been in foster care?

MS. WOODS: It - - - there's an obligation on the county to bring a termination petition when a child has been placed in foster care for twelve of the most recent fifteen months.

JUDGE STEIN: So if -- if - if the court is allowed to continue jurisdiction under these circumstances that could lead to a finding of permanent neglect without



the parent ever having been found neglectful or abusive?

MS. WOODS: Absolutely. Your Honor mentions the
Tammie Z. case and I think that particular analysis is
illum is illuminating this case, and I would also
point the court towards the matter of Marie B. In that
case the court held unconstitutional Section 1039 of the
Family Court Act which held that which stated that:
"Upon violation of an adjournment on contemplation of
dismissal, there would be an automatic finding of neglect."
And in finding that unconstitutional this court articulated
and I can just read briefly from the decision: "That
legislation authorizing the removal of a child from the
parent without the requisite showing of abandonment,
surrender, persisting neglect, unfitness, or other like
behavior evincing utter indifference and irresponsibility
of the child's well-being constitutes an impermissible
abridgement of fundamental rights of fundamental
parental rights and that a constructive finding of neglect
is constitutionally inadequate in terms of a justification
for this." The analysis is the same in this case, but the
posture is even more extreme. Here we reach the merits.
There was a finding, a finding of no neglect. And to
and to then say that placement can continue past that flies
in the face of all the precedent that that has come -



1	JUDGE FEINMAN: So so assuming you're						
2	interpreting Article 10 correctly, what do we you						
3	know, in terms of the dismissal of the petition, what do we						
4	with this plain language in 1022: "The case shall remain						
5	on the court calendar and the court shall maintain						
6	jurisdiction over the case under the child until the						
7	child is discharged." Alright. And that's from Article						
8	10-A.						
9	MS. WOODS: Yes.						
10	JUDGE FEINMAN: What do we do with that plain						
11	language?						
12	MS. WOODS: The court is referencing the						
13	the language from 1088.						
14	JUDGE FEINMAN: Um-hmm. Yeah. I'm sorry. I						
15	meant 1088.						
16	MS. WOODS: That's okay. So there's						
17	there's two ways to think about this. One is that it						
18	states only that the court continues jurisdiction. 1088						
19	continues jurisdiction. It does not create it.						
20	Jurisdiction to place a child in foster care exists						
21	JUDGE FEINMAN: So so we would focus on						
22	that maintain? Maintain implies it is already there?						
23	MS. WOODS: Right. Something has to be						
24	inexistence for it to be continued. And jurisdiction to						
25	place a child exists only in two places in Article 10 and						

1 that's temporary placement pending a final order of 2 dismissal, which is exactly as it's articulated in the 3 statute, or an order of disposition following a finding. 4 But we can even look further. At 1088 it says: "Until the 5 child is discharged from placement." And pursuant to this 6 court's holding in Matter of Tammie Z., we know that when a 7 petition is dismissed the child is - - - is discharged from 8 placement. 9 I would say just - - - just to wrap up the Department in this case is seeking a solution to a problem 10 11 that doesn't exist. There is no danger of children being 12 returned to unsafe homes.

Department in this case is seeking a solution to a problem that doesn't exist. There is no danger of children being returned to unsafe homes. The Fourth Department's decision does nothing to extend protections that are already afforded to children in this article - - - in this statute. All it would serve to do would be unleash absolute chaos in the family courts across the state of New York. We ask the court to reverse.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, counsel.

MS. WOODS: Thank you.

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CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Counsel.

MR. BENNETT: Your Honor, Gary - - - Gary Bennett for DSS.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Mr. Bennett?

MR. BENNETT: Yes.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: I'm struggling. What is



the predicate finding that allows the State to hold this 1 2 child in its custody? 3 MR. BENNETT: Well, my - - - I believe the Fourth 4 Department dissent thought it was the - - - was the removal 5 but it wasn't. We had a first permanency hearing order. 6 The first what? CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: 7 MR. BENNETT: The first permanency hearing order 8 continued the child in foster care. And frankly, the 9 problem we have in this case is at the time the neglect was 10 dismissed the child was what I'll call on the Article 10-A She - - - the child was placed under 10-A. 11 track. 12 JUDGE STEIN: Wasn't 10-A enacted in the first 13 place as a corollary to - - - in other words to track the 14 placement of children who have been placed under Article 15 10? Can - - - how is it possible to view - - - where else 16 do you get any support for your - - - for your argument 17 that 10-A is some separate track - - -18 MR. BENNETT: Because - - -19 JUDGE STEIN: - - - from Article 10? 20 MR. BENNETT: Because the problem from a practice 2.1 point is they - - - when they created 10-A they - - - they 2.2 took the extension out of Article 10 where it was forever, 23 and they created this whole new Article 10-A, a whole 24 separate section of the Family Court Act. And they - - -

and they created that language in 1088 that says the court

has subject matter jurisdiction. My understanding of the 1 2 appellant's appeal is that she's arguing the court didn't 3 have subject matter jurisdiction, but my thought is if you 4 read 1088, it say - - - it clearly says the court has 5 subject matter jurisdiction. 6 JUDGE WILSON: So your theory is that if the 7 fact-finding had actually occurred - - - fact-finding 8 hearing had occurred and the disposition or that hearing 9 had occurred in February of 2015 you would not have 10 jurisdiction now. Is that right? It's only because it happened after the first permanency hearing - - -11 12 MR. BENNETT: Right. The - - -13 JUDGE WILSON: - - - that you have jurisdiction. 14 MR. BENNETT: What - - -15 JUDGE WILSON: If it happened before you wouldn't 16 have it? 17 MR. BENNETT: Right. What - what - what would 18 have happened or could have happened if the neglect petition was dismissed - - - and there was no order from 19 20 the court saying return the kid under Article 10. 21 court never issued such an order. All the Article 10 order 22 said is that the neglect was dismissed but - - -

Why - - - why is an order required?

MR. BENNETT: Well, I'm not sure - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: Well, that was my question before.



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1	JUDGE RIVERA: If if your petition is
2	MR. BENNETT: I'm not sure
3	JUDGE RIVERA: denied
4	MR. BENNETT: I'm not sure an order is required,
5	but I think
6	JUDGE RIVERA: Well, I thought that's what you
7	just said.
8	MR. BENNETT: The Department's remedy, I think,
9	would have been if the neglect was dismissed, there was no
10	prior Article 10-A order, we could have, I think under thi
11	case, asked for a new removal order or asked for a stay.
12	But I think I mean that that would be our
13	remedy for that. But
14	JUDGE STEIN: And what's wrong with that remedy?
15	JUDGE FEINMAN: Yeah. What's wrong with that
16	remedy now, though?
17	MR. BENNETT: Well, I think the problem is if yo
18	if you take what I call the legal snapshot at the
19	time at the time the neglect was dismissed there was
20	an order placing the child under Article 10-A that the
21	mother had agreed to. That was a final order of
22	disposition of the Wayne County Family Court. You just -
23	- you just can't ignore that order.
24	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Could they could the

Department have filed a new neglect petition?

MR. BENNETT: Well, we did - - - we did
eventually, but honestly, the reason that was filed is,
frankly, we didn't know what the Appellate Division was
going to do with this case, and we wanted there - - - that
there for what I'll call insurance. And we just finished
the fact-finding trial on - - on that neglect hearing,
and we expect to have a decision in a month or two. So
that's - - that's been done. That's been filed, done,
and litigated.

JUDGE STEIN: When I looked at the record and - -

JUDGE STEIN: When I looked at the record and - - and at the form orders for an order of fact-finding or disposition on an order of fact-finding in - - in an Article 10 proceeding, there are all these sort of boxes to check and things like that.

MR. BENNETT: Yes.

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JUDGE STEIN: And - - - and in the area where it provides for a date for the next permanency hearing, the footnotes say that if - - - if the petition is dismissed you don't put another date in - - - in that box or on that line. So is - - - does that tell us anything about the legislative intent?

MR. BENNETT: I don't think so because I don't believe the - - - the legislature drafts those form orders, and I think - - -

JUDGE STEIN: But is - - - but is that how it's



usually done? I mean is this sort of an exceptional case 1 2 because - - - because the court refused to allow DSS to 3 amend the petition to conform with the proof? 4 MR. BENNETT: This is an exceptional case. And I 5 think honestly what happened is the - - - the judge did say 6 to DSS, to one of my attorneys, you should have amend - - -7 you should amended the petition. Okay. I think he was 8 upset that we didn't, but I think - - -9 JUDGE STEIN: Right. 10 MR. BENNETT: - - - on one hand generally courts are very liberal in allowing oral amendments. We've done 11 12 that for - - - this is probably the first case where a 13 judge has not allowed us to do an oral amendment even when 14 he's sort of said you should do that because this is a case 15 where the judge, he knew - -16 JUDGE WILSON: You could have appealed that, 17 right?

MR. BENNETT: He knew - - - because the neglect was about the first seven days. He knew what the other information that he had before him that justified keeping this child in foster care.

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JUDGE STEIN: Well, but that's my point. If - - if, you know, for whatever reason, it didn't happen here,
but if, as you say, in most cases it would have been
allowed then presumably you would have had additional



evidence to support your position that the child was in danger. And which sort of leads me to my next question which is the standard of proof in an Article 10-A permanency hearing is different from the standard of proof to either get a temporary order of removal or to - - - for a finding of abuse and neglect. And doesn't that lead to some absurd results that somehow the - - - the State ends up keeping children in care when they - - - when they couldn't have removed them or - - or - or provided a basis for that in the first place?

MR. BENNETT: I don't think between the two

Articles - - - the judges don't give a lot - - - a lot of

weight to hearsay in permanency hearings. I think,

frankly, we put the same proof in at both hearings, and the

court - - I think the court doesn't really treat these

any differently.

JUDGE STEIN: Well, it's not just - - - it's not just, well, but they're allowed to. And it's - - - it's not just the evidentiary rules but it's also whether there's imminent risk of harm, whether there's, you know, some risk and it's in their best interest. I mean there are so many differences here. It just seems to me that it's a lot easier to maintain the child in - - - in the custody of the State while an Article 10 proceeding is pending or after a finding of abuse or neglect than it

would be to keep the child while there is no such basis on --- on the other side of the --- on the ---

MR. BENNETT: That's true. But also, a lot of these cases we have non-respondent parents and we're keeping the child from them, too, because the judge has enough concerns on the record for that to happen. So even, you know - - -

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, counsel.

Counsel.

MR. HINMAN: May it please the court, James
Hinman on behalf of James and Jennifer Ryan, the foster
parents. The thing about the Family Court Act is that it's
structured in articles. Article 3 deals with custody and - no, that's Article 6. Article 8 deals with family
events. Article 10 deals with abuse and neglect. And the
legislature created a new whole article, Article 10-A. It
is - - if they meant to provide protections under Article
10, they would have added subsections to Article 10, but
they didn't. They created a whole new article, Article 10A, and they gave the court independent jurisdiction. The
jurisdictional grant to the family court under Article 10-A
is entirely separate from the jurisdictional grant to the
court under Article 10.

JUDGE GARCIA: So your view is they created this entirely separate proceeding with an entirely separate



standard from Article 10 that operates - - - even though it's triggered initially in the context of this Article 10 proceeding, continues to have a life of its own - - -MR. HINMAN: Yes. It does. JUDGE GARCIA: - - - even after the - - -MR. HINMAN: Because to get into the Article 10-A there has to be an order from the court removing the child or one of two sections of the Social Services Law. JUDGE GARCIA: You just bring an Article 10-A proceeding, like, hey, I'm going to bring an Article 10-A proceeding? MR. HINMAN: Can't. JUDGE GARCIA: Right. So doesn't that tell you it's tied to some other article? MR. HINMAN: It's tied to the Social Services Law and Article 10-A. What's it tied to is the location of the children. When the children are in placement, doesn't matter whether they're there under the Social Services Law or under Article 10. That's when Article 10-A kicks in after six months. As Judge Wilson observed, if the petition had been dismissed in February, we wouldn't be here. JUDGE STEIN: Doesn't that potentially - - potentially - - - create some constitutional problems? And

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if that's the case and if there are two possible

interpretations of Section 1088 shouldn't we avoid that 1 2 possible constitutional infirmity? 3 In a properly preserved case I would MR. HINMAN: 4 agree with you that that's appropriate. That's not 5 preserved here. What was - - -6 JUDGE GARCIA: Isn't that a rule of construction 7 we apply all the time? We have to preserve it. It says a 8 rule of construction. I mean if there are two 9 interpretations of the statute and one of them is going to 10 lead to some type of unconstitutional result, don't we, as 11 a general matter - - - you don't have to raise it, but as a 12 general matter we would apply the interpretation that 13 preserves the statute. 14 That doesn't apply to the facts of MR. HINMAN: 15 this case. This child was removed prior to the filing of 16 the petition. 17 JUDGE STEIN: But we're not just - - - we're not 18 just interpreting this statutory scheme for this case. 19 We're interpreting it for every case. So if that's what 20 we're doing then don't - - - don't we have to follow these 2.1 rules of statutory interpretation? 2.2 I have no problem with that, but the MR. HINMAN: 23 --- the facts of this case don't fall under an 24 unconstitutional interpretation of the statute. This child

was removed with all of the protections afforded to the

mother under Article 10. The mother had the right to ask for a hearing to determine whether or not the child was at imminent risk. The mother forewent that opportunity.

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JUDGE STEIN: So should we make it easier for the State to keep a child from a parent or at least equally difficult to have a parent return a child who has - - - if the parent has not been found to have done anything neglectful or abusive as it is for a parent who has been found to have abused or neglected the child. Does that make any sense? In other words - - -

MR. HINMAN: I'm trying to understand the question.

JUDGE STEIN: Well, the question is is according to your interpretation, the State's ability to keep a child from his or her parents is at least the same as it is for parents who have been found to have neglected or abused that child as for a parent who has been found not to have abused or neglected that child.

MR. HINMAN: Correct. Once the child is in foster care. And the provisions of Article 10-A are applicable.

JUDGE STEIN: That doesn't make sense. What if - - what if a completely frivolous petition has been filed
and an ex parte order of temporary removal is given. Okay.
And as has been said here, typically it may take up until -

- - up to a year for that petition to finally come - - - see the light of day, have a hearing, and find that there's no basis for this petition at all. And in that case, you're saying that the court has jurisdiction to continue placement?

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MR. HINMAN: If the statutory criteria is met, that return of the child to that parent would place that child at risk of harm and whether or not it's in the best interest of the child. No claim has ever been made in this case that the mother is capable of caring for this child. In fact, the findings throughout have been to the contrary other than the dismissal of the neglect case.

JUDGE STEIN: Well, those findings are not before us, right?

MR. HINMAN: Yes. One of them is in the first permanency hearing. The second one is the order that's appealed from. The court made a finding.

JUDGE STEIN: I thought the first permanency hearing was on consent?

MR. HINMAN: It was, and it included a finding that the mother consented to that return of the child would not be in the child's best interest and would pose a risk of danger to the child. The second testimony was taken that clearly established that, and then the mother came back and consented reserving only the court's authority



under subject matter jurisdiction to make the order. And since then, the court has even determined that it's unsafe for the child to have a two-hour supervised visit in the mother's home.

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So this is not a case where a child - - - the

State is using Article 10-A to keep a child from a parent
that's capable of providing care for the child. It is a
extremely exceptional case that comes from the fact that
the Department was not allowed to amend the petition and
allowed to go into further proof. But they have at
subsequent hearings and all of the due process protections
have been afforded to the mother throughout the facts of
this case and the way it has progressed. So a due process
argument that might exist in theory and may apply to the
practice of - - of the folks in New York City, as in the
amici brief, that's not what's at issue here. All of the
protections were afforded to the mother here, and the court
clearly had subject matter jurisdiction under 115(c).
Thank you very much.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, counsel. Counsel.

MR. LAIR: May it please the court, Sean Lair on behalf of the minor child, Jamie J. My comments - - - I'd like to focus my comments with regards to the time. We had a question with regards to the year and is this standard,



is this customary? And I would say it is when you're wearing that defense hat, when you have the mom and she's not in a good spot. She can't take care of this child. That is a move that defense counsel makes.

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JUDGE WILSON: But my - - - my question really was geared at the following. Does it make sense that the jurisdiction of the family court turns on how quickly the fact-finding hearing is held?

MR. LAIR: Well, I would suggest it - - - it should because in this case you have a seven-day-old child who's then in the care and custody of foster parents for eight months, the same - - - the same foster parents.

Those are the only parents this child knows. So now because mother hasn't asked for the 1027 removal hearing, she hasn't brought a motion to dismiss if it's frivolous, she has not demanded a fact-finding hearing - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: But DSS didn't meet their burden.

So how - - - aren't there already, as counsel has said,

other ways to protect the child. But - - - but DSS filed a

petition. They didn't meet their burden. Now they've got

to do something else if they think, indeed, that the child

is in danger. Except that we have an Article 10-A order.

Plain reading of the statute says - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: But my question is aren't there other way - - - forget the Article 10-A for one moment.



Are there not other ways to protect the child that already exist?

MR. LAIR: Well, I would suggest you're right, there are but for - - - for both sides of the aisle.

There's other - - - defense counsel have done things that she didn't do it. She didn't, again, bring the 1027 request.

JUDGE RIVERA: But it's DSS' petition, and they didn't meet their burden.

MR. LAIR: But now we're one year into this child being in foster care. And at some point, I would suggest the focus has to be on the child, not necessarily just the parent and what's in the parents' rights.

JUDGE RIVERA: But that's what I'm saying. If there are other ways - - - and you've said that there are, and we've already heard them laid out for us. There are other ways to protect the child if, indeed, the child is in danger.

MR. LAIR: And - - - and I agree with you. I think DSS could have done something different, and my point is there was things a mother could have done different to not let it get to the twelve-month period. But - - - but what was going on in the background was she - - - as the 10-A hearing pointed out, she's not stable. She's making bad choices personally. She's making bad choices with

1	regards to her medical care.
2	JUDGE RIVERA: Well, that may support these other
3	opportunities or ways that DSS can protect the child, no?
4	But it's not about whether or not there's jurisdiction once
5	the petition's denied.
6	MR. LAIR: I agree with you. There are other
7	ways. But I also think under the current scheme what they
8	did was proper.
9	JUDGE WILSON: But also
10	JUDGE FAHEY: How how long have you been
11	attorney for the child?
12	MR. LAIR: Since her seventh day of life.
13	JUDGE FAHEY: So since November 2014?
14	MR. LAIR: Yes.
15	JUDGE FAHEY: And has has the child had the
16	same foster parents?
17	MR. LAIR: Yes.
18	JUDGE FAHEY: I see. Thank you.
19	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, counsel.
20	MR. LAIR: Thank you.
21	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Ms. Woods.
22	MS. WOODS: Counsel described this as an
23	extremely exceptional situation. I would say that's an
24	understatement. This is literally the only time this
25	situation has occurred anywhere in the state of New York as

far as we can tell, and anecdotally, I'm unaware of any situation in Wayne County where this has been raised at all as well. This is truly novel.

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And certainly, if the legislature had intended this, what we all agree, is an incredibly dramatic shift in how Article 10 functions, not only would we see it happening, but we would see it reflected in the legislative history of this - - - of this statute. And it's just not there. There's not a single mention of a desire to create a separate track that can keep a child in foster care in perpetuity based on allegations that has been subsequently dismissed.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: What could DSS have done when the petition was not sustained? What would - - - what should they have done?

MS. WOODS: They could have appealed the fact that the petition was dismissed.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: With a stay.

MS. WOODS: And there - - - there's the automatic stay. They had time to do that. They could have brought - - - the petition that they eventually brought almost a year later, they could have brought that much sooner and held the child under that - - - under that petition. Instead, they elect to bend the law to suit their purposes here.

And we would ask the court to reject that.

1	CHIEF	JUDGE	DIFIO	RE:	Thank	you,	counsel.
2	MS. W	OODS:	Thank	you.			
3	(Cour	t is a	djourne	ed)			
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CERTIFICATION I, Sara Winkeljohn, certify that the foregoing transcript of proceedings in the Court of Appeals of Matter of Jamie J., No. 118 was prepared using the required transcription equipment and is a true and accurate record of the proceedings. Congleric Good Signature: Agency Name: eScribers Address of Agency: 352 Seventh Avenue Suite 604 New York, NY 10001 October 23, 2017 Date:

