1	COURT OF APPEALS
2	STATE OF NEW YORK
3	THE PEOPLE OF NEW YORK,
4	
5	Respondent,
6	-against- NO. 58
7	ANTWYNE LUCAS,
8	Appellant.
	20 Eagle Street
9	Albany, New York April 18, 2024
10	Before:
11	CHIEF JUDGE ROWAN D. WILSON
12	ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA ASSOCIATE JUDGE MICHAEL J. GARCIA
13	ASSOCIATE JUDGE MADELINE SINGAS ASSOCIATE JUDGE ANTHONY CANNATARO
14	ASSOCIATE JUDGE SHIRLEY TROUTMAN ASSOCIATE JUDGE CAITLIN J. HALLIGAN
	MODOCIMIE CODEL CMITEIN C. IMEETOM
15	Appearances:
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1 CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Next case on the calendar is 2 People v Lucas. 3 MR. NELSON: Good afternoon, Anders Nelson, 4 Appellate Advocates on behalf of the appellant, Antwyne 5 I'd like to reserve three minutes for rebuttal, Lucas. 6 please. 7 CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Yes. MR. NELSON: Defense counsel committed two 8 9 serious errors at Mr. Lucas' trial. Failing to make the 10 jury aware of prior testimony, casting doubt upon the complainants all important lineup identification and 11 12 consenting to the omission of a jury charge on the 13 questionable reliability of cross-racial identification. 14 JUDGE TROUTMAN: Are those mistakes impacted or 15 affected by the defendant testifying and putting himself at 16 the place? 17 MR. NELSON: No, Your Honor. There - - - this is 18 not - -19 JUDGE TROUTMAN: Why? 20 This is not a class - - - so this is MR. NELSON: 2.1 not a classic identification case, as Your Honor is noting. 2.2 Mr. Lucas did not say that he was not present during the 23 incident, during the robbery, as you would have in a normal 24 identification case. But Mr. Lucas was saying that he was



not the person that the complainant identified him to be.

1	He was not the gunman who committed the robbery. So the
2	identity matter
3	JUDGE RIVERA: Does that matter for purposes of
4	the charge not the char I'm sorry the
5	counts.
6	MR. NELSON: For purpose of
7	JUDGE RIVERA: Does it matter for purposes of th
8	counts? Did any of the counts turn on who actually held
9	the gun?
10	MR. NELSON: So the case turned on who actually
11	held the gun. The People proceeded under two theories, bu
12	they primarily presented the appellant Mr. Lucas as
13	gunman theory.
14	JUDGE HALLIGAN: But wasn't there also an
15	accomplice liability theory?
16	MR. NELSON: Yes. Yes. That's
17	JUDGE HALLIGAN: So what do we make of of
18	that and the impact on the consent to omit the charge?
19	MR. NELSON: So the evidence was vastly differen
20	of culpability between the if Mr. Lucas was
21	identified as the gunman, rather than the accomplice.
22	JUDGE CANNATARO: So the difference in defense -
23	
24	JUDGE GARCIA: Because that was your defense,
25	right?



JUDGE CANNATARO: - - - was the liability?

JUDGE GARCIA: But - - - but your defense, I thought, was I didn't know what was happening. The defendant, I didn't know what was happening. This person I was with took a gun out and shot. A big difference if the victim identifies him as the shooter or as the other person, right?

MR. NELSON: Precisely, yes.

JUDGE GARCIA: Yeah.

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MR. NELSON: Yes. So - - - so that is the core of the case and that's what the parties were arguing about. And if looking at the prosecution's summation as a whole, the prosecutor says, well, he's - - he could have been an accomplice, but really he was the gunman because that's what the complainant said. And the gunman, of course, was the one who walked up to the complainant, put a gun to his side, said, give me your property, took the property and punched the complainant.

The other guy, according to the prosecutor in his summation, is merely standing around. So he says, Mr.

Lucas was not this guy just standing around. He's the gunman. That's what the parties are fighting about throughout the entire case. And that's the primary issue before the jury.

JUDGE GARCIA: Counsel, the argument we just had



was a lot of back and forth on, do you have to know what's in the CJA - - - CJI instructions, right? Well, you have to know what's in there, the instruction that's in there. There's no issue in this case that defense counsel knew this was in there.

MR. NELSON: Precisely, because it's clear from the record that the court handed out a physical copy, a paper copy of the charges that it was considering at the charge conference - - -

JUDGE GARCIA: Um-hum.

MR. NELSON: - - - which is a common practice.

And it's the word - - - the word CJI appears over and over.

They're looking actually at the charges. When the court refers to this particular charge on cross-racial identifications, it says at the bottom of page 3, it's very clear that they're actually looking at this document. The footnote to that, which - - -

JUDGE GARCIA: And then the court says, you're not entitled to it, right?

MR. NELSON: Yes, the court gives its reasoning. So this is also a different record than in Mr. Watkins' case. It's the court says there was no expert and it says, so this wasn't in issue. But both of those - - - both of those rationales for not giving the charge are directly contradicted by the footnote to the CJI, which says - - -

which the parties had in front of them, and counsel should have been well aware of, which says an expert is not required - - -

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JUDGE TROUTMAN: So are you suggesting that he was aware of the charge, and he didn't take the time to consider what its import would be?

MR. NELSON: I - - - my argument is that counsel, in not asking for the charge, failed to - - - he may have recognized that the charge - - - I mean, he - - - they certainly discussed it. He seemed to recognize that it was available, but he apparently did not recognize that the court's rationales for not wanting to give the charge, for saying it was out, were incorrect and were actually contradicted by the footnote to this.

JUDGE GARCIA: But at the time, it's my understanding and correct me, of course, but I thought the appellate divisions were upholding judges who declined to give the charge for those reasons.

MR. NELSON: Correct, which is why - - - which - - - I mean, yes. That's what the appellate division decision in Boone basically says, and in Dingle and these other cases that were - - -

JUDGE GARCIA: So when the judge says essentially, this is the law and he agrees, the counsel agrees - - - yeah, you're - - - I'm not entitled to it,



accepting the law at the time. So this seems to be a case
where we really have to retroactively apply Boone, in terms
of being an ineffective not to ask, because you should have
gotten it. Because you weren't clearly entitled to it at
the time. In fact, I think counsel is right that under the
law, as it was, he probably wouldn't have gotten it.
MR. NELSON: I would disagree that counsel was
right because it, as has been pointed out, leave had been
granted in Boone. The case had been argued and submitted
for

JUDGE GARCIA: Okay. I understand that point.

But in Boone - - -

MR. NELSON: So - - - so counsel - - - so we have these cases like Turner, for instance, where Turner - - - this court acknowledged that there was maybe some contrary authority, but the standard that the court set forth is whether a reasonable defense attorney would have thought the argument not worth making, right? And that's the standard that should be applied here. Could an attorney - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: Was there expert testimony in Boone?

MR. NELSON: In Boone? In the - - - at the first trial, I - - - no. I do not believe so.

JUDGE GARCIA: But we have to apply Boone.



1 You'd have to say you should have seen Boone coming, right? 2 MR. NELSON: No, Your Honor. Counsel - - -3 JUDGE GARCIA: So then - - -MR. NELSON: - - - should have read this 4 5 footnote. Should have looked at the cases, right? 6 JUDGE GARCIA: But even with that footnote, the 7 Appellate Divisions were still saying, yes, it's 8 discretionary and the judge doesn't have to give it to you 9 for those reasons. 10 MR. NELSON: But if counsel had looked at those cases, right? Had done the bare bones minimum of going to 11 12 onto Westlaw or LexisNexis and seeing if there's any 13 history to those cases, it would have seen that in Boone 14 itself, leave had been granted. It had been, argued. 15 Dingle, right? 16 JUDGE GARCIA: You would have to anticipate Boone 17 is, I think, the point you're making. 18 MR. NELSON: No, you have to - - - counsel has to 19 know that there's an argument that's viable, that's 20 available for him to make, right? There's a viable 2.1 argument for him to say, these decisions are not 2.2 necessarily the law because the CJI is giving me that 23 there's no expert required. And that the only thing that 24 has to be an issue, right - - - counsel is not - - - is not



JUDGE SINGAS: Well, what if he doesn't want to make that argument? What if he says, I'm not going to focus on I.D., because I know my guy is going to get on the stand and say that he was there. So I'm going to go in another direction and talk about something different. He can't make that choice?

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MR. NELSON: I.D. was the primary issue in this case. Counsel said - - - counsel asked for - - -

JUDGE SINGAS: But the defendant placed himself there. So then it becomes a not - - - it becomes a what happened, not a who did it.

MR. NELSON: I - - - no, Your Honor. This - - - in this case, counsel convinced the court, and the court agreed rather willingly, that this was an identification case. It gave the one witness charge. This identification had so many problems with it. The identification of Mr. Lucas as the gunman, which was the critical issue, right? This a four-second robbery, after which the complainant can only describe two black men.

And in the complainant's testimony, when he's saying - - - when they're asking how light was it, you know? Could you see? This was kind of dawn. He says, I could identify their ethnicity, right? This is - - - there are - - there are clues throughout this record that the complainant, in fact, saw the race of the def - - - of the

two individuals who approached him. And those were the only things he could distinguish. In fact, in his 911 call right after the incident, he says, two black men. That's all I can describe.

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The gunman, the complainant says throughout, was wearing a white shirt. Mr. Lucas was wearing a blue shirt, right? This is undisputed. There were so many issues with this identification. The complainant focused on the gun. He described it as black - - - flat and black, not a revolver, right? This is a four second robbery. So he has no time to perceive what is going on during this robbery. He says, oh, this other guy made me feel - - -

JUDGE SINGAS: But that wasn't his defense though. He decided to defend it otherwise. He decided to say that he was at the scene. So all of those might - - - might have been a legitimate defense if he had said, you got the wrong guy. But that's - - -

MR. NELSON: He did say you got the wrong guy, because he said the complainant's testimony, that he identified the gunman in a lineup, was mistaken. That when the complainant allegedly looked at that lineup and said, that's the gunman, that was a mistaken identification, right? And so that's why this testimony by - - -

JUDGE HALLIGAN: Couldn't - - -

MR. NELSON: - - - the - - - the detective - - -



I'm sorry, just - -
JUDGE HALLIGAN: Go ahead, finish.

MR. NELSON: - - - by the detectiv

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MR. NELSON: - - - by the detective that the complainant wasn't too sure that he had identified the gunman in the lineup, which was never brought before the jury, was so meaningful and impactful.

JUDGE HALLIGAN: But couldn't the jury have concluded that even if your client was not the gunman, that he nonetheless was a willing accomplice. As opposed to, I think he testified he just, you know, went along, and did not anticipate that the robbery was going to take place. So wasn't there an alternative basis for liability, even if the identification of your client as the gunman had been rejected by the jury, which I assume is what the charge would go to?

MR. NELSON: Yes. Yes, but it was - - - it was vastly different quantity of and quality of evidence, right? That Mr. - - -

CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Your point, I think, is what Judge Garcia articulated a minute ago, which is that if he was the gunman, then your client's defense could not be believed.

MR. NELSON: Correct. Yes, exactly. So if he's the gunman, he is guilty. There is no question about that, right? But the - - - so that is why it's so important for



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CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Why the identification matters to you.

MR. NELSON: Why the identification matters.

Right. So when this court and other courts dealing with ineffectiveness have talked about, you know, the fairness of a trial, right? That's what we're really looking at.

We're looking at whether there was a reliable adversarial testing process here. Whether - - - whether the jury's truth-seeking function was facilitated by the presentation of the evidence.

And the jury was told that this complainant said

- - - that - - - by the complainant, I sat in the lineup.

I saw the gunman. They were told by the detective, he sat in the lineup. He saw the gunman and that was Mr. Lucas.

And they were never told that he said he wasn't sure if he was the gunman. I mean, it's the core - - - the most central issue in the case. And it certainly dev - - - was devastating to his defense, as well as the failure to give this charge.

JUDGE GARCIA: Counsel, to go back to something we were talking about earlier where you said, you know, Boone is up there. And there are these other signals. At what point in Boone's journey, or is it before, would you think that counsel has now the professional obligation to



ask for the charge, in anticipation of the law perhaps changing?

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MR. NELSON: I think leave being granted is certainly a signal that this court is considering changing the law, or advancing the law, or at least giving more clarity to the law, right? But counsel here had everything he needed before him, because the CJI said, you don't need an expert. And the court said, well, there's no expert, so I'm not giving it. And the CJI said, well, these other courts have said it should be given, if identification is an issue. And identification was an issue. The court agreed and said this is an identification case. It said, you know, that the identification is the primary disputed issue here, and it's what the parties were really contesting throughout.

CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Thank you.

MR. PEZZOLI: Good afternoon. May it please the court, Tim Pezzoli for the People. Defendant's case did not support the cross-racial identification instruction under the law in the Second Department at the time of trial. Nor would it support it under the law announced by this court in Boone. Additionally, a review of the record does not support defendant's claims of error and prejudice, but shows a competent trial attorney, who provided defendant with meaningful representation.



JUDGE TROUTMAN: Why wasn't he entitled to the charge?

MR. PEZZOLI: Because, Your Honor - - - well, legally or factually?

JUDGE TROUTMAN: Factually.

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MR. PEZZOLI: Factually, he wasn't entitled to it because this wasn't a - - - an identification issue in the sense of mistaken identity. The threshold issue here is how we look at the identification issue, because that will dictate what legal principles apply. The difference in identity issues was laid out by this court in People against Agina.

There in the context of an identity Molineux exception, where the defendant testified he was on scene but had not committed the acts he was accused of, this court held that the identity issue that was relevant was who did what, not whether defendant was on scene. And because defendant denied committing the acts, this court held that though there was no possibility of mistaken identity - - - but - - - but it was identity as far as who did what and was still at issue. And then so the Molineux evidence was properly - - -

CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Well, let me - - - let's back up a little bit. So that - - - and stop me at any point you disagree with me. The purpose of the cross-



1	racial identification instruction is based on science that
2	says people have witnesses percipient witnesses
3	have a difficulty identifying people of a different race.
4	MR. PEZZOLI: Correct.
5	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Okay. So here, the witness
6	is of a different race than the two assailants.
7	MR. PEZZOLI: Yeah. Yes.
8	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Right?
9	MR. PEZZOLI: Yeah.
10	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: So presumably, he might have
11	difficulty identifying one or the other, right?
12	MR. PEZZOLI: Potentially.
13	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: And so well, that's
14	what the instruction is about
15	MR. PEZZOLI: Right. Yes. That's yeah.
16	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: right? And the
17	question here is, which one of them had the gun.
18	MR. PEZZOLI: That is only part of the question -
19	
20	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Okay.
21	MR. PEZZOLI: Your Honor.
22	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: But but do well,
23	do you agree with the proposition that the defendant here
24	has no defense if he had the gun?
25	MR. PEZZOLI: I I do. Yes.



1	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Okay. And he has a defense
2	He might not win it, but he has a defense, if he doesn't
3	have the gun.
4	MR. PEZZOLI: He has a defense. But yes
5	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Okay.
6	MR. PEZZOLI: but so
7	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: So then the ability to
8	distinguish between which of two people of a different rac
9	has the gun, doesn't that depend on your ability to
10	recognize the person of the different race?
11	MR. PEZZOLI: I it could, but it also
12	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: But then why wouldn't you k
13	entitled to not entitled legally, why wouldn't you be
14	why wouldn't you be able to ask for that instruction
15	MR. PEZZOLI: You wouldn't be well, becaus
16	the identity issue that we have here is that after
17	defendant testified, there was no longer a question about
18	whether Fisol Father Roselli was robbed, whether
19	defendant was present, whether a gun was used, whether Pac
20	participated in the robbery, that the two men took the car
21	
22	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Right. But we need to know
23	which one of the two black men had the gun. It makes a
24	material difference



MR. PEZZOLI: Well - - -

1	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: to the defense.
2	MR. PEZZOLI: We don't need to know that, because
3	the identification issue here is who did what. And
4	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: But wait let me
5	MR. PEZZOLI: the victim was saying that
6	both men
7	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: let me back let
8	me back up a second. We need to know that because one way
9	he doesn't have a defense at all, and the other way he has
10	a potential defense.
11	MR. PEZZOLI: But the people's we need to
12	know that we it was defense that the that
13	Pack robbed the victim and defendant did not, but the issue
14	here is the credibility evaluation. It's not necessarily
15	just the gun; it's a credibility evaluation.
16	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: One way you don't have to
17	evaluate the credibility at all that is, if he has no
18	defense, you don't have to evaluate the credibility at all.
19	MR. PEZZOLI: Well, that's true.
20	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Right.
21	MR. PEZZOLI: And so in the in but
22	where he does have a defense it's still a credibility
23	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Sure.
24	MR. PEZZOLI: evaluation. It's you had two
25	different version of events you had the victim's and



1 you had the - - -2 JUDGE HALLIGAN: But that's what - -3 MR. PEZZOLI: - - - defense's. 4 JUDGE HALLIGAN: - - - the charge goes to, right? 5 The charge goes to helping the jury understand some of the 6 challenges in making cross-racial identifications, which -7 - - which will bear on how much you credit an 8 identification, right? 9 MR. PEZZOLI: But once defendant put himself on 10 scene, it became - - - it was no longer a mistaken identity. It was who did what, because the victim had said 11 12 repeatedly - - -13 JUDGE HALLIGAN: Well, to the Chief's point - -14 MR. PEZZOLI: - - - both men robbed me. 15 JUDGE HALLIGAN: - - - perhaps it's - - - it - -- it still is relevant because it - - - it determines 16 17 whether there is this defense available, that I was not a 18 willing participant or not. But let me ask you, if I can, 19 about the other error that defense counsel raises. 20 reason could there have been not to cross Det. Morales with 21 his prior inconsistent statement, that the victim wasn't 2.2 sure if the defendant was the gunman? 23 MR. PEZZOLI: Well, I think there's two 24 potential. I think, in response to that testimony, the - -



- the attorney cross-examined the detective and brought out

that the victim had told him that the person in the white shirt was the gunman, and that on the defense case, he made clear that defendant was not the person in the white shirt. So I believe he maybe went that route instead.

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And then if counsel did cross-examine Det.

Morales on whether he was certain - - - the victim was

certain that the defendant possessed the firearm, a simple

redirect from the people could address the matter with some

simple questions. Like, how many people did the victim say

did rob him? And was one of the - - - was the defendant

one of those people? How certain was the victim that both

men participated in the robbery? And this would give the

people a powerful last word on the matter and reinforce how

certain the victim was that he was robbed by both men. And

one of those men was the defendant.

And as far as the law under the cross-racial identification at the time in the Second Department, the Second Department routinely upheld these convictions in the absence of the instruction, because the reliability had not been put at issue and - - -

CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: In - - in single witness - - oh, sorry. Yours isn't a single witness case. Never mind.

MR. PEZZOLI: -- and the most reliable way to put that matter at issue under the case law was either



through expert testimony of the reliability of identification, or through cross-examination of the witness as to their background and experience, neither of which were present during defendant's trial. It - - - and it wasn't so much that the court just said there was no expert testimony here, so you're not getting it. He went on to say that the difference in race was not at issue during the trial. So he was saying that it wasn't an issue during the trial, so you wouldn't get this instruction.

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I know that the CJI is instructive on the issue, but the case law around in the Second Department at that time still bound the trial court. And to the extent a model instruction differs with binding precedent, it can't be ineffective for following the binding precedent over a model instruction. And counsel also says in the brief that we should ignore the 2011 cases, but - - - the pre-2011 cases in the Second Department - - but the - - - those were the cases that the post-2011 cases were citing and the law that they were applying.

And as for the - - - - - the contention that proper trial preparation requires consideration of a pending leave grant, would require the court - - the counsel to predict the outcome of the pending case, considering a novel question of law. And it's not so much novel that the CJ - - that the cross-racial



1	identification instruction was in issue, but which way this
2	court would come out on the issue because there were
3	multiple states
4	JUDGE RIVERA: It was already set for re-
5	argument. So you know
6	MR. PEZZOLI: it was
7	JUDGE RIVERA: you know your split, so you
8	got a 50/50 chance that it's going to come out favorably to
9	the defendant.
10	MR. PEZZOLI: That's correct, Your Honor. But
11	then also, the judge just said, well, you're not getting
12	it. So at that point, if you think that the it
13	the law
14	JUDGE RIVERA: Well, does does
15	MR. PEZZOLI: if you're familiar with the
16	case law
17	JUDGE RIVERA: doesn't counsel object
18	anyway? Doesn't counsel, all the time, when a when a
19	court holds against them on a request
20	MR. PEZZOLI: They can.
21	JUDGE RIVERA: can I take an exception or
22	the court may even say your exception is noted for the
23	_
24	MR. PEZZOLI: They
25	JUDGE RIVERA: record and move on?



1	MR. PEZZOLI: they do and they are
2	and they and sometimes
3	JUDGE RIVERA: Well, you don't raise it
4	MR. PEZZOLI: they don't.
5	JUDGE RIVERA: you've lost potentially your
6	appealable issue, no?
7	MR. PEZZOLI: Potentially. But it's it's
8	still if he's familiar with the case law, he knows
9	that he's not entitled
10	JUDGE TROUTMAN: So are you
11	MR. PEZZOLI: to it.
12	JUDGE TROUTMAN: saying that although the
13	charge was in the CJI as something that an attorney could
14	request, because there was discretion for the court to deny
15	the charge, defense doesn't have to ask for it no matter
16	what?
17	MR. PEZZOLI: I don't know about no I'm not
18	saying, it no matter what, but I'm saying in this case, it
19	was not ineffective not to ask for it or not to push back
20	on the trial judge, because the defendant
21	JUDGE TROUTMAN: Is that the credibility claim -
22	the credibility claim?
23	MR. PEZZOLI: No. That that's the
24	instruction claim.
25	JUDGE TROUTMAN: No. Because you you were



saying that he put himself there - - -1 2 MR. PEZZOLI: Yes. 3 JUDGE TROUTMAN: So cred - - -4 MR. PEZZOLI: - - - that's correct, Your Honor. 5 JUDGE TROUTMAN: Okay. 6 MR. PEZZOLI: So it - - - cred - - - it becomes 7 an issue of credibility. And that was the point of the 8 people's submission was basically that it was a credibility 9 The prosecutor said, I'm not saying it doesn't -10 - - what I'm saying is, is it doesn't matter if you believe the guy had the gun or even if Pack had the gun, because 11 12 we've proven our case both ways and that's on page 8631. 13 So the - - - it wasn't just a throw away, hey. 14 It was absolutely from the beginning of the case until the 15 end of the case, the prosecution's theory of liability was 16 the theory of accessorial liability. And I think the 17 defendant's argument rests on the assumption that the 18 cross-racial identification instruction applies to all 19 identity issues, including non-misidentification issues 20 like we have here, so long as the witness is of a different 21 race than the - - -22 JUDGE HALLIGAN: So - - -23 MR. PEZZOLI: - - - defendant. 24 JUDGE HALLIGAN: - - - does this court's decision 25 in Boone make any difference to your position?



1	MR. PEZZOLI: No. It doesn't, Your Honor,
2	because once the defendant testified, it took the issue of
3	mis identity
4	JUDGE HALLIGAN: So your view
5	MR. PEZZOLI: away.
6	JUDGE HALLIGAN: is that even post Boone, there
7	would not be a more robust, ineffective assistance claim?
8	MR. PEZZOLI: It may be more robust, but I don't
9	think he would be ineffective. I think I don't thin
10	it would be ineffective.
11	JUDGE HALLIGAN: And that's because of your view
12	about whether identification is really an issue or for
13	- for some other reason?
14	MR. PEZZOLI: Whether misidentification
15	JUDGE HALLIGAN: Yes. That's what I mean.
16	MR. PEZZOLI: is an issue. Yes. It's
17	- and all the people's evidence supported the theory that
18	the people put forward from the very beginning and
19	defendant's argument
20	JUDGE RIVERA: So if you're a charge
21	that might allow the jury to view the evidence as perhaps
22	not reasonable the providing the lack of reasonable
23	or I'm sorry establishing reasonable doubt, that
24	the witness may be wrong about who was holding the gun and



therefore perhaps deciding the defendant's version.

1 think that was not the kind of charge that defense counsel 2 should have requested? 3 MR. PEZZOLI: I don't think it would have helped 4 the situation here because it became about credibility. 5 Because it became that the defendant's story didn't - - -6 was not credible versus the victim's story. 7 defendant's story that he - - -JUDGE RIVERA: Well, yes. But the - - - yes the 8 9 point of that is, the victim saying this is the person who 10 held the gun. 11 MR. PEZZOLI: Right. And then - - - but then the 12 defendant - - -13 JUDGE RIVERA: All right. He's trying to suggest 14 to the jury, or through the charge perhaps, suggesting to 15 the jury that the witness may absolutely believe that, but 16 they may be mistaken. 17 MR. PEZZOLI: And but that also describes a - -18 JUDGE RIVERA: Which is a different kind of 19 credibility issue. It's not that you find the witness 20 incredible, that they're not credible. It's just that they 2.1 are mistaken. 2.2 But that only - - - that only pays MR. PEZZOLI: 23 attention to defendant saying I was not the one who had the 24 gun. He then went on to say, I wrestled with Pack who had 25 the gun.



JUDGE RIVERA: Yes.

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MR. PEZZOLI: I wrestled him off. And then I was forced at gunpoint into the car. And then I forced him to pull the car over. And then it also requires the - - - to ignore the facts of the mishap - - - the apprehension, and the flight there from, and the video that showed them in no apparent disharmony as they walked through the streets.

JUDGE RIVERA: Well, those all may be wonderful points to make to the jury, right, about why they shouldn't believe his version. Which is different from whether or not you should have the charge, so that the jury can factor in about whether or not they should or shouldn't believe his version. The fact that the victim may be incorrect. Believe it, but may be incorrect that defendant was holding the gun. Because if they believed the defendant wasn't holding the gun, or at least it's not the reasonable doubt that the defendant was holding the gun, maybe the rest of the story now looks a little bit more believable. Let me put it that way.

MR. PEZZOLI: I don't think that that - - - I don't think the cross-racial identification instruction cures the issue in this case. And I don't think it would have done that here.

CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Yeah. I thought I understood your position at the very beginning, which I



	don't think you budged from, is that if this case were
2	being tried today and counsel had asked for the cross-
3	racial identification charge, he would not be entitled to
4	get it.
5	MR. PEZZOLI: He would not be he
6	well, he would be under Boone, just because he asked for
7	it. But the facts of it would it would not be
8	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Oh. But you don't bu
9	I thought even under Boone you only get it when
10	identification is at issue.
11	MR. PEZZOLI: I
12	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: I mean, you don't get it in
13	a case where it's not.
14	MR. PEZZOLI: That's well, yeah. Well,
15	then yes. Then that's correct, Your Honor. Yes. And I
16	misspoke.
17	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: I thought that was how you
18	started your argument, actually
19	MR. PEZZOLI: Correct. And I I
20	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: is that he's not
21	entitled to the charge
22	MR. PEZZOLI: you're right.
23	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: even today.
24	MR. PEZZOLI: You're right. He would not be
25	entitled to the charge factually. He would not be entitled



to the charge today, because he did not put misidentification at issue. It was not the issue that the jury was evaluating in determining the ultimate decision in this case, of whether or not the defendant participated in the robbery of the priest - - - of the victim.

Defendant's claims don't withstand scrutiny because his trial counsel properly assessed the facts of the case and presented a well-tailored defense with a valid litigation strategy. And because counsel's actions were not error and present no prejudice, if there are no further questions, the respondent respectfully asks that the judgment be affirmed.

CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Thank you.

MR. NELSON: Just getting back to this issue of, you know, was this an identification case and how did I - - how did identification play in here, given that Mr. Lucas put himself on the scene. An identification is always a confluence of two things, or at least two things. It's a recognition of another person, but then they don't say, who do you recognize? And then stop at that. They say, where do you recognize them from? And in this case, they asked - - specifically, the complainant was asked what - - which one was he, right? So it wasn't just that he said, I recognize him from being - -

JUDGE RIVERA: So - - -



1 MR. NELSON: - - - there. 2 JUDGE RIVERA: - - - fair enough. But perhaps, 3 once Boone was granted, that that was not an obvious 4 nuance; is that possible? 5 MR. NELSON: Not under this record that we have 6 here, when counsel said this is an I.D. case. Asked for the - - - first, he asked for the one witness charge, but 7 8 then he - - - the you know, when the court said I'll give 9 the witness plus, he didn't object to that. So - - -10 JUDGE SINGAS: Under the acting in concert 11 charge, if a jury, and we presume the jury follows the 12 charge, does it matter who was holding the gun - - -13 MR. NELSON: No. 14 JUDGE SINGAS: - - - if the jury follows the 15 judge's instruction on that, the CJI instruction? 16 MR. NELSON: No. The jury would have had to have 17 found that Mr. Lucas shared the Mr. Pack's intent and that 18 he, you know, there's a long list - - -19 JUDGE SINGAS: Right. 20 MR. NELSON: - - - importuned, aided, et cetera. 2.1 JUDGE SINGAS: So again, I guess, I go back to 2.2 the question that I asked in the earlier argument that 23 troubles me, that we're going to call someone ineffective 24 and mark them as ineffective for their entire career, based 25



on a trial strategy. Maybe we don't know. Why isn't it

better to just allow the defense attorney to come in and 1 2 tell us what he or she was thinking? Maybe they wanted to 3 focus on the accessorial liability, you know, not the 4 identification. They're the ones who are in the best 5 position, viewing the jury, looking at the witnesses. 6 just a little loathe to say that someone's ineffective, 7 especially when Boone wasn't even decided yet. 8 MR. NELSON: This court -9 JUDGE SINGAS: And especially in a case like this 10 where he does place himself at the scene. 11 So the entire defense from beginning MR. NELSON: 12 to end was, he was there, but he didn't do it. He didn't 13 have the gun. So I don't see how it's strategic to not 14 tell the jury, and not cross-examine, and impeach when the 15 prosecution presents a case. He said he had the gun and 16 you have, in the hearing minutes, him saying, well, he 17 wasn't sure that - - -18 JUDGE SINGAS: You're still - - -19 MR. NELSON: - - - that he had the gun. 20 JUDGE SINGAS: - - - you're still - - - you can

JUDGE SINGAS: - - - you're still - - - you can still argue the identification factors. Here, we're talking about the cross-racial identification.

MR. NELSON: Right. So - - -

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JUDGE SINGAS: So you know, you can still explore that. And they did explore that.



MR. NELSON: The - - - there would have been a particular - - - particularly easy way to argue the cross-racial identification issue here, given that, number one, as I've already noted, there was this racialized kind of element to the description. It was two black men, and he said I could identify their ethnicity, right?

JUDGE SINGAS: No. I'll give you it would have been better for them, but I'm just saying, does it rise to the level of being ineffective?

MR. NELSON: Yes, because the question is, can you identify a strategy? The people, for the first time standing up here saying, maybe he would have gone with the white shirt. I believe that's say - - - pointing to the fact one of the many, many at issues here with the I.D., that Mr. Lucas was wearing a white shirt, which was a key factor of the description during the lineup. They said, well, it was covered with a sheet, that was in dispute. That would have played - - - the testimony that - - - the impeachment testimony that was not brought out would have played perfectly with that defense. It would have harmonized it, as would the cross-racial identification charge.

Counsel could have gotten up and said, look, you're going to hear that some people have more difficulty making an identification, when someone is of a different



race. And this idea that this was a credibility contest is just - - - it's not correct. It's not a correct way of looking at this case. Counsel said, this was - - - he was mistaken. He said, I'm not accusing him of lying.

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He's not accusing a priest of lying. That didn't

- - - that wouldn't make any sense. He's saying that he
- - that he was mistaken. And he - - - and when you have a
four-second robbery that's on video that the guy gives the
wrong, allegedly the wrong shirt color, right? That he's
focused on the gun, that he - - - he's saying, I'm so
stressed out. He can't remember whether they have hats on
or not. He can't remember anything but two black men, one
wearing a white shirt. You have a perfect case, you have a
perfect scenario to argue all these identification factors,
say he mixed these two men up, right? He couldn't - - he
was limited in his ability to perceive the cross-race
effect - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: And all of that goes to the defense. Not only that, I didn't have the gun, but I am not a willing participant in this robbery.

MR. NELSON: Precisely.

JUDGE RIVERA: It's not just about I didn't have the gun.

MR. NELSON: Precisely. Counsel had a great argument to make.



1	JUDGE RIVERA: The fact of not having the gun is
2	to support the actual defense, which is
3	MR. NELSON: Yes.
4	JUDGE RIVERA: I was not a willing
5	participant.
6	MR. NELSON: The Complainant has four seconds in
7	which to perceive the actions of the other man, who again,
8	the prosecutor said just standing around during the
9	incident, right? And said, that's not Mr. Lucas.
10	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Thank you, Counsel.
11	(Court is adjourned)
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CERTIFICATION I, Stephanie Huppert, certify that the foregoing transcript of proceedings in the Court of Appeals of The People of New York v. Antwyne Lucas, No. 58 was prepared using the required transcription equipment and is a true and accurate record of the proceedings. Stephanie Huppert Signature: Agency Name: eScribers Address of Agency: 7227 North 16th Street Suite 207 Phoenix, AZ 85020 Date: April 24, 2024

