1	COURT OF APPEALS
2	STATE OF NEW YORK
3	THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK,
4	
5	Respondent,
6	-against- NO. 13
7	OMAR ALVAREZ,
8	Appellant.
9	20 Eagle Street Albany, New York
10	February 12, 2019
11	Before:
12	CHIEF JUDGE JANET DIFIORE ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA
13	ASSOCIATE JUDGE LESLIE E. STEIN ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE M. FAHEY
14	ASSOCIATE JUDGE MICHAEL J. GARCIA ASSOCIATE JUDGE ROWAN D. WILSON ASSOCIATE JUDGE PAUL FEINMAN
15	ASSOCIATE JUDGE PAUL FEINMAN
16	Appearances:
17	RICHARD M. GREENBERG, ESQ.
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25	Official Court Hamselfsel



1	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: The next appeal on this	
2	afternoon's calendar is appeal number 13, The People of the	
3	State of New York v. Omar Alvarez.	
4	Good afternoon, sir.	
5	MR. GREENBERG: Good afternoon. Your Honor,	
6	Richard Greenberg for Omar Alvarez. May I reserve three	
7	minutes for rebuttal?	
8	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Three, sir?	
9	MR. GREENBERG: Yes. Three.	
10	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Yes, you may.	
11	MR. GREENBERG: Thank you. Your Honors, Omar	
12	Alvarez was sentenced to consecutive terms totaling sixty-	
13	six-and-two-thirds years	
14	JUDGE FEINMAN: Mr. Greenberg	
15	MR. GREENBERG: to life	
16	JUDGE FEINMAN: if I may?	
17	MR. GREENBERG: I'm sorry?	
18	JUDGE FEINMAN: We're familiar with the record.	
19	But are you advocating that the failure to brief the	
20	excessive sentence point is a single egregious error that	
21	warrants coram nobis relief?	
22	MR. GREENBERG: In this case it is. But in this	
23	case also I ask the court to look at the totality of	
24	circumstances and the totality of counsel's performance to	
25	determine whether Mr. Alvarez received meaningful	

1 representation. 2 JUDGE GARCIA: Back to the first part of Judge 3 Feinman's question. If - - - if failure to raise the 4 excessive sentence point is ineffective, and you said "in 5 this case", what would the rule be why this case and not a 6 case where there's a five-year sentence? MR. GREENBERG: Well, every case has to be 7 8 determined on its totality of circumstances and the 9 performance by counsel. 10 JUDGE GARCIA: But what's the totality - - - but 11 12 MR. GREENBERG: In this case - - -13 JUDGE GARCIA: - - - again, to go back to just 14 the excessive sentence point. And I think your answer to 15 Judge Feinman's question was yes, failure to raise the 16 excessive sentence point standing alone, in this case - -17 in this case - - -18 MR. GREENBERG: Well - - -19 JUDGE GARCIA: - - - was ineffective. Is - - -20 MR. GREENBERG: - - - when I say standing alone, 21 I - - - I - - - I should back up and say coupled with the 22 fact that counsel never communicated at all with Mr. 23 Alvarez. He never explained to him that he had a right to 24 that - - -



JUDGE FEINMAN: Well - - -

MR. GREENBERG: - - - that kind of an argument.

JUDGE FEINMAN: - - - to support that point, you have the affidavit of your client and the one letter, but we'll never really know what was in Mr. Franklin's file - - or Mr. Brown's file, rather, because obviously he's deceased and those files are long gone.

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MR. GREENBERG: We have a much broader record than that, Judge Feinman. What we have here is not only my client's affidavit but his wife's affidavit.

And what we know and is undisputed is that my client was in the dark about his appeal for years. And in fact, when Diana Alvarez contacted him in 2004 and said what happened to your case, Omar; he said I don't know. Can you contact my lawyer and find out?

JUDGE STEIN: Well, but - - - but doesn't that all - - - also relate to what arguments were made and what arguments - - - what other arguments might have been made?

Now, of course none of us would minimize the importance of - - - of communication between an attorney and a client. But when we are - - - when we are reviewing a coram nobis application, okay, we consider a number of things, one of which is how - - - how might things have turned out better if something had been done differently.

So looking at the communication piece, to me that ties in with if he - - - if counsel had communicated with



his client that maybe there was something that he might have argued that he didn't or he might have argued better, and I see nothing in this record that suggests that there were other arguments - - - again, aside from the harsh and excessive - - - that could or should have been made, or that the Appellate Division didn't fully consider the arguments that were made.

MR. GREENBERG: Judge Stein, I think it's very, very important to - - - for this court to look at the nature of an excessive sentence point in general and look at it in this case. Now - - -

JUDGE STEIN: Well - - - well, before you talk about excessive sentence, I think we were talking about the lack of communication and the other pieces, because - - - $\frac{1}{2}$

MR. GREENBERG: Right. And I'm - - I'm going to tie that together.

JUDGE STEIN: Okay.

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MR. GREENBERG: The - - - the fact is that an individual like Mr. Alvarez, who's convicted, has an absolute right to appeal not only his conviction, but he has an absolute right to have the Appellate Division review the sentence and reduce that sentence in the interest of justice if the Appellate Division finds it unduly harsh.

JUDGE STEIN: But the only time we've ever held that that counsel - - - as far as I know - - - that counsel



1	was ineffective for failing to raise a single argument, is			
2	when it would have been clear and dispositive			
3	MR. GREENBERG: Right, and that would be			
4	JUDGE STEIN: dispositive. And how could			
5	that be here?			
6	MR. GREENBERG: Right. And and clearly			
7	it's not. And yet in this in this court's case			
8	decision in People against Gonzalez, back in 1979, you			
9	granted a reversal and you sent the case back for a new			
10	appeal			
11	JUDGE FAHEY: Wasn't wasn't Gonzalez			
12	MR. GREENBERG: where there was no			
13	dispositive issue.			
14	JUDGE FAHEY: Mr. Greenberg, wasn't Gonzalez a			
15	little different? I thought there he just listed the			
16	points, there were no arguments at all.			
17	MR. GREENBERG: Correct. There was a little			
18	difference. But			
19	JUDGE FAHEY: Yeah.			
20	MR. GREENBERG: but let me get back to the			
21	excessive sentence point of this, because Mr. Alvarez			
22	essentially got life without parole: sixty-six-and-two-			
23	thirds to life. He could have gotten as low as fifteen to			
24	life, which would have been fifty years more than			

fifty years less than he had.

1	The difference is is really incredibly	
2	important because the difference is	
3	JUDGE STEIN: Well, can we consider	
4	MR. GREENBERG: whether he'd have a chance	
5		
6	JUDGE STEIN: on that on that point,	
7	can we consider things that happened after his sentencing	
8	and appeal	
9	MR. GREENBERG: Sure.	
LO	JUDGE STEIN: in terms of	
L1	MR. GREENBERG: It's in this record.	
L2	JUDGE STEIN: How but	
L3	MR. GREENBERG: It's part of the coram nobis	
L4	record.	
L5	JUDGE STEIN: but aren't we reviewing	
L6	whether he was denied effective assistance at the time of	
L7	his appeal?	
L8	MR. GREENBERG: Your Honor, at the time of his	
L9	appeal	
20	JUDGE STEIN: Whether he received meaningful	
21	representation.	
22	MR. GREENBERG: Correct.	
23	JUDGE STEIN: How could counsel, at that time,	
24	have known what he would or wouldn't have done years later	
25	MR GREENBERG. He wouldn't nor would the	

1	sentencing court or the Appellate Division. That's the		
2	whole point. You have a nineteen-year-old who had no pric		
3	record, who was convicted clearly of very serious crimes,		
4	but could have gotten fifteen to life, which would enable		
5	him to go to the parole board some day and have parole		
6	consideration.		
7	JUDGE STEIN: Theoretically yes. But if you rea		
8	the		
9	MR. GREENBERG: Not theoretically		
10	JUDGE STEIN: if you read the record, what		
11	happened at the sentencing was pretty egregious, and it's		
12	hard to imagine that based on what the sentencing court		
13	knew at that time and what the Appellate Division knew at		
14	the time of the appeal, that you know, that he would		
15	have been likely to get fifteen years to life.		
16	MR. GREENBERG: I'm not saying he would have		
17	_		
18	JUDGE STEIN: I mean, that just seems		
19	MR. GREENBERG: been likely to get fifteen		
20	but he could have gotten anything between fifteen and		
21	sixty-six-and-two-thirds. And the difference is if he had		
22	gotten a lower sentence, he would be eligible for parole,		
23	he would go before the parole board		
24	JUDGE GARCIA: Counsel counsel		



MR. GREENBERG: - - - he might come home some

1	day.	
2	JUDGE GARCIA: I understand that. Counsel, we	
3	understand that. But	
4	MR. GREENBERG: Well, it's a big it's an	
5	important point, Judge.	
6	JUDGE GARCIA: one it is, and we	
7	understand it. But one of the problems I think we're	
8	having is, not everyone raises excessive sentence claims of	
9	appeal, right?	
10	MR. GREENBERG: Correct.	
11	JUDGE GARCIA: And they're not ineffective	
12	we would say not	
13	MR. GREENBERG: Not in every case.	
14	JUDGE GARCIA: right.	
15	MR. GREENBERG: No.	
16	JUDGE GARCIA: So there are strategic reasons -	
17	_	
18	MR. GREENBERG: Correct.	
19	JUDGE GARCIA: not to raise them. Perhaps	
20	because the client was laughing and doing things at the	
21	sentencing that the trial just just hypothetically	
22	found very offensive.	
23	MR. GREENBERG: Judge	
24	JUDGE GARCIA: But going back can I speak?	
25	Going back to Judge Feinman's point, we don't know now	

whether there were strategic reasons and we'll never know, 1 2 for this particular lawyer not to raise an excessive 3 sentence in this case, because he died. 4 And does that go to a due diligence requirement 5 on the part of the client here - - - your client - - - to 6 raise this at some reasonable point of time when the client realizes - - -7 8 MR. GREENBERG: He tried to. He tried to. 9 raised it when - - - as soon as he found out that his appeal had been denied, that his conviction was affirmed, 10 he filed a motion in the Appellate Division to have counsel 11 12 appointed to file a coram nobis. That was denied. 13 He then filed a 440 motion - - -14 JUDGE GARCIA: Did he raise the excessive 15 sentence -16 MR. GREENBERG: - - - and he raised - - -17 JUDGE GARCIA: - - - issue in the initial coram 18 nobis? 19 MR. GREENBERG: No, he didn't know that he was 20 even entitled to excessive sentence, Your Honor. That's 21 the whole point of communication. My client - - - and - -22 - and just to get to the point of strategic reason. 23 inconceivable - - - and I've practiced for over forty years 24 - - - it is inconceivable that any competent attorney would

fail to at least discuss with his client and if not raise

1	excessive sentence regardless of the fact that he may have
2	been immature
3	JUDGE FEINMAN: Does that mean does that
4	mean
5	MR. GREENBERG: and laughed at sentencing.
6	JUDGE FEINMAN: per se, then, that the co-
7	defendants' lawyers were also ineffective because
8	MR. GREENBERG: We don't know the circumstances
9	of their case.
10	JUDGE FEINMAN: because they didn't bring
11	the challenge either.
12	MR. GREENBERG: Right. One of those co-
13	defendants committed three
14	JUDGE FEINMAN: Got a hundred to life. And one
15	got sixty-six-and-two-thirds.
16	MR. GREENBERG: one who committed three
17	execution-style murders, the other one actually did raise
18	excessive sentence in an initial brief. That brief was
19	withdrawn and refiled without it. We don't know the
20	circumstances. It would be wrong to speculate.
21	My point is that if Mr. Alvarez's attorney had
22	said to him, by the way, you have an absolute right to ask
23	the Appellate Division to consider reducing your sentence,
24	for any reason that it seems it feels appropriate,
25	would you like me to do that it is inconceivable that

1 Mr. Alvarez would say no, no, no; that's okay, because I 2 laughed at sentencing. 3 JUDGE STEIN: So - - - so - - -4 MR. GREENBERG: The whole point - - -5 JUDGE STEIN: No, no, no, wait. It wasn't 6 just laughed at sentencing. There was - - - there was a 7 lot more. It was the nature of the crime. There was a 8 failure to take any responsibility. There's a lot that 9 happened at the sentencing. 10 But that aside, you're saying that a re - - -11 that a competent attorney could not possibly have weighed 12 the danger to his client of bringing all of this up and - -13 - and - - - and - - - you know, in the judge's - - - in the 14 Appellate Division's face, rather than focusing on what he 15 thought were errors at trial that went to the fairness of 16 the trial itself and that could possibly result in a 17 reversal. 18 MR. GREENBERG: You know - - -19 JUDGE STEIN: How could that not be a reasonable 20 2.1 MR. GREENBERG: Not in this case. 22 JUDGE STEIN: - - - even if in - - - even if an 23 unsuccessful strategy. 24 MR. GREENBERG: Not in this case. Point 1 of the 25 brief, the first point that counsel raised, was the

suppression issue that would have had no effect on the 1 2 conviction or the sentence here. It would have done no 3 good for Mr. Alvarez. 4 What Mr. Alvarez wanted was a chance to come home 5 some day and get - - - get his case before the parole 6 board. 7 JUDGE STEIN: But what if he got a new trial - -8 9 MR. GREENBERG: And the fact that it was - - -JUDGE STEIN: - - - what if he got a new trial 10 11 because of these other points raised - - -12 MR. GREENBERG: He wasn't going to get a new 13 Those points were frivolous. They were blown out trial. 14 of the water by the by the DA and by the court. What he 15 needed was - - -16 JUDGE RIVERA: Counsel, let me ask you this - -17 MR. GREENBERG: Yes. 18 JUDGE RIVERA: - - - now that you've said that. 19 From the vantage point and with the benefit of People v. 20 Gonzalez, are you in part arguing that - - - that given the 21 little we've said about ineffective assistance of counsel 22 when it comes to appellate counsel, that the rule needs to 23 be tweaked? Is there something that - - - else that needs to be the consideration and the focus of the bench when 24

it's thinking about appellate counsel's effectiveness

1 that's different from trial counsel's effectiveness? 2 MR. GREENBERG: I think it's critical that 3 counsel communicate with his client. And I - - - I object 4 to any characterization that says that oh, this is all 5 based on my client's self-serving affidavit. The - - - the 6 record is clear; he didn't even know what happened in his 7 appeal. He never saw a copy of the brief. 8 Had he - - - had he had that information, he 9 wouldn't have sent his wife looking for that information. 10 He didn't know anything. His lawyer never contacted him, 11 never told him, you can ask the Appellate Division to 12 reduce your sentence so that you might someday go before 13 the parole board. 14 Judge Stein, I certainly agree that the crimes 15 are very serious crimes. My client's behavior was 16 17 He laughed, he took - - - he was - - - he was not acting

reprehensible. He did not take responsibility at the time. appropriately. He was a nineteen-year-old. He was a teenager.

The whole point of getting a sentence that has a minimum where you can go to the parole board someday is to allow time for growth and reflection and rehabilitation and remorse and for someone to take responsibility - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: So - - - so is that what you're -

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1 MR. GREENBERG: - - - as he does now. 2 JUDGE RIVERA: - - - suggesting might make this 3 different from what otherwise sounds like a rule that means 4 every appellate counsel must raise an effect - - - excuse 5 me - - - a request - - -6 MR. GREENBERG: Excessive sentence? 7 JUDGE RIVERA: - - - thank you - - - a request for reduction of sentence because - - -8 9 MR. GREENBERG: No, no. 10 JUDGE RIVERA: - - - it's excessive, unless their client says otherwise? 11 12 MR. GREENBERG: No, I'm not even asking for that. 13 I could give you a - - - plenty of examples of a strategic 14 basis. Let's take a defendant who has a prior robbery 15 conviction; he's now convicted of three armed robberies. 16 The minimum sentence on each one is ten years, the maximum 17 is twenty-five years. Right? 18 Let's say the judge says, okay, I'm giving you 19 twelve years on each of these three, but I'm running them 20 concurrently. So instead of the possibility of seventy-21 five years, which he could have got, he's getting twelve 22 years, just two years above the absolute minimum he could 23 get. 24 I could understand in a case like that, a lawyer 25 saying to his client, you know what, if we try to argue

2 the Appellate Division. They are going to look at us in a 3 way - - - they're going to think what the heck are you 4 doing. Let's focus on these other issues that we have. 5 However, the client may say you know what, I 6 really - - - those two years are important to me, I want 7 you to raise it. That would be something that the lawyer 8 would explain and - - - and the client would have a right 9 to raise on his own if he wanted to. 10 JUDGE STEIN: So - - -MR. GREENBERG: He has to know he has that right. 11 12 JUDGE STEIN: If we agree with you - - - and I 13 think what I'm hearing you say is that it - - - when - - -14 when they receive the absolute maximum, right, then there's 15 no reason not to raise it, right - - - then are - - - are 16 we - - - is every defendant who is serving time now whose 17 appellate counsel did not argue that, who received a 18 maximum sentence, is - - - is every one of those people - -19 20 MR. GREENBERG: No. 21 JUDGE STEIN: - - - entitled to now bring a - -22 MR. GREENBERG: No. 23 JUDGE STEIN: - - - error of coram nobis? 24 MR. GREENBERG: No, of course not, Your Honor. 25 JUDGE STEIN: Why not?

that your sentence should be reduced, we are going to upset



1	MR. GREENBERG: Because there are a lot of
2	factors. It's not just getting the maximum. It's a
3	question of what was the minimum? What was the spread?
4	Here the spread was over fifty years. The spread for Mr.
5	Alvarez was the difference between having a shot at parole
6	some day
7	JUDGE FEINMAN: So so
8	MR. GREENBERG: or dying in prison.
9	JUDGE STEIN: Does the nature of the crime
10	JUDGE FEINMAN: I mean, I guess the problem
11	
12	JUDGE STEIN: matter?
13	JUDGE FEINMAN: I'm sorry.
14	MR. GREENBERG: In addition, if I may
15	JUDGE STEIN: Why don't you answer let
16	_
17	JUDGE FEINMAN: The problem that I'm having is -
18	is what is the rule that is going to get articulated?
19	MR. GREENBERG: Okay. The rule is very simple,
20	Your Honors. I am not asking for any new rule. The rule
21	that this court has maintained for forty years is that in
22	New York, unlike in the federal courts, unlike Strickland,
23	the New York rule for ineffective assistance of counsel is
24	that counsel must provide meaningful representation.
25	And if the case is going to rise or fall on



whether we could have won the excessive sentence - - whether we could show that we would have gotten a better
result in the end, obviously that is going to undo that - - that standard of meaningful representation.

I just want to say one more thing. I know the
red light is on. But Your Honors, an excessive sentence
point is - - is absolutely qualitatively different from
every other appellate argument. You can raise it in every
single case. There's no preservation requirement. There's

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It's - - - it's not a question of whether the sentencing judge made a mistake, broke the law, or abused her discretion. It's a question of whether the Appellate Division thinks that a lesser sentence would be more humane, more appropriate in the case.

no harmless error. There's no error requirement, in fact.

And so it's really a qualitatively different thing. The Appellate Division, in the First Department, reduces sentences about twice as frequently as it reverses convictions. You have a better chance of getting a sentence reduction on appeal than you have of any other kind of relief.

JUDGE STEIN: Is that true - - -

JUDGE FEINMAN: It partially depends on what - - what years you look at. I don't - - -

MR. GREENBERG: Well, I would - - - I just



checked the other night, Judge Feinman. Between 1995 and 2005, that ten-year period, the Appellate Division First Department granted more than 200 discretionary sentence reductions; that's over 20 a year.

And that's - - - that's very significant, because

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And that's - - - that's very significant, because what Mr. Alvarez lost here was the opportunity to have the one thing that he needed, a second bite of the apple, some other court to review that sentence and say you know what: that's - - life without parole is too much for this case. You need to have a shot, whether it's fifteen to life, twenty, twenty-five, thirty to life, something where someday down the road you can go to the parole board and - - and explain why you have a right to - - -

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, Mr. Greenberg.

MR. GREENBERG: - - - to go home. Thank you so

much.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Counsel.

MR. SLAVINSKIY: Good afternoon, Your Honors. Yan Slavinskiy for the People.

JUDGE FEINMAN: So what - - - I mean, you concede, if I recall correctly, that the brief that was actually filed had significant problems with it. And I guess putting aside the whole issue of excessive sentence, how does this brief that was filed satisfy the Stultz standard?

MR. SLAVINSKIY: Absolutely, Your Honor. The brief that coun - - appellate counsel raised, raised four issues for appellate review: the suppression issue, an issue that the judge erred in denying an adjournment, a challenge to the judge's protective order, and a challenge to the weight of the evidence with respect to the conspiracy charge.

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Those four issues were presented in a manner that was sufficient for appellate review. And we know that because the Appellate Division addressed each of those claims, and in fact, it was only appellate - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: You mean as long - - - as long as you raise the issue, regardless of the quality of the advocacy, regardless of whether or not you failed to cite appropriate case law, that's good enough, that's the benchmark?

MR. SLAVINSKIY: That's not what I'm saying, Your Honor. If - - as counsel characterized it just now - - - these claims were purely frivolous, then the manner - - - the thorough manner in which the People responded to those claims, and the detail with which the Appellate Division took to address each of them, simply would not have occurred. And - - -

JUDGE WILSON: Would you - - - wouldn't you agree that most pro se briefs - - - and you have seen more than I



1 have, I'm sure - - - are better than this brief that Mr. 2 Brown submitted? 3 MR. SLAVINSKIY: I - - - Your Honor, this brief 4 identified three legal issues. Each - - -5 JUDGE WILSON: So do - - - so do pro se - - -6 MR. SLAVINSKIY: - - - of which - - -7 JUDGE WILSON: - - - briefs, no? 8 MR. SLAVINSKIY: I - - - I have not seen a pro se 9 brief that's better than this brief. But that is also not the standard, Your Honor, because the reason we know beyond 10 11 the quality of this brief, is that Mr. Greenberg, after 12 spending months combing this record, the only issue that he 13 could identify that counsel could have raised which he 14 didn't was an excessive sentence claim that absolutely had 15 no chance of success. 16 What Mr. Greenberg's search over the last few 17 days on Westlaw did not find was a case in a homicide of an 18 innocent teenager with two other teenagers - - -19 JUDGE RIVERA: But I understood his argument to 20 be - - - he's focused on this excessive sentence and - - -2.1 and the reality is that I now better understand his 2.2 argument, which is it meant there was no - - - no 23 possibility of ever getting out. And that's what it turns 24 on. Okay.

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But he's also raised what he says are other

deficiencies of counsel. He's saying we have to look at 1 2 all of them. And again, from the vantage point and with 3 the benefit of People v. Gonzalez, why isn't he right that 4 it's the - - - the major deficiencies in the brief; it's 5 the failure to communicate with the client; it's not acting 6 expeditiously or in any timely fashion, at least until you hear otherwise, to perfect the appeal, to file papers; and 7 8 that's just some of it. Why - - - why isn't that - - -9 when you step back and say this is not what the Court of 10 Appeals should say is good enough for indigent defendants? 11 MR. SLAVINSKIY: Well, if Your Honor puts aside 12 the excessive sentence claim, then all the other claims 13 that Mr. Greenberg raises, which I would love to have an 14 opportunity to address, and in particular the communication 15 claim, all go to the first prong of the Stultz test: 16 counsel's appellate advocacy fall below an objective 17 standard of reasonableness? 18 Even if you grant - - -19 JUDGE RIVERA: Um-hum. 20 MR. SLAVINSKIY: - - - that some of those errors 21 may have depr - - - have dropped below that standard - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: Um-hum.

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MR. SLAVINSKIY: - - - which we cannot, as some of Your - - - as some of Your Honors have alluded to, because we have no idea whether the communication



1	allegations are true, then	
2	JUDGE RIVERA: I thought counsel admitted that he	
3	hadn't talked to his client, when he finally hears from the	
4	client, and he says	
5	MR. SLAVINSKIY: Your Honor	
6	JUDGE RIVERA: what's happening?	
7	MR. SLAVINSKIY: Your Honor, I think what you're	
8	alluding to is in 1999, the case was placed on the	
9	dismissal calendar.	
10	JUDGE RIVERA: Yes.	
11	MR. SLAVINSKIY: Which prompted defendant to	
12	write to	
13	JUDGE RIVERA: Yes, and isn't that the problem?	
14	It's on the dismissal calendar. So the attorney hadn't	
15	done anything.	
16	MR. SLAVINSKIY: Your Honor, as Mr as Mr.	
17	Greenberg could tell you, cases end up on the dismissal	
18	calendar all the time in appellate courts, but what counsel	
19		
20	JUDGE RIVERA: And if that was the only problem,	
21	I might not I might see your way. My my	
22	difficulty is, as he's already raised, it's not just that	
23	one thing; it's several things.	
24	And you're right, the People put in a spectacular	
25	brief. And when you compare that to what his attorney did,	

it's - - - it's really troubling.

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MR. SLAVINSKIY: Your Honors, the co-defendants also presented more polished briefs at the Appellate Division. And those polished briefs accomplished even less for their clients - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: Yeah, but the - - - our standard is not that the defendant has to get a reversal. This is not Strickland that you have to show prejudice. We've been very clear about that.

MR. SLAVINSKIY: Your Honors have also been very clear that while prejudice is not a required component of the test, the court is extremely clear in Stultz that they would be skeptical of any claim - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: No, we've said we would consider it. It's something to consider, because the factor that you're focusing on is did this individual get meaningful representation - - here's my problem - - - the question I asked him. We've - - - we've talked about a fair trial, but of course now we're talking about appellate representation. Is - - is it necessary for us to tweak our rule with respect to the standards applied for ineffective assistance of appellate counsel versus trial counsel?

MR. SLAVINSKIY: Your Honor, the rule that exists works, and the reason we know it works is by looking at



Gonzalez.

JUDGE RIVERA: Um-hum.

MR. SLAVINSKIY: Which this case is different from in multiple ways. First of all, unlike the lawyer in Gonzalez, that simply identified four point headings and then said these points have absolutely no chance of success, a new attorney looked over the record and identified six issues that should have been raised. Now -

JUDGE FEINMAN: But let me ask you this. Let's say in - - instead of filing the brief, the appellate counsel had submitted this as an Andrew Saunders and said these are the four points I looked at and for all the reasons that the People are then going to later put in a response, we can't succeed; but he had failed to mention the excessive sentence. What do you think would have happened when it got to the Appellate Division?

MR. SLAVINSKIY: I'm - - - I'm glad you asked that. The same thing that happened here, Your Honor. The case would have - - - I think that claim would have been dismissed, because looking at - - -

JUDGE FEINMAN: You don't think they would have denied the motion and reassigned it because there's that - - that issue that could be raised?

MR. SLAVINSKIY: Even in that circumstance, where



they were faced with no other issues and wanted to give the defendant an opportunity to appeal, even if they had grant

- - - they allowed an attorney to brief that issue, given the circumstances of this crime as well as the egregious information that was revealed at sentencing - - -

JUDGE FEINMAN: But - - - but you see, it - - - he doesn't have to have a guarantee of success. I think that's Judge Rivera's point and Mr. Greenberg's point - - -

MR. SLAVINSKIY: Ab - - -

 $\label{eq:JUDGE FEINMAN: --- in order to be afforded} $$ $$ meaningful representation, necessarily.$

MR. SLAVINSKIY: Absolutely, Your Honor. But when counsel did raise four arguments for appellate review and then left out another one that appellant - - - the defendant now claims should have been raised, that changes the inquiry. And you have to look - - - I mean I - - - I wasn't paraphrasing Stultz, Your Honor. Stultz says we would be skeptical of any claim that does not show prejudice.

And if you look at the circumstances of this case, when the Appellate Division, in 2000, reviewing an excessive sentence claim, not far removed from the drug and violence epidemic of the 90s, would have looked at the facts of this case, defendant's conduct during sentencing, including the allegations that he set his jail cell on fire

and that he threatened to kill witnesses, additionally, not 1 2 only do you have the murder, but his torture of women who 3 steal from YTC, including an excessive sentence claim in 4 this brief - - -5 JUDGE RIVERA: But isn't that part of his point 6 that that - - - those are things that get discussed with 7 the client, about whether or not to move forward when - -8 when you're talking about a sentence that means no 9 opportunity to ever get out - - - even though it doesn't 10 say life without parole? MR. SLAVINSKIY: Well, and - - - and I think - -11 12 - if Your Honor would let me address the communication 13 issue, because I think it goes to that. 14 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Would you just finish - -15 you got interrupted - - - your - - - to include an 16 excessive sentence - - - finish your thought. 17 MR. SLAVINSKIY: Sentence claim would not only 18

MR. SLAVINSKIY: Sentence claim would not only have had no chance of success, but it would have completely allowed the court to not look at any of the other issues that counsel has raised.

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And - - - and in particular, because the - -
JUDGE FEINMAN: Well, that might be true in the

context of an oral argument, if an advocate gets up there

and starts saying, you know, you gave my client sixty-six
and-two-thirds, the judge - - - and the - - - you know, the

members of the Appellate Division panel might, you know, get a little steamed or - - - perhaps that's the wrong word, but - - - and so that you would lose focus on those. But in the written decision, aren't they still going to have to answer all the points? MR. SLAVINSKIY: Of course they're going to answer all the points, Your Honor. But I do believe the information that would have been provided, which wasn't,

answer all the points, Your Honor. But I do believe the judges are human, and that had looking at - - at all the information that would have been provided, which wasn't, and nothing that happened at sentencing was included in this brief, because an excessive sentence wasn't raised, the judges would certainly have taken note of that, just as Mr. Greenberg would like the judges to take note of all the things that happened in prison to defendant after his acceptance claim was denied.

JUDGE GARCIA: Counsel, I'm sorry - -
MR. SLAVINSKIY: His claim was denied. Sorry.

JUDGE GARCIA: - - - you were going to go to -
- and I know you're lights on - - - you were going to go to the communication with counsel.

MR. SLAVINSKIY: Yeah.

JUDGE GARCIA: And while doing that, could you also address the due diligence point?

MR. SLAVINSKIY: Absolutely. I'll first talk about communication briefly and then I'll talk about due



diligence.

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JUDGE GARCIA: Thank you.

MR. SLAVINSKIY: And - - - and they go together, actually, because nowhere is the prejudice that the People suffered more evident than in the communication point.

Defendant - - - the only source that we have for the allegation that defendant and his attorney did not communicate are defendant's and his wives' - - - his wife's allegations. However, not only do we not have the advantage of Mr. Brown refuting those claim, which is what trial counsel did in this case when defendant raised the same exact accusations about communications with his trial attorney, except his trial attorney was alive and filed an affidavit, and that motion was denied.

But beyond that, there's also reason to doubt defendant's assertions, because two of the claims that appeared in the brief are things that defendant independently pressed. First of all, defendant filed a civil lawsuit in 2000 claiming that the judge should not have ordered the protective order which was in point 3 of the appellate brief. Second of all, defendant, to this day, denies being a member of YTC, which is what the - - - which was the subject matter of the fourth point raised on appeal.

And going quickly to the due diligence element,



and counsel may bring - - - stand up and say it's

unpreserved, it's the same exact issue we raised in the

Appellate Division. In a wide swath of this court's cases,

including issues such as this one, it has recognized that

defendants must act diligently in - -
JUDGE STEIN: But has it recognized that in any

context having to do with error coram nobis other than the

Syville situation?

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MR. SLAVINSKIY: Yes, Your Honor. In

D'Alessandro, which was not a Syville type case, it was a

coram nobis case, the court said - - and I'm quoting -
- delay in itself was not enough to deny a coram nobis.

What that explicitly leaves room for is delay coupled with
a showing of prejudice by the People.

And we show that prejudice here, not only with the communication element, but also with the fact that coun - - - we are forced to speculate as to why counsel did not raise an excessive sentence claim. In the brief, counsel even suggested that Mr. Brown did not know that an excessive sentence claim was an option.

Luckily, we have evidence from Westlaw cases showing that Mr. Brown did know it was an option and raised it where it was appropriate. But this kind of speculation

JUDGE RIVERA: You agree we don't have to



speculate about the quality of the briefing, correct? 1 2 MR. SLAVINSKIY: The brief - - -3 JUDGE RIVERA: And we don't have to speculate 4 about the fact that this was on the dismissal calendar, 5 correct? 6 MR. SLAVINSKIY: Those two things you - - -7 JUDGE RIVERA: Or about Brown's letter and the 8 content of that letter, correct? 9 MR. SLAVINSKIY: There are certain things in this 10 record. But looking at just those things along with the 11 fact that counsel raised four issues that were preserved, 12 unlike the other co-defendants, which also did not raise ES 13 claims, and that the court decided those claims, and that 14 an experienced and certainly competent appellate attorney 15 has looked over that record and has identified only one 16 claim that had stood absolutely no chance of success at 17 that time, that does not amount to ineffective assistance 18 of appellate counsel, and we urge Your Honors to affirm 19 defendant's conviction - -20 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, counsel. 21 MR. SLAVINSKIY: - - - and denial of the coram 22 nobis. 23 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you. 24 Mr. Greenberg? 25 MR. GREENBERG: Judge Leslie Croker Snyder

imposed consecutive sentences totaling sixty-six-and-two-thirds years to life, that is essentially life without parole for a twenty-year-old. He would be eighty-seven when he would be first eligible for parole.

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as a legal sentence in New York at the time that this sentence was imposed, but yet Judge Snyder took it upon herself to say you are so bad, you are so terrible, you're the worst of the worst and so unredeemable, that I'm sentencing you to die in prison, rather than say you know what, maybe you'll do well in prison, maybe you'll reform yourself, maybe you'll grow up and mature, and - - - and someday you can go before the parole board which will decide that.

Because even in the best of circumstances, Omar Alvarez was going to have a life sentence and was facing the possibility of spending his life in prison. All he was asking for and all we're asking for now is a shot at parole someday.

With respect to the due diligence claim, it is unpreserved, number one. Number two, as Judge Stein said, it has never been applied by this court outside of the Syville line of cases, which are totally different from this situation. And moreover, there was no prejudice to the People. They like to say well, if we had known by the

time you filed your coram nobis, we could have gotten counsel to explain what he did or what he didn't do. The fact is, they knew as early as 2006; they knew years before counsel died that this claim was in the works, because Mr. Alvarez asked the Appellate Division to assign counsel for this claim.

And when they denied that, he filed a 440 motion in the trial court and said - - - and also raised the claim of ineffectiveness of appellate counsel. The People responded by saying well, you can't do that here; you've got to file coram nobis, and the judge agreed, of course.

But they were on notice way back then that this claim was in the works. If they thought there was any reason to speak to Mr. Brown, they had ample opportunity to speak to him.

Now, in terms of prejudice, I know we talked about the question - - - you know, the standard, whether we're dealing with Strickland or - - - or meaningful representation. There is prejudice here. I can't say for sure that Mr. Alvarez would have gotten a sentence reduction in the Appellate Division, but the prejudice is, he had an absolute right to have that court review the sentence. And when you're serving essentially life without parole, the fact that the law in New York gives you the absolute right to have the second bite of the apple,

another court review that sentence and determine whether - - you know what - - - we understand why Judge Snyder
gave him that sentence, we understand why he was deserving
of a very long time in prison, but we think a nineteenyear-old might mature someday and we think that that's just
too extreme. Let's - - let's knock it down to twentyfive to life.

That wouldn't have been unreasonable for the

That wouldn't have been unreasonable for the Appellate Division to do. It would not have been that out of the ordinary. They do it all the time, as - - - as some of Your Honors know from your experiences on the Appellate Division. And in fact, he was denied his absolute right, Mr. Alvarez, to have that kind of review, that second-chance review in the Appellate Division, and that is prejudicial to him.

And all we're asking for now is for this case to be sent back for a de novo appeal so that he can raise that issue before the Appellate Division and say look, I want to have a chance at parole someday.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, counsel.

MR. GREENBERG: Thank you.

(Court is adjourned)

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1		CERTIFICATION	
2			
3	I, P	enina Wolicki, certify that the foregoing	
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5	People of the State of New York v. Omar Alvarez, No. 13 was		
6	prepared using the required transcription equipment and is		
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