1	COURT OF APPEALS
2	STATE OF NEW YORK
3	THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK,
4	Respondent,
5	-against-
6	NO. 55 FREDDIE T. WRIGHT,
7	Appellant.
8	20 Eagle Street
9	Albany, New York April 18, 2024
10	Before:
11	CHIEF JUDGE ROWAN D. WILSON ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA
12	ASSOCIATE JUDGE MICHAEL J. GARCIA ASSOCIATE JUDGE MADELINE SINGAS
13	ASSOCIATE JUDGE ANTHONY CANNATARO
14	ASSOCIATE JUDGE SHIRLEY TROUTMAN ASSOCIATE JUSTICE STAN PRITZKER
15	
16	Appearances:
17	CHELSEA F. LOPEZ, ESQ. APPELLATE ADVOCATES
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25	Official Court Transcribe:



CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: People v. Wright.

MS. LOPEZ: Good afternoon, Your Honors. Chelsea Lopez on behalf of Freddie T. Wright. May I reserve three minutes for rebuttal?

CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Three?

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MS. LOPEZ: Three minutes, yes.

CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Yes

MS. LOPEZ: Thank you. So even one peremptory challenge based on race violates Batson, and in this case we have two. By the second round of jury selection, all three African-American panelists were removed from serving on Mr. Wright, a black man's jury. This is troubling.

Starting with C.C., he was a black man, who very clearly said his cousin, who had been arrested about fifteen years ago for marijuana possession, would not affect his ability to be fair and impartial juror in this case. When the prosecutor decided a single amount and questioned him, and in her own words, pick on C.C., the black man, she decided to ask him about this - - - this - - his cousin's arrest. He confirmed at that time that he had no pre-judgments towards police. He confirmed that he'd be able to listen to police testimony before making any conclusions.

He was a suitable juror in this case. He also said that testimonial evidence would be enough, and yet,



the prosecutor removed him from serving on the jury for three reasons, three pretextual reasons: one, he had cousins who had been arrested; two, she - - -

JUDGE SINGAS: On page - - - I don't know the exact page, but during the questioning of C.C., the people say, so you have a negative feeling about how the police got there and their approach in going inside? And he says, well, yeah. The way - - just the fact that they took everybody. I didn't know that they had to take everybody, but that was it.

You don't think that's a reason for the prosecution to think that maybe his feelings toward the police as a result of that incident might cause him to view the evidence in a way that is affected by that?

MS. LOPEZ: No. For two reasons, one, he only said that after she kept pushing him, and she put those words basically in his mouth by saying, so you don't have negative feelings about the police? And all he says is that he only has a negative feeling after repeatedly being asked about the way he treated his grandma in the situation. He never said I have a problem with police in - - generally. And then when she followed up and asked, do you have any negative feelings from that incident with your family that may make it so that when those police officers testify, you may have a pre-judgment about them? Not at

all. She presses him again, and she says, can you listen to the police - - -

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whether they're qualified to be jurors and could be stricken - - the juror could be stricken for cause. We are looking for support in the record for the judge's determination that this was not pretextual. And as I understand that whole series of answers, that was raised by C.C. in response to a question, do you have relatives who were victims of crimes? And he says, yeah. I had these cousins or whatever who were arrested for marijuana charges, right?

MS. LOPEZ: So he act - - it was actually in response to whether you're a victim of a crime - - - this is on Appendix Page 130, 193 - - - or if you've witnessed a crime. So no. It wasn't just being a victim of a crime. And also this court's analysis of the step two reason should be what the - - -

JUDGE GARCIA: So he was mean - - - he meant he witnessed them smoking marijuana? Is that why you think he raised it in response to that question?

MS. LOPEZ: No. So what happened was that his cousin had been arrested for marijuana possession fifteen years ago, but generally, this court's analysis should not be on whether he had these, what the respondent calls



lingering negative feelings, because that's not the reason that was given at step two, and we should be careful because what's being asked is what's the subjective intent of the trial prosecutor at the time - - -

JUDGE GARCIA: Right. So we provide a lot of deference to the trial court in determining that, right, and our review standard is is there support in the record for the court's conclusion that this was not pretextual - -

## MS. LOPEZ: Well - - -

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JUDGE GARCIA: -- and I think then we can look at the record to see what was surrounding that -- those answers that were problematic to the prosecutor.

MS. LOPEZ: So in Hecker, this court made clear that your review power is limited to the examination of pretext determination in light of the reasons placed on the record. In this case, it was a reverse Batson so by defense counsel, but the reasons placed on the record by the nonmovant, and here, all she said was he had cousins who had been arrested. This was pretextual because it applied to other jurors that she chose not to single out.

Uneven questioning is proof of pretext - - - of discrimination - - -

JUDGE GARCIA: Both those jurors didn't raise those issues in response to that question. As I read the



1 record on that question, the responses all talked about 2 victims of crimes, and this juror raises, I had relatives 3 who were arrested. 4 MS. LOPEZ: Well, that's her reason, right? Her 5 reason is he had cousins who had been arrested, and C.C., 6 yeah, he had a cousin who had been arrested fifteen years 7 ago for marijuana possession. 8 JUDGE GARCIA: Presume the judge is also familiar 9 with the record in that exchange, right? I mean, it's really the judge's determination that we're reviewing of 10 that reason and whether that reason is pretextual given the 11 12 record here? 13

MS. LOPEZ: Correct. So given the record, it's not supported because there are other panelists who had friends or family members that were arrested. Based on the record, we know that there's a non-African-American panelist, whose younger brother was not only arrested, but convicted of robbery, which is the case that the - - what Mr. Wright was charged for in this case, and yet, the prosecutor didn't follow up - - -

JUDGE SINGAS: But that wasn't the only reason that was given that they had a family member who was arrested, right - - -

MS. LOPEZ: No - - -

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JUDGE SINGAS: As I recall - - -



1	MS. LOPEZ: No. But
2	JUDGE SINGAS: record regarding C.C., there
3	were four issues: the family member arrested, renter,
4	unmarried, no children. And were any other jurors who have
5	those four criteria
6	MS. LOPEZ: Yes.
7	JUDGE SINGAS: on the jury?
8	MS. LOPEZ: So those are also they're all
9	pretextual reasons. The
10	JUDGE SINGAS: What I'm saying is there anyone
11	else who had that
12	MS. LOPEZ: The three
13	JUDGE SINGAS: conglomeration of those four
14	factors?
15	MS. LOPEZ: Yes. Two seated jurors, and we know
16	one of them, Juror 7, is not Africa-American, and yet, they
17	weren't struck. So again, it's uneven application of this
18	criteria, and it couldn't be a strategy because for those
19	three criterias, renting in an expensive place, like New
20	York City, being unmarried and having no children,
21	factually irrelevant to the facts of the case or an ability
22	to serve nor did the prosecutor provide any conceivable
23	relationship between those factors and being a jury in this

JUDGE CANNATARO: Counsel, I'd like to go back

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case.

for one second to the statement by C.C. that he had negative feelings towards the police, which I understand you to say, and I believe you're right, that that wasn't argued as a nonpretextual reason when a justification was asked for, but is it your testimony, having said that and being part of the record of what happened, that the court was not entitled or permitted to even consider that statement in determining whether or not nonpretextual reasons had been given?

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MS. LOPEZ: Yes. Because that wasn't a reason provided at step two. We are looking at the trial prosecutor's subjective intent at the time it was given, and just - - - this just wasn't a reason given, and the reasons that were given are pretextual, and because at step two the prosecutor gave a whole laundry list of reasons that are unevenly applied or unsupported by the record - -

JUDGE CANNATARO: I'm having a little difficulty squaring that with this idea of deference being made to the determination of the court as to whether or not the reasons given were nonpretextual because it seems as if you're asking for the court to willfully disregard something. I mean, yes. That statement would be great to use in a forcause challenge, but I also think it could be very animating towards the prosecutor's decision to strike the



1 juror peremptorily if you don't get a cause challenge. 2 So it seems to me is if you're - - artificially 3 limits the universe of available information for the court 4 to use in deciding whether or not the reasons are 5 nonpretextual. 6 MS. LOPEZ: I'm just asking this court to apply the analysis that it's done in Hecker, which is to look at 7 8 the step two reasons provided and see if there's record 9 support for it. 10 JUDGE GARCIA: But do they have to list every 11 nuance of that reason? If it's this exchange over victims, 12 do they have to then say that he said they just raided the 13 house and took them all out, they barged in, that he 14 changed his story later, and said he wasn't actually there? 15 Do they have to list all those sub-reasons in the record 16 for the overall - - - this issue of victim of crime? 17 they have to each of those things - - -18 MS. LOPEZ: For the prosecutor - - -19 JUDGE GARCIA: - - - for us to be able to find -20 2.1 MS. LOPEZ: Yeah - - -2.2 JUDGE GARCIA: - - - support in the record? 23 MS. LOPEZ: Yes. The prosecutor has to clearly 24 state their step two reasons. That's what this court and



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the Supreme Court -

	JUDGE GARCIA: To that degree of specificity?
2	MS. LOPEZ: Yes. Because in Miller L., the
3	Supreme Court clearly stated a nonmovant must stand or fall
4	on the plausibility of the reasons provided at step two are
5	current
6	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: But if the prosecutor had -
7	prosecutor didn't hearsay this, but the prosecutor had
8	said, there was an exchange in which the juror said that he
9	harbored negative feelings towards the police, wouldn't
10	that be enough to bring in the colloquy about that? Are
11	you really saying he needs to recite or she in this
12	case needs to recite the entire colloquy to preserve it?
13	MS. LOPEZ: Yes. Because we're looking at the
14	subjective intent of
15	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Right. But
16	MS. LOPEZ: of the prosecutor
17	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: the prosecutor says -
18	the prosecutor says, the reason so you're going
19	after the prosecutor's subjective intent. I take your
20	point. The reason is because this potential juror said he
21	still harbors negative views towards the police. Isn't
22	that enough?
23	MS. LOPEZ: But he didn't
24	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Can't we then just look at
25	the record to see if there's support for that?



MS. LOPEZ: No. Just based on this analysis, it 1 2 has to be the step two reasons. It's a subjective intent, 3 and basically, we -4 JUDGE TROUTMAN: Well, with respect to you're 5 saying it's uneven - - with respect to the nonminority 6 jurors that were selected and seated, did they respond in a 7 way indicating that they had some negative or hurt feelings 8 with respect to the police, the relative convictions, et 9 cetera? 10 MS. LOPEZ: No. But it's because - -11 JUDGE TROUTMAN: But doesn't that matter? 12 MS. LOPEZ: It doesn't - - - it doesn't matter 13 because it's the reasons that are provided, and if there 14 was a reason to now look at the record and conjure up new 15 reasons to remove C.C., that's just -16 JUDGE TROUTMAN: No. But - - -17 MS. LOPEZ: - - - inappropriate. 18 JUDGE TROUTMAN: - - - aren't - - - if there is 19 an interaction and the juror says, I had relatives, there 20 was an arrest, happened a long time ago, and that's it, 2.1 it's over and done with. That is one thing. But if they 2.2 express some concerns or negative feelings, are you saying 23 that is not relevant? 24 MS. LOPEZ: It's not relevant to this court under 25 the current Batson framework of looking at the subjective



intent, and we should really scrutinize what the reasons are provided. It is so easy to think of new reasons now that we've sat with the record - - -

JUDGE GARCIA: I think to the Chief Judge's point, it's not a new reason. It's how specific do you have to be in giving your reason. So if, let's say, the prosecutor had said here, the job this person has, I really think they harbor, you know, a bias, they may be sympathetic, and then later, we try to look at the record and say, but look at this answer they gave to the victim question where they talk about relatives being arrested for marijuana, I think you clearly can't do that.

But where you give a more general answer in terms of what your reason is, but specific enough, do you really have to get into the nuances of the back and forth of what was said, or can we see, because the judge has obviously heard that colloquy, if it supports that view?

MS. LOPEZ: Under the current Batson framework, no. It has to be specific to the reasons that are provided, especially where C.C. unequivocally and clearly says that he would not - - has no prejudgments towards police in general. If the prosec - - -

JUDGE PRITZKER: Counsel, if we didn't agree with that - - - just go with me for a minute. Hypothetically, if it was fair game, if it was a reasonable inference, for



example, that what he said would make him a juror that the people didn't want for a nondiscriminatory reason, namely, maybe he harbors hostility, if we could reach that, would you agree then that it was nonpretextual?

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MS. LOPEZ: No. Because there were other pretextual reasons provided. So even if - - - she should have made a for-cause challenge if she believed this to be true, but she didn't. But because there were reasons that provided, especially the one about having a note that she had other friends involved in multiple arrests, the respondent concedes that this doesn't exist, not once, but twice misstating the record to remove two African-American panelists is extremely concerning in a Batson analysis.

JUDGE PRITZKER: So do you have to have a nonpretextual reason, right, at step two? It has to be the only reason? Like, what if it's mixed? What if there's mixed reasons?

MS. LOPEZ: Then even if it's - - even if there's one reason that's pretextual and one reason it's not, I would - - - I would - - - this court should find a Batson violation because peremptory challenges based on race, even if it's a little bit based on race or a lot of it based on race, Batson needs to - - -

JUDGE GARCIA: Do you have a case that says that?

MS. LOPEZ: I don't. But I do - - but based on



1 the totality of the facts and circumstances is what this 2 court's consideration is so I think that fits squarely in 3 that is when you look at the - - -4 JUDGE TROUTMAN: What about K.C.? 5 MS. LOPEZ: K.C. K.C., she was an African-6 American woman, who was also a suitable juror. She said 7 that she worked for the Department of Probation. 8 aligned herself as a member of law enforcement, and she 9 didn't describe her employment as being this sympathy, 10 diverting juveniles - - -11 JUDGE TROUTMAN: However, it was relevant that 12 her job did involve supervising and interacting with 13 juvenile - - -14 MS. LOPEZ: She actually described her employment 15 as evidence based, which would make her a great juror 16 because that's what jurors' roles are. 17 JUDGE TROUTMAN: However, the reality is there is 18 police officers outside arresting people, and there's 19 supervision, and how one would supervise a juvenile 20 offender versus arresting adults, that's not exactly the 2.1 same.

MS. LOPEZ: It - - - whether different minds can think of K.C. as more similar to a police officer or not, it doesn't - - - I think the strongest evidence here was like - - -



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1	JUDGE TROUTMAN: Let me try it this way
2	MS. LOPEZ: Um-hum.
3	JUDGE TROUTMAN: as a probation officer,
4	the person is put on probation. What is the purpose of
5	probation to you?
6	MS. LOPEZ: The purpose of probation is to
7	essentially still punish someone for something they did.
8	JUDGE TROUTMAN: It's not to supervise and make
9	sure that they take part
10	MS. LOPEZ: It's
11	JUDGE TROUTMAN: that measures to avoid
12	them continuing on in a path that rehabilitation, that has
13	no relevant factor
14	MS. LOPEZ: Well
15	JUDGE TROUTMAN: it's not?
16	MS. LOPEZ: Well, not here. There's no children
17	involved. Mr. Wright is an adult man. There's no children
18	witnesses.
19	JUDGE TROUTMAN: The family with teachers,
20	prosecutors have struck jurors, potential jurors because
21	they're teachers, because they're social workers. They've
22	given a reason as a concern, not that it would rise to a
23	level for cause. You're saying that can't be done here?
24	MS. LOPEZ: Maybe. I don't know the facts of
25	that record or what the voir dire looks like, but here, she



said that - - - she never said sympathy plays a role in her employment, and it's also concerning, this strike because again the prosecutor claims she never asked her any questions about it. JUDGE TROUTMAN: Do you recognize that a prosecutor or a defense attorney can reject a characterization given in response to questioning and still - and not - - - as a result not accept that juror? Do you believe that?

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MS. LOPEZ: I believe that if that's - - JUDGE TROUTMAN: Okay.

MS. LOPEZ: - - - if that's what the prosecutor said, but she didn't. She said I believe - - - I don't - - I didn't question her about this and thinks that sympathy might play a role, but she did - - -

JUDGE CANNATARO: I don't think that was a question, though. If she affirmatively said that she thinks of herself, K.C., as a - - - law enforcement, you don't think that the prosecutor is entitled to reject that self-assessment without even saying so? Just to say no, I don't think you're anything like law enforcement.

MS. LOPEZ: The prosecutor could think that, but that's not the - - - the reason was that she believed - - - I certainly - - - she said, even though I didn't question her on it and I don't have grounds for cause for these



reasons, I do think that sympathy might come into play for 1 2 her based on her line of work. Not based on her answers, 3 just based on her line of work. But here, she said that 4 her line of work was evidence-based, not sympathy-based, 5 and she also was clearly - - -6 CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: But is evidence-based sort 7 of a term of art in psychology? 8 MS. LOPEZ: I don't know, but - - -9 CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Okay. 10 MS. LOPEZ: - - - she - - -11 CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: But maybe the prosecutor 12 knows? 13 MS. LOPEZ: Well, I think what's relevant is the 14 15 won't play a role for you here? And then she said, same 16 for you, Ms. C.C.? Not a problem. We follow evidence-17

prosecutor asked on Appendix Page 415, and so your sympathy based practice, clearly refuting that sympathy plays any role in her daily job duties.

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CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: I'm not so sure about that. Right. Plus, the other thing, it seems like your argument is that for the purpose of peremptory strikes, if a potential juror says I can be unbiased, that has to be taken at face value.

MS. LOPEZ: Well, yes, if there's nothing else to refute that they're not going to be biased, and here, she -



- - but - - - I - - - yes.

pretextual.

CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Well, peremptory is a strike you can use for sort of any reason as long as it's not racially discriminatory or gender-based, itself, right?

MS. LOPEZ: Yes.

MS. LOPEZ: Um-hum. And here, we know it's pretextual-based because all of the reasons that were provided for either C.C. or K.C. were either factually inaccurate or unevenly applied to other jurors. And so

under the current Batson framework both of these were

CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Pretextual classification?

what the judge said? It's at A-360. And he said it a number of times, and it sort of bothered me. This is the quote. It said, as to prima facie case, he said, "What factor of inferences established a prima facie case that your adversary has excluded jurors" - - and he said this several times - - "solely on account of the membership in that group"?

So it looked to me like the judge was saying, you could have a racially discriminatory reason, but as long as it's not your sole reason, it's okay. Is that what the judge is saying here, or is that - - in other words, you can have mixed reasons, and if you have mixed reasons,



2 is that right? 3 MS. LOPEZ: I would agree that if even one of 4 those reasons is based on race, it should violate Batson. 5 MS. O'BOYLE: May it please the court. 6 afternoon, Your Honors, for the respondent, Assistant 7 District Attorney Danielle O'Boyle from the office of Melinda Katz. 8 9 As this court made clear in Hecker, and as 10 several of Your Honors have noted today, this third step of the Batson inquiry is a pure issue of fact. So this 11 12 court's review is limited as to whether - - - limited to 13 whether there is record basis for the trial court's 14 finding. 15 So with respect to the record JUDGE TROUTMAN: 16 and the facts here, was there a difference in what was the 17 criteria for allowing a nonwhite juror to sit versus a 18 juror of color? 19 MS. O'BOYLE: No, Your Honor. Because the 20 defense cannot point to any juror. We'll start with K. - -21 C.C., I'm sorry, any juror who was similarly situated to 2.2 C.C. 23 JUDGE TROUTMAN: What about the ones who had 24 relatives actually convicted of crimes?

still no good, if one of them is racially discriminatory;

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MS. O'BOYLE: Well, Your Honor, preservation is

actually relevant to your point there. Here, by the time the Batson challenge happens with respect to C.C., thirty-two jurors have been questioned, two different panels of sixteen, and a lot of the information as to who had relatives that had been arrested or convicted or other interactions with law enforcement, those answers were given in response to questions by the judge, and it's not actually clear which jurors they correspond to.

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We only really get that clarity when either the prosecution or the defense follows up with those jurors. So when the defense makes the challenges and says, well, there are other that meet those criteria that are non-African-American, he says, there are crime victims and people who have rented. First of all, C.C. did not identify as a crime victim. He identified as someone who had relatives who had a negative experience with police who had been arrested. So to say that there are similarly situated jurors, one, we don't have the record really to support that - -

CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: We do have a record to certain of the jurors of their race, right, and as to whether they have relatives who were convicted of crimes, right? We have that.

MS. O'BOYLE: Absolutely, Your Honor.

CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Okay.



MS. O'BOYLE: But in that regard, I think the two critical jurors to look at are C.C. and K.L. because both of those were in those second - - I'm sorry, the first round - - -

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CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Why does it have to be in the same round? I mean, isn't it almost universally across jurisdictions, the rule is that the Batson challenge is timely as long as it's made before the jury is seated?

MS. O'BOYLE: Absolutely, Your Honor. And I apologize if I was unclear. It's not that they were in the same round. It's just helpful to look at the analysis of those two jurors and the questioning.

CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Maybe I misunderstood you, and maybe I misunderstood your papers as well. I thought you were making a point that unless you made an objection right at the time that a particular panel was there, it was not preserved. You started out saying something about preservation.

MS. O'BOYLE: No, Your Honor. That would not be our position, but just that the defense would have to certainly assert with sufficient specificity as to which jurors are being alleged to be similarly situated. That could be in either of the first two panels. C.C. is in the first panel, and the Batson challenge is made during the second round.



1	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: It could be made as regard
2	to the third panel, right?
3	MS. O'BOYLE: Absolutely.
4	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Okay.
5	MS. O'BOYLE: It's just a matter of alleging with
6	sufficient specificity which jurors you're challenging so
7	that the prosecutor could meaningfully respond to that.
8	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Well, they did identify
9	which jurors they're challenging, which is with
10	specificity. They did that.
11	MS. O'BOYLE: Yes, Your Honor. But in terms of
12	saying, well, that juror is similarly situated to others
13	with these vague assertions, that doesn't allow the
14	prosecutor a meaningful opportunity to respond as to
15	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Well, well
16	MS. O'BOYLE: why she elected to not
17	challenge those.
18	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Why not? I mean, they're
19	both there. They both have the record.
20	MS. O'BOYLE: Absolutely, Your Honor. And
21	certainly, the court had that full record before it, but -
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23	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Right. And the
24	MS. O'BOYLE: at the time
25	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: prosecutor could say,



no, actually, there's no jurors here or whoever else is 1 2 convicted of a crime. 3 MS. O'BOYLE: Correct, Your Honor, but that would 4 not have been accurate here. Certainly, there were jurors, 5 right? 6 CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Which is what - -7 MS. O'BOYLE: - - - but the defense has - - -8 CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: And everybody knows who 9 those are. 10 MS. O'BOYLE: Yes, Your Honor. But the defense 11 has the burden in two respects. The defense has the burden 12 here to show at step three that the reasons were 13 pretextual, and the defense has the burden to adequately 14 preserve that record for appeal, and the defense failed in 15 both of those respects. 16 So while it may have been known that some of 17 these jurors had other relatives who were convicted of 18 crimes, the defendant never alleged who those were with 19 sufficient specificity that we could actually tie other 20 qualities even to them because that record is not made, and 21 JUDGE RIVERA: But if - - - but if - - - I'm 22 23 sorry. Maybe I misunderstood you. But if they are all 24 known, does it - - - is it necessary for the defense 25 counsel to say, all of those others who are comparable, and



then you know it's all of them, and you can just go through them as opposed to saying it's this prospective juror on that panel and so forth?

MS. O'BOYLE: Well, Your Honor, if he were - - - if the defense were to say all - - - if we were to say all of them were known, we have to talk about which criteria. Are we saying one criteria, one or more? Because again, our position is that no other juror was similarly situated to C.C.

JUDGE GARCIA: It seems somewhat unfair complement to what we were saying to your adversary that we can go back and look in the record and say, you know, this colloquy with this potential juror was different, and then you made a general objection, but it brings with it this record, and then saying, no, you have to be more specific on where we look in the record for comparable jurors.

MS. O'BOYLE: No, Your Honor. And there's a critical distinction there because here, if you look at the prosecutor's reasons, admittedly she does not bring up at the time she gives her reasons with respect to C.C. that he had negative feelings, but the trial court is not looking at that in a vacuum. And it's not only the colloquy that the prosecutor had with C.C., but also that the court had. As Justice Garcia mentioned, at the time the judge was actually inquiring about people who were crime victims or



witnesses to crimes, and then C.C. offers this lengthy response. He's the first one to do that beyond just a brief statement about very clearly a negative experience that has had an impact on him - - 
JUDGE TROUTMAN: So C.C. is - - 
MS. O'BOYLE: - - - fifteen years later.

JUDGE TROUTMAN: - - being forthright in answering a question that the court put to him. Sometime jurors don't immediately answer with respect to that iss

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answering a question that the court put to him. Sometimes jurors don't immediately answer with respect to that issue, but later, in response to something else, they will respond to the - - to a question that's related to more than one specific category.

MS. O'BOYLE: Absolutely, Your Honor. And the issue is not that he was not being forthright. It's that that colloquy, together with the questions - - his answer to the questions that the prosecutor posed, show that he absolutely had negative feelings toward police officers, and he explicitly affirmed that in response to those questions.

about the impact of the experience on people. Not that - - because wasn't there some discussion about what the
cousin or the relative that caused the police to put the
grandmother in that situation in the first instance?

MS. O'BOYLE: Yes, Your Honor. But there are two



different issues here, one, being whether the juror could have been struck for cause and one whether it was appropriate for the prosecutor to use a peremptory challenge, and that's really why it's important to look at the distinction and the colloquies with C.C. - - -

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relevant when you look at the overall circumstances. When you look at Flowers v. Mississippi, when the - - - it was over a course of a number of trials, the sole strategy of the prosecutor was to get rid of black jurors. So what she's saying is, looking at what had happened before, it makes it more suspect, so to speak, when you're saying certain criteria apply to this one, yet she points to other people who they believe were seated in spite of, not simply arrests or having people who had contact, but actual arrests and convictions. Wasn't someone convicted of a weapon who sat on the jury?

MS. O'BOYLE: Yes, Your Honor. That was

Alternate Number 1, but it's that juror and Juror Number

10, S.M., who the defense points to, and neither of them

can be seen as similar situated to C.C., even if we're just

looking at the - - -

JUDGE TROUTMAN: So even though they had actual convictions themselves, that doesn't cause it to be suspect when she didn't have a conviction. There was a relative



who had contact fifteen years earlier, and some of the others, their experiences were more recent in time. So you're saying you can't look at any of that?

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MS. O'BOYLE: Of course, Your Honor, you can look at it, but actually only one of them had the conviction, the seated Juror Number 10, S.M. She had the brother who had been arrested two years before for possession of stolen property. It was the alternate juror who had been prosecuted previously.

JUDGE TROUTMAN: So two years. Two years, that juror sat, someone has an experience, the relatives have an experience, and not even necessary within the close degree, and they can't sit from fifteen years ago, and you don't see a different application of the criteria used?

MS. O'BOYLE: It's not the same - - - it's not a different application, Your Honor, because at the time those jurors were questioned, Juror Number 10 and Alternate Number 1, they actually expressly affirmed that they did not have negative feeling towards police officers.

Alternate Number 1 said she harbored no resentment.

That is very different from K.C., who had already given this lengthy colloquy about how the police raided his home. How he told that story was very telling, and that's actually all the more reason to give deference to the trial court.



1	JUDGE TROUTMAN: So K.C ask if K.C.
2	currently harbored ill feelings against the police?
3	MS. O'BOYLE: Yes, Your Honor. C.C. was asked i
4	it was a present-day question if he had negative
5	feelings, as he was seating there that day, towards the
6	police officers, and as Justice Singas pointed out earlier
7	
8	JUDGE TROUTMAN: And the answer was?
9	MS. O'BOYLE: Well, yeah. And he talks about ho
10	I didn't know why the police
11	JUDGE TROUTMAN: The police overall or the polic
12	present at that time?
13	MS. O'BOYLE: I believe he says the police
14	generally, Your Honor, and as Justice Singas pointed out
15	earlier, he then went on to say they barged into the home.
16	I didn't know why they had to take everyone. So those
17	answers and the explicit affirmance that he currently
18	harbored negative feelings absolutely
19	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: So what do we
20	MS. O'BOYLE: distinguishs C.C
21	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: What do we do with
22	prosecutor's second reason, which is that C.C. has friends
23	and relatives who've had multiple arrests, and there's zer
24	support in the record for that?



MS. O'BOYLE: Your Honor, although that note

1	seems to have been in error, no doubt, the it's not
2	fair to say that there would be no support in the record
3	for that because even the trial court acknowledges that
4	there had been a number of people arrested in connection
5	with his cousin's arrest. And again, this another
6	opportunity
7	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: But that was offered as an
8	independent reason from the cousin
9	MS. O'BOYLE: Yes, Your Honor.
10	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: the incident with the
11	cousin?
12	MS. O'BOYLE: Yes, Your Honor. But the court is
13	not looking at these just as one-by-one statements. The
14	court is looking at the prosecutor's responses as a whole
15	in connection with that colloquy.
16	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Well, wait. I think we're
17	trying to decide whether the prosecutor gave
18	essentially, we're trying to decide is the prosecutor
19	striking people based on racial animus?
20	MS. O'BOYLE: Yes, Your Honor.
21	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Fair?
22	MS. O'BOYLE: Correct.
23	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: So how do we deal with a
24	situation where let's suppose you're right, just for
25	purpose of argument, that as to the first she's got a



4	peremptory; is that fair?
5	MS. O'BOYLE: Correct, Your Honor.
6	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: So why aren't we looking at
7	these explanations independently?
8	MS. O'BOYLE: Well, it's not I actually
9	don't think you should look at them independently. I just
10	think that you should I think you should look at it
11	as the totality of the
12	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Well, but so
13	MS. O'BOYLE: evidence and record before
14	the court.
15	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: But that's sort of saying,
16	sort of goes to Justice Pritzker's question, right? If a
17	strike if you give a couple of reasons and one of
18	them is a perfectly good reason for using a peremptory and
19	the other is a perfectly invalid reason, why isn't
20	why are you looking at the totality?
21	MS. O'BOYLE: But Your Honor, the second reason
22	that we're talking about here about this note, it's I
23	really don't think it's fair
24	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: No, no. Right. I
25	understand. I'm giving you a hypothetical at the beginnin
	ecribers

nonpretextual reason for striking the juror. Let's suppose

for the second, she's got a racially biased reason for

striking the juror. We would then say you can't use the

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MS. O'BOYLE: Sure.

CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: - - - I don't think that the second is a concession that the prosecutor is operating in a racially biased way. I'm trying to get at the methodology first.

MS. O'BOYLE: I think if there was a mix of racially-motivated and nonracially-motivated reasons, of course that would be a basis for the court to have a finding - - - to make a finding of pretext. I don't disagree with that.

CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: We're not really looking at the totality, right? One racially biased explanation is sufficient to get you into Batson trouble.

MS. O'BOYLE: Yes, Your Honor. If the court finds that that makes that challenge pretextual, yes, but everything - - -

CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Right.

MS. O'BOYLE: - - - would just have to be so factually specific because you do have to look at the full record before the trial court, and I go back to why that deference is so important.

JUDGE GARCIA: Wouldn't that depend, it seems to me, on what the reason is for the allegation that it's pretextual? So if you had three reasons - - - you had



reason A, and you say, okay, reason A is nonpretextual.

And then you had B, C, D, and the reason the allegation is those are pretextual is other people have that, and you didn't strike them, then it seems to me you can say, okay, but those, in combination with a nonpretextual reason, is fine.

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If there's B, C, or D that's standing on its own indicates it's a pretextual-racially, cover-to-cover racial animosity towards a juror, that would be bad. So it really depends on what the net - - what the problem is with the other challenges is, doesn't it?

MS. O'BOYLE: Absolutely, Your Honor. That's why it would be so fact specific and you have to look at it as a whole. So with that issue regarding the note, it's important to say that wasn't the only reason given, right? And I think the court actually reconciled that, even though never pointed it at the time, the defense never said, oh, C.C. never said that. He never said he had other friends in law enforcement. I think the court was able to reconcile that because he says, yes, a number of people at the house were arrested.

So again, yet another reason to defer to the court there and to find that the court's finding that this is not pretextual is appropriate. It's not something that came out of the blue. This is all happening very quickly.



The prosecutor and the defense had twenty minutes in the first round - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: I just need to clarify because I took this note, and I'm not sure I captured your response to the Chief Judge. I wrote down that you said a mixed reason. That would be part of the response is the judge would say is pretext, right? The other part of the response, the judge would not find as pretext, that a mixed reason of basis for a finding of pretext. Did I get you right that you said that?

MS. O'BOYLE: I believe so, Your Honor, because you're not evaluating them one by one. You're looking at the challenge to that juror. So if you find that the prosecutor's reason or reasons are pretextual on the whole

JUDGE RIVERA: Right.

MS. O'BOYLE: - - - and that could have been maybe when the prosecutor said the first reason the court was not yet - - - the court was not convinced that it was pretextual.

JUDGE RIVERA: All right. So if I'm understanding your position is that if mixed reasons are provided - - - what we're calling mixed reasons; let's just put it that way - - - that a judge could find pretext but need not find pretext. Have I understood you?



1	MS. O'BOYLE: I think so, Your Honor, but it's a
2	little bit difficult because when we're talking about mixe
3	reasons, ultimately at stage two, the prosecutor has to
4	offer facially neutral reasons, and the prosecutor
5	certainly did that here. Then at stage three, that's when
6	the burden shifts to the defense to determine or to
7	prove and establish
8	JUDGE RIVERA: Let's just go with, the judge
9	hears what the prosecutor said and decides let's say
LO	the prosecutor gave two reasons. I'm going to make it
11	simple, two, one the judge says I think that that's
L2	pretext; the other is not
13	MS. O'BOYLE: I think it
L4	JUDGE RIVERA: is it your position then
L5	that the judge could decide that therefore that the judge
16	will accept the peremptory challenge because
L7	MS. O'BOYLE: No
18	JUDGE RIVERA: there's a nonpretext reason
L9	MS. O'BOYLE: No, Your Honor.
20	JUDGE RIVERA: Okay.
21	MS. O'BOYLE: I think if the court were to find
22	that in any way
23	JUDGE RIVERA: Okay.
24	MS. O'BOYLE: the prosecutor improperly
25	discriminated against a cognizable group, then the court's



1 duty in evaluating that evidence at step three would be to 2 find that that was an improper challenge. 3 JUDGE RIVERA: Thank you. 4 JUDGE PRITZKER: Counsel, then the prime facie 5 analysis that the court is making at A-360 is incorrect 6 because he's talking about excluding jurors solely on 7 account of the membership in that group, and you're 8 disagreeing with that, aren't you? 9 MS. O'BOYLE: Yes, Your Honor. 10 JUDGE PRITZKER: That was wrong, right? 11 MS. O'BOYLE: Yes. I think the court does 12 somewhat mischaracterize that, but overall the inquiry does 13 happen as it's supposed to in this case, and the court does 14 follow the three-step process. 15 Your Honor, I see that my time has lapsed, but if 16 I could just have lead to briefly address Juror K.C.? 17 CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Yes. 18 MS. O'BOYLE: Thank you, Your Honor. In this 19 20 view, K.C. is a suitable juror, but again, I think this

MS. O'BOYLE: Thank you, Your Honor. In this case, my opponent focuses on the fact that in the defense's view, K.C. is a suitable juror, but again, I think this really blurs that distinction and the critical distinction between striking a juror for cause and exercising a peremptory challenge, and the line of work that my opponent says was - - she characterized as evidence-based, before she got to any discussion of evidence-based, K.C. says that

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she works as an intake probation officer dealing with juveniles, and then she goes - - - she's actually more specific and says she works in intake diversion. The prosecutor absolutely had reason to doubt that she could set that aside, not just for sympathy reasons - - -JUDGE TROUTMAN: So the prosecutor had the right to not just accept labels of general, you're in law

JUDGE TROUTMAN: So the prosecutor had the right to not just accept labels of general, you're in law enforcement, and look at the particulars and decide if a nonracial reason - - - I'm not comfortable with this juror. You can exercise a peremptory challenge validly, correct?

MS. O'BOYLE: Absolutely, Your Honor. And at the time, the defense only said that there were other jurors, and it was not clear whether the defense was talking about that particular group or any juror who has been questioned thus far - - at this point, we're up to forty-three - - - had associations or identified with law enforcement, but law enforcement is such a broad group, and there is no other juror, prospective juror in this record that would have been similarly situated to K.C.

JUDGE TROUTMAN: But when the court is doing the general canvassing that is to elicit initial response, and then there's further inquiry - -

MS. O'BOYLE: Absolutely, Your Honor.

JUDGE TROUTMAN: - - to clarify?



MS. O'BOYLE: Yes. But the prospective juror that my opponent points to was D.L., who said he was a police officer, he was a delegate. That is certainly a significantly different day-to-day job than someone whose role day in and day out is to use these extra judicial factors to determine whether someone should be put through the court system at all.

JUDGE TROUTMAN: So again, the assessment of the prosecutor that the intake probation officer and the police officer are not the same, and in any event, this is not a juror for a valid reason that you wish to exercise a peremptory challenge, then it is valid to do so?

MS. O'BOYLE: Exactly, Your Honor. And so with respect to both C.C. and K.C., there was ample support in the trial record for the court's findings that these were not pretextual - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: So then what would a - - - given your position on K.C. and the comparison to D.L., what would be any perhaps any retort by the defense counsel to show that's pretext, other than showing, let's just say, a white person who also worked for probation was not peremptory?

MS. O'BOYLE: Well, Your Honor, it would matter that - - to use your hypothetical, the white person that they also worked for probation, it would matter what their



role was within probation because this juror is really uniquely situated as having worked in intake diversion.

That presents unique concerns, and I think the prosecutor and the court both appropriately recognized that as her line of work.

JUDGE RIVERA: So it boils down to the prosecutor perhaps thinking that this particular prospective juror, given the specific nature of their work, right, that's what you're focused on, might be defendant-friendly?

MS. O'BOYLE: Yes, Your Honor. Not just - - 
JUDGE RIVERA: Probation might find that

interesting, but I take it that that's what you're saying?

MS. O'BOYLE: It's actually not just defendantfriendly, Your Honor, but it would also be that they would
not be a great juror in any criminal case because the job
of the jurors is to consider the evidence before them, the
evidence presented to them in the courtroom, and someone
whose job it is to consider all of these things beyond the
courtroom, to determine whether juveniles should even be
placed before a judge - - that was the juror - - - those
were the juror's own words, there is significant concern
that they would not take into account those other factors
at the time they're doing what is supposed to be their job
of evaluating the evidence before them.

JUDGE RIVERA: So it's an odd position I think to



argue. I accept your point, but it is an odd position to say that someone who works for this kind of department would not follow the instructions of the court, but you only decide this based on what is presented in this courtroom and your findings here. I understand the difference between what goes on there and what goes on in their job - - -

MS. O'BOYLE: Absolutely, Your Honor.

JUDGE RIVERA: - - - at their office at probation.

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MS. O'BOYLE: Yes. But the - - - I think your point goes to more that a cause challenge would not have been appropriate for this juror because we could not have established that here, but to the extent the prosecutor had any doubt as to her ability to do that, even if K.C. genuinely thought that she could do that - - - she certainly has respect for the law as a self-identified member of law enforcement, but the fact that the prosecutor has reason to doubt that, she had the right to use that peremptory challenge because this was not a discriminatory - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: So then the only way to overcome that is someone who is not peremptory, who is in probation, a similar if not the exact same position, who is not of the same race of the person who is peremptory, right, is not



Thank you.

challenged - - -1 2 MS. O'BOYLE: That would be - -3 JUDGE RIVERA: - - - that is then the only way 4 you're going to be able to overcome this? 5 MS. O'BOYLE: I don't know that you could say 6 that that's the only way, Your Honor, because there would have to be - - - and again, we don't have a full record 7 8 here because of the lack of preservation from the defense. 9 It would depend on what arguments were raised, but none of 10 these were raised, and without those, there's no basis for this court to overturn the findings of the trial court. 11 12 If the court has no further questions, I'll rely 13 on my brief. Thank you. 14 CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Justice Pritzker might have 15 I wasn't sure. had one? 16 JUDGE PRITZKER: Just one quick one. 17 It just doesn't add up to me. This is a juvie probation 18 officer who does divergence. She wants to keep kids out of 19 trouble, okay? She tries. How would she be sympathetic to 20 a grown man that robbed somebody? 2.1 MS. O'BOYLE: Well, Your Honor - - -2.2 JUDGE PRITZKER: How does that make sense? 23 idea is it's a pretext. So it may have a little bit of

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sense?



facial validity, but how ultimately does it really make

MS. O'BOYLE: Well, Your Honor, it doesn't have to be related to this specific defendant, and Hecker specifically rejected that facts-of-the-case argument, saying it was overly restrictive. So it's not that Mr. Wright was a juvenile. That's not the issue, but the fact of working with juveniles as Justice Troutman pointed out earlier, similar to teachers who may often be struck by prosecutors - - 
JUDGE PRITZKER: To what?

MS. O'BOYLE: To teachers.

JUDGE PRITZKER: Oh.

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MS. O'BOYLE: There may be more professions just more inclined to sympathy that would not be suitable jurors in any criminal case. So it's not about being a suitable juror for this defendant, but just that the prosecutor had reason and not just because of concerns of sympathy, but again, because of her role in what she did every day, her method of analysis in considering those other factors, that's why she had the right to strike that juror.

CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Thank you.

MS. O'BOYLE: Thank you, Your Honors.

MS. LOPEZ: Your Honors, to protect the rights of all New Yorkers, criminal defendants, and just people who want to serve on a jury, their civil duty to serve, we need to be careful not to allow prosecutors on appeal now to



provide new step two reasons. We should carefully scrutinize the reasons that are provided, and if they are not supported by the record here, it's evidence of pretext, even if one of the reasons may not be under this court's determination, especially what we're - - -

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JUDGE GARCIA: But wouldn't that depend on what the basis for the other reasons being pretextual is?

Because if you're saying this reason, this juror had this reason, that juror had this reason, and another juror had, and reason A is a valid, nonpretextual reason, can't the people say, well, that in combination with these things is why we struck? If you're saying independently reason B is pretextual for some other reason, sure, then I think you can make that argument. So doesn't it really depend on what the basis for the challenge to that reason is?

Because if you're just saying other people had that reason, you know, other people had that and you didn't strike them, but you have a nonpretextual reason, that in combination with those things, makes that nonpretextual reason stronger?

MS. LOPEZ: Well, I'm not conceding that any of these reasons are not pretextual - - -

JUDGE GARCIA: I understand. I understand.

MS. LOPEZ: - - - but I think it's based on the view of this case, we just don't have that it was unevenly



applied, and the reason why we have this strong record against C.C. and all of his back and forth is because of this unequal questioning of a black juror when you compare it to how they questioned non-African-American panelists who fit that criteria. And I believe it's Flowers v. Mississippi, who says that this is concerning because it arms prosecutors with like what's happening now with the reasons to conceivably have these face-neutral reasons for black panelists while choosing to ignore, sort of distort the record on what non-African-American panelists could have responded in the same way. So that's the problem there, and that's very concerning in this case.

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But I also want to clarify that C.C. never said he had present-day feelings towards the police. Although the respondent said that his - - I would urge the court to look at the record. He did not say that.

And then if I could just briefly point - - - address the show-up point, if Your Honors have no questions as to Batson.

So this is a very short robbery case that involved a disguised perpetrator. He was wearing a red hood, covering all of his hair and hairline, and a mask covering most of all of his face, all the bottom. Really what's visible is the eyes, and against this backdrop, we have a suggestive show-up, and the verdict in this case

really hinged on this show-up that should have been suppressed.

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I'll focus on two suggestive factors, one, wearing that nonspecific red hoodie. This was a generic description that really the only thing there was that the person was wearing a red hoodie. There was no, like, specific color of red, no logo. It could have been anyone wearing a red hoodie, who was also black or dark-skinned, and both witnesses at the hearing admitted that their identifications were based on the red hoodie, itself.

Ram Sahoy (ph.), who was unable to make an identification both at the hearing and at trial, stated that her identification was not based on the face, but, quote, clothes he was wearing. And when pressed about the clothes, she says that's all I remember, just wearing a red hoodie. Guzman (ph.) also admits that his identification was based on this nonspecific hoodie. First thing he noticed when he saw Mr. Wright was the hoodie, the same red hoodie as in the store, and then further tainting Guzman's was the suggestive police remarks in combination with his observations at the scene. So not only does he hear that they stopped a guy at a location, but critically, a police officer in that car says, I think it's the guy, and then they go to that location only to see more suggestive They see a lot of police officers -



1	CHIEF	JUDGE	WILSON:	Thank	you.	Your	time	is	up.
2	MS. LO	PEZ:	Thank you	J.					
3	(Court	is ac	djourned)						
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1		CERTIFICATION						
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3	I, Cathy L. Kleinbart, certify that the foregoing							
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5	People of New	York v. Freddie T. Wright, No. 55 was						
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