1	COURT OF APPEALS
2	STATE OF NEW YORK
3	Matter of National Energy Marketers Association, et al.
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5	Appellants,
6	-Against- No. 21
7	New York State Public Service Commission
8	Respondent.
9	
10	Matter of Retail Energy Supply Association, et al.
11	Appellants,
12	-Against- No. 22
13	New York State Public Service Commission
14	Respondent.
15	
16	20 Eagle Stree Albany, New Yo
17	March 19, 20
18	Before:
19	CHIEF JUDGE JANET DIFIORE ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA
20	ASSOCIATE JUDGE LESLIE E. STEIN ASSOCIATE JUDGE MICHAEL J. GARCIA
21	ASSOCIATE JUDGE ROWAN D. WILSON ASSOCIATE JUDGE PAUL FEINMAN
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25	Sharona Shapir Official Court Transcribe



CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: The first matter on this afternoon's calendar are appeals 21 and 22, the Matter of National Energy Marketers Association v. the New York State Public Service Commission and Matter of Retail Energy Supply Association v. the Public Service Commission. Counsel? MR. CYRULNIK: Good afternoon, Your Honors. it please the court. Jason Cyrulnik on behalf of the NEM appellants. My colleague and I are collectively - - would request four minutes rebuttal time, and we'll split that evenly. CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Very well. MR. CYRULNIK: Thank you, Your Honor. appeal asks whether the legislature imparted to the Public Service Commission the authority to set the rates that private energy service companies charge their customers for

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CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Counsel, if the Public Service Commission does not have broad authority to regulate access to utility infrastructure, how is it that the Commission unilaterally opened the retail energy market in the first place by ordering the infrastructure open to the ESCOs.

MR. CYRULNIK: So Your Honor, I think the opening of the market is different from the closing of the market.



I think the legislature imparted to the Public Service
Commission many areas in which it can oversee the market,
in particular areas including the one that we're focused or
today, Your Honor, rate making, the legislature made clear
what its intent was with respect to which entities the PSC
could could regulate rates and which entities it
couldn't. Your
JUDGE STEIN: They're generally regulating
conditions under which their access to the infrastructure
can either be obtained or maintained.
MR. CYRULNIK: So Your Honor, I think it it

MR. CYRULNIK: So Your Honor, I think it - - - it depends on what they're doing. I think if what - - - what the PSC is doing is really an end run around the legislative decision to limit rate making to utilities, which couldn't be clearer from the text of the Article 4 that deals with rate making, couldn't be clearer from the legislature's subsequent amendments to other articles, et cetera. I think if that's what the PSC is trying to do and use a back door of - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: I thought what they were trying to do is just set a cap.

MR. CYRULNIK: Well, I think - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: Doesn't that go to what's just and reasonable?

MR. CYRULNIK: Well, I think that setting a cap



is a manifestation of regulating rates. I think Your Honor is right that the way - - - the way they try to - - - to set - - - they tried to regulate rates here was to say the rates can't exceed the rates that are charged by utilities. JUDGE RIVERA: Isn't that the legislative intent? MR. CYRULNIK: I don't think so, Your Honor. think the legislative intent is in Article 4, and - - - and these words are ellipsised out of every single quote that you see in respondent's brief with respect to Article 4.

The words that are excised out or ellipsised out are "rates charged by electric and gas corporations". And those words are in - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: But the point of competition is to provide something beneficial to the public. And their position is you're not providing anything - - - the ESCOs are not providing benefit to the public because, first of all, they're not charging less, and second of all, to the extent they are charging more, they're not providing some value for the premium.

MR. CYRULNIK: Your Honor, we agree that's the position they have taken. We don't think the record supports it at all. I don't think that that's - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: Well, let's say it did.

MR. CYRULNIK: Well, but I don't - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: Let's say it did.



1 MR. CYRULNIK: Right. 2 JUDGE RIVERA: Why wouldn't they be able to 3 regulate, in furtherance of the legislative goal, which is 4 to achieve a benefit for the consumer through the 5 competitive market? 6 MR. CYRULNIK: I think, Your Honor, two - - - two 7 things. Number one, eliminating the competitive market, 8 which is what the PSC would do, can possibly improve things 9 for - - - for consumers, that is to - - - to restore us to 10 a state of monopoly. 11 JUDGE RIVERA: Well, they didn't eliminate it; 12 they just said it's actually got to provide a benefit. And 13 so they've defined a range of benefit - - -14 MR. CYRULNIK: Well, but the benefit - - -15 JUDGE RIVERA: - - - including cost as well as 16 service. 17 MR. CYRULNIK: Right, what the PSC tried to do 18 here is say if you are not providing the benefit, ESCOs 19 can't exist, and if we determine that's the case, we're 20 going to be restored to a state of monopoly. So - - -2.1 JUDGE GARCIA: Counsel, I have a more basic 2.2 question on that. Clearly there is some authority for the 23 PSC to regulate you, and maybe they don't have other 24 authority, maybe they don't have certain rate making under

a different article. My problem with this case is what are

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we applying that to? Your regulation isn't here, right?

The regulation was thrown out by the Supreme Court here; it hasn't been re-promulgated. So we're giving, kind of, an advisory opinion on what authorities that the PSC may or may not have over you without a concrete example of what they've tried to exercise before us.

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MR. CYRULNIK: So Your Honor, I think this is -
- it's more specific than that. I think we had requested

below a declaration that the Public Service Commission does

not have the authority to set the rates that ESCOs charge,

whether it's by a cap, by anything. And if - - -

JUDGE GARCIA: Maybe they do, maybe they don't have "rate making" authority, but how they promulgate a regulation that may have some effect on your rates is really the controversy. So maybe we could say, sure, you know, they don't, but that doesn't answer the question of whether this particular regulation is good or not good because maybe, as I think Judge Rivera's questions may have been getting at, this isn't a rate-making regulation.

So what are we supposed to decide, in a vacuum, they do, they don't have rate-making authority over you, they do, they don't have Article 4 authority over you? We don't generally do that.

MR. CYRULNIK: Your Honor, where the relief requested below was for precisely that declaration, I think



that it is fair - - - it is fair material for the Appellate Court to review and for the Court of Appeals to review.

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I think Your Honor is right that the devil is going to be in the details. Once this court answers that question and $-\ -\ -$

JUDGE GARCIA: So if we affirm the Appellate
Division's finding that whatever that particular provision
was in Article 4 didn't apply, and they didn't have
authority under that provision, that would be it? That's
basically what we could do here, or not, or reverse that;
that's what you're asking us to do?

MR. CYRULNIK: I think that's the controversy before this court. I think once this court gives the guidance and particularly considers the issue we raised, whether or not the lower court erred in finding that the - - - that the Public Service Commission does have jurisdiction to set rates, I think that the - - -

JUDGE GARCIA: They didn't really find that.

They found a particular provision of this scheme didn't apply because of the definitional section, but that isn't the end of whether what they do is good or not good. So I don't see how we can reach the ultimate issue of what they did, which isn't before us, whether that falls within a certain rate-making authority or not because that isn't even here.

MR. CYRULNIK: Yeah, we respectfully submit, Your Honor, that that is the discrete issue before the court. That is the lower court found that there is rate making, that there is the ability - - - the PSC has the ability to set or control the rates the ESCOs charge. We think that the plain language of the statute and the legislative history make clear that can't be true.

And Your Honor's right; I think there will be subsequent actions on the part of the PSC that will comply with whatever this court pronounces, and we can see whether or not there is a problem that that raises. But there is a discrete issue before the court, and we think that it would - - - it - - it needs to be addressed, and we think it's fundamental.

JUDGE WILSON: Chief, I have one question, if I might.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Yes, of course.

JUDGE WILSON: I don't understand, counsel, and maybe you can clarify your position for me. Is it your position that the PSC does not have the authority right now to say forget the ESCO market, we're shutting everybody out, utilities no longer have an obligation? Is that your position? Or is it your position they don't have the power to set rates?

MR. CYRULNIK: It's the latter, Your Honor. It's



that - - -1 2 They could shut the whole thing JUDGE WILSON: 3 down, is your view? 4 MR. CYRULNIK: That's not our view, but that's -5 - that's not the issue - - - that's not the issue -6 JUDGE WILSON: I'm not ask - - -7 - - - before the court. MR. CYRULNIK: JUDGE WILSON: 8 I'm asking - - -9 MR. CYRULNIK: You're asking just our view? 10 JUDGE WILSON: - - - about your view about the power of the Commission. Does the Commission have the 11 12 power - - - let's say, after holding - - - you know, after 13 going through SAPA, to say this whole thing isn't working 14 out, utilities no longer have an obligation; do they have 15 that power? 16 MR. CYRULNIK: I think that would be problematic 17 under Boreali. I think that would be a policy-making 18 decision in which the legislature has repeatedly made 19 pronouncements regarding the ESCOs. And if that was going 20 to be - - - decision was going to be made, it would need to 21 be made at the legislative level. That is a major policy 22 decision that satisfies all four of the Boreali factors. 23 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, counsel. 24 MR. CYRULNIK: Thank you, Your Honor.



MR. BURCH: Good afternoon, Your Honors.

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please the court. David Burch, Barclay Damon, on behalf of Retail Energy Supply Association.

I'd like to pick up with a question that was asked previously, you know, are we aggrieved, essentially, was Judge Garcia's question. If you look at Judge Zwack's decision and then - - - and then the Appellate Division's decision, they - - - they find jurisdiction and they remit this to the PSC for further proceedings in accordance therewith. We've now been faced with, you know, nearly two years of - - -

JUDGE GARCIA: But we don't have that regulation in front of us, right? It's not in effect. And what I find, the Appellate Division, after going through Article 4, says: "We find that PSC's broad statutory jurisdiction and authority over the sale of gas and electricity authorized it to impose the limitations set forth in the reset order." That's their holding. We don't have the reset order. So I don't know how we reach that - - I mean, I think maybe we could reach whether or not that provision in Article 4 covers you or not and agree or disagree with the Appellate Division on that, but I don't know how then we go on to say whether or not authority authorizes the PSC to promulgate an order that isn't in effect and isn't before us.

MR. BURCH: No, I think the question before Your



Honors, respectfully, is, you know, what is the scope of 1 2 that authority. And I think that if you look to Judge 3 Zwack and the Appellate Divisions, they find this broad 4 jurisdictional authority over rates and then the - - - the 5 PSC's proceeding in accordance with that, and so - - -6 JUDGE GARCIA: But they found, in the one that I 7 just read, is that they had authority to promulgate this 8 order, not a broad authority to do various, you know, 9 things that we could hyp - - - you know, hypotheticals we 10 could give. They found broad authority to do what they did with the reset order. But what would we say? You do or 11 12 you don't have broad authority to do what? There is no 13 order. 14 MR. BURCH: To do what they did in the reset 15 order, and that's what I think Judge Zwack remanded and had 16 said: you have to follow proper notice proceedings under 17 SAPA, and that's what - - -18 JUDGE GARCIA: But the order is no longer in

effect.

MR. BURCH: That's - - -

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JUDGE GARCIA: And it's not been re-promulgated, right?

MR. BURCH: I understand, Your Honor, and we think that the court should weigh in and - - - and either uphold or, in our view, reverse the lower court's decision.



	JUDGE WILSON: But you're sort of assuming a						
2	result after the SAPA process, right? I mean, it's						
3	possible that the PSC does nothing.						
4	MR. BURCH: Well, I don't think we're assuming						
5	it. The Public Service Commission, in that proceeding, and						
6	I believe in the briefs there are some citations to their						
7	arguments, where they assert they have this jurisdiction.						
8	So that's sort of a fundamental premise of what's going on						
9	in front of the PSC today.						
10	JUDGE GARCIA: But I think there have been some						
11	new orders promulgated, if I'm not correct, which may be						
12	going through various stages, and I'm not commenting on						
13	them, but they seem to have been phrased differently than						
14	this order.						
15	MR. BURCH: Well, that's I think the order						
16	is, you know, in kind of colloquially, are the low-						
17	income orders. That's a separate fact.						
18	JUDGE GARCIA: Right.						
19	MR. BURCH: That's a separate proceeding. In						
20	fact, RESA's not, you know, a party to that litigation.						
21	If I might turn						
22	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Do you want to move to the						
23	merits?						
24	MR. BURCH: That's what I'd like to turn to, you						
25	know, the question of the question of, you know, what						

did the legislature intend here to be the scope. I mean, 1 2 we - - - we have a - - - a good legislative record that 3 goes through decades. We have the legislature opening up 4 the markets to some degree. We have orders from the public 5 service commission implementing it. 6 JUDGE STEIN: Well, don't you also have a history, over decades, of the PSC establishing various 7 8 requirements of - - - of the ESCOs through the UBPs? 9 MR. BURCH: Yes, Your Honor. 10 JUDGE STEIN: Okay. And where does the authority for that come from? 11 12 MR. BURCH: Well, I think the UBPs are, you know, 13 not before the court, you know, whether they're valid or 14 not. 15 JUDGE STEIN: I know, but looking - - -16 MR. BURCH: But the - - -17 JUDGE STEIN: But you're asking us to look at 18 what the - - -19 MR. BURCH: What the scope is. 20 JUDGE STEIN: - - - the PSC's authority is. So 21 I'm trying to ascertain, we know - - - well, at least your 22 colleague says that - - - that they have the authority to 23 require the utilities to allow access to the 24 infrastructure, and then the argument is, is that but they

don't have the authority to - - - to take it away.

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they - -

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MR. BURCH: Right.

JUDGE STEIN: But apparently they have authority, because you haven't questioned it or - - or challenged it, to impose various restrictions and requirements and so on through the UBPs. And my question to you is where do you think that authority comes from?

MR. BURCH: And so that authority comes from the ability of the Public Service Commission to regulate things within its purview that are consistent with what the legislature has said. So the legislature has said HEFPA applies, Article 2 applies to ESCOs. UBPs can be consistent with that. But - -

JUDGE STEIN: Okay. But the UBPs came before HEFPA, before Article 2, right?

MR. BURCH: Um-hum.

JUDGE STEIN: So that - - - that's - - -

MR. BURCH: And - - -

JUDGE STEIN: So my - - -

MR. BURCH: And at that time, in 1999, I think, when the UBPs were issued, you know, and then 2002 we have the HEFPA shortly thereafter, after there was some dispute about whether it applied or not, legislature spoke. But the UBPs also, you know, to the extent they're consistent with general, you know, consumer protection things, that's



2 jurisdiction is a very specific thing. 3 JUDGE STEIN: But they didn't have the right - -4 - I think you say they didn't have the right to regulate 5 consumer protection things until the amendment to Article 6 My point, again, is is that the UBPs were there before 7 that amendment to Article 2. 8 MR. BURCH: And they were, and I was not involved 9 in any decisions on challenging it or not, and I don't know 10 that RESA was. But you know, the point is here we have 11 them trying to impose a regulation on rates which is 12 something the legislature specifically applied to 13 utilities, for good reason, because they're monopolies. 14 JUDGE RIVERA: But then does your argument boil 15 down to PSC can regulate you as much as they want, but they 16 can't touch what you want to charge? 17 MR. BURCH: They can't touch things that the 18 legislature spoke on. 19 What else is there other than the JUDGE RIVERA: 20 rates? 2.1 MR. BURCH: I - - - I could come up with 2.2 hypothetical things right now. We're talking about rates. 23 You know, conceivably, if they wanted to shut down the 24 market, I would agree with my colleague, that would be a

fine, but here you have the legislature saying rate-setting

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bridge too far.

1 JUDGE RIVERA: Why is that? Doesn't the statute 2 just say "may" as opposed to "must" open up that 3 infrastructure? 4 MR. BURCH: Well, I think they did open it up, 5 and now we've had decades of people using it. The - - -6 and I see I'm out of time, but if it's okay, Chief, I'd 7 like to finish. 8 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Of course, yes. 9 MR. BURCH: They - - - they, you know, opened the 10 market up. People have been acting in accordance. People 11 have made business decisions, invested a lot of money in 12 New York, and New York, you know, boils down to - - - and 13 this court's long recognized competition is a fundamental 14 principle of the policy of the State of New York. And that 15 starts in 1968 in this court's decision, Aimcee v. Tomar 16 Products, 21 N.Y. 2d 621. When a market's opened up,

> And the legislature can certainly speak to, you know, what the boundaries of rates are, but here they did, and they applied it to public utilities, gas and electric corporations, which ESCOs are not. The Third Department got that right. Thank you, Your Honors.

> there's competition. It should be allowed to continue and

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you.

Counsel?

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prosper.



MR. BASSINSON: Good afternoon, Your Honors. May it please the court. Scot Bassinson on behalf of the New York Public Service Commission.

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Your Honors, the Commission's order here implemented a legislative policy that's over a century old to protect consumers who purchase essential gas and electric service - - - utility service, by insuring that such utility service, including its price, is just and reasonable. The legislature's policy and the Commission's jurisdiction over the sale of that essential energy applies irrespective of who is selling the energy.

The Commission's authority is broad and specific and clearly set forth in the plain statutory language of the Public Service law and, more recently, the general business law, legislative history and over a hundred years of regulation and case law.

In addition, this court, over sixty-five years ago, in Campo v. Feinberg, affirmed the Commission's broad jurisdiction over the utility distribution system in upholding a Commission determination to eliminate third party resellers. In that case they were known as submeterers. How that worked was the submeterers or landlords would purchase the energy from the utility and resell it to tenants. So they were third-party energy resellers such as ESCOs are here.



JUDGE STEIN: So who's being regulated? Are the ESCOs being regulated or are the utilities being regulated in - - in to whom they may or must open their - - - their infrastructure?

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MR. BASSINSON: Yes, the Commission regulates the utilities directly and over there, under Sections 5 and 4 and 65 and 66, a direct regulation of the utilities and their infrastructure, and the Commission in 1996 determined to open the market to allow ESCOs access to that utility distribution system.

And so, as in Campo, the Commission's jurisdictional authority over the utility distribution system is broad enough to encompass regulating the price that ESCOs can charge for the commodity which is the same thing that the submeterers were selling.

JUDGE WILSON: Well, does it make a difference to your authority if - - - if the rule is phrased, say, option one, ESCOs can't charge more than X, or it's phrased: utilities do not have to allow an ESCO access unless the utility is charging not more than X? Does that make a difference to your authority the way that's phrased?

MR. BASSINSON: No, Your Honor, because both of those things derive from the Commission's statutory authority and duty to ensure that the essential energy services, the utility service is - - -



JUDGE WILSON: Right, but one is - - - just to be 1 2 clear, one is a regulation of the utility and the other is 3 a regulation of the ESCO. 4 MR. BASSINSON: Yes, Your Honor, and they both 5 derive from the same duty to ensure safe and adequate 6 service at just and reasonable rates. 7 JUDGE RIVERA: So could you require that their 8 rates be twenty percent less than a utility? 9 MR. BASSINSON: That's not the issue before the 10 court, Your Honor. 11 JUDGE RIVERA: I'm just trying to get a sense of 12 the scope of the authority that you're arguing for on 13 behalf of the PSC. I understand that we're talking about a 14 cap and I get that, but my question is about the scope. 15 MR. BASSINSON: If it were determined that such a 16 rate were just and reasonable under the PSL, that's 17 possible, but this particular case, it was determined, 18 because the utility price for the commodity is, by 19 definition, just and reasonable under the Public Service 20 Law, that in order for ESCOs to continue to serve the 21 market they had to meet or beat that utility price. 2.2 JUDGE RIVERA: So let me ask you this. So that's 23 in furtherance of competition that benefits the consumer, 24 correct?

That's correct, Your Honor.

MR. BASSINSON:

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1	JUDGE RIVERA: So if it's exactly the same,						
2	what's the benefit to the consumer? If it's the exact same						
3	fee, where's the benefit?						
4	MR. BASSINSON: For the commodity itself, it						
5	would be the same price. So						
6	JUDGE RIVERA: But what's the benefit to the						
7	consumer?						
8	MR. BASSINSON: Well, if the ESCOs and						
9	again, the Commission's not in the in the you						
10	know, it's not the Commission's duty to ensure that ESCOs						
11	make a profit.						
12	JUDGE RIVERA: I understand.						
13	MR. BASSINSON: But if ESCOs find a way to either						
14	hedge in the wholesale market or offer value-added energy						
15	services, that would benefit the consumers, if they could						
16	purchase the energy for below the cost of						
17	JUDGE RIVERA: So they might still give more at						
18	the same price is what you're saying?						
19	MR. BASSINSON: That's correct, Your Honor.						
20	That's correct.						
21	JUDGE RIVERA: But if they didn't, if it's						
22	exactly the same, how does that help the consumer? I can						
23	choose from the same four companies that that give me						
24	exactly the same thing, or or a hundred companies.						
25	MR. BASSINSON: Essentially, the energy is passed						



through, and they get the service at the same price.

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JUDGE RIVERA: So that sounds to me like an argument for competition for the sake of competition, or the existence of just more choices that are meaningless, at the end of the day.

MR. BASSINSON: Well, it may be that the Commission would consider that in determining whether the market should continue. If there is no - - - the whole purpose of the market was to benefit consumers. In fact, goal number one was to lower the price for consumers.

JUDGE RIVERA: Um-hum.

MR. BASSINSON: And that figured heavily in the Commission's determination here that in order to make sure that the price is reasonable for consumers you either meet or beat the utility price.

JUDGE STEIN: So one of the provisions is is that they can charge more if they provide some alternative energy options. Is that $-\ -\ -$

MR. BASSINSON: That's correct. There was one exception in this order which allowed ESCOs, theoretically, to charge more if they committed to using thirty percent renewable energy. And there's statutory authority for the Commission to order that under Section 5(2). It requires the Commission to encourage programs for environmental issues and - - -



JUDGE STEIN: Are there other value-added things, 2 other than that, that you can give me examples of that - -3 - that might provide me - - -4 MR. BASSINSON: I would have to say the 5 Commission's been hard pressed to find them, and that is 6 why, over the years, since the - - - the market was opened, 7 the Commission has initiated several proceedings in order 8 to determine if the ESCOs are bringing anything - - - any 9 value-added services. What was found was that the price 10 was higher than what utilities charge, but it was difficult to identify what - - - other than costing more for the 11 12 commodity, what the ESCOs were actually providing. 13 JUDGE WILSON: Do you have a view on the 14 aggrievement or mootness, ripeness issue? 15 MR. BASSINSON: Well, we did raise the 16 aggrievement issue in this court. We believe that the 17 applicants received the relief that they requested. They -18 - - they filed an Article 78, and they sought invalidation 19 of the three ordering clauses, and that's what they got. 20 JUDGE FEINMAN: But they didn't get the 21 declaration they wanted, did they? 2.2 MR. BASSINSON: Well, Your Honor, the 23 declaration, they've - - - they haven't preserved that 24 issue before this court. They didn't raise it in either

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brief before the Appellate Division, and they didn't raise

it in this court until their reply, and we haven't had an opportunity. So we would argue that they just never preserved that issue.

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JUDGE STEIN: Well, if we were to find - - - you - - - you also order mootness. If we were to find that it was moot, then - - - then it was moot before the Appellate Division, right? So wouldn't we have to vacate the entire Appellate Division order including that part that essentially, I think, says that you have the authority - - you had the authority to issue the - - - the reset order?

MR. BASSINSON: I have two responses, Your Honor. First of all, no one has requested - - - the other side has not requested that you invalidate the Appellate Division order. But I would also point out - - -

JUDGE STEIN: But we might have to do that, if we found that it was moot, wouldn't we? Well, let's just say we would, then - - - then the effect would be, theoretically, to throw it out, right?

MR. BASSINSON: If you were to invalidate the order, it would no longer be in effect. But as far as the jurisdictional issue, I would point out this - - - I forgot which of you mentioned the low income order, but there is a live order of the Appellate Division, Third Department, relating to a similar order issued by the Commission directing ESCOs to meet or beat utility prices with respect

2 Appellate Division, including the issue of jurisdiction 3 under a full Boreali analysis as well. So even if we were 4 to - - -5 JUDGE RIVERA: But aren't you, in part, able to 6 move forward with that because of the decision by the 7 Appellate Division in this case because they had not decided in favor of NEM and RESA that - - - that indeed the 8 9 PSC had the authority, wouldn't that litigation have been 10 dead in the water? 11 MR. BASSINSON: The - - -12 JUDGE RIVERA: You couldn't move forward with 13 that, could you? You couldn't move forward with that 14 order. 15 MR. BASSINSON: In the low income order? 16 JUDGE RIVERA: Correct. 17 MR. BASSINSON: That's correct. But that order 18 was issued after - - - after the Appellate Division order 19 here, and - - -20 JUDGE RIVERA: But that's my point. There are 21 consequences flowing from that order that affect them. 22 That - - - that's my point. 23 MR. BASSINSON: That's correct. So even if this 24 court were to invalidate the Appellate Division order on 25 aggrievement grounds or mootness grounds, the low income

to low income customers. And that order was upheld by the

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order would still be in effect and would be settled law.

And I do note that the appellants, one of them is - - - NEM appellants have chosen not to seek leave to appeal that decision to this court.

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JUDGE GARCIA: But let's say in the Supreme Court they win, as you say, that it gets tossed, the rest of the Supreme Court order is out there, you re-promulgate, you comply with SAPA, they challenge again, wouldn't you come in and say that you can't do that, you already got a decision? So didn't they, in effect, have to appeal?

MR. BASSINSON: They would have to appeal the Supreme Court order.

JUDGE GARCIA: But could they do that then? If they didn't appeal, if what happened happened here and they didn't appeal, and then you re-promulgate and you comply with SAPA, then they come in to challenge, wouldn't you say it's too late, you didn't appeal the other order, the Supreme Court order stands?

MR. BASSINSON: We would certainly argue that the low income Appellate Division order - - -

JUDGE GARCIA: Not the low income, this case -
- this case. So if they hadn't appealed and said, look,

we won, let's go home, we won on SAPA grounds, and you went

out and you re-promulgated, in compliance with SAPA, and

now they want to challenge, would they have a problem



because they didn't appeal the original Supreme Court order?

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MR. BASSINSON: No, Your Honor, because they weren't aggrieved by the original Supreme Court order.

They won what they sought. They sought invalidation of the order. If the Commission, after its ongoing proceeding, issues another order, they'll have an opportunity to challenge that, if they're not happy with it, and they can raise whatever issues they want to the Supreme Court.

Your Honors, under - - - I could address the Boreali issues if you would - - - $\!\!\!$

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Please.

MR. BASSINSON: - - - like that. So the first part of the analysis is what's the function of the Agency. So in order to do that, let's look at - - - I sort of conflate that with the first element of the four-part test.

So let's look at the legislative declaration of policy, all right, because Boreali involves whether the Agency is implementing a clear legislative policy. So I would draw the court's attention to Public Service Law Section 30, which is entitled "Residential Gas Electric and Steam Service Policy", and it's the declaration of policy by the legislature that the continued provision of electric and gas service to residential customers is necessary to preserve the health and general welfare and is in the



1 public interest. So it's an essential service according to 2 the legislature. That's the declaration policy. 3 We then go to the broad statutory grant of 4 authority to the Commission, and we start with Public 5 Service Law Section 5(1). Section 5 is entitled 6 "Jurisdiction, powers and duties of the public service 7 commission". 8 5(1)(b) states that the Commission has 9 jurisdiction, powers and duties over the entire range of 10 the generation and provision of energy, the manufacture, 11 conveyance, transportation, sale, or distribution of gas 12 and electricity. I draw the court's particular attention 13 to the word "sale". This first clause in 5(1)(b) 14 demonstrates the legislature's specific grant of authority 15 to the Commission to supervise, and it has jurisdiction and 16 duties with respect to the sale of the energy. 17 The second clause in 5(1)(b) after the - - -18 JUDGE RIVERA: Regardless of the seller? Regardless of the seller? Any seller? 19 20 MR. BASSINSON: Correct. That's correct, Your 2.1 It's over the commodity itself. It's over the 22 whole process: manufacture - - -23 JUDGE RIVERA: The market. 24 MR. BASSINSON: - - - tran - - - correct. 25 Correct, Your Honor.

Then you go to PSL Section 4(1), which is one of those, kind of, generic grants of broad authority in which the Commission - - - the Public Service Commission has all the power specified in the PSL and also all powers necessary or proper to enable it to carry out the purposes of the Public Service Law.

So that's the - - - we have the legislative policy, we have the general broad statutory grant of authority to the Commission, and then we get to Article 4 of the PSL which has more specifics with respect to the Commission's jurisdiction over the utility distribution system.

JUDGE WILSON: Can I back you up to 5(1)(b) for a moment?

MR. BASSINSON: Sure.

JUDGE WILSON: Because I think, you know, the string you read: "manufacture, conveying, transportation, sale, distribution" finishes with "to gas or electric plants". Right? So is it really the whole market, or is it the sale, transportation, distribution, et cetera, to the gas and electric plants?

MR. BASSINSON: Gas or elec - - - I would say that the comma means that the jurisdiction - - - it offsets the prior clause, so the jurisdiction, powers and duties apply to those things and also to gas plants, electric



plants, and the persons or entities who own or operate them. That's how I would read the provision.

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So in Public Service Law Section 65(1), that requires that gas corporations and electric corporations provide service that is safe and adequate and just and reasonable. That's the primary charge of the legislature to the Commission to ensure that these essential energy services are provided in a way that are safe and adequate and just and reasonable.

Under 66, the Commission can determine whether rates that are charged by these corporations are reasonable or unreasonable and can set reasonable rates.

Under - - - so that's - - - that's the more specific grant authorizing the Commission to regulate the utility distribution system.

I see that I'm out of time. A few moments in closing. In closing, Your Honors, the regulation of ESCO sales is fundamentally the regulation of utility service and is designed to protect consumers. That's the legislature's policy, and the Commission has merely implemented that policy.

If the court finds that the appellants are aggrieved, and it decides to address the substance of the issues here, we ask that the court affirm the lower court's clear holdings that the Commission has the authority to



protect consumers by regulating ESCO's access to utility distribution systems and preclude the utilities from carrying overpriced energy.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, counsel.

MR. BASSINSON: Thank you very much, Your Honor.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: You're welcome.

Counsel?

MR. CYRULNIK: Thank you, Your Honor. And my colleague, Mr. Burch, will have just a couple of points at the end. I'll try to address as many as I can in the short time that I have.

Your Honors, I think that, you know, Judge
Wilson's question hit the nail on the head. This is the
answer to the question that you asked in their brief. At
page 56 of their brief, Mr. Bassinson, answers the
question: "The Commission does not need the power over
ESCOs, as corporate entities, in order to impose a price
cap on ESCOs." That's their position. Their position is
that they can backdoor in regulation of ESCO prices without
regulating ESCOs. And that is antithetical to the basic
tenants of statutory interpretation that this court has
consistently pronounced.

Make no mistake about it, this is not an issue where we are operating in a void or a vacuum. The legislature spoke to this issue in 2002. The legislature



debunked everything that you just heard in the last two or three minutes with respect to the meaning of Article 1. If electric and gas corporations — — and Article 1 generally gave the PSC jurisdiction to do whatever it wanted to do in this market and this space, the legislature wouldn't have needed to debate and enact legislation in 2002 to change the definition of the entities over whom the PSC had jurisdiction with respect to Article 2.

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JUDGE STEIN: Is there a difference between what the PSC does under Article 4 with respect to the utilities and how it sets the rates? Is it - - - are the rates that it sets under Article 4 a maximum and a minimum as opposed to what the effect of what it did here is - - - is to impose just a maximum?

MR. CYRULNIK: I think it sets - - - by setting a - - - it's not really a maximum or a minimum; it sets the rates. It reviews the rates by the - - - that the utility has, through a whole process of - - - which includes utilities needing to make a profit. What they've done over here is they said an ESCO cannot operate unless they're charging those rates.

And this is an important factual point for Your Honor's benefit. ESCOs often - - it speaks to - - - to several questions in terms of what - - - what benefits are provided. ESCOs offer a variety of products including



fixed-rate products. So that means an ESCO - - - if I enter into a contract with an ESCO, I am - - - I am given the opportunity to pay a fixed rate for the next year, two years, three years, just like a mortgage.

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Under the PSC's order, if that rate ends up going down, if the regular variable rate goes down, I am being overcharged because I committed to paying twelve cents a kilowatt hour instead of what ended up being ten. But of course there's a benefit to the consumer because they chose voluntarily, because they wanted the fixed rate, just like I chose a thirty-year mortgage, one of my friends chose an APR that had a variable rate mortgage.

Under this rate reg - - - rate-setting regulation, they can essentially say every ESCO here is overcharging simply because a customer elected to enter into a fixed-rate agreement. That's not fair. That's not what the legislature had in mind. And the legislature made this clear in enacting its amendments. Rate setting is a separate power. It doesn't - - -

JUDGE STEIN: Well, wouldn't that be an argument, then, that what it's doing isn't fair and reasonable?

Isn't that a different argument?

MR. CYRULNIK: Your Honor, I think it's also unfair and unreasonable. And I think that is a separate argument. But I think there's a threshold problem here.

And they don't get past go if they don't have the authority to set ESCO rates, nor do they need the authority to set ESCO rates. ESCOs are a voluntary slice of the market.

Any consumer who doesn't want to buy from an ESCO doesn't have to buy from an ESCO. Any consumer who doesn't want a fixed-rate product need not have it. You don't need rate-setting regulatory authority - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: Yeah, but the legislature's made clear that the point of opening the market is to benefit a consumer, and you don't need 300 choices that are giving you the same choice, right?

MR. CYRULNIK: Your Honor - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: Which is their - - - I understand you may have a different position, but they're arguing that unless the price you charge is exactly the same, because you're not doing anything more than the utility's doing, or you're actually offering something for the premium, that that's not just and reasonable.

MR. CYRULNIK: Yeah, but your - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: It doesn't meet what the legislature intended.

MR. CYRULNIK: So two quick points, Your Honor, to respond. One, the legislature never even uttered the words "just and reasonable" with respect to prices that consumers pay. It's about what utilities, at the time that



it was enacted, monopoly utilities charged. And the reason 1 2 was clear: if the utilities can charge whatever they want 3 to in a monopoly, and we all need electric and we all need 4 gas, we have no choice but to be at their mercy. 5 So the legislature, they ellipsis out the thirty-6 nine, I think it is, times that Article 4 refers to gas and 7 electric corporations only, and then the legislature spoke 8 to this issue in 2002 and said we are only changing those 9 references to gas and electric corporations for purposes of 10 Article 2. Only - - -11 JUDGE WILSON: So let's assume for a moment that 12 the PSC can't set ESCO rates. Assume that. Why can't the 13 PSC say to traditional utilities, you don't have to make 14 your lines and pipes available unless an ESCO is charging 15 less than your rate? 16 MR. CYRULNIK: So I don't want to evade the 17 question, I just want to point out that's not the - - -18 JUDGE WILSON: I know. I understand that's not -19 20 MR. CYRULNIK: To Your Honor's point, that's not 2.1 2.2 JUDGE WILSON: - - - what they said. 23 MR. CYRULNIK: I think that would be an end run 24 around the legislative intent. I think that the - - - the



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PSC - -

JUDGE WILSON: Doesn't the statute authorize that?

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MR. CYRULNIK: I don't think so. There's not a single citation to a statute that says that the PSC gets to decide whether or not a particular ESCO or a group of ESCOs or ESCOs generally get to use those lines. That was enacted - - and to the questions that were asked earlier, it may have been enacted in - - in '99, some of those protections, but most of those protections are coterminous with the things the legislature spoke to in Article 2. And if they weren't, they very well might not have been proper. But it wasn't raised because shortly thereafter the legislature spoke and said here's what we're going to allow you to do.

So to Your Honor's question directly, I think it would be wrong to allow the PSC to essentially open up a back door. And back door is the wrong word; it's basically a gaping hole that - - - that upended the entire - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: But it isn't the reality that if you look at the legislative history, look at the legislative trends, it's let's deal with the monopoly, competition, we believe, is a good thing, let's allow the opportunity for that. And then, as moving forward, it's the legislature trying to ensure that there's actually a benefit and that there are protections for consumers. And



if that's not what's happening in the market, why don't they have the authority to say we're going to try and figure out a way to make that happen in the market? Maybe eventually they'll decide they can't.

MR. CYRULNIK: Yeah.

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JUDGE RIVERA: Maybe they think they can.

MR. CYRULNIK: So Your Honor, I think there are - I'll try to answer it short because I know I'm over
time, but I think the answer to that question is, if you
look at the PSC's brief itself, pages 25 through 29, they
cite four instances where the legislature responded to what
they thought were problems with the ESCO market. They cite
PSL 32(d) - - 32(5)(d), PSL 30, and GBL 349. Each of
those is introduced by the PSC in its brief as the
legislature saw a problem with ESCOs, now that ESCOs were
introduced, and the legislature acted. They enacted this
statute and this statute and this statute.

That speaks volumes about how the legislature can and does and intended to reserve the right to legislate with respect to ESCOs. That's not the same thing as saying we're not getting involved, we're going to let the PSC do everything it wants to because this is part of the energy market.

And I think this really reduces to that discrete question. This is a statutory interpretation issue, and if



there is a regulation that's promulgated that's inconsistent with the statutory express language, the legislative history, in that regard, the amendment in 2002, and the PSC's own admissions, I think it's - - - I think it's proper for this court to reverse.

And I don't want to test the court's patience, but if I can have just fifteen seconds to address the mootness issue on this point.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: You may.

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MR. CYRULNIK: To Judge Garcia's question. I
think there is - - - I think there is an order before this
court. It was promulgated. It was the reset order. I
know the reset order's not in effect, but there was a
request below, very clear; it was a count to declare that
reset order, the regulations with respect to price on the
ESCOs, as an invalid, ultra vires exercise of the PSC's
authority. It couldn't have been clearer. The reason it
wasn't raised below is because the first time we ever heard
a mootness argument was in their opposition brief in this
court.

But to Your Honor's question, absolutely, that was an issue that - - - on which we're aggrieved because the court then remitted this for further proceedings. And not only is there a further proceeding going on, but it denied us the declaration, and then the low-income order

was based on the very same order that's before Your Honors right now. So it's bootstrapping to say, well, the third - - - and he - - - and Mr. Bassinson told you what he's going to do; he's going to use the low-income order, which was based on the order below, that is before this court right now, he's going to use that as a basis for saying the ESCOs don't get to raise this issue anymore.

So it's clear - - - we're clearly aggrieved, we see the writing on the wall, we know what's going on over here, and that's why we properly preserved the right to challenge Judge Zwack's and the Third Department's decision with respect to the discrete issue that we raised in our pleading and that we were aggrieved on. The idea that the PSC has the authority to set ESCO rates is antithetical to the PSL and it can't be squared with this legislative history.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, Mr. Cyrulnik.

MR. CYRULNIK: Thank you, Your Honor, and thank you for the extra time. I apologize.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Mr. - - - you're welcome.

Mr. Burch?

MR. BURCH: Thank you, Your Honors, and I will be brief and try not to repeat anything. But thank you for allowing me a brief amount of rebuttal time.

You know, when you look at what the legislature



did here, I think they set up a scheme that's organically grown where you have utilities being regulated. One thing I would correct from respondent's argument is the - - - the PSC certainly has the ability and the responsibility to make sure utility rates are just and reasonable. The Public Service Law doesn't say ESCO rates have to be just and reasonable. Obviously we hope, through competition, that they are. And this is really about consumer choice and the legislature, you know, setting up a system - - -

JUDGE STEIN: Well, but the purpose of this wasn't just to give them the choice to either get more expensive energy or less expensive energy because somebody - - - some nice young person came to their door and said, oh, why don't you buy your gas and electric from me. I mean, that wasn't the purpose. So - - - so to say that - - - that the Public Service Law doesn't say that ESCO rates have to be fair and just doesn't fit, to me, within the legislative purpose and scheme.

MR. BURCH: I'm not arguing that they shouldn't be fair and just. Obviously we hope competition sets them in a fair and just way. I'm saying they don't have the power to set them.

 $\label{eq:And to address your example of someone coming to} % \begin{center} \b$

JUDGE STEIN: Well, the question is: do they



have the power to set up the system to ensure that the rates being charged in the - - - for - - - for utilities is fair and reasonable - - - are fair and reasonable.

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MR. BURCH: And Your Honor, I think the legislature clearly has spoken on that, and they say, yes, you can regulate the rates of utilities, no, you can't regulate the rates of ESCOs. If they wanted to put that power into place, they have had times when this was hotly debated in the legislature, and they came out with a scheme that - - that they did. And it's not this one.

And you know, to address your hypothetical of, you know, someone coming to the door, there are all kinds of consumer protection statutes in place, and rightly so.

No one wants bad actors in this market, and the government has powers. Yeah.

JUDGE STEIN: I'm not suggesting that they be bad actors; I'm just suggesting that - - - that the - - - the purpose of the system is to enhance the likelihood that consumers will receive the best prices for their utilities.

MR. BURCH: And again, I'd go back to the legislature spoke on this, there's competition; that's the broad policy of the state, except for limited circumstances like where there's monopolies acting. It's not for the Public Service Commission to make this decision. This is a very big policy choice. The legislature should make that

1	decision,	and they ha	ven't. T	hank you	, Your Honors
2		CHIEF JUDGE	DIFIORE:	Thank	you, counsel.
3		(Court is a	djourned)		
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CERTIFICATION I, Sharona Shapiro, certify that the foregoing transcript of proceedings in the court of Appeals of Matters of National Energy Marketers Association v. NYS Public Service Commission and Retail Energy Supply Association v. NYS Public Service Commission, Nos. 21, 22 was prepared using the required transcription equipment and is a true and accurate record of the proceedings. Shanna Shaphe Signature: Agency Name: eScribers Address of Agency: 352 Seventh Avenue Suite 604 New York, NY 10001 Date: March 24, 2019

